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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the "timing" of equity issues. We seek to find the factors 
that "drive" the time series variation in the equity issuance activity. Our main 
motivation is to see whether the Initial Public Offerings, Seasoned equity offerings 
and Takeover activity financed with equity move together. Our second motivation is 
to see whether certain individual factors affect the timing of the three corporate 
activities. We focus our research effort on whether business conditions, adverse 
selection costs and "sentiment timing" can explain the variation in equity issue 
activity across time. 
Economic conditions have a significant effect on equity issuance activity. 
More firms make an IPO and more capital is raised from IPOs during the upturn of 
the business cycle relative to the downturn of the cycle. The impact of economic 
conditions on the SEO volume is also positive but marginally significant. In addition, 
more bidders use equity to finance a takeover bid during the upturn of the business 
cycle. 
The improvement of business conditions has a significant effect on the 
magnitude of adverse selection costs associated with the announcement of a SEO and 
a takeover bid that is financed with equity. During the upturn of the business cycle 
the market reacts less adversely to the announcement of these actions while in the 
downturn of the cycle the announcement of the SEO and the equity financed bid is 
accompanied by more negative returns. Underpricing for IPOs however is not lower 
during the upturn of the business cycle. 
Firms that make an IPO, a SEO and a takeover bid that is financed with 
equity are associated with significant adverse share price movements which impose 
significant indirect costs to the issuers and bidders. This thesis investigates how these 
costs affect the timing of the three corporate actions. The magnitude of adverse 
selection costs has a significant effect only on the volume of Seasoned equity 
offerings with more firms making a rights issue during periods when the 
announcement of the recent rights issues is accompanied by less negative returns. 
IPO volume is not higher when the average first day returns of the recent IPOs are 
low and the percentage of bidders that use equity to finance the bid over all bidders is 
not higher when the drop of the share price of the bidder on the announcement of the 
recent equity financed bids is smaller. 
It has been widely documented that firms which make an IPO, a SEO and a 
takeover bid that is financed with equity offer inferior returns to their shareholders in 
the post-issue period. Cognitive bias and deliberate timing of these actions at periods 
when share prices are irrationally high are the best explanations that the literature 
has provided for the underperformance. We find a significant underperformance of 
SEOs and bidders that use equity to finance the bid and IPOs if the high first day 
returns are not included. These findings suggest that the above firms are overvalued 
at the time these action take place but does not address whether variations in volume 
across time are driven by variation in the degree of overvaluation. We find that only 
variations in IPO volume are driven by variations in the degree of overvaluation. 
Periods when more capital is raised from IPOs are periods when the average IPO is 
more overvalued than IPOs that go public in periods when IPO activity slows down. 
9 
Variations in the SEO volume and the equity financed takeover activity are not 
driven by overvaluation exploitation. 
Time series regressions on the amount raised from IPOs and SEOs reveals the 
significant role of investors' sentiment on the timing of equity issues. We use 
financial analysts earnings forecasts as a proxy for market sentiment and we find that 
more capital is raised from IPOs during periods when analysts' earnings forecasts for 
the recent IPOs are more optimistic. We also find that more capital is raised from 
SEOs during periods when analysts' earnings forecasts for the recent SEOs are more 
overoptimistic. 
Previous empirical studies suggest that firms time the issues at the peak of 
their profitability. Our evidence from financial analysts earnings forecast revisions 
reveal that SEO firms time the issue after a period of high earnings growth and prior 
to a small deterioration in earnings while IPO firms time the issue at the beginning or 
during a period of sustainable earnings growth and not at the peak of their 
profitability. 
10 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1. RESEARCH MOTIVATION AND OBJECTIVE OF THE THESIS. 
During the life-time of every company there are some important decisions to 
be made with regard to its future growth. Almost all companies start as a very small 
private company and gradually they begin to grow. In the beginning of the 
company's life, its growth can be funded by additional investments from the 
entrepreneurs or from retained earnings. At some point however, the demand for 
investment may exceed the financial capabilities of its owners or the company's 
profitability. Then, important decisions have to be made in order to acquire the funds 
that are necessary to finance further development. Borrowing money from creditors is 
an option but another one is the issue of additional equity capital. At the early stages, 
the new capital is provided by the owners of the firm. At some point however, as the 
size of the firm increases and the need for investments intensifies, the owners may 
not be able to provide the capital needed. 
A company that is held by a small number of investors and has reached that 
point can raise new capital by offering new shares to the public. An Initial public 
Offering is the first attempt to raise capital from outside investors. With the Initial 
Public Offer, shares are offered to the public and the company becomes listed on a 
Stock exchange where its shares begin to be traded. There are a lot and important 
benefits for a firm that makes an IPO. By going public, a firm can raise capital that 
can be used to fund the growth of the company, a growth that perhaps could not be 
funded by borrowings from a bank. It can provide an opportunity to original 
shareholders to liquidate their, investment who can sell a part or all of their 
shareholdings in the company through the IPO. Another important benefit is that by 
going public, the company increases its bargaining power with clients and creditors. 
Banks are aware that after the listing, firms increase the number of alternative 
sources of finance and they have to be competitive and offer cheaper credit to the 
newly listed firms in order to attract their custom. Going public increases the 
customer awareness of the company and may result to higher 
- 
sales if customers 
prefer to deal with a listed company as a more serious entity relative to an unknown 
private firm 'that is less rn accountable and -. with less - constraints on its managers' 
discipline. 
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All the benefits of going public however do not come without a cost. The 
most obvious of the costs is the direct costs which include the underwriters' fees, 
stock exchange fees, auditing fees, etc. The underwriter plays a vital part in the 
Initial public offering. It advises the firm on the regulations and the ways of going 
public, it participates in the pricing of the offer and helps to market and sell the issue 
to investors. It also guarantees, in some cases, that the issuer will receive all the 
money from the issue even if some part of it might not be sold. 
Important indirect costs also could act as a deterrent from going public. Every 
listed company has to conform with the stock exchange regulations. Every vital piece 
of information that can be used by investors to determine the present and future value 
of the company has to be promptly disclosed to the public. Among those pieces of 
information are details about ongoing and planned projects and other information that 
can be used by competitors to understand the managerial and marketing strategy of 
the public company and help rival firms to establish a more efficient competition. In 
same cases, these costs may be big and prevent a firm from going public but these 
costs are very difficult to be measured and quantified and therefore may be of lesser 
importance. 
One of the most publicised indirect costs of going public is the cost created by 
selling the shares at a price that is below their intrinsic value. Firms that make an IPO 
have large positive returns in the first day that the shares are traded. These large first 
day returns represent a big cost to the issuer since the underpricing is an average of 
10 to 15% with big variations from country to country and issuers characteristics. A 
large number of explanations have been proposed for these large first day returns and 
they are extensively analysed in the thesis. However, no matter what is the factor that 
causes such big returns, the bottom line is that the company would benefit if these 
returns are smaller under the assumption that the lower first day returns are caused by 
pricing the issue at a price closer to the one that investors are willing to pay. 
After the Initial public offer, a firm may reach a point when the funding of 
future projects requires additional equity issues. In such cases the firm can make a 
Seasoned Equity Offer. New shares are issued and offered 
. 
to investors. In some 
counties such as the US, these new shares are offered to the general public that 
expresses an interest in buying the issue. In the UK and other countries the method 
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of Seasoned Equity Offering is different. Regulation requires that the new shares 
must be offered first to existing shareholders who have two options: either to 
exercise their right to buy the new shares that are allocated to them or not exercise 
their rights and sell their rights to the market to an investor that wants to buy the 
shares. 
Such an equity issue has advantages and costs similar to those associated with 
an IPO. It can provide a cheaper source of-financing a project. It also creates less 
constraints on the management relative to debt which has to be serviced regularly by 
fixed interest payments. The costs of a SEO include underwriters fees who organise, 
market and sometimes guarantee the complete sell of the issue. Disclosure of the use 
of the proceeds of the issue may reveal to competitors the firm's plans for the future 
or its financial state resulting to a release of vital information to competitors adding 
to the costs of the SEO. 
As with IPOs there are important indirect costs associated with a SEO. The 
announcement of a SEO is accompanied by a drop on the share price of the issue. 
This drop is 3% on average in the US and can create a loss of market value that for 
some large issuers can wipe out a large portion of the issue proceeds. The proposed 
explanations for these adverse price movement are numerous and are discussed in 
detail later on. Managers would prefer to see the smaller price decline on the 
announcement of the issue or even a positive market response. 
Firms that need to expand have two available routes: First, they can make 
plans to expand "internally" by, investing in their own production lines. A second 
way of expansion is offered by mergers and acquisitions. An acquisition of another 
company has important advantages. It provides a quicker and sometimes a more 
efficient way of expanding relative to internal expansion especially into new markets 
and new products. The target firm's expertise can be used and make profits is shorter 
periods than the, internal expansion. An acquisition however is not a pain free 
exercise since there are disadvantages as well. 
-The most important of them seems to 
be the overestimation of the potential gains that can arise from, the acquisition. The 
bidder may overpay for a target and, the acquisition may. never realise its potential 
destroying bidders' shareholders value. i. 
_ 
.. 
ý.. i' 
.. ._ 
'- 
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When a public company announces a takeover bid for another company that 
bid has an impact on the bidder's share price. The market reaction on the 
announcement of a takeover bid is affected by numerous factors that are related to the 
profitability and the synergies that could arise from the proposed takeover. What the 
literature supports however is that takeover bids which are financed with equity have 
significantly lower returns than takeover bids that are financed with other means of 
payment. That negative reaction, even though is not of the magnitude of the negative 
reaction to the announcement of a SEO, is an indirect cost that can add to the costs of 
the acquisition. 
The first objective of this thesis is to gain a greater understanding of the 
market response to the announcement of a seasoned equity offering or a takeover bid 
that is financed with equity and the large first day returns observed for the Initial 
public offerings. By uncovering what drives these large price movements we can get 
useful insights of what are the management's incentives behind the timing of these 
issues at certain periods of time. 
The second objective of this thcsis is to try and evaluate the impact these 
significant price movements, which create extra costs to the issuer, have on the 
timing of equity issues. Firms that make an IPO or a SEO or a takeover bid that is 
financed with equity can benefit if these large adverse share price reactions are 
minimised. What is the role of these adverse selection costs and how important they 
are in the timing of equity issues is not documented internationally. Do managers 
really care about how large these costs are or do they consider them as a by-product 
of their actions with no significant influence are among the questions that will be 
answered in this thesis. 
Firms that make an IPO, a SEO or a takeover bid that is financed with equity 
can obviously benefit if the price of the issue is high. If the issue price is high, more 
capital can be raised, or a smaller portion of the firms ownership will be sold to 
acquire the necessary proceeds to fund the investments and in the case of a takeover 
that is financed with equity, the target can be. bought 'cheaper., It is widely 
documented in the literature that firms that make an IPO and a SEO are bad 
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performers after the issue takes place. There are also evidence that bidders 
underperform after the issue and that bidders that use equity to finance the bid have 
significantly worst performances that bidders that use cash offers. The most accepted 
reason behind the underperformance is that these actions took place around periods 
when their current share prices were higher than their intrinsic values. 
The third objective of this thesis is to investigate the post-issue performance 
of issuers and bidders because we can draw significant conclusions about the true 
value of the share prices of the issuers and the bidders at the time of the issues and 
the bids from the way that these firms perform. The literature suggests that issuers are 
overvalued when they make the issue. If equity issue volume is driven by 
overvaluation exploitation then more equity issues and more equity financed bids 
should be made when firms can achieve higher prices for their offers. Such an action 
will result to firms that made these activities in heavy volume periods to have worst 
performances than the firms that made the activities in lights volume periods. The 
comparison of the post-event performances across "intense" or "tranquil" periods 
will reveal whether managers deliberately exploit overvaluation. 
Although there are evidence that issuers time the issue when their share prices 
are above the fundamentals, there is little consensus as to what "persuades" investors 
to buy these overpriced issues. Obviously when the market sentiment is favourable, 
prices are bound to be higher and investors may be willing to participate in the new 
equity issues more eagerly. The market sentiment however is a factor that can not be 
quantified with accuracy. Therefore, researchers have to use proxies to "measure" the 
market sentiment. One of the factors that can act as a proxy for market sentiment is 
market sentiment is the financial analysts' earnings forecasts. Whenever the' 
favourable, analysts should forecast higher earnings and when market conditions are 
gloomy earnings forecasts should be lower. The thesis makes extensive use of 
financial analysts earnings forecasts in our attempt to find how the timing of IPOs 
and SEOs is affected by the market sentiment. 
The fourth objective of the" thesis is to investigate the effect of financial 
analysts earnings forecast on the timing of Initial Public Offerings and Seasoned 
equity offerings in the UK. Financial analysts' earnings forecasts should reflect and 
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to some extent affect the market sentiment. If equity issuers exploit investors' 
sentiment then the use of financial analysts' earnings forecasts can be used to 
uncover such a relation. 
The UK market is relative understudied relative to the number of studies that 
investigate the timing of equity issues in the US. By using a different data set we are 
able to test the alternative hypothesis that have been proposed as driving forces 
behind the time series variation of equity issues volume and in takeover activity. We 
pursue out investigation by looking at the three corporate action in a unified 
framework. This thesis has the benefit of testing whether the same factors drive the 
IPO, SEO and takeover activity in the UK. We felt the need to pick up the pieces and 
complete the puzzle of equity volume variation by testing the effect of three main 
factors on the timing of equity issues: the adverse selection costs, overvaluation 
exploitation and financial analysts' earnings forecasts optimism. Indeed, the final and 
most important objective of this thesis is to see whether the timing aspect of the 
equity issue decision is driven by the same factors whether the issue is made for an 
IPO or a SEO or a takeover bid. 
2. OVERVIEW AND STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
The thesis contains ten chapters. Chapter 1 introduces the thesis and describes 
our research motivation and the structure of the thesis. Chapter 2 makes a reasonable 
comprehensive review of the empirical findings of other studies concerning the 
behaviour of Initial Public Offerings, Seasoned Equity Offerings and Takeover bids. 
It describes the effects that the IPOs, SEOs and takeover bids have on the share price 
of the issuer and evaluates the proposed explanations that can account for such big 
share price movements. We also take a look at what the literature has documented 
with respect to the long run performance of equity issuers and takeover bidders as 
well as the reasons why these firms perform badly after the issues. Finally we 
describe what factor can contribute to the time series variation. in the volume of 
equity issues with emphasis on the effect that adverse selection costs, overvaluation 
exploitation and business conditions have on the timing of equity issues. The chapter 
2 concludes with a review of previous empirical work on the timing of UK equity 
issues. 
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Chapter 3 explains the importance of financial analysts earnings forecasts in 
today's world stock markets. It reviews previous studies that have investigated the 
accuracy of financial analysts' earnings forecasts around equity issues and the 
influence financial analysts' earnings forecasts have on the timing of equity issues. 
Chapter 3 concludes with a review of how financial analysts' forecasts are affected 
by the announcement of a SEO or a takeover bid. 
In Chapter 4 we describe the data used, the data collection methods and the 
methodology followed in this thesis. The sources used to acquire details about the 
companies that made an IPO, SEO and takeover bids are mentioned. We analyse the 
methods we follow to calculate first day returns for IPOs and abnormal 
announcement period returns for SEOs and Takeover bids as well as abnormal long- 
run performances. In addition, we explain how financial analysts adjusted or 
unadjusted earnings forecasts errors and earnings forecast revisions are calculated. 
Chapter 5 is the first empirical chapter of our thesis. We investigate the 
timing of UK Initial Public offerings with special emphasis on the effect that the 
magnitude of the first day returns and business conditions have on the volume of 
IPOs. We also report our findings on Post-IPO performance which is very useful in 
our attempt to test whether IPO volume in the UK is driven by overvaluation 
exploitation. 
Chapter 6 investigates the timing of Rights issue activity in the UK. The 
effects of business conditions on rights issues activity and on adverse selection costs 
are discussed. Chapter 6 also examines what are the forces behind the time series 
variation in UK SEO activity and seeks to find whether the magnitude of adverse 
selection costs plays a significant role in the timing of rights issues. The last part of 
chapter 6 reports our findings on the post-announcement performance of rights 
. 
issuers and whether rights issuance activity is driven by overvaluation. 
In Chapter 7 the centre of attention is the takeover bids that are financed with 
equity. We report what impact the announcement of a takeover bid has on the share 
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price of the bidder and especially the differences among bids that are financed with 
equity and cash. Since takeover bids financed with equity are associated with 
significant adverse selection costs we investigate how these costs are affected by the 
business cycle and how they affect the timing of equity financed takeover bids. As 
with the previous two chapters, chapter 7 concludes with the evidence on the long 
run performance of bidders partitioned by the method of payment and tries to find 
whether equity financed takeover activity is driven by overvaluation exploitation. 
Chapter 8 is the first chapter where we use financial analysts' earnings 
forecasts to see their effect on the timing of Initial Public Offerings. We present 
details about the behaviour of analysts in forecasting the earnings of UK listed 
companies. We then limit our focus on the firms that make an IPO and see how 
accurate are analysts when they forecast the earnings of recently public firm followed 
by an investigation of what effect analysts' optimism has on the timing of IPOs. In 
the last part of chapter 8 we look at how analyst view that the profitability of IPOs 
will behave after the listing by looking at the analysts' earnings forecast revisions in 
the months following the IPO. 
Financial analysts earnings forecasts are also used in chapter 9 where the 
centre of attention is the firms that make a rights issue in the UK. We see how 
accurate are analysts in forecasting the earnings of rights issuers in the years before 
and after the issue and what effect the magnitude of their forecast errors has on the 
timing of UK seasoned Equity offers. The impact that the announcement of a rights 
issue has on the profitability of the issuer concludes chapter 9. 
Chapter 10 concludes the thesis by providing a survey of the main empirical 
findings of our study and analyses what are the contributions of the thesis and their 
significance. Most important it summarises on the main objective of the thesis which 
is to see whether the timing of the three corporate activities exhibits a degree of 
unification. Future research areas that can further strengthen the legality of our 
findings conclude the thesis. 
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3. LIMITATIONS TO THE STUDY 
A number of limitations may be identified in the empirical research of the thesis: 
" The maximum effort has been made within reasonable time limits to acquire the 
data that will maximise the sample and will enable us to test the alternative 
theories with the greater statistical significance. However, data unavailability has 
been a problem during this research and may limit the significance of our 
findings. 
19 
20 
CHAPTER 2: EMPIRICAL FINDINGS ABOUT THE 
BEHAVIOUR OF FIRMS THAT MAKE INITIAL PUBLIC 
OFFERINGS, SEASONED EQUITY OFFERINGS AND 
TAKEOVER BIDS. 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
Firms that make an Initial Public offering, a Seasoned equity offering or a 
takeover bid have certain similarities. They are all characterised by three significant 
stylised facts: first, on the first trading day of the IPO firm and on the announcement 
of the SEO or the takeover bid, the share price of the issuer or the bidder is 
characterised by significant movements, second, firms that make an IPO or a SEO or 
a takeover bid perform poorly in the long run after the event and third, there are 
periods when the equity issuance and takeover activity is extremely high and other 
periods when activity subsides. 
This chapter first presents the empirical evidence of previous researchers 
about these three stylised facts and then makes a reasonably comprehensive 
evaluation of the explanations that have been proposed as the driving forces behind 
these patterns. 
2.2. PRICE PERFORMANCE ON THE DAYS AROUND THE EQUITY ISSUE AND THE 
TAKEOVER BID 
Equity issues and takeover bids are major corporate events and have a big 
impact on the share price of the issuer. One of the best known things in the world of 
finance is that firms that go public experience large positive returns on the first day 
their shares are traded on the stock exchange. Firms that go public see their share 
price increasing by more than 10% on average in the first trading day in the UK and 
US, an increase that represents a significant indirect cost for the issuer. 
IPOs are, not the. only equity issues that are characterised by significant share 
price movements. An announcement of a seasoned equity issue also has a significant 
impact on the share price of the issuer. US studies document that the announcement 
of a SEO is accompanied by a significant drop on the share price of the issuer of 3%, 
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a drop which imposes significant indirect costs to the issuer. In addition to SEOs, 
takeover bids also have an effect on the share price of the bidder. Several studies 
have indicated that the bidder's shareholders are worst off by the announcement of 
the takeover bid and that the share price drop is greater when the takeover bid is 
financed with equity. In the next part we present the empirical findings of previous 
studies on the issue of the market reaction to the equity issues and the takeover bids 
and evaluate the reason behind these abnormal share price patterns. 
2.2.1. First Day Returns for IPOs 
All studies that investigate the behaviour of IPOs have documented that firms 
that go public experience large positive initial returns. The positive first day returns 
for IPOs is a phenomenon that is present in almost all the world's stockmarkets. 
Loughran, Ritter and Rydqvist (1994) examine average initial returns for 25 countries 
and in all of them IPOs have large positive first day returns. These returns range from 
4.2% in France to 80.3% in Malaysia. Levis (1993) finds that UK IPOs have an 
average return of 14.3% in their first trading day with 82% of the issues having 
positive returns. Ibbotson, Sindelar & Ritter, (1988) find that the average first day 
return of 10,626 US IPOs made between 1960 and 1992 is 15.26%. 
Even though positive first day returns is a fact, there is a wide variation in the 
magnitude of the first day returns according to issuers characteristics and the method 
of issue. Levis (1993) finds that the UK IPOs made with the method of offer for sale 
which are offered to the general public have lower first day returns, 11.50%, relative 
to the IPOs that were placed directly with investors and had an average return of 
15.28%. Byrne & Rees (1996) also report that UK IPOs made as placings have a 
significant higher return by 3.31% relative to the rest of the issues. Levis (1993) and 
Byrne & Rees (1996) report that the larger the issue, expressed as a percentage of 
equity offered relative to the market value of the firms, the lower the first day returns 
are. 
A large variation in average first day returns across different industries is also 
found by several studies. Ritter (1984) reports that firms in the natural resources 
industry in the US have significantly higher first day returns relative to other 
industries. Ritter (1991) also reports significant variations in the average first day 
returns across industries with financial institutions having an average first day return 
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of only 3.69% and oil and gas firms having an average return of 30.92% on their first 
trading day. 
Aggarwal & Rivoli (1990) report that firms that go public with an offer price 
smaller than $5 have an average first day return of 24.78% while the issues that are 
priced higher than $5 have an average return of 6.66%. Underwriters' reputation also 
affects the average first day returns. Issues that are underwritten by more prestigious 
underwriters have lower first day returns. Aggarwal & Rivoli (1990) report that 
issues with the most prestigious underwriters have an average return of only 4.91% 
on the first trading day while the issues that are underwritten by the least known 
underwriters have an average first day return of 22.45%, result which is also 
supported by Carter, Dark & Singh (1997) who find that three different measures of 
underwriters' reputation show that IPOs underwritten by more prestigious 
underwriters have smaller first day returns than IPOs which are underwritten by least 
known underwriters. 
Many studies document that the magnitude of the first day returns is affected 
by the uncertainty that investors feel about the intrinsic value of the IPO. Firms 
which are young, small in size and make smaller issues are considered to be ex-ante 
as more risky and are characterised by higher first day returns. Ritter (1984) finds that 
firms with small sales have higher returns while Beatry & Ritter (1986), Levis (1993) 
and Mauer & Senber (1992) find that firms that make smaller issues relative to their 
market values have higher first day returns. Mauer & Senber (1992) report that older 
firms are characterised by lower first day returns. The strongest evidence that 
uncertainty that surrounds the intrinsic value of the IPO affects the first day returns 
comes from studies of non-operational IPOs such as closed end funds and Master 
Limited Partnerships. These firms have little uncertainty for their true value and 
have very- small, almost insignificantly different from zero' first day returns. 
Michaely & Shaw (1994) find that 58 Master Limited'Partnerships'IPOs have an 
average first day return of 0.12%, insignificant from zero. Levis & Thomas (1995) 
find that investment trusts IPOs have a very small first day return of 1.91%. 
Despite the effect that various factors have on' the magnitude of the first day 
returns the'evidence is quite clear. Initial public offers ire characterised by significant 
positive first day returns. If the he price at the' end of the' first trading day reflects 
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the intrinsic value of the firm then it is clear that the IPO firm has offered a "bonus" 
to investors and that represents an indirect cost for the issuer. That abnormality has 
attracted the attention of many researchers who tried to explain why investors are 
offered such high returns on the first day of the listing of a firm. Most theories argue 
that issuers deliberately underprice the issue and then provide various reasons why 
firms set the offer price below the fundamental value of the IPO. We discuss the 
various explanations that have been proposed after we present the empirical findings 
on another corporate event that is accompanied by significant abnormal returns: the 
Seasoned Equity Issue. 
2.2.2. Announcement Period Returns for SEOs 
The initial Public offer is not the only equity issue that has attracted the 
attention of researchers because of the large price movements associated with it. A 
seasoned equity issue is also characterised by significant returns on the share price of 
the issuer on the announcement of the issue. The share price of the issuer drops by 
3% on the day the firm's intention to make the issue is made public (US studies). 
The area of seasoned equity issuance has not been researched internationally 
as intensively as the area of IPOs. Therefore, the main empirical findings refer to the 
US. Nevertheless, all studies that look at the announcement of SEOs report a 
significant drop on the announcement of the issue. Bayless and Chaplinsky (1996) 
report an average drop on the announcement of the SEO of 2.3%. Choe, Masulis and 
Nanda (1993) report an average drop of 2.62% with 75% of all issuers experiencing 
negative returns. Asquith and Mullins (1986) find that the announcement period 
returns is a negative and highly significant 
-2.7%. The same percentage is reported by 
Jung, Kim and Stulz (1996) while Masulis and Korwar (1986) report the most 
negative returns of 
-3.25% and Lucas & McDonald (1990) report a negative price 
reaction of 3% on the announcement of a SEO. Levis (1994) finds that the share price 
of issuers drops by 1.5% on the announcement of rights issues in the UK. Shah 
(1996) also examines Rights issues made in the UK and finds that the announcement 
is accompanied by a drop of 1.63% 
As with the IPOs, the magnitude of the negative returns on the announcement 
of the SEO varies according to the issuers' characteristics. Issues that, are used to 
fund investments have higher returns than issues used to repay debt or issues that are 
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used to aid the financial restructure of the company. Among all the issuers 
characteristics, those that can be used as measure of the firm's growth opportunities 
have attracted the most attention. Myers & Majluf (1984) argue that the drop should 
be less negative if the investment opportunities available to the firm are high. High 
growth firms should have less negative price reaction relative to low growth firms. 
Barclay & Litzenberger (1988) find a weak relation between Tobin's Q and the 
market reaction to equity announcements. Pillote (1992) and Dierkens (1991) find 
that when the growth opportunities are high, the announcement day returns are less 
negative. Jung, Kim and Stulz (1996) exhibit that firms with high Q ratios and high 
market to book values experience a smaller drop on the announcement of the 
seasoned equity offer. The growth opportunities are not the only factors that can 
affect the magnitude of the announcement period returns. The size of the issue also 
affects the magnitude of announcement period returns but the literature provides 
contradictory results. Asquith & Mullins (1986) find that larger issues are 
characterised by more negative returns and so do Bayless & Chaplinsky (1996) but 
Denis (1994) finds an insignificant relation between size and returns. Firms that 
make a SEO experience a large price run up in the period before the announcement. 
Masulis & Korwar (1986), Denis (1994) and Choe, Masulis & Nanda (1993) find 
that firms with high price run ups have more negative returns but Asquith & Mullins 
(1986) and Shah (1996) find the opposite. 
Many theoretical explanations have been proposed for the price drop on the 
announcement of the SEO. Some of them are related with the explanations for the 
significant price drop on the announcement of a takeover bid that is financed with 
equity and so we analyse them together later on in this chapter after we present the 
evidence on the market reaction to the announcement of a takeover bid that is 
financed with equity. 
2.2.3. Announcement period returns for takeover bidders. 
Apart from the announcement of a SEO, other corporate announcements are 
followed 
: 
by significant 'price changes. Among them is the announcement of a 
takeover bid. Studies that look at the bidders' returns on the announcement of the 
bid find that zero or negative returns accrue to bidders' shareholders. Servaes (1991) 
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reports a significant drop of 1.07% on the share price of the bidder from the 
announcement day of the bid until the effective day of the takeover or the delisting 
date, whichever comes first. Firth (1980) finds that bidders in the UK in the period 
from 1969 to 1975 have significant negative return on the month of the 
announcement of the bid. Successful bidders experience a drop of 6.0% and 
unsuccessful bidders have a slightly larger drop of 6.3%. Sudarsanam and Salami 
(1997) finds that the share price of the bidder drops by 2.0% in the period 5 days 
before up to 5 days after the takeover bid announcement. 
The method of payment has a significant effect on the magnitude of the 
announcement period returns. Servaes (1991) finds that the average cumulative 
return between the announcement day and the delisting or approval day for 142 
takeover bids financed with equity is 
-5.86% while for 172 bids that were financed 
with cash the returns were +3.44%. In 66 bids where a mixture of cash and equity 
was used the average cumulative abnormal return was -3.74%. Eckbo and Langhor 
(1989) find that takeover bids in France that are financed only with cash have a 
positive impact on the price of the bidder while bids financed with equity have a 
negative impact 
. 
Travlos (1987) finds that the announcement period returns for cash 
offers is 0.24 % not significant from zero and for equity offers the return is 
-1.47% 
which is highly significantly different from zero. Travlos (1987) also finds that the 
two day cumulative abnormal returns were more negative when the proportion of the 
transaction funded through shares is high. Amihud, Lev and Travlos (1991) report 
that equity offers have significant negative returns of 
-1.19% and cash offers have a 
return of +0.44%. Brown & Ryngaert (1991) find that equity offers have an average 
announcement period return of 
-2.48% while cash offers have an average return of - 
0.06%. Frank, Harris & Titman (1991) document that all cash bids have a positive 
but insignificant effect on the price of the bidder while all equity bids reduce 
significantly the price of the bidder by 3.15%. Sudarsanam & Salami (1997) however 
report that UK takeover bids that use equity as method of payment have similar 
returns with bids that use other methods of financing the bid. 
There are a number of alternative explanations for the adverse price reaction 
on the announcement of the takeover bid and especially what forces are responsible 
for the significant differences in the announcement period returns of cash and equity 
26 
financed takeover bids that are closely related with the explanations of the price drop 
on the announcement of a SEO and are discussed next. 
2.3. ABNORMAL RETURNS AND EXPLANATIONS 
The significant share price movements that we described above have attracted 
the attention of a large research effort which tried to find the driving forces behind 
these phenomena. Various explanations have been proposed but only a few of them 
have been backed up by empirical results and can explain in a unified framework 
what happens to the share price of an equity issuer or a bidder that uses equity to 
finance the bid. In the next lines we make a reasonably extensive presentation of 
these explanations and evaluate the evidence against or for them. 
2.3.1 IPOs and Theories on the First Day Returns. 
One thing that is considered a fact in the world of finance is that managers 
have better information about the firm they manage relative to outside investors. 
They possess more and of better quality pieces of information concerning the value 
of the firm's assets, its future projects and in general anything that can have an 
impact on the value of the firm. Outside investors on the other hand, get regular 
information about the firm from information releases such as earnings and dividend 
announcements, balance sheets and other sporadic news announcements. These news 
however may be outdated at the time they reach the market and may not reveal the 
whole picture of the value of the firm that can be known with accuracy only to 
managers. Therefore, outside investors are at a informational disadvantage relative to 
managers in estimating the true, intrinsic value of the firm. When this information 
asymmetry is small and investors know almost as much as managers do, they can 
estimate with greater accuracy and confidence the true value of the firm. 
The level of information asymmetry becomes immensely important when the 
firm wants to raise equity capital. Managers have the incentive to use the inside 
information they have in order to minimise the cost of their capital. They have 
reasons to price the new issues at the higher price possible in order to raise more 
money from the issue. If managers act in an attempt to minimise their cost of capital, 
a high price for the IPO will result to more money being raised with the same number 
27 
of shares sold or a smaller portion of the firm sold to raise the required funds relative 
to an IPO with a low price. 
Information asymmetries however do not exist only between managers and 
outside investors but between investors as well. Rock (1986) argues that there are 
investors who are more informed than others creating two groups: the informed and 
the uninformed investors. Uninformed investors are at a disadvantage relative to 
informed investors over estimating the true value of the new issue. The former group 
of investors will not be able to determine the true value of the issue while the latter 
group will be able to determine whether the issue is fairly priced or even underpriced. 
The existence of information asymmetries and the motivation of managers to 
overprice the equity issues may be responsible for the abnormal returns we observe 
around equity issues. In the case of an Initial Public Offer, uninformed investors can 
not estimate whether the issue is overpriced or not and bid heavily for all issues. 
Informed investors can evaluate whether the issue is overpriced or not and participate 
heavily only in the undervalued issues. If the issue is oversubscribed a rationing will 
take place and each investor will only get a percentage of the shares he/she 
demanded. This creates the winners curse problem. Uninformed investors get all the 
shares they demand because these shares are overvalued and informed investors do 
not bid for those. On the other hand, since informed investors bid heavily only for 
undervalued issues they will get a large percentage of undervalued issues while 
uninformed investor will only get a small number of undervalued shares. Uninformed 
investors are the losers in this "game". They end up with the overvalued issues while 
informed investors end up with the undervalued issues Therefore, issuers, in order to 
encourage uninformed investors to participate in the issue have to "leave some 
money on the table", to underprice the issue 
, 
hence the large first day returns. This 
underpricing will compensate uninformed investors for their lack of knowledge of 
the intrinsic value of the firm and it will also compensate informed investors for the 
cost they pay for collecting and analysing the information they get about the issuer. 
The strongest empirical support for Rock's (1986) model comes from 
Michaely & Shaw (1994). They look at the first day returns of Master Limited 
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Partnerships IPOs where informed institutional investors do not participate2 and find 
that their average first day returns are very low and not different from zero. 
Therefore in MLPs there is no possibility that uninformed investors are at a 
disadvantage relative to informed investors and there is no need to underprice the 
issue to attract their attention. According to Michealy & Shaw (1994) findings, the 
first day returns of MLPs are not significant different from zero. 
According to Rock's (1986) model, in issues when there is less uncertainty 
about the true value of the issuer, the first day return should be lower. If uninformed 
investors are less uncertain about the true value of the IPO then managers do not 
have to leave as much money on the table as in IPOs when the uncertainty is high. 
Carter & Manaster (1990) argue that the riskiness of the IPO also affects the 
underwriters. Most prestigious underwriters choose the least risky IPOs. Therefore, 
IPOs underwritten by the most reputable underwriters are less risky and should have 
smaller first day returns something which is supported by a number of studies. Carter 
& Manaster (1990) Michaely & Shaw (1994) and Carter, Dark & Singh (1997) find 
that IPOs underwritten by the least prestigious underwriters have higher first day 
returns. Other factors that could also be used as proxies for the uncertainty that 
surrounds the intrinsic value of the IPO have been found to affect the first day 
returns. Firms which are small, young and with small issues are regarded as ex-ante 
more risky and are characterised by higher first day returns. Ritter (1984) finds that 
firms with small sales have higher returns while Beatty & Ritter (1986), Levis (1993) 
, 
Mauer & Senber (1992) find that smaller issues have higher returns. Mauer & 
Senber (1992) reports that older firms are characterised by lower first day returns. 
The Rock's model however has not escaped criticism because it does not answer why 
firms want to attract uninformed investors and pay such, a big cost and why 
institutional investors bid not only for undervalued issues but for overvalued or fairly 
priced issues as well. 
,Fý-,. 
2 The reason behind the non-participation of institutional investors in MLP IPOs is that the income 
received from the MLPs is classified as unrelated business income and tax has to be paid on this 
income even from non-tax paying entities such as pension funds. ' 
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The existence of information asymmetries and overvaluation exploitation is 
not the only theory put forward to explain these abnormal returns. A large number of 
alternative explanations have been proposed. Another theory argues that the large 
first day returns are imposed by the underwriters who deliberately exercise their 
bargaining power and set the offering price at a low level to ease their marketing 
efforts to sell the issue. Even though that might be a practise followed by 
underwriters in some cases it can not explain why even financial firms and 
investment houses that go public are characterised by significant positive first day 
returns. Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1989) find that investment banks that went 
public have a significant average first day return of 7%. 
Another theory argues that underwriters deliberate underprice the IPOs to 
avoid lawsuits from investors. If firms however underprice IPOs to avoid lawsuits 
then the cost of this avoidance is gigantic relative to the possibility of being sued and 
the damages that firms might have had to pay in the case of successful prosecution. 
Keloharju (1993) documents that in Finland there are no law suits against firms that 
went public in 1984 to 1989 but Finish IPOs exhibited an average first day return of 
8.7% According to our findings, more than £ 70 billion were raised from IPOs in the 
period 1981 to 1996 in the UK excluding privatisations, and the average first day 
return was 12.72%. If the underpricing was an attempt to avoid being sued then firms 
had paid almost £9 billion to avoid that possibility. Definitely that is a very high 
premium to pay to avoid being sued and law suit avoidance does not seem that can 
fully explain the larger first day returns. 
Ibbotson (1975) suggested that firms may deliberately underprice the IPO to 
"leave a good taste in investors mouth" because they want to make further issues 
later on at more favourable prices. If that happens then firms are likely to issue small 
amounts of capital in the IPO and raise more funds in the SEOs which will have to 
be made after a short period of time. Jegadeech, Weinstein & Welsh (1993) 
however find no relation between first day returns and the probability to make a SEO 
afterwards. Levis (1993) does not find that UK IPOs with high first day returns make 
larger SEO issues afterwards but he also finds that IPOs with high first day returns 
make a SEO quicker than firms that had small first day returns. `Michaely & Shaw 
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(1994) find that firms that underprice more tend to reissue less often and for smaller 
amounts than firms with small underpricing. 
The large first day returns do not necessarily mean that they are caused by 
deliberate underpricing. Managers may price the issue at prices which are very close 
to their intrinsic value. Market overreaction may push the prices at level above the 
intrinsic values creating the large first day returns. 
Whatever the reasons behind the large first day returns are, one thing is 
widely accepted. The large first day returns represent an additional cost to the issuer. 
Rational managers who want to minimise their cost of capital would like to have the 
smaller underpricing. The large first day returns are not constant across time. They 
are characterised by significant time series variation and there are some periods when 
the average first day returns soar. If managers care about the magnitude of 
underpricing and want the IPO to have the lower possible underpricing then periods 
of high returns should be periods when the IPO activity should be low. The relation 
between IPO volume and underpricing has been previously investigated with mixed 
results. This issue is being reviewed later on in this chapter when we look at the 
factors that might drive the IPO activity. 
2.3.2 Explanations for the Announcement Period Returns for SEOs 
As we saw earlier, the announcement of a SEO causes the share price of the 
issuer to drop by 3% on average (US studies). A large research effort has been 
undertaken to try and explain that significant price reaction. This section presents the 
competing theories and weighs the empirical evidence that support them. 
The equity issue increases the number of shares that are available to investors 
and according to the supply and demand law, if demand stays the same, the increase 
in the supply should cause a reduction in the price. This theory which is called the 
price pressure, has been proposed as an explanation for the price drop on the 
announcement of the issue and relies on the assumption that each security is unique 
and no close substitutes exist. That assumption however contradicts the, theory that 
the demand curves for stocks are horizontal and share prices are determined by the 
risk return relation they offer. This theory has received criticism for two more points. 
First, it can not explain why issues that are made 
. 
to fund, 
_ 
investments and 
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acquisitions have less negative price reactions than issues made to repay debt. Two 
issues that have the same relative size should create the same negative return no 
matter what the use of the proceeds is. The literature however provides evidence that 
issues made to reduce debt have significantly worst announcement period returns 
than issues made to finance future growth. Second, according to the price pressure 
theory, large issues that increase the supply of shares by larger percentages should 
have more negative impact on the share price of the issuer. Dennis (1994) however, 
finds that the relation between the relative size of the issue and the announcement 
period returns is negative but insignificant. Asquith & Mullins (1986) find that the 
ratio of the amount of capital raised over the market value of the common stock in 
the period 1963 to 1981 is negatively and significantly related with the 
announcement period return, thus supporting the price pressure theory. Jung et all 
(1996) however by using the same variable as Asquith & Mullins (1986) but for a 
sample of issues made from 1977 to 1984, find a positive but insignificant relation 
between the size of the issue and the returns on the announcement of the issue 
creating doubts as to whether the price pressure theory can explain the significant 
price declines on the announcement of the SEO. 
The equity issue has a significant impact not only on shareholders but to 
debtholders as well. The equity issue can reduce the bankruptcy risk thus offering to 
debtholders a better risk return relation with a resulting increase in the debtholders' 
wealth. The debtholders have priority over the shareholders over the assets of the 
firm in case of a bankruptcy. Shareholders can satisfy their claims only after the 
debtholders get paid. An equity issue reduces the risk that debtholders will lose 
money in case of a bankruptcy since more equity will be available to satisfy their 
claims. An equity issue should leave the debtholders better off. In case of a 
bankruptcy, the shareholders' claims are the residual of what is left after the 
debtholders claims are satisfied. So, what the debtholders gain must represent a loss 
to the equity holders, hence the market reacts negatively to the announcement of a 
SEO. As with the price pressure theory however, according to the debt-coinsurance 
theory, larger issues should create a larger transfer of wealth from shareholders to 
debtholders and so should cause more negative reaction which as we saw earlier has 
not gathered overwhelming empirical support. -'. ` 
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Managers may not always pursue the interests of their shareholders but 
sometimes they place their personal satisfaction higher than that of the firm's 
shareholders. The agency cost theory as it is called argues that managers may seek to 
maximise their own utility and not that of the shareholders and may undertake 
negative net present value projects that enhance their own satisfaction but harm 
shareholders value. The issue of debt on the other hand places constraints on 
managers and makes it more difficult for them to undertake projects that harm the 
value of the firm. Whenever the market perceives that managers may use the 
proceeds to engage in such value destroying actions it penalises the issuer with a 
mark down on the share price to reflect the potential reduction in the firms value that 
will be caused by the agency costs. 
The most widespread theory is the one that is based on information 
asymmetries and managers' incentives to exploit the superior information they have 
over the true value of the firm relative to outside investors. Managers can estimate 
whether the current price of the share is higher than its intrinsic value. Under the 
assumption that managers seek to maximise their shareholders utility and that the 
new shares will be purchased by new shareholders, the firm will be better off to make 
an issue when the share price is overvalued. More capital can be raised in such a 
situations with a smaller portion of the firm's ownership lost to new shareholders. 
Outside investors are aware of managers' incentives and since they are not able to 
distinguish the overvalued from the undervalued issuers, they perceive an equity 
issue as an attempt to exploit overvaluation and hence they mark down the share 
price of the issuer. According to the information asymmetry models, when there is 
less information asymmetry about the value of assets or when there are less concerns 
that the issuer exploit overvaluation the drop on the announcement should be smaller 
or even a positive return should occur. Evidence from other studies : indicate that 
issuers which are less likely to exploit overvaluation, such as the firms that have high 
growth opportunities, have less negative price reactions. On the other hand, issuers 
; '. that are more likely to be overvalued such as issuers with large pre announcement 
price run-ups have more negative announcement period returns. !2 
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Probably the most cited model that can explain the negative price reaction on 
the announcement of a SEO is the one developed by Myers and Majluf (1984). Their 
model argues that there is a pecking order in the financing choices and manages will 
first consider the use of slack to finance the projects followed by the use of debt 
when the slack is not enough. They argue that firms issue equity only when the share 
price is overvalued. When there is information asymmetry between managers and 
investors about the value of assets in place, the former have the incentive to exploit 
overvaluation and issue when the price of the share investors are willing to pay is 
higher than the true value of the firm. Investors are aware of managers' incentives 
and mark down the share price of the issuer at the announcement of the issue to take 
into account that overvaluation. 
Lucas & McDonald (1990) argue that undervalued firms, which are the firms 
that have good information to announce that will push their share price up, will not 
issue upon receiving a project. These firms would be better off waiting and issuing 
after the mispricing is corrected. Overvalued firms, which are those that the 
revelation of new information will reduce their share price, issue equity upon 
receiving a project. So, only firms with bad news issue equity since firms with good 
news will wait and issue after the announcement of these news. Their model can 
explain why we observe a significant drop in the share price of a firm that announces 
a seasoned equity issue. They argue that firms with rising share prices accumulate 
projects because these firms would not issue until the continuous rise comes to an 
end. So, firms that have high excess returns prior to the issue accumulate projects. 
The market is aware that firms with successive rises in the share price are sure to 
have a project and so the decision to issue equity does not reveal the sudden arrival 
of a new good project but that managers are expecting that the value of assets will 
fall in the future and that moment represents the best time for the firms to issue and 
so they mark down the share price of the issuer. 
Information asymmetries between managers and investors do not exist only 
about the true value of assets but for the future earnings as well. Managers are aware 
of how the profitability of the firm will be in the near future while investors estimate 
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the level of future earnings by relying on information releases which may not always 
incorporate all the information possessed by managers. Miller and Rock (1985) 
argue that managers that expect a decrease in earnings will be better off to make an 
equity issue before the decrease in earnings is revealed to the market. According to 
them, equity issues alter the leverage ratios and changes in leverage signal similar 
changes in the future earnings. An increase in leverage indicates an increase in future 
earnings while a decrease in leverage suggests a decrease in earnings. Therefore, 
investors regard an equity issue as a signal that the future profitability of the firm is 
in danger. The strongest empirical evidence that support that argument comes from 
Brous (1992) who finds that financial analysts regard an equity issue as a turning 
point in the profitability of the firm. On the month of the announcement of the issue, 
analysts revise downwards their forecasted earnings per share, a trend that continues 
for 3 months after the issue. Brous (1992) finds a positive relation between forecast 
revisions and the price drop on the announcement of the issue indicating that firms 
with negative forecast revisions have more negative returns.. 
Overall, the market reacts adversely on the announcement of a SEO. Firms 
that make a SEO lose around 3% of their market value in a period of just 2 days. That 
drop represents an indirect cost for the issue that can sometimes exceed the direct 
costs of the issue and can wipe out a large percentage of the proceeds of the issue. 
According to Asquith & Mullins (1986), the drop on the announcement of a SEO 
wipes out 31% of the proceeds of the issue. As with the IPOs, where issuers would 
like to see the lower first day return for the issue, in the case of SEOs the total cost of 
the new issue will be significantly lower if the issuer suffers a small price drop on the 
announcement. The literature has provided evidence that the, magnitude of the 
adverse selection costs are important in the timing of equity issues. More capital is 
raised when adverse selection costs are low. That issue however refers tot the timing 
of equity issues which is the last stylised fact that we discuss in the last part of this 
chapter., 
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2.3.3. Takeover Bids and Explanations for their effect on the share price of the 
bidder. 
The market reaction to the announcement of the takeover bid is dependent on 
numerous factors that are related to how the market views the proposed takeover will 
affect the profitability of the bidder. A larger number of synergistic gains may arise 
from a merger. When investors think that positive synergies can arise from the 
takeover then obviously a positive response is expected. If the potential gains from 
the merger are not significant or even non-existent, then the market might react 
adversely. It is not in the objectives of this issue to explain the price reaction on all 
takeover bids. We focus our attention to the bids that are financed with equity in 
whole or in part. The literature has provided evidence as we saw earlier that equity 
financed bids have a significant negative impact on the share price of the bidders 
while cash offers have a non-negative impact. 
A number of explanations have been proposed to explain the difference in the 
announcement period returns of equity and cash offers. One could argue that the 
difference in the announcement period returns may be due to a difference in the 
characteristics of equity and cash financed bids. Previous empirical studies suggest 
that hostile bids are financed with cash and friendly bids are financed with equity. 
As with the SEOs, the price pressure theory argues that the drop is caused by 
the increase in the supply of shares that will result from the equity financed bid. 
Since the demand for the shares stays the same according to the supply and demand 
law, a drop in the share price of the bidder is observed. The use of cash on the other 
hand does not cause an increase in the supply of shares and so no negative returns 
should be expected. According to the price pressure theory, in cases when the target 
is large relative to the bidder a larger price drop for the bidder should be observed 
relative to bids where the target is small relative to the bidder. The acquisition of 
large targets should require a larger issue of shares and therefore should increase the 
supply of shares by greater percentages which according to the price pressure theory 
should have more negative returns. Servaes (1991) however finds that the size of the 
target and the bidder are positively related to the announcement period returns. 
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Travlos (1987) finds a negative relation between the relative size of the target in 
relation to the bidder but the relation is not statistically significant. 
The debt-coinsurance theory could also in theory explain the drop on the 
announcement of an equity financed takeover bid. An equity financed takeover bid 
will require the issue of equity and that will reduce the bankruptcy risk of debtholders 
causing a transfer of wealth from shareholder to debtholders causing the share price 
to drop. A cash financed bid will not cause a transfer of wealth and therefore no 
negative reaction should be expected. As with the price pressure theory however, the 
evidence presented previously suggest that large targets that should require larger 
equity issues and therefore should transfer more wealth from the bidders' 
shareholders to bidders' debtholders do not have more negative impact on the bidder 
making the debt-coinsurance theory unable to explain the difference in equity and 
cash financed bids. Furthermore, Travlos (1987) looked at abnormal bond returns of 
firms that announced a takeover bid and found that in equity financed takeover bids 
the abnormal bond returns on the announcement of the bid are significantly negative 
and that in cash offers the bond returns are positive. If the equity financed bids result 
to a transfer of wealth from shareholders to bondholders then the equity bid should 
increase the value of the bonds. Travlos (1997) however finds evidence against that. 
The most publicised reason for the drop on the announcement relies on the 
existence of information asymmetries between managers and investors. Managers 
who know that the share price of their firm is overvalued have reasons to use equity 
to finance a bid since that will reduce the cost of the acquisition. Suppose for 
example that a bidder can acquire a target by offering Elm in cash or, if the current 
share price of the bidder is £1, by offering Elmin shares. If managers, using the 
inside information, estimate that the true 'value of the share is £0.90 then they will be 
better of using equity to finance the deal. Investors and the shareholders of the target 
firm however are not unaware of managers' incentives and they perceive an equity 
financed bid as an attempt to exploit införmation' asymmetry and overvaluation. 
Hence, they mark down the share price'of the bidder to correct for the overvaluation. 
V 
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Once more as with the SEOs, no matter what the cause for the drop on the 
announcement of the equity financed takeover bid is, it is clear that this adverse 
price reaction increases the cost of the acquisition. No study however has been 
conducted to see the effect of adverse selection costs on the volume of equity, 
financed takeover activity. 
2.4. LONG RUN PERFORMANCE OF EQUITY ISSUERS 
Another reason why firms that make an equity issue or a takeover bid have 
attracted the attention of the academia is that equity issuers, both IPOs and SEOs, as 
well as bidders offer inferior returns to investors in the post-event period relative to a, 
number of different benchmarks. In the next part we review the literature findings on 
the post-IPO, post-SEO and post-acquisition performance and discuss the potential 
explanations that can account for the poor post issue performance of those firms and 
the implications that these poor performances have on the "timing" of equity issues. 
2.4.1. Post IPO Performance 
Ritter (1991) was among the first to draw the attention to the performance of 
firms that make an IPO. He found that even investors that buy the IPO at the offer 
price and therefore benefit from the high initial returns, are worst off relative to 
investments in a number of alternative benchmarks. The 3-year average buy and hold 
return for IPOs was 34.47% while firms in the same industry and similar market 
value as the IPOs had a3 year average buy and hold return of 61.86%. Loughran and 
Ritter (1995) use an even bigger sample of 4753 firms that went public in the US 
between 1970 and 1990 and also find that firms conducting an IPO subsequently 
underperform. Their results were robust to a number of alternative benchmarks. 
Aggrawal and Rivoli (1990) find that IPOs underperform from the closing price of 
day 1 to the 250 trading days after the issue by 
-13.73% relative to the NASDAQ 
index. The underperformance is 
-5.45% when the first day returns are included. 
IPO underperformance is present outside the US as well. Ljungqvist (1996) 
finds that German IPOs underperform if the first day returns are not taken into 
account. Levis (1993) documents that UK IPO underperform for 3 years after the 
issue. Firms that went public in the UK in the period between 1980 to 1988 offered 
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inferior returns to investors relative to the market value weighted, equal weighted 
FTA SHARE PRICE INDEX and the Hoare Govett Smaller Companies Index once 
first day returns are excluded. With the inclusion of the first day returns, IPOs are 
found to underperform only relative to the equal weighted FTA. Loughran, Ritter and 
Rydqvist (1994) present evidence about the post-IPO performance of 9 world 
markets. In 6 of them, IPOs underperform on adjusted terms and only in Japan, Korea 
and Sweden IPOs have performances similar to the seasoned firms. 
Even though firms that go public seem to be bad performers, there are factors 
that affect their performance. Ritter (1991) reports that the IPO underperformance is 
higher for younger firms and firms that raise smaller amount of capital from the 
issue. Different industries have different performances with financial institution IPOs 
outperforming their seasoned counterparts while oil and gas IPO firms offer a5 year 
underperformance of 60%. 
Another important finding of Ritter (1991) is that there is a time series 
variation in the post IPO performance with IPOs that come into the marker in years 
of heavy IPO volume having worst performances than IPOs that go public in light 
IPO periods. The same conclusion is reached by Aggarwal & Rivoli (1990). 
Loughran & Ritter (1995) find that IPOs that go public in light issuance periods do 
not significantly underperform when market value and book to market factors are 
taken into account. IPOs however that went public in heavy issue periods 
significantly underperformed by 0.60% per month. Helwege and Liang (1997) report 
that firms that went public in 1983 in US, which was a heavy IPO volume year, 
underperform but the IPOs that went public in 1988, which was a light IPO volume 
year, did not underperform. Ljungqvist (1996) however, *finds 'that German IPOs that 
go public in heavy IPO volume periods have similar post-IPO performances than 
IPOs that go public in light IPO volume periods. Levis (1993) also does not find a 
negative relation between the intensity of UK IPO volume and their post-IPO 
performance.... 
Overall it is widely documented that firms that go public offer inferior returns 
to their shareholders: Such consistent findings contradict the weak form of efficiency 
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which states that all publicly available information should already be incorporated in 
the share prices so that nobody can make abnormal profits. By looking at the Post- 
IPO returns it is clear that nobody should hold a portfolio of newly listed firms since 
they will lose money. Investors that have bought the IPO at the offer price should sell 
them at the first months while the price is still high and not keep the IPO for a long 
period of time. The literature is not short of explanations for such an abnormal 
pattern and we discuss them after the documentation of the long run performance of 
two other groups of firms that also offer bad returns to their shareholders: the SEOs 
and the bidders. 
2.4.2 Post-Issue performance of Seasoned Equity Issuers. 
Poor performance is not a characteristic only of Initial Public Offers. 
Loughran & Ritter (1995) report that firms that make a Seasoned Equity Offer 
underperform for up to five years after the issue. Their sample of 3702 SEOs made 
by firms listed on NASDAQ, AMEX and NYSE for the period 1970-1990 had a3 
and 5 year buy-and-hold returns of 15.0% and 33.4% respectively while the returns 
for the firms within the same industry and similar market to book values were 48.0% 
and 92.6% for the same period. The underperformance of SEOs was robust to 
various benchmarks used which allowed for book to market, size and industry 
effects and it was not due to long term reversals or due to higher risk of SEO firms 
after the issue. Asquith and Mullins (1986) also find that firms that make a SEO 
underperform after the announcement day. By the end of the day 480 after the 
announcement, cumulative excess returns were 
-23.1%. Spiess and Affleck-Graves 
(1995) document a significant underperformance for Seasoned Equity Offerings 
during the period 1975-1989 for a sample of NASDAQ and NYSE/AMEX stocks. 
In the 36 months after the issue only 3 months had positive average monthly adjusted 
returns two of which were the first two months after the issue. The cumulative 
average size adjusted returns were 
-39.36% for the five years and -31.24% and - 
30.99% for the industry/size and book to market/size adjusted returns for the same 
period. Shah (1995) finds that firms that make a rights issue in the UK underperform 
by 38% relative to the FTA share price index 3 years after the issue announcement. 
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As with Loughran & Ritter's (1995) findings for IPOs, younger and smaller 
firms that make a SEO seem to do worst. Firms with high book to market did better 
than firms with low book to market but they still underperformed. Nearly all 
industries underperformed with only financial institutions and Airlines doing better 
than their matching sample. The magnitude of the SEO underperformance was 
related to the intensity of SEO activity with SEO firms that make the issue in periods 
of heavy activity having significantly negative returns for the 60 month after the issue 
while firms that issue during light volume periods do not have significantly negative 
returns for the 5 years after the issue. Ritter (1991) also reports a significant variation 
in the post-SEO performance of different industries. 
Overall, firms that make SEOs experience a long run underperformance 
following the announcement of the issue. The reasons for this poor performance have 
been investigated previously and the most accepted ones rely on the notion that 
issuers exploit windows of opportunity when capital can be raised in more favourable 
terms. These explanations are related with the explanations for the poor long run 
performance of IPOs and are presented after we present the findings on the poor long 
run performance of bidders which indeed also exhibit underperformance. 
2.4.3 Post-acquisition performance of bidding firms. 
As with Seasoned Equity Offer and Initial public offers, firms that make a 
takeover bid have been found to underperform. This issue however is still in dispute 
because some studies have found insignificant underperformance or even 
outperformance for the consolidated firms. In addition to that, the magnitude of the 
underperformance is much smaller than the underperformance of firms making a 
SEO or an IPO. 
Aggrawal, Jaffe & Mandelker (1992) find that after adjusting for the size 
effect and beta risk, acquiring firms' shareholders experience a significant 10% loss 
over five years after the acquisition. Average Abnormal returns were found to be 
negative for each one of the 5 years following the completion of the bid. Cumulative 
Average Abnormal returns were negative from the first year, and became more 
negative and significant as the period after the event increased. 5-year Cumulative 
abnormal returns were negative 
, 
10.26%, and, significant at 5% level and were not 
driven by outliers. The percentage of bidders that underperformed was 56.03%, 
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significantly higher than the percentage of bidders who outperformed at 1%. 5-year 
cumulative median returns were less negative 
-7.51%, but were also significantly 
different from zero. Aggrawal, Jaffe & Mandelker (1992) also find significant 
differences between the performance in the seventies and other decades. Cumulative 
abnormal returns were significantly negative in the fifties, sixties and eighties but 
positive, insignificant though, in seventies. Using data for the period between 1975 
and 1984 they reported no significant underperformance a result consistent with 
Franks, Harris and Titman ( 1991). Asquith (1983) finds that both successful and 
unsuccessful bidding firms have a significant underperformance of 7.2% and 9.6% 
respectively until 240 days after the final outcome of the bid. 
Frank, Harris & Titman (1991) examine post-acquisitions performances after 
adjusting for risk. They are particularly concerned that using a wrong or inefficient 
benchmark can lead to results that do not represent the reality. Abnormal 
performances can be sensitive to the choice of benchmarks. They use not only the 
CRSP equally and value weighted indexes to calculate the abnormal long run 
performances 
, 
but two more benchmarks. A ten-factor benchmark provided by 
Lehnan and Modest (1987) and an eight-portfolio benchmark developed by Grinhlatt 
and Titman (1988,1989a) which consists of four portfolios based on firm size, three 
based on dividend yield and one based on past returns. The eight-portfolio 
benchmark was designed to eliminate biases in the traditional benchmarks. 
Comparing the post-acquiring performance of bidders with different 
benchmark portfolios yielded different results. The Equally-weighted CRSP index 
produced negative post-bid performance but compared to a value weighted CRSP 
index, bidders had positive and significant post-acquisition performance. The eight- 
portfolio benchmark and the ten-factor benchmarks also produced negative but 
insignificant post-acquisition performances. Frank, Harris & Titman (1991) show 
that using alternative benchmark to calculate post-acquisition abnormal performance, 
the bidders do not underperform, 
The two multifactor benchmarks showed that there were not statistically 
significant differences between the post-bid performance when the bid was opposed 
by the management of the target or not and even when the bid was contested by other 
bidders or not. The use of equally and value weighted CRSP benchmarks however 
produced significant results between the previous groups ( cash vs equity, opposed vs 
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unopposed, contested vs uncontested) with cash offers outperforming the equity 
offers and contested and opposed bids outperforming the uncontested and unopposed 
bids respectively. In conclusion, Frank at al. (1991) believe that the post-acquisition 
underperformance that others have found is due to benchmark errors and not due to 
overpricing at the time of the announcement. Using multifactor benchmarks, bidders 
exhibit no significant negative post-acquisitions performances. Frank & Harris 
(1988), as with Frank, Harris & Titman (1991) find that the post-takeover 
performance is highly sensitive to the method used to calculate excess returns. They 
report however that bidders have a2 year underperformance of 12% 
Firth (1980), reports that abnormal returns after the bid announcement do not 
deviate significantly from zero. Three years after the bid announcement cumulative 
abnormal returns have remained virtually the same both for successful and 
unsuccessful bidders. Lodefer & Martin (1992), make another attempt to solve the 
puzzle of post-acquisition performance. Their results showed that acquiring firms 
experienced significant negative performances in the second and third year after the 
merger. Parametric tests revealed negative performances as well but marginally 
significant. The first, fourth and fifth years after the bid had positive but insignificant 
performances. The underperformance was higher in the period 1966 to 1969 relative 
to the seventies and eighties. In fact seventies and eighties never had a significant 3- 
year underperformance and 5-year performances were positive. In conclusion, they 
argue that the negative 3-years performances they found, which were insignificant 
after the sixties, support the efficiency market hypothesis 'since after 1970 the 
market appears to value the profitability of a merger more realistically and no 
underperformance is observed thereafter. ' Breadley, Desay & Kim (1988) 'examine 
unsuccessful tender offers and their effect on shareholders wealth. They find that for 
the period 1963 to' 1980' unsuccessful bidding firms experienced marginally 
insignificant negative post-acquisition returns of 
-7.85% in the period up to 180 
days after the announcement of the tender offer. 
Significant variations in the post-takeover performance exist according to the 
method of payment. Frank, Harris and Mayer (1988) report that bidders that financed 
the bid with equity have significant negative "abnormal returns förup to 2 years after 
the issue. ` Frank, Harris and Titman' (1991) , also find- that'the equity financed bids 
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have negative monthly returns in the 36 months after the takeover but again different 
benchmarks produced different results with some producing significant negative 
performances and other insignificant ones. The difference in the monthly returns 
between all cash and all equity bids ranged from 0.44% to 0.72% per month 
according to the methodology used to calculate abnormal returns and the test 
statistics were from 1.37 to 2.57. 
In summary, the evidence regarding the post-acquisition performance of 
bidders is contradictory. A larger number of studies have shown that bidders 
underperformed significantly after the bid. A few studies have suggested that there is 
a small, insignificant though, underperformance. The method of payment seems to 
have an impact on the long run performances with equity offers having worst 
performances than cash offers. The difference between the cash and equity offers is 
puzzling especially A number of theories have been developed to explain that 
difference that rely on the existence of information asymmetries and the managers 
incentives to exploit overvaluation when they use equity to finance a bid. These 
theories are closely linked with the theories that can account for the poor long run 
performance of IPOs and SEOs and analysed in more detail in the next part. 
2.4.4. Theories of Underperformance 
Even though almost everybody agrees that firms that make an IPO, a SEO or 
a takeover bid underperform there is little consensus as to what causes' this 
underperformance and what implications that has on the market efficiency. The main 
question asked is whether the post-announcement underperformance is artificially 
created by insufficient asset pricing model who do not take into account the changes 
in the riskiness of the assets in the post-event period or is the post-event 
underperformance a result of a careful timing of the issues at periods when investors 
pay prices which do not reflect the intrinsic value of the firms. 
Numerous methodologies have been used in the calculation of long run 
performances for IPOs, SEOs and Bidders. The overwhelming majority of those 
produce a significant underperformance especially, for IPOs and SEOs. Of course, 
nobody can not discount the possibility that in the future more. sophisticated asset 
pricing models will be developed that may prove today's, researchers wrong. Until 
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such development materialise, we can not accept that the long run underperformance 
is due to measurement errors. 
The most accepted explanation that the literature has provided relies on 
investors' irrationality and market imperfections such as information asymmetries. 
The cognitive bias theory argues that the long run underperformance is caused by 
investors who overweigh the improvements in recent operating performances of 
issuers. Investors believe that this improvement will continue in the future and the 
high expectations they have push the share prices above their fundamentals. As 
investors' expectations do not materialised, a mark down of the share prices of the 
issuers occurs causing the underperformance. 
Mikkelson and Shah (1994) and Jain and Kini (1994) find that firms that 
make Initial Public Offers are characterised by an improvement in their operating 
performance in the years before the IPO and a deterioration in their operating 
performance after the IPO. Toeh, Welsh and Wong (1998) argue that firms 
conducting an IPO and a Seasoned Equity Offer manipulate their earnings before the 
listing or the announcement of the SEO. They report that managers inflate their 
earnings by taking positive accruals. Loughran & Ritter (1997) report that firms 
making Seasoned Equity Offerings have a deterioration in their operating 
performance after the issue. They argue that firms may time the equity issue in 
periods around peaks of their operating performance. Loughran & Ritter (1997) 
conclude that such patterns indicate that equity misevaluation is an important 
determinant of corporate financing choices. Rajan & Servaes (1997) find financial 
analysts overestimate the growth potential of IPOs showing the presence of cognitive 
bias. 
So, investors may pay high prices for the IPOs because they extrapolate the 
post-IPO performance from the Pre-IPO operating, ' performance. ' Investors 
overestimate the growth potentials of firm conducting an IPO or a SEO and therefore 
overpay for the issue. Investors who incorrectly assume that this ý improvement is 
fundamental and is going to continue after the' IPO$ are paying high prices for the 
IPOs and SEOs. When investors realise they were wrong, issuers underperform. 
The cognitive bias theory can explain why firms underperform but does not 
explain the time series variations in equity volume. The fact that, equity, issuers 
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underperform after the issue does not necessarily mean that issuers deliberately time 
the equity issue when their share price is overvalued. It also does not indicate that 
variations in equity issuance volume is driven by overvaluation exploitation. If firms 
deliberately time their issues when prices are above their fundamentals then we 
should see that periods of heavy volume should be periods when issuers can achieve 
more overvalued prices. As a consequence of the higher degree of overvaluation in 
heavy volume periods, these issuers should have worst post-issue performances 
relative to issuers"that make the issue in light volume periods, periods during which 
issuers should be less overvalued. 
Loughran & Ritter (1995) find evidence supporting the above proposition. 
They find that the post-issue return of IPO and SEO firms are significantly negative 
when the firms make the issue in heavy volume periods while the post-issue returns 
of IPOs and SEOs that make the issue in light volume periods are not significantly 
different from zero. Evidence in favour of overvaluation timing is also found by 
Helwege and Liang (1997) who report that firms that went public in 1983 in US, 
which was a heavy IPO volume year, underperform but the IPOs that went public in 
1988, which was a light IPO volume year, did not underperform. 
The international evidence on that issue however are not supportive of 
overvaluation. timing. Ljungqvist (1996) finds that German IPOs that go public in 
heavy IPO volume periods have similar post-IPO performances than IPOs that go 
public in light IPO volume periods. Levis (1993) does not find a negative relation 
between the intensity of UK IPO volume and their post-IPO performance. 
The overvaluation timing however has not escaped criticism. Probably the 
strongest evidence against the overvaluation timing theory comes from evidence on 
the post issue underperformance of rights issuers. The method of rights issue 
diminishes the incentives to exploit new shareholders for the benefit of existing ones. 
There is no extra benefits for the firm that makes a rights issue to time the issue when 
the shares are overvalued. - Therefore, overvaluation exploitation can not explain the 
poor long run performance of. rights issuers and the variation in the rights issue 
volume across time. 
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Bidders also offer inferior returns to their shareholders after the 
announcement or the completion of the merger. The reason for such a disappointing 
result are many. The acquisition may not fit in the general strategy of the bidders and 
the target may no really create value for the bidder. Bidders' management may 
overestimate the potential synergies that arise from the merger but these synergistic 
gains may never materialise. In some case the acquisition may create value for the 
bidders but the implementation and consolidation process of the takeover may take 
too long, it may not have been thoroughly planned and checked and may destroy 
some or all the potential profits from the bid. The managers that are responsible for 
implementing the takeover may not be aware of the bidders' long term strategy and 
acquisition aims or the target firms' management and staff may be incompetent, not 
integrate well with the bidder and may have significant attitude and cultural 
differences from the bidders' management. No previous acquisition experience and 
lack of knowledge of the industry of the target may also create additional problems. 
Overall, many factors can attribute to the poor long run performance of bidders. 
However, the literature has provided evidence that there are significant 
differences in the performances of bidders according to the method of payment. 
Bidders that use cash to finance the bid do not underperform while bidders that use 
equity underperform. That difference is interesting and very challenging for the 
academia. There are evidence that bidders that use cash are hostile bids and that bids 
that are hostile bids generate more wealth gains especially for the target firms' 
shareholders. Another factor that could explain the'difference in the performance of 
equity and cash financed bids is managers incentives to use equity when the share 
price is overvalued. 
Overvaluation concerns could explain the difference in the performance 
between cash offers and equity offers. Managers have, the incentive to use equity 
when it is overvalued to reduce the cost of the acquisition. Investors are aware of 
those incentives and regard the use of equity as a method of payment as a signal that 
the shares are overvalued. On the" other hand; 
- 
bidders that are undervalued will not 
reduce the cost of the acquisition by using shares 'so undervalued firms are more 
likely to use cash. 
This thesis investigates whether the poor long run-"performance of bidders that 
use equity to financed the bid is due to the timing of the bid when bidders shares are 
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overvalued. Equity financed bids may exhibit an underperformance but that does not 
automatically mean that they deliberately exploit overvaluation. As we saw, equity 
financed bids have different characteristics from cash financed bids. If the choice of 
equity as a method of payment for the takeover bid is driven only by overvaluation 
exploitation then periods of heavy equity financed takeover activity should be periods 
when the magnitude of overvaluation should be higher. Bidders that use equity, to 
finance a bid in high volume periods should have the most overvalued shares and 
worst post-bid performances relative to bidders that use equity in light volume 
periods. 
2.5. TIMING OF EQUITY ISSUES 
The research effort has not concentrated only on the abnormal returns around 
or after the equity issues but has focused on the issue of "timing" as well. The need 
to study the "timing" aspect comes from the fact that the number of firms that 
engage in IPOs, SEOs and takeover bids varies across time. Most of the studies 
however look at the timing of IPOs while the timing of SEOs and takeover bids have 
not been researched as thoroughly. The main motivation of these studies is to 
explain why the number of firms going public and the amount of capital they raise 
from their listing vary significantly across time. Ritter (1991) reports wide variations 
in IPO volume in the US in the period 1975 to 1984 with 1983 having more than 
57% of the total dollar volume raised in that period. Ibbotson and Jaffe (1975) report 
that more firms conducted an IPO during the early and late part of the 60's relative 
to the middle part of that decade. Levis ( 1993) reports that UK IPO activity is 
characterised by wide time series variations. Gerbich (1996) and Rees (1997), also 
document that there are some periods when UK IPO activity is high and other periods 
when the activity subsides. 
Research in the US has also shown that Seasoned equity issuance activity is 
not constant across time. Significant variations occur in the number of firms that 
make a seasoned equity issue and in the amount of capital firms decide to raise. 
Ritter (1991), Loughran and Ritter (1995), Choe, Masulis and Nanda (1993), Bayless 
& Chaplinsky (1996) are only some of the studies which document that there are 
periods when Seasoned Equity Offering activity is high and other periods when the 
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activity subsides. Loughran and Ritter (1995) report large variations in the number of 
Equity issues in the US from 1970 to 1990 with Initial Public offerings being more 
volatile than Seasoned Equity offerings. 
The evidence about clustering of merger and takeover activity indicate that 
mergers and acquisitions come in waves rather than in short time variations. Golbe & 
White (1993) Clark, Chakrabarti & Chiang (1988). Mitchell & Mulherin (1996) 
found significant differences in the rate and time-clustering of take-over activity. 
Industries that experienced the greatest number of take-overs are those exposed to the 
greatest fundamental shocks. More than 50% of take-overs in a given industry cluster 
within a period of two years. Sudanrsanm (1995) reproduces evidence from the 
central statistical office that takeover activity in the UK varies across time. He also 
reports that takeover activity financed with shares also exhibits sigificant variations 
over time with more than 50% of all bids made in 1986 and 1987 being financed with 
equity. 
Overall, we can safely conclude that the number of firms that engage in equity 
issues and takeover bids vary significantly over time. Such patterns contradict the 
efficient market hypothesis under which no corporate action can create abnormal 
benefits for the firm. All pieces of information, private or public, are already 
incorporated in the stock markets. and therefore the firm can not gain extra benefits 
by carefully timing the equity issue. Under such a framework, variations in equity 
issuance volume are random and driven by rational stories of changing business 
conditions. More firms would make equity issues when the demand for investment is 
higher which is typical for periods with improving economic conditions. 
A large opposition to the rational explanations of time series variation in 
equity issuance volume however has build up momentum since research has unveiled 
that equity issues are not a zero net present value corporate action. The belief of the 
irrational explanations is that there are "windows of opportunities" in stock markets 
when equity issues can be made in more favourable terms and therefore can enhance 
the benefits for the, firms. The fundamental belief of. irrational stories is that the 
presence of market imperfections, such as information asymmetries and variations in 
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investors' sentiment can be exploited by equity issuers and bidders in order to 
minimise the cost of the capital or the cost of the acquisition. 
The role that changing business conditions, information asymmetries and 
investors' sentiment play in the timing of equity issues is the subject of this thesis in 
the later chapters. First however we analyse in depth the effect that these three factors 
have on the timing of equity issues. 
2.5.1 Adverse Selection Costs and the Timing of Equity issues 
In the world of finance there is a number of market imperfections that are 
responsible for some of the abnormal patterns that we observe. The asymmetric 
distribution of information between managers and investors is one of these market 
imperfections. Investors do not have the same information as managers do and so are 
in a disadvantageous position to estimate the intrinsic value of the firm and its future 
prospects. Investors are aware of managers' incentives to minimise their cost of 
capital by selling overvalued equity and since they can not distinguish between the 
overpriced and fairly priced issues, they regard an equity issue as an attempt to 
exploit overvaluation and mark down the share price of the issuer. That creates an 
adverse selection problem which represents an additional cost of capital to the issuer 
of common stock. Managers would like to see the smaller possible drop on the 
announcement of the issue otherwise the loss of the market value of their firm could 
wipe out a large percentage of the amount of capital raised from the issue. If 
managers are concerned about these indirect costs then they would not issue in 
periods when adverse selection costs are high. 
The relation between adverse selection costs and equity issuance activity has 
provided evidence that managers care about these costs. Choe, Masulis and Nanda 
(1993) find that adverse selection costs are lower when the volume of seasoned 
equity issues in the US is high. They argue that periods when the' information 
asymmetry problem is not severe attract the attention of more equity issuers. Bayless 
& Chaplinsky (1996) also find that there are period when the volume of equity issue 
is high. The driving force behind that increase, is the lower adverse selection costs 
that issuers experience when volume ' is high. During the most active SEO months, 
adverse selection costs were '-2.0%, significantly less negative form the inactive SEO 
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months when adverse selection costs were 
-3.3%. Their reason for that decrease in 
adverse selection costs during periods of heavy volume is that during these periods 
information asymmetry about the value of assets is lower. More information about 
the value of assets is known to investors during periods of heavy volume and 
investors are less concerned that managers might be exploiting overvaluation. 
Firms that make an IPO also face significant indirect costs. The large first 
day returns represent an additional cost to the issuer. According to the information 
asymmetry models, the large first day returns are a result of managers having to 
compensate uninformed investors for their lack of knowledge of the intrinsic value of 
the firm. Periods when more and of better quality pieces of information about the 
value of firm's assets are known to investors reduce the uncertainty about the 
intrinsic value of the IPO and reduce the first day returns. If managers do not want to 
"pay these significant indirect costs" then they will not make the IPO during periods 
when information asymmetry is acute and the required underpricing is large. On the 
other hand, during periods when investors' uncertainty is minimal, the underpricing 
should be lower. These periods should attract the attention of more issuers because 
the information costs that are associated with the issue during these periods are 
lower. In the case of IPOs, that predicts lower first day returns when the information 
asymmetry problem is not so acute and an increase in the IPO activity when the level 
of underpricing is lower. 
The evidence on the relation between IPO volume and adverse selection costs 
is mixed. Jegadeesh, Weinstein and Welsh (1993), Michaely and Shaw (1994) do not 
support the story that IPO volume in the US is driven by lower underpricing. Gerbich 
and Levis (1996) and Gerbich (1996) however, find that the amount of capital raised 
from UK IPOs increases as the average first day returns of the IPOs that went public 
during the previous quarter decrease. 
Firms that announce a takeover bid that is financed with' equity also face 
significant 'adverse, selection costs. The share price of the bidder drops by a 
significant percentage creating additional, ' indirect costs to the ' bidder., 
- 
There is no 
empirical work however that investigates whether these indirect costs are really 
important for the timing of the equity financed takeover bid., If the magnitude of 
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adverse selection costs is of paramount importance to the bidder that uses equity to 
finance a bid then, more equity financed bids should be made in periods when these 
costs are low. 
Overall, the investigation of the effect of adverse selection costs on the timing 
of equity issues has produced mixed results. Previous empirical findings suggest that 
the significance of adverse selection costs is high in the timing of SEOs but has a 
lesser role in the timing of IPOs. International evidence on this area are scarce. Only 
one international study for the UK IPOs is available linking the IPO decision with 
the magnitude of underpricing. One of the main research motivations of this thesis is 
to investigate the effect that adverse selection costs have on the timing of IPOs, SEOs 
and takeover bids financed with equity. In chapters 5,6 and 7 we examine whether 
the magnitude of adverse selection costs affects the timing of IPOs, SEOs and 
takeover bids financed with equity respectively. 
2.5.2 Equity issues and the business cycle. 
During favourable economic conditions, firms face more investment 
opportunities and the net present value of the project is likely to be higher. Therefore, 
the demand for investments is higher. One source of finance for these projects is the 
issuance of capital. During periods of good economic conditions stock markets are 
usually rising making the choice of equity as a more preferable one relative to other 
options such as debt. It is rational to assume that more firms would make an equity 
issue during periods when economic conditions are improving. 
Empirical evidence support the argument that more firms make equity issues 
during the periods when firms face better business opportunities. Choe, Masulis and 
Nanda (1993) find that the ratio of common shares issued to all securities issued 
increases during expansions. Gerbich (1996), and Rees (1997) find a strong relation 
between the short leading indicator and the UK IPO activity. Hickman (1953), Moore 
(1980), and recently Berkovich & Narayanan (1993) also document that the number 
of firms that issue common stock increases when the economy is in the phase of an 
expansion. Berkovich & Narayanan (1993) believe that when economic conditions 
are improving and the expected profits from investments increase, firms are 
undertaking even lower quality projects. In their model they prove that low quality 
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projects are financed with equity. Hence, we have more equity financing during 
expansions because in these periods firms undertake more low quality projects and 
these projects are solely financed with equity. 
According to Choe, Masulis and Nanda (1993) however, the reason behind 
the increase in equity financing during the upturn of the business cycle is not simply 
that the demand for investment is higher but that these periods are characterised by 
lower adverse selection costs. During an expansion, firms face more profitable 
investment opportunities and the value of their existing assets is higher. Choe, 
Masulis and Nanda (1993) believe that there is a marginal firm of quality i* that is 
indifferent between issuing debt or equity because for that firm the market value of 
common stock held by old shareholders is the same, after the issue, whether equity or 
debt is issued. Firms of lower quality than the marginal firm ( i< i*) issue equity 
and high quality firms (i >i*) issue debt. The market value of all firms is considered 
to be a positive function of economic conditions. Therefore, as economic conditions 
improve, the market value of the issuer under both the two options ( equity or debt) 
increase by the same amount. So, the quality of the marginal firm i*, which is 
indifferent between the issue of equity or debt, increases. As i* increase, more firms 
will find themselves to be below the marginal firm. Since the firms that are below the 
marginal firm issue equity, the volume of equity financing increases as economic 
conditions improve. 
Going even further, Choe, Masulis and Nanda (1993) 
- 
argue that when 
economic condition improve and the aN erage quality of equity issuers increase, the 
announcement of an equity offer signals less negative information about the value of 
.. 
1 the firm's assets. Therefore the adverse selection ' costs should be lower. Investors 
should not mark down or mark down by a smaller percentage the price of a firm that 
is of higher quality. Since the average quality of the equity. issuer increases during the 
upturns of the business cycle, less negative returns should be observed at the upturn 
of the cycle. So, according to Choe, Masulis and Nanda (1993), 'during an expansion 
'r, more firms resort to issuing equity because the adverse selection costs associated 
with the announcement of an equity issue are lower during an'expansion. Along with 
that argument are the findings of Gerbich (1996) who finds that underpricing for UK 
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IPOs is smaller when the economy is in the last stage of the expansion and increases 
as the economy goes through a recession. 
Bayless & Chaplinsky (1996) however dispute the fact that periods of low 
adverse selection costs are periods with favourable economic conditions. The lower 
adverse selection costs do not arise from improvements in economic conditions or 
other macroeconomic factors. Not all periods of heavy volume are periods when 
economic conditions are favourable. In fact, they find that there are some light 
volume SEO periods when the economic conditions are much better than some heavy 
SEO periods. 
Economic conditions have an effect on the merger and takeover activity as 
well. Nelson(1961) finds that merger activity responds positively and consistently to 
the business cycle. Between 1895 and 1956, merger activity fluctuated with the 
business cycle. Merger peaks preceded the business cycle peaks by about ten months. 
Sudarsanam (1995) reports that UK takeover activity is high in 1986 to 1987, a 
period when the UK economy experienced an economic boom. No study however 
has looked as the effect of business conditions on takeover gains for bidders and 
particularly whether these gains vary with the business cycle. If acquisition gains for 
bidders are found to fluctuate across time that would indicate that there are certain 
periods when the market response to a bid announcement is more favourable relative 
to other periods. That could be a factor with great importance in the timing of 
mergers and acquisition. 
In general, the literature has provided examples of a positive relation between 
the equity issuance activity and the economic conditions. Periods of more favourable 
business conditions seem to attract the attention of more issuers. Some of the 
evidence suggest that economic conditions have an impact on the adverse selection 
costs as well. Chapters 5,6 and 7 investigate whether such cyclical patterns exists in 
the UK by looking at the IPO, SEO and takeover activity across different phases of 
the business cycle and the impact that economic conditions have on the magnitude of 
adverse selection costs. 
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2.5.3 Overvaluation Exploitation and Variations in Investors' Sentiment 
The improvement in economic conditions and the reduction of adverse 
selection costs is not the only explanations that has been put forward for the variation 
in equity issuance activity over time: Instead of concentrating on the adverse 
selection costs of the issue as the driving force behind the timing of the issue, others 
concentrate on the more obvious costs of the issue. The timing of an IPO in periods 
when share prices are high will enable the issuer to raise more money from the issue. 
A firm will also benefit if the SEO takes place in a period when its stock is 
overvalued. That will result to a smaller loss of the firm's ownership by the existing 
shareholders and/or more capital raised from the offer. In addition, the bidder that 
uses equity to finance the bid also will reduce the cost of the takeover if it uses equity 
as a method of payment when its share price is overvalued. So, another explanation 
argues that firms prefer to issue shares or use equity to finance a bid when share 
prices are higher than their intrinsic values. 
Lucas & McDonald (1990), believe that the variation in the volume of equity 
issues over time is caused by the fact that equity issues, on average, follow market 
increases. The clustering of equity offers results from bullish markets. Lucas & 
McDonald (1990), believe that the percentage of all firms that are undervalued in the 
whole economy varies across time. According to them, there are periods that the 
fraction of undervalued firms ( firms about to release good news for their future) is 
higher than the average. These firms will have to wait and issue equity after that 
undervaluation is corrected. That rise in the share price of the "undervalued "firms 
will cause a general market rise. So, we see more equity issues after general market 
rises. 
Loughran & Ritter (1995) document a significant underperformance for US 
firms conducting an IPO or a Seasoned Equity Offer for up to five years after the 
issue. These- results together with the price run-up that has been-documented 
before the announcement of the SEO, lead them to believe that. - firms issue when 
their stock is overvalued. According to Loughran and Ritter (1995) variations in 
equity issuance activity, 
-! arise from changes in investors'. sentiment. Issuers take 
advantage of transitory windows of; opportunity during which issuers. can achieve 
higher valuations and so issue equity when their, stock is overvalued: Managers are 
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'interesting in setting the price of the offer at the higher level possible and when they 
identify a period during which investors are willing to overpay for new equity issues 
they see the opportunity and raise capital in more favourable terms. As time 
progresses and investors gradually realise the true value of the issues is lower, they 
mark down the prices of firms that have overpriced the issues creating a significant 
underperformance for SEO issuers. The underperformance should be higher for those 
firms that have the most overvalued issues. If there are periods when issuers can 
achieve higher levels of overvaluation in their issues then we should see that firms 
that raised capital in those periods must have worst post-issue performances. 
If exploitation of overvaluation and sentiment timing are major driving forces 
of the variability of the equity issuance activity, then firms that make the issues in 
periods of heavy volume should have the most overvalued issues and should have 
higher levels of underperformance relative to the firms that make the issues it 
periods of light issuance activity. Loughran & Ritter ( 1995), report that IPOs that 
come to the market in periods of light volume do not significantly underperform but 
those IPOs that come into the market in periods of Heavy IPO volume significantly 
underperform. Ritter (1991) finds that the difference in 3-year total return for a firm 
that goes public in a low IPO volume year is 90.7% from the IPO that goes public in 
a heavy IPO volume year, ceteris paribus. Helwege & Liang (1997), find that firms 
that went public in 1983 which was a year of heavy IPO volume in the US, 
underperformed relative to the mean Nasdaq return. IPOs of year 1988, which was a 
light IPO volume year 
, 
outperformed the Mean Nasdaq return. Ljungqvist (1996) 
however finds that German IPOs that went public when IPO volume was high, 
performed better that the IPOs that went public in periods of low IPO volume. 
Loughran & Ritter (1995) find evidence that SEO volume is driven by overvaluation 
exploitation as well. They report a significant underperformance of firms that make a 
SEO which is indeed concentrated only on firms that make the SEO in heavy volume 
periods. Firms that make a SEO in light volume periods do not have significantly 
negative performances. 
Not only IPOs and SEOs that are offered to the general public can benefit by 
timing the issues when investors' sentiment is favourable and prices are high. Even 
in the cases of rights issues, where the new shares are offered to existing shareholders 
and 'therefore managers' incentives of overvaluation exploitation are 
. 
diminished, 
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there are benefits by timing the issues in periods of high investors' sentiment. Firms 
that make a rights issue are not guaranteed that they will raise all the money that they 
need to fund their projects. Existing shareholders may choose not to exercise their 
rights but to sell them to the market or to the underwriter that may have underwritten 
the issue. By timing the issue at periods when the market sentiment is high, the 
issuer is more likely to make a successful issue, that is to raise the full amount of 
capital it requires. Investors must be more eager to participate in equity issues when 
the market is characterised by an optimism. 
We investigate whether overvaluation exploitation is a major driving force 
behind the timing of equity issues in chapters 5 and 6 where we compare the post- 
Issue performances of IPOs and SEOs that made the issues is periods of heavy and 
light issuance. 
The issue whether the choice of equity as the method of payment for a 
takeover bid is driven by attempts to exploit overvaluation of equity has not been 
previously researched. If bidders opt to use equity only in cases when it is 
overvalued, then bidders that use equity should underperform after the bid, and the 
underperformance must be higher during periods when more bidders resort to equity 
financing. Chapter 7 investigates the post-bid performance of bidders that use equity 
to finance the bid and the relation between performance and equity financed takeover 
volume. 
2.5.4 UK Evidence on the Timing of Equity Issues. 
IPO activity in the UK varies over time. Gerbich (1996), Byrne and Rees 
(1996), Rees (1997) have looked at the UK IPO activity and tried to explain what 
drives the time series variation in UK IPO activity. 
Gerbich (1996) links the decision to make an IPO to the adverse selection 
costs associated with 
. 
the IPO. He believes : that IPO volume is driven - by lower 
underpricing. His findings suggest that more capital is raised from IPOs 
, 
excluding 
privatisations, during months when the first day returns of the IPOs that went public 
in the previous quarter were low., He also links the IPO activity with economic 
conditions arguing that during periods, with improving economic conditions more 
IPOs come to the market in shorter day intervals.. 
..:. 
rý 
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Gerbich (1996) also reports a significant indirect relationship between 
economic conditions and underpricing. He does not establish however a direct 1inlt 
between economic conditions and underpricing to support his story that adverse 
selection costs are lower during the expansion phase of the business cycle. Instead, 
he finds that during the last stages of the expansion, the duration, which is the 
number of days between two consecutive IPOs 
, 
is lower than any other period of the 
cycle. Following that, he forms ten portfolios according to the length of the duration. 
The portfolio with the smaller duration has the lower first day returns. In other 
words, when the economy is near the peak of the cycle, IPOs are coming into 
shorter intervals and when IPOs come into shorter intervals first day returns are 
lower. Gerbich (1996) also find that rising markets and high volatility positively 
affect the amount of capital raised from IPOs 
. 
Byrne and Rees (1996), concentrate in explaining the number of Initial Public 
Offers per month instead of the amount of IPO proceeds. In contrast with Gerbich 
(1996) they find that the stock market does not significantly affect the IPO activity 
and that the volatility adversely affects the number of IPOs that come to the market 
per month. They find however a strong interest rate effect. High interest rates reduce 
the IPO activity. 
Rees (1997) investigates both the amount of capital raised and the numbers' 
of IPOs per quarter. In contrast with the earlier study, Rees (1997) finds that the 
market positively affects the number of IPOs per quarter and that interest rates have 
no effect on the IPO activity. A strong relation between the short leading indicator 
and the IPO activity is also documented. When the dependent variable was the' 
amount of capital raised from IPOs per quarter, excluding the privatisations, 
economic conditions lost their significance in explaining the IPO volume in contrast 
with Gerbich (1996). The level of the stock market was still positively related with 
the IPO volume while interest rates had no effect. In this paper however, Rees 
(1997) collects the data from the Stockexchange Quality of markets Survey. In his 
earlier paper the source was the KPMG new issues statistics. We used both databases 
and we find that the two differ in the day they record as the first trading day. So, the 
difference in the results may be due to the different sample. The econometric analysis 
used in the two papers is also different. } In the first paper poison regression are 
performed while in the second ordinary least squares are used. Even the explanatory 
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variables are different. The 6 month market return is used in the first paper while the 
FT All Share Price index deflated with 1990 prices is used in the second. So the 
differences in the results between Rees (1997) and Byrne and Rees (1996) are be due 
to differences in methodology or sample collection. 
No studies have been done concerning the timing of UK SEOs or takeover 
bids that are financed with equity. This thesis, attempts to fill in the gap that exists in 
the literature by investigate the timing not only of IPOs but of SEOs and takeover 
bids as well. 
2.6. CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter has reviewed and evaluated the empirical findings of other 
studies on the three stylised facts that characterise the behaviour of firms that make 
an Initial public offering, a Seasoned equity offering and takeover bid. First we 
present the results of previous research on the large positive first day returns for IPOs 
and the significant negative price reactions on the announcement of the SEO and the 
takeover bid. Models based on avoidance of law suits and signalling quality for 
future issues as potential explanation for the large first day returns for IPOs have 
been rejected by the literature since empirical evidence do not support them. The 
uncertainty that surrounds the intrinsic value of the IPOs has a significant effect on 
the magnitude of underpricing that investors "require" in order to participate for new 
issues. The existence of market imperfections such as information asymmetries and 
managers' incentives to exploit overvaluation in equity issues is widely. believed to 
offer the best explanation for the larger first day 
- 
returns. Investors' uncertainty 
about the intrinsic value of the issuers has a significant effect on the issuance 
decision with IPO firms having to underprice the issue to encourage uninformed 
investors to participate. Significant price movements occur on the announcement of 
a SEO and a takeover bid as well. Seasoned issuers and bidders see their share price 
decrease by significant percentages. Theories based on the price pressure hypothesis 
and debt co-insurance theories fail to attract support as explanations for these price 
movements. Information asymmetries between investors and managers about the true 
value of the issuers"and its future profitability "and managers incentives to exploit 
overvaluation are the academia's favourable answer for the reasons behind these 
adverse price reaction. 
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The second stylised fact that characterises the firms make an IPO, a SEO and 
a takeover bid and was reviewed in this chapter is that all of them are poor 
performers after the event. IPOs, SEOs and bidder underperform significantly after 
the issue and the bid. The cognitive bias and overvaluation timing are the best 
explanations that the academia has provided. Improvements in operating performance 
of issuers in the pre-issue years and a deterioration in the operating performance in 
the post-issue years provide support to the cognitive bias theory. Evidence of a 
significant time series variation in underperformance with issuers that make the issue 
during heavy issuance periods having significantly worst performances than issues 
that make the issue in light volume periods support the overvaluation timing theory. 
Finally, the third stylised fact that characterises equity issuance and takeover 
activity is that there is a significant time series variation in the issuance volume. 
While changes in business conditions and investment opportunities can provide an 
explanation to such a variation other theories link the volume of equity issues with 
the adverse selection costs that are associated with equity issues. Periods when 
underpricing for IPOs and adverse selection costs for SEOs are low are periods when 
equity issue activity is high. Most important however, the literature seems to favour 
the idea that issuers exploit transitory windows of opportunity when issuers can raise 
capital in more favourable terms windows which result from inventors'. 
overestimation of the growth potential of issuers and extrapolation of recent 
operating improvements. 
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CHAPTER 3: LITERATURE REVIEW ON THE EFFECT OF 
FINANCIAL ANALYSTS EARNINGS FORECASTS ON THE 
TIMING OF EQUITY ISSUES. 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
We saw in the previous chapter that a big part of the literature believes that 
equity issuers "time" the issues around periods when investors' sentiment is 
favourable. Such a proposition however is very difficult to be tested directly. An 
investigation into the effect of market sentiment in the timing of equity issues can 
only be conducted either by looking at ex-post equity issues anomalies or by trying to 
find a factor that could approximate to the market sentiment. In the first case, 
researchers look at the post-issue performances of issuers and try to identify first 
whether issuers underperform after the issue and second if there are significant 
differences between the performance of issuers that make the issue in heavy and light 
volume periods. In the second case, researchers can use proxies for the market 
sentiment. The problem in this case is to identify such a proxy. 
A very important accounting information that is used by investors to estimate 
the true value of a firm is the earnings. The expected future growth in the earnings is 
incorporated in the current share prices. Firms that are expected to have a large 
increase in their earnings are likely to be priced at higher levels than firms with low 
earnings growth prospects. During periods of favourable market conditions the 
expected future growth of earnings is likely to be higher. When the market sentiment 
is high this optimism will have an impact on the earnings forecasts. Periods when the 
market is characterised by favourable conditions should be periods when analysts 
should be forecasting higher earnings for the firms relative to periods when the 
growth prospects are gloomy, ceteris paribus. Financial analysts' earnings forecasts 
could be used as a proxy for the market sentiment. Analysts' earnings forecasts 
should reflect and to some extent even affect the market sentiment. 
Firms that make an equity issue stand to gain a lot by timing the issue at a 
period when analysts' earnings forecasts are optimistic. This optimism will be 
incorporated into the current share prices pushing them to higher levels. The cost of 
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the issue will be lower when the share price of the issue is high. Managers, who 
rationally seek to minimise their cost of capital, will use every available opportunity 
and make an IPO when the market sentiment is more favourable, ceteris paribus. 
The market sentiment should be important in the timing of Seasoned equity 
issues as well. In Seasoned Equity offerings where the new shares are offered to the 
general public, managers, who act on behalf of existing shareholders, have the 
incentive to make the issue when the share price is high. In such a case, more capital 
will be raised with the existing shareholders losing a smaller portion of the firm's 
ownership to the new shareholders. Under such a scenario, periods when the 
earnings' forecast are optimistic and the prices are above the fundamentals can 
create the conditions when the cost of new capital can be minimised. 
In the UK and other countries, the seasoned equity issues are made with the 
method of rights issues. This is a unique method for raising seasoned equity capital 
because it eliminates managers' incentives to exploit new shareholders in favour of 
existing ones by selling to them overvalued shares, Myers & Majluf (1984). Under a 
rights issue, the new shares are offered first to existing shareholders. They have the 
right to buy the new shares at a prefixed price and terms or to sell their rights to 
another investor who wants to buy the shares or to the underwriter of the issue, if the 
issue is underwritten. In either way, shareholders or managers do not gain or lose 
anything if the issue price is high. ( see endnote 1) 
If managers seek to maximise the existing shareholders' utility, they have no 
incentive to price the new shares at dearer prices since existing shareholders will not 
gain or lose anything if the share price of the issue is high or low. Therefore, 
managers that seek to maximise their shareholders' utility have no incentive to time 
the issue at periods when analysts' earnings optimism is high. That is unless 
managers place their own satisfaction higher than that of their shareholders. 
Managerial compensation and personal satisfaction and fulfilment may be related to 
the firms size. In such a case, managers do have the incentive to issue at higher 
prices. By issuing at a higher price, they can raise more capital with offering the same 
amount of shares. If managers' personal satisfaction is ranked higher than that of 
their shareholders we might expect that managers may be tempted to time the equity 
issue when the market sentiment favours the issuance of capital at higher prices.. 
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Firms that make a rights issue are under pressure from the underwriters to 
ease their marketing and selling efforts. If the new issue is priced at a high price then 
the probability increases that existing investors might not commit their funds to buy 
the new shares and therefore would prefer to sell their rights to the market. In some 
cases, the underwriter's obligation is to buy these rights if no other investor wants to 
buy them and provide the money to buy the shares that correspond to these un- 
exercised rights. That represents a cost to the underwriter who, in such a outcome has 
to commit funds to acquire and effort to sell the shares to the market. Therefore, there 
is pressure from the underwriters of the issuers to price the issue at low prices that 
will make investors participate in the issue. If however there are periods during 
which existing shareholders are more willing to buy the new issue, then these 
pressures from the underwriters may ease thus making the issue of capital easier. 
Certainly periods when analysts' earnings forecasts are high should be periods when 
investors will be more willing to participate in the issues and therefore underwriters' 
concerns should be minimised compared with periods with gloomy earnings' 
forecasts. 
Even in the cases when the rights issue is not underwritten or there is no 
guarantee that the un-exercised rights will be bought by the underwriter, firms will be 
better off to time the issue at a period when earnings' forecast are high. Investors will 
be more eager to participate in the issue when they see that the forecasted earnings of 
the firms are high, reassuring firms that the they will raise all the amount that they 
have planned as necessary to fund their projects. On the other hand, the participation 
of investors on rights issues should be lower when the earnings forecasts are lower or 
the business environment is gloomy making the raise of the full amount of capital 
demanded by the firms less likely. 
Overall, equity issuers have to benefit from making the issues when the 
market sentiment is favourable. If issuers exploit investors' sentiment in the timing 
of equity issues then a significant relation between analysts' optimism and the 
number of equity issues should exist. This issue has just started to attract the attention 
of those that investigate the forces behind the time series variation in the volume of 
equity issues. The effect of analysts' earnings optimism has not been thoroughly 
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researched and the only studies conducted up to now have been made in the US. In 
the next section we present the main findings of these studies. 
Several studies have documented that the operating performance of firms that 
make an equity issue improves in the period prior to the equity issue and deteriorates 
in the post-issue years. These studies look at various accounting measures at the time 
these figures are reported. The financial analysts' earnings forecasts are very helpful 
not only as a proxy for market sentiment but also because they provide the market's 
view of the future profitability of the firm at the time of the issue. The use of 
financial analysts' earnings forecasts can provide an updated view of firms 
profitability. Analysts' forecasts for a firm are usually available every month and so 
every new piece of information that becomes public is incorporated into the earnings 
forecasts. If the equity issue has an impact on the profitability of the issuer then that 
should be, either immediately or even gradually, reflected in analysts' forecasts. By 
looking at how analysts revise their earnings forecasts we can see how a particular 
corporate action such as a SEO or an IPO affects the firm profitability. If the issuers 
time the issues at the peak of their profitability and the timing of the issue is 
motivated by managers who foresee a deterioration in future performance then 
analysts should revise upwards their earnings forecast in the pre-SEO period and 
revise downwards their forecasts in the post-SEO and post-IPO period. The second 
part of this chapter looks at previous studies that have uncovered how analysts regard 
that the equity issue will affect the profitability of the issuer. 
This chapter reviews the empirical findings of previous studies on the issue of 
analysts earnings forecasts overoptimism around the equity issues and the effect of 
earnings' overoptimism on the timing of equity issues. At the last part we look at the 
studies that have been conducted looking at analysts forecast revisions around equity 
issues. 
3.2 EQUITY ISSUES AND ANALYSTS' EARNINGS OPTIMISM 
Financial analysts play a very important role in today's capital markets. In 
order to make an earnings forecast they gather as many pieces of macroeconomic and 
firm specific information they can and form an assessment of the future earnings of 
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the firms. Investors use these forecasts to estimate the intrinsic value of the firms. 
Especially uninformed investors or investors who are not willing to pay the cost of 
gathering information which will enable them to estimate the value of the firms with 
accuracy rely, at least to some extent, on financial analysts' earnings forecasts in 
order to estimate the growth potential of companies. 
Several studies have found that financial analysts overestimate firms' future 
earnings growth potential. Dreman & Berry ( 1995), report that the average forecast 
error is more than 20 per cent of the actual EPS. Chopra (1998) concludes that 
analysts forecasts of EPS and growth in EPS tend to be overly optimistic with 
calendarised earnings estimates overstating actual earnings by 11% at the start of the 
year. Brown (1997) reports that the mean consensus EPS over the absolute value of 
actual EPS is 
-31.6%. Hansen & Sarin (1998) also find that analysts overestimate the 
actual earnings. The evidence on analysts' overestimation of earnings is 
overwhelming. This overestimation however decreases as the month of the 
announcement of the earnings approaches. As time passes by, more information 
about firms' earnings become public and that make analysts to be more accurate in 
their forecasts. Capstaff, Paudyal & Rees (1995) find that the mean forecast error of 
forecasts made 20 months before the fiscal year end is 0.235 and the mean forecast 
error made 10 months before the fiscal year end is 0.185. 
Brown (1997) reports significant variations in forecast errors for different 
industries. Brown (1997) also finds a negative relation between market capitalisation 
and the magnitude of forecast errors. Small firms are characterised by more negative 
earnings surprises than larger firms for which, although the average earnings surprise 
is negative, it is not significant from zero. Brown (1997) also reports, a negative 
relation between the number of analyst following the firm and the magnitude of the 
errors. The number of analysts covering a firm however is significantly related with 
the size of the firm and so the effect of analyst following and market value of the 
firm is somehow overlapping. Hansen & Sann (1998) find that analysts make larger 
forecast error when they forecast the earnings of firms with high earnings growth. 
Even though analysts are overoptimistic on average for all. firms, a part of the 
literature reports that, certain groups of. firms experience more than the average 
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overoptimistic forecasts. According to Rajan & Servaes (1998) analysts are 
systematically overoptimistic about the growth of earnings of all firms. They are 
more overoptimistic however for IPOs. The forecasts analysts make during the first 
year after the listing for firms that went public, are significantly overoptimistic. 
Earnings forecasts, scaled by the share price at the time the forecasts were made, 
with a forecast horizon of 3,6, and 12 months and made within one year after the 
IPO, were 3.36%, 4.45% and 5.77% respectively above the actual earnings. Forecast 
errors remained negative even when they were industry and size adjusted. The 
adjusted forecast errors were 
, -1.65%, -1.47% and -3.21% for the 3,6, and 12 month 
forecast horizons respectively. Average unadjusted and adjusted forecast errors 
remained significantly negative even when the forecasts were made in the second 
year after the IPO indicating that analysts' overoptimism for firms that went public 
continues into the second year of their public life. 
According to Rajan & Servaes (1997) 
, 
analysts are overoptimistic for the 
long term growth in earnings of IPOs as well (up to 5 years). When analysts forecast 
the long term growth in earnings of IPOs during the first 3 to 6 months after the 
listing they expect IPOs to have a 5% higher long-term growth in earnings, relative 
to firms in the same industry. When analysts forecast the long term growth in 
earnings of IPOs at the end of year 1 they expect IPOs to have a 3.22% higher long- 
term growth in earnings relative to firms in the same industry, while when the 
forecasts are made in the end of year 2 and 3, IPOs are expected to have a growth of 
3.04% and 1.39% higher that firms in the same industry.. 
A few studies have been conducted investigating the analysts' earnings 
overoptimism around Seasoned equity issues as well. Their results however are 
contradictory due to the different methods used to calculate forecast errors. Dechow, 
Hutton & Sloan (1998) investigate the accuracy of analysts' forecasts of long term 
earnings made in the period of 9 months prior to and up to 3 months after the SEO 
announcement. They find that analysts overestimate the long term earnings by 10.6% 
providing support to the argument that analysts are overoptimistic for the earnings of 
firms around SEO announcements. They do not compare these errors however with 
any control group nor do they adjust them for any of the factors that have been found 
to significantly influence analysts' forecast accuracy. V 
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That issue is highlighted by Hansen & Sann (1998) who find big differences 
between analysts' unadjusted and analysts adjusted forecast errors. They report that 
the unadjusted forecast errors analysts make 6 terms prior to the announcement of 
the issue and up to 1 month after the announcement are significantly negative as in 
Dechow, Hutton & Sloan (1998). Unadjusted forecast errors are also significantly 
negative in the post-announcement as well, quarters 2 to +8, and of higher 
magnitude compared with the pre-announcement period. Hansen & Sarin (1998) 
emphasise however the important of adjusting forecast error for some characteristics 
that have a significant effect on the magnitude of analysts overoptimism. They report 
that analysts' errors are higher when they forecast the earnings of firms with high 
growth. They find that firms that make a SEO are firms with high growth and 
therefore the forecast errors have to be adjusted for this "growth bias". Adjusted for 
the growth bias, Hansen & Sarin (1998) find that analysts are not overoptimistic in 
the period prior to the announcement of the issue in contrast with Dechow, Hutton & 
Sloan (1998). Forecast errors for the current year earnings are positive and 
significantly different from zero in the pre-SEO period. With regards to the post- 
announcement period, their analysis reveals that errors are insignificantly different 
from zero. Similar results were obtained when they adjusted the errors for the number 
of analysts following the issuer or when they looked at analysts' overoptimism for 
the long term growth in the earnings instead of current year earnings. 
The difference in the two papers is puzzling since both look at approximately 
the same time periods. The discrepancy however must be driven by the method used 
to calculate long term growth in earnings. Hansen & Sarin (1998) calculate the long 
term forecast error as the difference between the error made for the company and the 
error made for non-SEO companies with similar forecasted growth in their earnings. 
Dechow, Hutton & Sloan (1998) on the other hand, do not adjust their errors for any 
benchmark. 
Ali (1995) examines SEOs for a period of 20 year and finds that the errors 
made for the year of the offering, after being adjusted for the I/B/E/S mean forecast 
error, are not significantly negative. The forecasts however that were'made during the 
5 years after the issue announcement are significantly overoptimistic. 
-. 
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The fact that analysts are overoptimistic for firms that recently went public or 
made a SEO has received criticism because these forecast errors could be driven by 
selection bias. Financial analysts that make these forecasts may be employed in a 
firm that acted as an underwriter of that IPO or the SEO and so these analysts may be 
"ordered" to overestimate the growth potentials in order to assist the issue process. 
Close business relations with the firms may prevent analysts from making precise 
and objective forecasts for them especially when those forecasts are not good. Sc), 
agency problems may cause those forecast errors. It may even be that underwriters 
underwrite issued made only by firms that they believe have high growth potentials. 
If any selection bias drives the behaviour of forecast errors then those errors should 
be higher when a larger percentage of all the forecasts available for the issuers comes 
from the underwriters. 
Once again the evidence on the effect of analysts' affiliation on the accuracy 
of their forecasts is mixed. Rajan & Servaes (1997) find that there is no relation 
between the number of underwriters that provide forecasts and 'the forecast errors. 
Only for the three-month forecasts were the errors higher and positively related with 
the number of underwriters. For all other forecast horizos, errors were not affected by 
agency problems. So all financial analysts, not only those that underwrite the issues, 
are overoptimistic about the IPOs. 
In line with the above findings, Lin & McNichols (1998) report that analysts' 
affiliation has no effect on analysts' overoptimism. They find no significant 
differences in the average forward year 1 earnings, forward year 2 earnings and long 
term growth forecasts for firms that make a SEO in the year prior to the issue 
between affiliated and unaffiliated analysts providing support to the argument that 
the special relation that some analysts have with the firms that make an equity issue 
does not affect the accuracy of their earnings forecasts. 
Hansen & Sarin (1998) find that forecast made by lead analysts are not higher 
from forecast made from non-lead analyst providing further evidence that analysts' 
affiliation does not affect the accuracy of their forecasts. In fact, Hansen & Sarin 
(1998) find that lead analysts' errors are smaller than the non-lead error. 
Dechow, Hutton &, Sloan (1998) however report that the long term growth 
forecasts made by affiliated analysts are more overoptimistic than those made by 
non-affiliated analysts by as much as 4%. They argue that the higher overoptimism of 
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affiliated firms may be driven by pressures" from the analysts' employees to help to 
reduce the cost of the equity issue. 
Overall, the issue of the accuracy of analysts' earnings forecasts around the 
equity issues is far from resolved. Unanswered question remain and further research 
is needed. An investigation into analysts' earnings forecasts overoptimism around 
equity issues outside the US definitely provides a challenge and will shed more light 
into this contentious issue. 
3.3 EFFECT OF ANALYSTS' OVEROPTIMISM ON THE TIMING OF EQUITY ISSUES. 
Even though there are a few studies that look at analysts' overoptimism in the 
period around equity issues only one study tries to link analysts' overoptimism with 
the time series variation in equity activity. As we saw earlier, Rajan & Servaes 
(1997) present evidence that analysts make overoptimistic assessments of earnings 
growth for IPOs. Going one step further they find that IPO activity increases when 
the growth potential attached to them by analysts are higher. The number of firms 
going public per industry per quarter increases as the average long term earnings 
growth forecast, for all the firms that went public in the previous 12 month period in 
that industry, increases. The same happens when the average long term earnings 
growth forecast for all IPOs in the past 12 months in the same industry increase. The 
coefficients on these variables remained significant even when other variables were 
added in the regressions such as historical and relative MB. Long term earnings 
growth forecasts never lose their significance. 
An interpretation of the coefficients found by Rajan & Servaes (1998) 
suggest that a 7% increase in the long term earnings growth causes an increase in 
the number of IPOs per industry per quarter by 2.4. Even when the growth measure is 
adjusted for the growth in earnings for all seasoned firms in the same industry there 
is still a positive - and significant relationship between 'growth 
- 
forecasts and IPO 
volume.. 
.-... 
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According to Rajan & Servaes (1997) more firms decide to go public after 
periods when the growth potentials attached by analysts to all the recent IPOs or the 
recent IPOs in their industry are high. One could 
-argue what - these results show is 
the phenomenon that firms go public when the industries have high growth 
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potential. To finance this growth, firms need to raise capital and an IPO is a solution 
to the funding problem they may experience. Since what analysts are predicting is 
the growth opportunities for firms what these findings may be telling us is that firm 
go public when growth opportunities are higher. Nevertheless, the forecast errors 
analysts are making are big. These forecasts do not represent an accurate prediction 
of the true growth potential. These predictions are upwards biased. The fact that 
analysts attach high growth potentials to a firm does not necessarily mean that this 
potential are actual or of the same magnitude. Rajan & Servaes (1998) argue that the 
above results are more in line with the argument that IPOs occur when analysts are 
overoptimistic about their earnings growth. To further support that, they find, a 
positive and significant relation between the number of IPOs per industry per quarter 
and the forecast errors analysts make in forecasting the long term earnings of recent 
IPOs in the same industry. More negative forecast errors ( adjusted for industry and 
size) lead to higher IPO activity. In other words, the greater the analysts 
overoptimism is, more firms decide to go public. The obvious benefits that could 
accrue to the firm that times the equity issue around periods when analysts are, 
overoptimistic is that this overoptimism may cause an increase in the share price, 
therefore reducing the cost of capital. According to Rajan & Servaes (1997) IPO 
activity is driven by financial analysts' earnings forecasts. When analysts are more 
overoptimistic for the growth potentials of newly listed firms other firms seize the 
opportunity and go public. Any variation in that overoptimism would create a 
variation in IPO activity. 
The significant relation between initial equity offerings and analysts', 
overoptimism however has not been investigated for Seasoned equity offerings and 
there are no international studies that. support a relation between analysts' 
overoptimism and equity issue activity. In Chapters 8 and 9 we make our own 
investigation on the effect of analysts' overoptimism on the timing of equity issues in 
the UK. We find further evidence in favour of the sentiment timing hypothesis. IPO 
and SEO activity is significantly related with the analysts' overoptimism for. the 
earnings of recent issuers. 
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3.4 EQUITY ISSUES AND ANALYSTS' FORECAST REVISIONS 
There are studies that find evidence that firms time the equity issues around 
peaks of their operating performance and that an equity issue is regarded as a signal 
of a deterioration in the future earnings of the firm. Loughran & Ritter (1997) find 
that the median profit margin drops from 5.4% from the year of the offering to 2.5% 
at the 4th year after the offer. The mean operating income over assets and the return 
on assets also exhibit significant declines which are higher than non-SEO firms from 
similar industries, size and operating performance. 
Toeh Welsh & Wong (1998) find a deterioration in the earnings of firms 
making a SEO in the post-issue years. According to them, that is a consequence of 
managers actions who are "aggressive" in their use of discretionary accruals in the 
pre-announcement years in order to boost share prices. The deterioration after the 
issue is due to the inability of managers to retain the high discretionary accruals after 
the issue. Healy & Palery (1990) however report that earnings do not decrease in the 
years after the issue. Earnings per share increase in the three years before and on the 
year of the issue. After the issue changes in earnings are not significantly different 
from zero. The industry adjusted earnings also showed no deterioration in the post- 
announcement years. Healy & Palery (1990) conclude that the timing of the SEO is 
not driven by a deterioration in future earnings. 
Miller & Rock (1985) believe that actions that result in a change in the 
leverage signal changes of similar changes in the future earnings. An equity issue 
reduces the debt to equity ratio and is interpreted as a signal-that the level of future 
earnings will deteriorate. Investors mark down the price of firms that make an equity 
issue to discount for that deterioration. 
Financial analysts' earnings forecast can provide a useful tool to test whether 
managers time the SEO at the peak of their profitability.. If, firms time the equity 
issues around the peak of their operating performances and/or before a deterioration 
of, the future earnings, then, that should be "mirrored', into analysts' forecasts. 
Analysts' should revise downwards their earnings forecasts for the issuers after the 
that, issue announcement if, they, believe 
. 
the issuer's profitability will 
deteriorate after the issue. Healy & Paleru (1990) investigate analysts earnings 
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forecasts around 93 Seasoned equity issues made from 1966 to 1981. They find that 
analysts' earnings forecasts in the post-announcement period are not lower than the 
. 
earnings forecast made in the pre-announcement years disputing that managers time 
the SEO prior to a deterioration in the profitability. Brous (1992) also investigated 
whether a SEO sends negative signals to the market about the issuers' profitability. 
He uses a larger sample than Healy & Palery (1990) of earnings forecast revisions 
made around 431 Seasoned Equity Offers in the period 1976 to 1985 for which 
earnings forecasts were available. Brous (1992) finds that the average monthly 
forecast revisions 
, 
for the earnings of the current year in months 
-4 to -1 before a 
seasoned equity issue announcement, are positive. Average abnormal forecast 
revisions for the earnings of current year in months -6 to -1 are also positive and 
significant. These positive revisions mean that analysts increase their earnings 
forecasts before the issue announcement. 
At the month of the announcement of the issue, average forecast revisions 
and average abnormal forecast revisions for the current year earnings were negative 
indicating that analysts revise downwards their forecasts, of current year earnings, on 
the announcement of a SEO. Forecasts for the current year earnings continue to be 
revised downwards even after the announcement month of the SEO. Average 
forecast revisions are negative and significant for month +1 to +5 and average 
abnormal forecast revisions are negative and significant for months +1 to +3. So, the 
downwards trend in forecast revisions continues even after the announcement month. 
Average forecast revisions and average abnormal revisions for the 5-year long term 
growth in earnings did not follow the same pattern. They remained unchanged in the 
months before or after the Seasoned equity Offer announcement. Brous' (1992) 
evidence suggest that firms may time their equity issues prior to a deterioration in 
their earnings. 
No study has looked into how analysts revise their forecasts after the initial 
Public offering. If IPO firms time the equity issue around the peak of their 
profitability then analysts should revise downwards their forecasts after the firms 
have gone public. We intend to cover that gap by looking at financial analysts 
earnings forecast revisions for the UK IPOs in chapter 8. Furthermore, we look at 
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analysts forecast revisions around UK SEOs to see whether UK firms time the SEO 
at the peak of their profitability. 
3.5 CONCLUSIONS 
Since Loughran & Ritter (1995) argued in their paper that variation in equity 
issuance activity is driven by variations in investors' sentiment, a growing part of the 
literature tried to find direct tests for the above proposition. Immediately, the focus of 
the attention was in financial analysts' earnings forecasts. Analysts' forecasts should 
be affected by the market sentiment and to some extent they may even affect it. If 
managers time the equity issues in periods when the market sentiment is more 
favourable then that should be mirrored into a relation between analysts' optimism 
and equity issue volume. 
This chapter presented the empirical results of previous research on the issue 
of the effect of analysts' earnings forecast overoptimism on the timing of equity 
issues. That effect is severely understudied and only one study by Rajan & Servaes 
(1998) provides direct evidence that IPO activity in the US is higher when analysts 
forecast high growth in the long term earnings of recent IPOs and when analysts' 
overoptimism for the current year earnings of recent IPOs is high. According to them 
analysts are overoptimistic on average for all firms but this overoptimism is more 
severe for newly listed firms and has a significant impact on the IPO volume. Periods 
when analysts are more overoptimistic for recent IPOs are periods when IPO activity 
increases. 
The evidence on analysts' overoptimism around Seasoned equity offerings is 
contradictory. Hansen & Sarin (1998) find that SEO firms are firms with high 
earnings growth and are not characterised by more overoptimistic forecasts relative 
to non SEO firms with similar growth. Ali (1995) also finds that analysts are not 
overoptimistic in the year prior to the issue announcement. Dechow et all (1998) 
however find that analysts are overoptimistic for the long-term earnings forecasts in 
the period around the issue. These studies however look at the-state of analysts 
overoptimism around equity issues and not whether these overoptimism varies across 
time and if it affects the SEO volume. No study - has been conducted into 
investigating what effect analysts' 
. 
optimism has on the SEO volume. 
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In the 8`h and 9th chapter of this thesis we look at analysts' overoptimism 
around equity issues in the UK. Our main purpose in these chapters is to see whether 
analysts' overoptimism for the earnings of equity issuers varies across time and 
whether it has an impact on the equity issuance volume. 
Analysts' earnings forecasts have also been used in the literature to see what 
impact analysts believe the announcement of corporate actions such as SEOs will 
have on the profitability of the issuer. Studies using other accounting information 
find that issuers time the issue at the peak of their operating performance. The studies 
that used forecast revisions however provide mixed evidence. Brous (1992) shows 
that the announcement of a SEO induces investors to revise downwards their forecast 
of the current year earnings believing that the timing of SEO is driven by managers 
who foresee a shortcoming in the level of future earnings. Healy & Palery (1990) in 
contrast, find that analysts forecasts are not lower in the period after the issue relative 
to the forecasts made in the period prior to the issue announcement disputing the fact 
that the SEO signals a deterioration in the future profitability. 
As with analysts overoptimism and its potential effect on issuance volume, 
there are no international studies that investigate analysts forecast revisions around 
equity issues. In chapters 8 and, 9 we look at analysts forecast revisions After IPOs 
and around rights issues announcement to see whether these managers "time" the, 
equity issues around the peak of their operating performance. 
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CHAPTER 4: DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
4.1. DATA COLLECTION AND DESCRIPTION 
Our data set for the Initial Public Offerings activity in the UK covers the 
period from January 1981 to December 1996. The sample is the sample used by 
Levis (1993) extended up to 1996. The name of the issuers, the listing date, the 
amount of proceeds, the offer price and the method of the offer were collected from 
KPMG New Issue Statistics. We limited our sample only to the firms that raised 
capital from the Issue. So, only offers for sale, offers for subscriptions and placing 
were used. We excluded introductions. In total 1424 firms made an IPO to the 
MAIN, USM and AIM markets during the period 1981 to 1996. IPO firms that 
subsequently went bankrupt or were taken over are also included in the sample. We 
also used the London Stock Exchange Fact Book and the "London Quality of markets 
monthly" that provide details on the new listings such as the amount of capital raised. 
In a few cases, details on the amount of capital raised were not available in KPMG 
and were found in London Quality of markets monthly. 
Table 4.1 reports the annual distribution of new issues in the London Stock 
Exchange and the distribution of our sample. On average we have 89 new firms every 
year with 1994 seeing a record of 179 new firms being listed on the London Stock 
Exchange. Early 90's were the years with the lowest activity with only 18 firms going 
public in 1991. The amount of capital also varies across time. Through the 16 year 
period more than £ 70 billion were raised from IPOs excluding the privatisations. 
1984 was a particularly active year with early 90's being the quieter period. Not for 
all the IPOs did we manage to find data that would enable us to calculate the first day 
returns. Our sample covers more than 88% of the population. In total we have first 
day returns for 1262 firms in the 16 year period. In columns 4 and 5 of table 4.1 we 
report the average and median first day return of the 1262 IPOs per year. The average 
first day return was 11.72% and the median 7.14%. The higher first day returns were 
in 1987 when the average IPO had a first day return of 25.73%., The lowest average 
first day returns with 4.93% was in 1981. 
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TABLE 4.1: ANNUAL VOLUME OF INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERINGS IN 
THE UK AND FIRST DAY RETURNS PER YEAR FROM 1981 TO 1996 
Year Number of 
IPOs 
per Year 
( source KPMG 
new Issue 
statistics) 
Amount of 
capital 
raised per yea? 
(prices Dec 
1996) 
in £m 
Average 
First Day 
Return 
Median First 
Day Return 
Number of 
IPOs for 
which First day 
returns were 
able to be 
calculated 
1981 40 822 4.93% 3.48% 37 
1982 48 5730 14.46% 4.67% 46 
1983 76 11116 19.80% 6.86% 76 
1984 96 18633 14.91% 8.93% 95 
1985 122 758 8.82% 4.46% 120 
1986 140 1897 8.11% 4.91% 139 
1987 118 813 25.73% 22.26% 118 
1988 125 1806 9.02% 6.49% 125 
1989 82 526 11.02% 9.57% 82 
1990 30 156 11.41% 9.77% 30 
1991 18 425 10.05% 4.86% 17 
1992 33 1232 6.86% 5.69% 33 
1993 137 5363 11.34% 7.48% 92 
1994 179 8788 5.97% 3.42% 124 
1995 75 2514 8.47% 4.96% 55 
1996 105 9973 10.28% 7.82% 73 
Our data set for the Rights Issues covers a larger period, from 1975 to 1996. 
The rights issue announcement days were collected from DATASTREAM TM. In 
total, 2992 rights issues of common equity were announced during that period 
according to DATASTREAM TM 
. 
Doing random checks to see if the day 
DATASTREAM TM provides as the announcement day is correct, we found that in 
some cases (about 12%of 100 issues that we checked) the day given as the 
announcement day in DATASTREAM TM (DAY 0) is the day the announcement 
appears in Financial Times. That created a problem as to what is the true date of the 
3 Excluding privatisations 
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announcement. If an announcement appears in Financial Times at day 0 that 
indicate that it could have been announced during the working hours of the previous 
day (-1) and so price movements should have occurred in day 
-, 
1 as well. If however 
the announcement is made after the closure of the markets of day 
-1 or during the 
working hours of day 0, the major price movements should occur at day 0. For the 
rest of the issues, the announcement appears in Financial Times one day after the day 
reported by Datastream. In these cases if the issue is announced after the closure of 
markets at day 0 then the price response should occur at day +1 otherwise the price 
movements should occur at day 0. To cover all cases we use an event window of 
-1 
to +1 days. Result however were similar whether periods 0 to +1 were taken. From 
the whole population of the rights issues in DATASTREAM, only for 1569 rights 
issuers did we find enough data to enable us to calculate the abnormal 
announcement period returns and at the same time details about the amount of capital 
raised were available. No DATASTREAM mnemonic and no share price at the 
announcement or the pre-announcement period were the reasons for the reduced 
sample. Dead companies that made rights issues prior to their delisting are also 
included in the sample. Details for the use of the proceeds from the issue are also 
collected from DATASTREAMTM 
The following table reports the annual distribution of the DATASTREAM 
rights issues population and the distribution of our sample. Though the 22 year 
period we had 2992 announcements of rights issues. Rights issuance volume varies 
across time with 1987 being the busiest year with 260 issues and 1982 the quieter 
year with 72 issues. The amount of capital raised also varies across time with 1987 
being the busiest year and 1978 the quitter one. In the last column of table 4.2 we 
report the average announcement period return per year. On average on the 
announcement of the rights issue the price of the issuer drops by 1.79%. In 1991 and 
1992 however the drop was around 5% while in the late 70's the returns were almost 
zero. 
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TABLE 4.2: ANNUAL VOLUME OF RIGHTS ISSUE ACTIVITY IN THE 
UK AND ABNORMAL ANNOUNCEMENT PERIOD RETURNS FROM 
1975 TO 1996 
YEAR NUMBER OF NUMBER OF 
RIGHTS RIGHTS 
ISSUES ISSUES 
(datastream (Our sample I) 
population) 
AMOUNT OF 
PROCEEDS 
(datastream 
population) 
(Real terms, prices 
Dec 1996 in £m 
AVERAGE 
ANNOUNCEMENT 
PERIOD 
ABNORMAL 
RETURNS 2 
( days 
-1 to +1) 
1975 162 72 2386 0.011*** 
1976 119 45 1521 
-0.032*** 
1977 126 54 1267 0.003 
1978 80 35 807 0.000 
1979 95 43 3349 
-0.001 
1980 95 36 1281 
-0.038*** 
1981 108 51 1995 
-0.026*** 
1982 75 35 1021 
-0.022** 
1983 132 52 2093 
-0.015 
1984 112 53 1371 0.000 
1985 135 71 3036 
-0.009 
1986 184 89 4678 
-0.029*** 
1987 260 85 6325 
-0.013*** 
1988 174 83 4612 
-0.013* 
1989 177 72 2974 
-0.022*** 
1990 149 74 3108 
-0.049*** 
1991 186 112 6655 
-0.051*** 
1992 95 54 2228 
-0.034*** 
1993 188 140 7809 
-0.004 
1994 151 126 5115 
-0.030*** 
1995 83 82 2867 
-0.013 
1996 106 105 3253 0.002 
............................................................................................................................................... _ ........................................ , denotes signi............................................................... icance at 1% 
, 
Sand 10% one tail, 
-- 
.................... _ 
-- 
. 
As far as the takeover bids are concerned 
, 
the method of payment and their 
announcement days were acquired from Dr Ayo Salami. The initial source of the 
sample is the journal "Acquisitions monthly". This journal has details about the bids 
made for UK public companies. Among the details it lists are the name of the bidder 
and the target, the announcement date of the bid and, in some cases, the bid price. It 
also has comments on the proposed bids that include the proposed method of 
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payment for the bid and it also reports which issues were successful or not. The 
sample covers the period between 1985 to 1995. The takeover bids are bids made for 
UK publicly listed companies. We excluded from the sample all takeovers bid 
announcements that were made together with a rights issue announcement. From the 
whole sample we identified the bids that were financed with equity in whole or in 
part. In total, 482 take-over bids were financed with equity during that period. The 
most active years was 1986 and 1987 where 105 and 93 takeover bids financed with 
equity were recorded. The proportion of takeover bids over all takeover bids reached 
a high of 52% in 1987 while in 1990 only 16% of all bids were financed with equity. 
TABLE 4.3: ANNUAL VOLUME OF TAKEOVER 
ACTIVITY IN THE UK FROM 1985 TO 1995 
YEAR NUMBER OF NUMBER OF PERCENTAGE OF 
ALL TAKEOVER BIDS BIDS FINANCED WITH 
TAKEOVER FINANCED WITH EQUITY OVER ALL 
BIDS EQUITY IN WHOLE OR TAKEOVER BIDS 
IN PART 
1985 139 55 40% 
1986 241 105 44% 
1987 216 93 43% 
1988 187 56 30% 
1989 186 41 22% 
1990 140 23 16% 
1991 115 28 24% 
1992 68 18 26% 
1993 68 22 32% 
1994 72 17 24% 
1995 102 24 23% 
All firm specific data such as market values, PE ratio, Market to book value, 
dividend yields, debt to equity ratios, Q ratios and Earnings per share for IPOs, 
Rights issuers, Takeover bidders and targets as well as macroeconomic data such as 
coincident economic indicators, interest rates, stock market indexes were collected 
from DATASTREAM TM. Share prices were all acquired from Datastream. None of 
the variables used in the thesis are in levels. Variables such as Market returns, 
2 the average announcement period abnormal returns are calculated according to the market model. For 
more details see section 4.2 
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interest rates, volatility, economic conditions are measured as the change from the 
previous month and are not in levels. All independent variables are stationary. 
The choice of the econometric models used in the thesis is dictated by two 
things. First that the models should be similar in general when testing the influence 
of the same factor and second the models should be adjusted to correct for the 
various econometric problems that each regression exhibits. In that fashion, the 
regressions of the number of IPOs and SEOs per month and the amount of capital 
raised from IPOs and SEOs and the regressions of the percentage of equity financed 
takeover bids over all takeover bids is done with the COCHRANE-ORCUTT method to 
adjust for the problem of the serial correlation which the above regressions exhibit. 
The regressions of the IPO and SEO proceeds against forecast errors is done 
with the Newey West method to adjust for the problem that is created with the 
moving average independent variables and produces an Heteroscedasticity consistent 
covariance. 
The regressions of the announcement period returns of the rights issues and 
the equity financed takeover bids against firm specific variables are event studies and 
are done with the weighted least squares which is the established type of regression 
in all event studies because it gives higher weight to the cases where returns are more 
predictable and lower weight to the cases where returns are more unpredictable and 
correct for the heteroscedasticity problem. 
The regressions of the first day returns against firm specific variables are with 
the ordinary least squares with the robust technique that the statistical package TSP 
offers which corrects for heteroscedasticity. The unavailability of pre-IPO prices, 
which makes it impossible to estimate the alpha and beta parameters which are 
essential for the market model, does not enable us to use the weighted least squares 
in the regressions of the first day returns against firm specific variables. 
In all the regressions, the results that are reported are with the type of 
regression that corrects for the various econometric problems that the specific 
regression exhibits. However, alternative type of regressions were used to cross 
check the main points and see whether these points are sensitive to the econometric 
method. The main results are waterproof to the regression type and alternative types 
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of regression such as a negative binomial regression are unlikely to qualitatively 
change the main points. 
1. 
4.2. CALCULATION OF FIRST DAY AND ABNORMAL ANNOUNCEMENT DAY RETURNS. 
First Day returns for IPOs are calculated as the difference between the price at 
the end of the first trading day Pi,, and the offer price of the IPO P;,,. 
ý, t - Pý, o First day return of IPO; =P P1, o 
Average Returns for day 1 are calculated as 
ARt =I _t FDR1, t where n is the number of IPOs 
Abnormal first day returns were calculated as the difference between the normal 
return of IPO i at day t and the return on the market at that day. We use the daily 
returns of FT ALL SHARE PRICE INDEX as a proxy for the market returns. 
ABR(i, t)= Ri, t - Rm, t 
Average Abnormal Returns for day 1 are calculated as 
AARt =n ýI AR, where n is the number of IPOs 
The use of the market model in order to calculate the abnormal first day 
returns in not possible since the market model requires the use of pre-IPO prices to 
calculate the market model parameters (a and ß) and there are no pre-IPO prices. 
Abnormal announcement day returns for rights issues and takeover bids for 
firm i at day t were calculated as the difference between the return on asset i at day t 
and its expected return on that day. 
AR(i, t)= R;, t - E(R;, t) 
where the expected return is calculated according to the market model 
E(R;, t) = a; + ßiRm, t + ei, t 
The a and ß are estimated from cross-sectional regression of the return on asset i 
against the return of the market from an estimation period of 
-260 to -40. trading 
81 
days before the event day. As a proxy for the market returns we use the returns of the 
FT ALL SHARE PRICE index. Average Abnormal Returns for day 
-1,0 and day +1 
are calculated as AARt =1nn Zi_' ARt where n is the number of firms 
The cumulative abnormal returns for the event window 
-1 to +1 is the sum of 
the average abnormal returns of days 
-1,0 and +1 
CAR-1, +1= ARi, i 
4.3. HOT AND COLD PERIODS. 
Two ways have been used in the literature to classify periods as HOT and 
COLD. The first uses the economic conditions as a criterion to find which periods are 
HOT and COLD and the second uses the volume of equity activity. Choe, Masulis & 
Nanda (1993) classify HOT periods in terms of economic conditions. HOT periods 
are the upturn of the business cycle, the periods from the trough to the peak, and 
COLD periods are the downturn of the cycle, the periods from the peak to the trough. 
Bayless & Chaplinsky (1996) on the other hand define HOT periods in terms of 
volume. They rank the three month moving average of the monthly issue volume, 
scaled by the total month-end value of outstanding equity of NYSE, AMEX and 
NASDAQ. HOT periods are periods when the SEO volume is in the top quartile. 
COLD periods are those periods when the SEO volume is in the bottom quartile. For 
Bayless & Chaplinsky (1996), HOT periods are the periods when the Seasoned 
Equity offering activity is high and not the periods when the economic conditions are 
good as in Choe, Masulis & Nanda (1993). 
In this thesis we use both methods. For the purpose of investigating the effect 
of economic conditions on the issuance volume, HOT periods are the periods 
between the trough of the business cycle and the peak and COLD periods are those 
between the peak of the cycle and the trough as in Choe et all (1993). The peak and 
trough is identified as the month with the highest and lowest consecutive values 
respectively of the Coincident indicator as supplied by Central Statistical Office. 
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In figure 4.1 we have plotted the coincident and short leading indicators from 
1975 to 1996 and have pointed out the turning points of the coincident indicator. 
Throughout the 22 year period, we had four cycles in the UK economy. The first 
cycle started at August 1975 and lasted until February 1981. It had a duration of 67 
months. The upturn was longer than the downturn with a duration of 47 months 
while the downturn had a duration of 20 months. The second cycle started at March 
1981 and reached the peak at February 1984. The second cycle ended with the trough 
at December 1985 with a total duration of the cycle of 58 months. In the third cycle, 
the duration of the downturn was longer than the duration of the upturn. The third 
cycle started at January 1986 and the upturn lasted for 33 months until September 
1988. After that point, the UK economy had to wait for 43 months before the end of 
the recession which was officially noted at April 1992. In the last cycle, the upturn 
lasted 30 months from May 1992 to October 1994. After that point, the UK economy 
entered a period of a recession and until the end of our sample in December 1996 the 
upturn turning point has not been recorded. Therefore the last downturn is not 
complete. 
TABLE 4.4: BUSINESS CYCLES IN THE UK FROM 1975 TO 1996 
Upturns of the Downturns of the 
Business Cycle Business Cycle 
I" cycle August1975- July 1979- 
August1975- February 1981 June 1979 February 1981 
(67 months) (47 months) (20 months) 
2" cycle March 1981- March 1984 
- 
March 1981 
-December 1985 February 1984 December 1985 
58 Months) (36 Months) (22 months) 
3` cycle 'January 1986 
- 
October 1988 
- 
January 1986 
-April 1992 September 1988 April 1992 
76 months) (33 months) (43 months 
4` cycle 'May 1992 November 1994 
- 
May 1992 
-December 1996 October 1994 December 1996 
56'months (30 months) '' 26 months 
We have chosen to use the " coincident indicator to record the turning points 
of the business cycle because the coincident indicator is constructed to move in line 
with the business cycle. The short leading indicator on the other hand is looking to 
the future and tries to predict where the business cycle will be in approximately one 
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year ahead. The coincident indicator is comprised by six components: GDP at factor 
costs, an index of production, CBI quarterly surveys of below capacity utilisation and 
the change in raw materials and the monetary aggregate (MO) divided by the GDp 
deflator. 
For the purpose of testing the overvaluation timing hypothesis we use an 
alternative measure of HOT and COLD periods according to the intensity of equity 
issuance activity. In order to classify periods as HOT or COLD for the IPO sample, 
we rank all months from January 1981 to December 1996 (192 months) according 
the 3-month moving average of the amount of capital raised from IPOs in real terms 
excluding privatisations. The 48 months with the highest IPO activity in terms of 
capital raised are classified as HOT months. The 48 months with the lowest IPO 
activity are classified as COLD months 
. 
The remaining 96 months are classified as 
OTHER. 
Our rights issues sample starts earlier in time than the IPO sample, at January 
1975. So, to find the HOT and COLD months in terms of seasoned Equity Issuance 
activity we ranked all months from January 1975 to December 1996 (264 months) 
according to the 3-month moving average of the amount of capital raised from rights 
issues in real terms. The 66 months (25% of the whole period) with the highest 
activity are classified as HOT and the 66 months with the lowest SEO activity being 
classified as COLD. The rest of the months are classified as OTHER. V 
The duration of the takeover sample is 11 years. In order to classify HOT and 
COLD periods for the equity financed takeover bids we calculated the percentage of 
equity financed bids over all equity bids per month from January 1985 to December 
1995. Then we ranked the 132 months according to the percentage of equity financed 
bids over all bids. The 33 months with the higher equity financed bid activity are 
classified as HOT. The 33 months with the lowest equity financed bid activity are 
classified as COLD. The remaining 66 months are classified as OTHER. 
I', 
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4.4. CALCULATION OF LONG RUN PERFORMANCES 
The issue of calculation of long run performances is a very important one in 
studies that draw significant conclusions from findings that rely on long run 
performances. In this thesis, we investigate the post-equity issue and post-bid 
performances and whether these performances differ according to the intensity of 
equity issuance and takeover activity. Therefore, we need a measure of post-issue 
performance that can stand against criticism. The researcher has 3 options available 
for the method to calculate long run returns, continuously compounded, cumulative, 
and buy and hold returns. In order to calculate abnormal long run returns an even 
larger number of options is available. The use of a market index such as the FT ALL 
Share price index is probably the easiest one in terms of computations. 'Other options 
include size and market to book reference portfolios or matching the sample firms by 
a control firm based on some firm characteristics such as size and market to book 
value. Finally, various models have been used such as the Fama-French three factor 
model and the CAPM to estimate the expected return of the sample firms. Some of 
these method however are fundamentally biased and the results based on them may 
not represent the true picture. 
Barber & Lyon (1997), investigate the empirical power of several methods to 
calculate long run performances. They suggest that continuously compounded and 
cumulative returns are biased and only buy and hold returns yield unbiased results. 
Continuously compounded' returns are negatively biased and should not be used in 
long run performances especially in the study of firms where significant 
underperformance is found such as IPOs, SEOs and bidders. The use of continuously 
compounded returns would result to a higher underperformance of IPOs than the one 
that truly exists and therefore this method should be avoided. 
Cumulative returns are also biased according, to Barber and Lyon (1997). 
They find that cumulative abnormal returns are biased predictors of long run buy and 
hold returns. In other words, according to Barber & Lyon (1997), on average if a 
firm has a 5-year buy a hold return of 0% its 5-year cumulative returns will be more 
than 0%. Therefore, Barber and Lyon (1997) strongly suggest the use of buy and 
hold returns as the best way, to calculate long run performances. 
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The issue of choosing the best specified controlling group to calculate 
abnormal returns is a more difficult one. According to Barber and Lyon( 1997), buy 
and hold abnormal returns where the controlling group is based on size or market to 
book deciles or equally and value weighted market indexes are negatively biased. 
They show that to calculate abnormal returns, the use of reference portfolios such as 
equally or market value weighted market indeces, or size decile portfolios is 
problematic. They support the use of abnormal returns that match sample firms with 
firms of similar size and/or market to book value ratios since that method yields well 
specified test statistics. 
Following Barber & Lyon's (1997) recomendations we calculate the long run 
performances as buy and hold abnormal returns (BHAR). The buy and hold abnorm 
returns for firm i until month t is calculated as the difference between the buy and 
hold return of firm i until month t and the expected buy and hold return for firm i 
until month t 
rr 
BHAR;, t = 
fl[1 + Rº, º) - fl[1 + E(Ri, º)] where 
º=1 t=1 
[1 + Ri, r) is the buy and hold return of the firm i until month t or its delisting and 
r=ý 
fl [I+ E(Ri. r)] is the expected buy and hold return of the firm 1 until month t or its 
delisting. 
The average buy and hold abnormal returns of n firms until month t is calculated as 
follows. 
ABHARt= n ý1BHARi, t 
The buy and hold return represents the return to an investor that purchased the 
stock at month 0 and kept it until month t. So for example, if an IPO has an offer 
price of £1 and its price at the end of the first year after the IPO is £1.50 then that 
IPO firm has offered to the investor an annual buy and hold return of 50%. If the 
expected annual buy and hold return of IPO firm was 30%ithen the 'annual Abnormal 
Buy and Hold return of IPO firm is 20%. All returns are discrete returns and are 
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calculated from end of month prices. First month return for the IPO firms are partial. 
The time interval for the IPO first month returns varies from 1 to 30 calendar days. 
As proxies for the expected buy and hold returns we use three measures. First 
we use the buy and hold returns of the FT ALL share price index. The FTA is a 
market capitalisation weighted index and is comprised by approximately the largest 
650 firms listed on the London stock exchange that account for almost 90% of the 
total market capitalisation of the London Stock Exchange. FTA may be biased for 
small caps but to correct for this bias we use the industry market value adjusted 
performance which according to Barber and Lyon (1997) is the only unbiased 
measure of performance 
In the second method we match the sample firms with a control firm from the 
same industry and similar market value as the sample firm. For this purpose we rank 
all firms in the same industry as with the sample firm, according to their market 
values. The expected return for the sample firm i is the return of the firm in the same 
industry and with the immediately smaller market value. The matching is done every 
12 months. 
So for example, the company CPU computers went public in July 1983 and 
had a first month return of +14.3%. At the end of July 1983, CPU computers had a 
market value of £ 20.8m. We ranked all companies4 that belonged at the same 
industry as with CPU computers according to their market values at the end of July 
1983 and found the company with the immediately smaller market value than CPU 
computers. The returns of that control company from July 1983 to June 1984 were 
the expected return for the IPO. firm CPU computers for July 1983 and the following 
11 months. At the end of month 12, we match CPU computers with a new firm from 
the same industry according to the market value of the CPU computers at the end of 
June 1984. 
4 we collected share price data on more than 5000 firms from 1975 to 1998 so that we were able to 
compare the sample firms with a large number of firms. Both dead and live companies are included in 
the above sample. 
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For the third measure of expected returns, we match the sample firm with ä 
firm in the same industry and immediately smaller market to book value. So for 
example, as the IPO firm goes public we rank all firms in the same industry with the 
IPO firm i according to their market to book values. The expected return of the IPO 
firm i is the return on the firm in the same industry and the immediately smaller 
market to book value. As previously, the matching is done every 12 months. 
When the sample firms are delisted, returns are truncated at the month of the 
delisting. In the cases where the matching firm is also delisted we removed the 
sample firms from the sample. 
The test for the null hypothesis of zero buy and hold abnormal returns of n 
number of firms until month t we use the test statistic as used by Barber & Lyon 
(1997). 
t BHAR= Average(BHAR, t)/ (6(BHAR, t)/' ) 
where a(BHAR;, t) is the standard deviation of abnormal Buy and Hold returns until 
month t for the n number of firms. 
To test the significance in the difference in the performances of two different 
portfolios such as the IPOs that went public in HOT and COLD volume periods, we 
employ the following test statistic which assumes unequal variances of the samples. 
BHAR(HOT: ) 
- 
BHAR(COLD1) 
S2(HOT) s2(COLD) 
V n(HOT) n(COLD) 
where BHAR(HOT: ) is the average buy and hold abnormal return until month t of 
HOT IPOs and s2(hot) is the variance of Buy and Hold abnormal returns until month t 
of n firms that went public in HOT periods. 
4.5. FINANCIAL ANALYSTS EARNINGS FORECAST ERRORS 
Financial analysts earnings were obtained from Institutional Brokers Estimate 
System (IBES). I/B/E/S provides a global database of analysts' forecast earnings per 
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share for a large number of publicly traded corporations world-wide. UB/E/S covers 
the UK with a large number of forecasts available from 1987. UB/E/S coverage in 
the UK includes forecasts for 1359 companies provided by 629 analysts. s 
The financial analysts earnings forecast error for firm i is calculated as : 
(ACTUAL E4RNII`L S PER SHARE)i 
-(FORECASThD FARIIGS PER SHARE)i 
SHARE PRICE OF FIRMT AT THE BVDOFTHE ADAM THE FORC4ST IS MADE 
We use the consensus forecasts that I/B/E/S provides. For reasons of 
comparability with other papers we have chosen to calculate the errors over share 
price and not over the actual earnings or forecasting earnings. 
Analysts' accuracy improves as the announcement of the earnings 
approaches. We distinguish between the forecasts according to the horizon of the 
forecasts. The forecast horizon is measured in months from the month the forecast is 
made until the month the earnings are announced. 
The magnitude of forecast errors is affected by many factors including the 
size and industry of the firm the earnings of which analyst are trying to forecast. We 
use in the thesis adjusted forecast errors as well which take into account the industry 
and size effect. The adjusted error for firm i with a forecast horizon of n months is 
computed as the difference between the unadjusted forecast error with a forecast 
horizon of n months for firm i and the expected forecast error for firm i with the 
same forecast horizon n. In order to compute the expected error for a particular 
forecast horizon of n months, first we transform the market values at the month of the 
fiscal year end of all the firms in the IB/E/S sample into December 1996 prices. We 
identify the different industry sectors and we split each sector into 10 groups, one for 
each year of the sample (1987 to 1996) based on the month the forecast is made. 
Then we ranked all firms available in the I/B/E/S database within the same sector 
and the same year according to their market values at the time of the fiscal year end. 
We then split the number of firms into four quartiles and calculate the average error 
in each quartile. The expected forecast error for firm i is the average error that 
analysts make in the same year, as with the year the unadjusted forecast error was 
made, in forecasting the earnings of the firms in the same sector, in the same market 
size quartile with the same forecast horizon. 
s. IBES Press pack of Global Estimates as if in March 199 8: 
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For example we take the firm JKX oil that is in the energy sector and that 
went public in July 1995. The first forecast that is available for that firm is made in 
October 1995 which is 4 months after the IPO. That forecast was forecasting the 
earnings of the fiscal year end of December 1995. The earnings were announced. in 
May 1996 and so the forecast made in October 1995 had a forecast horizon of 7 
months The error of that forecast is 
-0.0258. The company JKX oil at the time of the 
fiscal year end (Dec 1995) had a market value of £ 11.59m. We identified all the 
companies in the I/B/E/S sample that were in the same sector (Energy) and 
transformed their market values, at the month of all fiscal year ends for which 
I/B/E/S provided forecasts, in prices Dec 1996. We then "isolated" the forecasts of 
the energy sector that had a forecast horizon of 7 months and split the sample of the 
. 
energy firms into 10, one for each of the 10 years of the sample. To allocate a 
particular forecast into one of the 10 years we used the month the forecasts were 
made. For each year we ranked the firms according to their market values at the end 
of the fiscal year (the end of the fiscal year may be different from the year in which 
the forecasts were made). Then we split the sample into four equal number quartiles 
and calculated the average forecast error in each size quartile. We allocated the JKX 
into one of the four size quartiles, which for that particular company is the SMALL. 
The expected forecast error for firm JKX oil was the average error of the forecasts 
made in 1995 with a forecast horizon of 7 months for the firms in the energy sector 
that belonged to the SMALL size quartile and that error turned out to be 
-0.0591. 
4.6. FINANCIAL ANALYSTS FORECAST REVISIONS 
In order to calculate financial analysts earnings forecast revisions we use 
analysts consensus earnings forecasts as supplied by I/B/E/S 
. 
These forecasts are on 
a monthly basis for individual firms. The monthly forecast revision (FRi, t) at month t 
for the sample firm i is calculated as follows: 
F, 1-F,, t-i FRý, c =P 
F1, t is the consensus analysts earnings forecasts for the sample firm at month t and 
F1, t. 1 is the consensus analysts earnings forecasts for the same sample firm i at month 
t-1. In the IPO sample the P* is the offer price of the IPO and is used to normalise the 
forecasts by the share price. We normalise the forecast revisions over the offer price 
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and not over the price at the end of the month of the forecast because that would have 
produced smaller forecast revisions as the life of the IPO progresses. Suppose that the 
forecasted earnings per share of an IPO, with an offer price of 100p, at the end month 
1 is 10 and increases to 11 at the end of month 2 and also that the forecasted earnings 
per share at the end of month 59 is 10 and increases to 11 at the end of month 60. The 
normalisation of the forecast revisions over the same share price would indicate that 
the forecast revisions have the same magnitude in the two months, that is 0.01 
. 
Since 
the prices on average increase over time, if we have normalised the forecast revisions 
over the current share price, the forecast revision in month 60 will be smaller that the 
forecast revision in month 2 even though the actual forecast revision remains the 
same. (See endnote 2 for a numerical illustration of this) 
The problem that could arise from the use of share prices to normalise the 
forecast revisions is that the average forecast revisions gives higher weight to the 
IPOs with small offer prices and low weight to the IPOs with high offer prices. An 
increase in the forecasted earnings per share from 10 to 11 for a firm with an offer 
price of 50p would give a forecast revision of 0.02 but a similar increase in 
forecasted earnings per share for a firm with an offer price of 500p would give a 
forecast revision of 0.002. To overcome this problem we also use price weighted 
forecast revisions where each firm is given a weight according to its share price. (See 
endnote 3 for a numerical illustration) 
In the calculation of the forecast revisions for the rights issue sample the 
forecast revisions are normalised by the share price of the issuer at the end of month 
- 
1 relative to the announcement of the issue. 
As we have shown in chapter 3, analysts'. 
-forecast accuracy 
increases as we 
approach the month of the announcement of earnings. So, expected forecast revision 
from one month to the following is not zero. Analysts are on average overoptimistic 
for the earnings of firms. As the announcement of the earnings approaches, analysts 
become more accurate and revise downwards their forecasts. So, the ex ante forecast 
revision is not zero. That is an important property that has to be taken into account in 
the analysis of I/B/E/S data. No safe conclusions can be made by using only normal 
forecast revisions. One has to control for the expected forecast revision'that results 
from the downwards revision of analysts forecasts as time passes by. This 
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downwards forecast revision does not result from any extraordinary piece of 
information but from the realisation by analysts that their forecast were too high. 
Another point that has to be taken into account in the estimation of the 
expected forecast revision is that analysts do not revise their forecasts every month. 
Sudarsanam & Salami (1997), find that only 18 to 20 % of UK analysts revise their 
forecasts each month. Therefore, there will be a four month lag between individual 
analysts' updates. In other words, if an analyst provides a forecast at July, on average 
the next update he/she will be make will be at November. The July forecast 
however will affect all the forecasts from July to October. That means that the 
forecast revisions follow a fourth order moving average process. 
In order to find the forecast revision that is caused because analysts take new 
information about the earnings of IPOs, or the SEOs one has to remove from the 
normal forecast revision the negative drift of analysts forecast revisions. 
The abnormal forecast revision (AFRi, t) for firm i at month t is the difference 
between the normal forecast revision for firm i at month t and the expected forecast 
revision for that firm at month t: 
AFR;, t = FR;, t - EFR;, t 
The expected forecast revision (EFRi, t) ibr firm i at month t is 
I n-1 EFR;, t=K; + nEs=l 
K; represents the analysts overoptimism for firm i and is estimated as the average of 
all forecast revisions that are available for the firm i outside the period t-3 to t+3 
where month t is the month of the event. K is on average negative and represents the 
negative drift that exists in analysts forecast revisions. The E;, t_S is the unexpected 
component and is measured as the difference between K; and actual forecast revision 
at month t. This unexpected component is summed over a period of a minimum of 
one month (s) and a maximum of four month. 
We also calculated price weighted abnormal forecast revisions (PWAFR). 
P WAFR;, t= 
Y zt Wi AFR, r 
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where W; is the weight for firm i and is equal to the offer price P*; of IPO firm i over 
*, 
the sum of all offer prices P*; W; 
P 
Z P*; 
and n is the total number of firms 
Inclusion in the sample required that earnings forecasts for the firms were 
available for at least 5 months prior to the announcement month of the rights issue. 
No such requirements were imposed in the IPO sample. 
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CHAPTER 5: THE TIMING OF UK INITIAL PUBLIC 
OFFERINGS 
5.1. INTRODUCTION 
Previous research has pointed out the significant variations in the Initial 
Public Offerings activity across time. Ritter (1991), Loughran and Ritter ( 1995) for 
US stocks and Levis (1993), Gerbich (1996) and Rees (1997) for UK among others, 
document that there are some periods when IPO activity is high and other periods 
when the activity subsides. 
A lot of effort has been put into trying to explain this variability without 
crystal clear results. According to Loughran and Ritter (1995) and Ritter (1991) 
variation in IPO activity arises from changes in investors' sentiment. They believe 
that issuers take advantage of transitory "windows of opportunity" during which 
issuers can achieve higher valuations and issue equity when their stock is valued 
above its' fundamental value. Managers want to minimise the cost of capital and in 
doing so they want to set the offering price of the IPO at the higher price possible. 
When they identify a "window of opportunity" during which investors are willing to 
pay prices for new issues higher than the fundamentals, firms grab the opportunity 
and go public. 
If the offer price of the IPO is set at a level which is above the intrinsic value 
of the firm then, as time progresses, and investors gradually realise that the true value 
of the IPO is lower, a mark down of IPO shares should occur. According to the 
. 
"window of opportunity" theory, IPO firms should perform badly after the issue. The 
literature is full of studies that document that IPOs underperform after the listing. 
According to the sentiment timing theory, variations in the IPO volume are driven by 
variations in investors sentiment. More firms go public during periods when the 
magnitude of overvaluation is higher. If that is the case, the post-issue 
underperformance should be higher for those IPOs that have the most overvalued 
issues. If there are periods when issuers can achieve higher levels of overvaluation in 
.. 
their issues then the IPOs that go public in those periods must have worst post-IPO 
performances. The ; evidence on the relation between IPO activity and post-issue 
underperformance is mixed. Aggarwal & Rivoli (1990), Ritter (1991), Loughran & 
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Ritter (1995) and Helwege & Liang (1997) find that US IPOs that come into the 
market in periods of heavy IPO volume have worst post-issue performances than 
IPOs that go public in light IPO volume periods. The international evidence however 
do not suggest that IPO volume is related with the post-issue performance. 
Ljungqvist (1997) finds that German IPOs that go public in heavy IPO volume 
periods have similar post-IPO performances than IPOs that go public in light IPO 
volume periods. Levis (1993) also does not find a negative relation between the 
intensity of UK IPO volume and their post-IPO performance. 
The issue of overvaluation exploitation and the relation between IPO volume 
and post-issue performance has not been adequately tested for the UK IPOs. Levis 
(1993) finds no relation between annual volume of IPOs and post-IPO performance. 
He relies however on the visual examination of the 3 year wealth relatives of IPOs 
that went public in different years and the choice of HOT and COLD years is rather 
subjective. We use a more stylised approach to classify periods as HOT and COLD 
based on the 3 month moving average of the amount of capital raised from IPOs in 
real terms. That, together with a larger sample with a time span of 16 years relative to 
the 9 years in Levis (1993) enables us to test the sentiment timing theory with greater 
confidence. 
Several studies have found that equity issuance activity increases as economic 
conditions improve, Choe Masulis & Nanda (1993), Rees (1997), Gerbich (1996). 
The most obvious explanation for an increase in equity financing in periods of 
favourable economic conditions is that during these periods companies are expected 
to grow faster and firms need to fund the high growth. Other studies however 
emphasise the importance of information asymmetries and link the higher equity 
financing during the upturn of the business cycle with a reduction in the adverse 
selection costs associated with equity issues during periods of improving economic 
conditions. 
According to information asymmetry models, during periods of high 
uncertainty, investors are less able to determine with accuracy the true value of the 
IPO and therefore managers have to "leave more money at the table", that is, to offer 
higher underpricing in the IPO to persuade uninformed investors to participate in the 
issue. Periods of high uncertainty about the true ` value of firms that go public are 
periods when the average underpricing is higher. High underpricing increases the 
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cost of the IPO. If managers want to see the smallest possible first day returns, then 
more firms may seek to go public at periods with low uncertainty and lower 
underpricing. 
Jegadeesh, Weinstein and Welsh (1993), Michaely & Shaw (1994) do not 
support the story that IPO volume in the US is driven by lower underpricing. Gerbich 
(1996) however, finds that the amount of capital raised from UK IPOs increases as 
the average first day return of the IPOs that went public during the previous quarter 
decrease. 
Even though the evidence on the relation between IPO activity and average 
first day returns is mixed, there is quite a lot of research going on in order to identify 
which periods are characterised by lower uncertainty and lower first day returns and 
therefore represent a window of opportunity to go public. According to Choe 
Masulis and Nanda (1993), a factor that has an effect on the level of information 
asymmetry and on adverse selection costs associated with the announcements of 
SEOs, is the business conditions. According to them, the negative price reaction 
observed on the announcement of a SEO is caused by investors who regard an issue 
as an attempt to exploit overvaluation. When the economy is during the phase of an 
expansion, the adverse selection costs associated with the announcement of a 
Seasoned equity Offer are lower. During periods of good economic conditions firms 
face better investment opportunities and ceteris paribus, the announcement of an 
equity issue creates less concerns for investors that managers seek to exploit 
overvaluation. The seasoned equity issue announcement is accompanied by a smaller 
price drop when it is made during the upturn of the business cycle. Gerbich (1996) 
applies that model to the UK IPO activity and finds that the degree of underpricing is 
related to economic conditions. He shows that when the business cycle' is near the 
peak, the average number of trading days (duration) between two consecutive IPOs is 
smaller than the average number of trading days between two consecutive IPOs that 
go public during a recession. Following that, he finds that during periods when IPOs 
come into shorter intervals, the average first day 
- 
returns are low : therefore 
establishing an indirect negative relation between, economic conditions and first'day 
returns. When the economy- is : in the last phase of the expansion, IPOs come in 
shorter intervals and when IPOs come ' into shorter intervals, the average first day 
returns are lower. During the downturn of the cycle, the average number of trading 
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days between two consecutive IPOs increases and as the number of trading days 
between two consecutive IPOs increases, the first day returns also increase. 
This indirect relation between the state of the economy and the average 
underpricing, together with the larger number of IPOs found during the upturn of the 
cycle lead Gerbich (1996) to conclude that the reason behind the high IPO activity in 
the upturn of the cycle is partly the reduction of average first day returns observed 
during the upturn. To further strengthen his conclusions he finds a negative relation 
between the magnitude of the average first day returns of the IPOs that went public in 
the previous quarter and the amount of capital raised form IPOs in the current month. 
According to Gerbich (1996), the improvement in economic conditions decrease the 
uncertainty for the IPOs intrinsic value and therefore managers can raise their offer 
prices at higher level resulting to lower first day returns. 
We believe however that there is a more direct way to test if first day returns 
and therefore adverse selection costs, are lower during periods of good economic 
conditions by looking at the first day returns across upturns and downturns of the 
business cycle. We do not use the duration measure in this chapter because we think 
that it puts an unnecessary "intermediary" which distorts the results. We directly test 
whether average or median first day returns are lower during the upturn of the 
business cycle to see if the improvement in economic conditions has a negative 
impact on the average first day returns. Furthermore, we investigate whether the 
magnitude of the first day returns for the recent IPOs has a significant impact on the 
IPO volume. A negative and significant relation between underpricing and IPO 
volume would suggest that managers do care about the magnitude of the first day 
return and that more capital is raised or more firms go public when the indirect costs 
of going public are lower. 
This chapter extends the IPO literature by testing the effect of the state of the 
business cycle both on IPO activity and first day returns. It also provides evidence on 
the post-IPO performance of UK IPOs that made the issues in Heavy and Light 
volume periods. The use of industry/market to book value and industry/market value 
adjusted post-IPO performances adds to the validity of our findings. 
Summarising our main results we find that: 
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1. More firms make an IPO and more capital is raised from IPOs during the 
upturn of the cycle relative to the downturn of the cycle. 
2. The level of underpricing is not lower during the upturn of the business 
cycle and it has no effect on the volume of IPOs. The magnitude of the first day 
returns during the previous quarter has no impact on the number of IPOs on the 
current month or the amount of capital raised from IPOs. 
3. Periods of heavy IPO volume are periods when firms can achieve higher 
prices for their issues. IPO firms in the UK underperform in the post-Issue period. 
Firms that go public during heavy IPO volume periods however, have significantly 
worst post-IPO performances relative to the IPOs that go public in light IPO volume 
periods indicating that overvaluation exploitation and sentiment timing is a major 
driving force of IPO activity. 
The rest of the chapter paper follows like that. In the next section we present 
our evidence on the UK IPO activity and the effect of economic conditions on the 
IPO volume and on the first day returns followed by an investigation of the relation 
between IPO volume and underpricing. After that, we test whether IPOs exploit 
overvaluation and whether heavy IPO volume periods are periods when managers 
can achieve higher valuations for their offers 
. 
5.2. UK IPO ACTIVITY ACROSS TIME 
The number of firms making an IPO in the UK is not constant across time. In 
figure 5.1 we present the number of IPOs per month from January 1981"to December 
1996 and can see that the number of IPOs per month varies across time. The source 
of the IPO sample is the KPMG New Issue statistics. (For more details on the data 
collection see section 4.1). Through the 16 year period, 1424 firms went public with 
the method of offer for sale 
, 
offer for subscription or placing. There is a difference in 
the intensity of activity across time. In the 4 years from 1985 to 1988,505 firms 
went public while in the 4 years that followed, only 163 firms floated into the 
stockmarket. Table 5.1 'reports the annual distribution of the number of IPOs, the 
amount of capital raised and the average first day returns. The same annual numbers 
can be found at figure 5.2. The busiest year was 1994 with 179 firms going public 
while in 1991 only 18 firms made an IPO. The amount of capital raised also varies 
across time with 1984 being the busiest and 1990 the quieter year. The average first 
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day returns also exhibit significant time series variation. Due to lack of share prices 
in DATASTREAM, we were unable to calculate the first day return for 162 issues. 
1987 was the year with the highest average first day return which is 25.73% and 1981 
has the lowest average first day return with 4.93%. Median first day returns exhibit 
similar fluctuations with the averages. 1987 was the year with the highest medians 
return of 22.26% while 1981 had a median first day return of only 3.48%. 1 
TABLE 5.1: ANNUAL VOLUME OF INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERINGS IN 
THE UK AND FIRST DAY RETURNS FROM 1981 TO 1996 
Year Number of 
IPOs per Year 
( source KPMG 
new Issue 
statistics) 
Amount of capital 
raised per year 
( prices Dec 1996) 
in £m excluding 
privatisations 
Average 
First Day 
Return 
Median 
First 
Day 
Return 
Number of IPO5 
for which First 
day returns were 
ale to be 
calculated 
1981 40 822 4.93% 3.48% 37 
1982 48 5730 14.46% 4.67% 46 
1983 76 11116 19.80% 6.86% 76 
1984 96 18633 14.91% 8.93% 95 
1985 122 758 8.82% 4.46% 120 
1986 140 1897 8.11% 4.91% 139 
1987 118 813 25.73% 22.26% 118 
1988 125 1806 9.02% 6.49% 125 
1989 82 526 11.02% 9.57% 82 
1990 30 156 11.41% 9.77% 30 
1991 18 425 10.05% 4.86% 17 
1992 33 1232 6.86% 5.69% 33 
1993 137 5363, 11.34% 7.48% 92 
1994 179 8788 5.97% 3.42% 124 
1995 75 2514 8.47% 4.96% 55 
1996 105 
_ 
9973 10.28% 7.82% 73 
The first day return is calculated as the percentage change between the closing price of day +1 and the offer 
Table 5.2, presents the number of IPOs and the average first day returns per 
industry. We present only the industries that had than 14 IPOs or more in the 1981 to 
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1996 period ( Other industries also available but not reported). We can see in the 
first column that the number of IPOs varies across industries. We can not say 
however that 1110 activity in concentrated in certain industries. Electronic equipment 
and Införmation technology firms have the higher numbers of' IPOs with 79 and 46 
IPOs respectively but there are other industries with a large number of IPOs. 
In table 5.2 we also report the average first day returns in each industry. There 
is a variation in the average first day returns across industries. The broadcasting has 
the higher first day returns with an average of 21.3% and the Road transport has the 
lower average first day returns with 2.6%. 
TABLE, 5.2: NUMBER OF INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERINGS AND AVERAGE 
FIRST DAY RETURNS PER INDUSTRY 
INDUSTRY CLASSIFICATION IPOs IN THE 
INDUSTRY 
AVERAGE FIRST DAY 
RETURNS 
OF TI-IE INDUSTRY 
El, iýC'IRONIC EQUIPMENT 79 15.1 % 
INI ORMA I'ION 'I'I; CI INOLOGY 46 18.3 % 
BUSINESS SUPPORT 44 11.4 0/o 
RI'. 'I All., C LAIN STORE 41 10.8% 
PROPER ('Y DEVELOPERS 40 15.5% 
OI 11ER BUSINESSES 34 11.6 % 
FOOD PRODUCERS 32 14.4% 
LEISURE FACILITIES 29 15.7 % 
HOUSE BUILDING 27 5.4 % 
OTI IFR BUILDING MAI FRIALS 24 13.2 % 
MEDIA AGENCIES 23 13.8 O/o 
PUBI. 151ZING 22 12.3 % 
DISTRIBUTORS IND. COMPANIES 22 18.6 % 
PAPER AND PACKAGING 21 11.5'% 
ROADTRANSPORT 20 2.6 % 
ENGINEERING 
, 
GENERAL 20 9.1 % 
PHARMACEUTICALS 14) 13.1 % 
BR()ADCAS FING 19 21.3 % 
V1l IICLI; DIS'1RII3I RON 19 10.3 % 
I'I IIiR CONS FRl1C f1ON 19 8.4 % 
I: l. F(`I RICITY Is 18.4 % 
MEI)ICAI. PRODUC. '"1'S Is 11.5% 
MISCIELANFOUS. FINANCIAL 14 12.7% 
The purpose ofthis chapter is to find what drives the IPO variation in the UK 
by testing the alternative theories that have been proposed. Choe, Masulis and Nanda 
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(1993) and Gerbich (1996) talk about the effect of economic conditions on the 
volume of equity issuance. Indeed, we find that we have more Initial Public Offers 
per month during the upturn of the business cycle relative to the downturn of the 
business cycle 
. 
The upturn and the downturn of the business cycle is determined 
according to the coincident indicator. The upturn is defined as the period between the 
trough and the peak and the downturn is defined as the period between the peak and 
the trough. We have 8.78 IPOs on average per month during the upturn of the cycle 
(KPMG population) and 6.67 IPOs per month in the downturn of the cycle, a 
difference which was significant with a test statistic of 2.39. The median numbers 
were 8 IPOs per month during the upturn and 6 IPOs per month during the downturn 
of the business cycle ( difference in the medians is also significant with a test statistic 
of 2.26) 
In the sample that includes only the IPOs for which first day returns were 
found, the number of IPOs per month in the upturn of the cycle is 7.65 and 5.69 IPOs 
per month during the recessions, a difference which was significant at 1% level two- 
tails tests with a test statistic of 2.69. ( The median numbers were 6 and 4 IPOs per 
month respectively, a difference which was also significant at I% two tail tests. 
We also split each upturn and downturn into three equal length sub-periods to 
create 6 sections of the cycle to see how the IPO activity varies across the whole 
duration of the cycle. So, if an upturn has a duration of 30 months we create three 
sub-periods ( upturn 1, upturn 2, upturn 3) of 10 month duration each. 
IPO activity at the beginning of the expansion is 6.64 IPOs per month 
KPMG population) and increases to 9.09 and 10.64 IPOs per month in the middle 
and last phase of the expansion respectively (Figure 5.3). As the economy enters the 
recession, IPO activity drops to 7.73 and 5.67 IPOs per month in the first and second 
parts of the recession respectively. Just before the economy reaches the trough, IPO 
activity picks up slightly but still remains low with 6.41 IPOs per month. 
Median number of IPOs per month across the business cycle also exhibit a 
similar pattern with the averages. The period before the peak has the higher activity 
with 9 IPOs per month. In the first part of the upturn 5 IPOs go public and in the 
middle part of the expansion we have 7 IPOs per month. After the economy has gone 
into a recession the median IPO firms per month is 7, and drops further to 4in the 
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middle part of the recession only to pick up slightly to 5 IPOs in the last period of the 
recession. 
Even in the reduced sample that includes only the firms för which first day 
returns were available, the same pattern of higher 1110 activity during the last part of 
the upturn of the business cycle is observed ( Blue bars in figure 5.3). During the last 
phase of the upturn of the business cycle we have the largest number of 1130s per 
month ( 9.00) and in the middle of the recession we have the smaller number of' II'Os 
per month ( 4.63) 
. 
IPO ACTIVITY ACROSS THE BUSINFSS CYCLE 
Phase of the Business Upturn Upturn 2 Upturn Downturn Downturn I)umnturn 
Cycle 1 3 1 2 3 
Average number of 1POs 6.64 9.09 10.64 7.73 5.67 6.41 
per month 
(KPMG population) 
Average number of IPOs 6.23 7.73 9.00 6.97 4.63 5.45 
per month (sample with 
first day returns) 
Median number of lP0s 4.33 6.00 7.50 6.50 3.00 3.67 
per month 
(KPMG population) 
Average amount of 142 334 859 467 105 447 
capital raised from IPOs 
per month (NO 
I RIVnI(SAlR)NS IN CM) 
Average amount of 238 681 894 848 421 63 3 
capital raised From 1110s 
per month (wi i ii 
('RIVA IISAIIONS IN 0, I) 
the same pattern across the business cycle is observed when we look at the 
amount of capital raised from the IPOs per month in real terms ( prices Dee 1996 
excluding privatisations). On average, firms raise 451 £ million every month during 
the upturn of the cycle and £ 366 million during the downturn of the cycle 
(Difference was significant at 10% two tails). Median values were £. 106 m and £ 
54m per month in upturns and downturns respectively. (significant at 10% also). The 
most intense part of the business cycle in terms of amount of capital raised is the 
period helore the peak of the cycle (figure 5.3a) when £ 860m is raised every 
month from II'Os. Activity remains high during the first part of the recession with 
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£467 million raised on average per month but during the middle part of the downturn 
IPO activity is very low with only £ 105m raised on average per month. Just before 
the end of the recession, volume picks up again to £447m per month. 
If we include the privatisations in the sample then we find no difference in the 
amount of capital raised from IPOs across upturns and downturns. During the upturns 
the capital raised is £ 616m per month on average, while during the downturn the 
amount raised is £665m. In figure 5.3a we have also plotted the amount of capital 
raised from IPOs across the business cycle including the privatisations. We see that 
when privatisations are included in the sample there is no difference between the 
upturns and the downturns. The least active period is the first part of the upturn with 
. 
£238m raised, while in the middle and the last phase of the expansion £681m and 
£894m were raised. Activity remains high even when the economy enters the 
recession with £848 m raised in the first part of the downturn ( Jaguar and the water 
companies made the IPO during that part of the business cycle) and £421m in the 
middle of it (BT, British Steel, Abbey National). In the last phase of the recession 
£633m are raised on average per month including the privatisations ( Powergen; 
National Power, Scottish Power). 
From the above descriptive statistics we can safely argue that IPO activity is 
higher during the expansion phase of the business cycle. We have more firms 
conducting an IPO when economic conditions are improving and more capital is 
raised during the upturn of the business cycle when we exclude the privatisations. 
The results above provide evidence that there is a positive relation between economic 
conditions and the intensity of Initial Public Offering activity. Of course this is not 
something extraordinary. During the expansion phase of the business cycle firms face 
increased demand for their, products. More investment opportunities appear and the 
Net Present Value of the projects is likely to be higher during that time when demand 
is high relative to the downturn when the demand is low, therefore inducing firms to 
invest more heavily. A source of finance is to issue additional capital. Therefore we 
may have more, IPOs in the expansion because firms want to finance the increased 
demand for growth. The fact that firms face better investment opportunities during 
the upturn of the cycle however also means that these firms should also find it easier 
to acquire credit to fund such projects. Interest rates start declining during the middle 
and last stages of an expansion making credit cheaper. 
, 
Therefore, an improvement in' 
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economic conditions should not automatically lead tirms to make an Ilk) just because 
demand for investments increases. Other factors may well aficct the timing of equity 
issues. 
C'hoe. Masulis and Nanda (1993) find that the monthly ratio of common 
shares issued over all securities issued in the US increases during the upturn of' the 
business cycle. They argue that the cause of the increase in equity financing during 
the upturn of the business cycle is that issuers of common stock face lower adverse 
selection costs when they announce the equity issue otter during an expansion. 
Gerhich (1996) also finds that IPO activity in the UK is higher during the upturn of' 
the cycle and argue that the increased IPO activity during periods of improving 
economic conditions results from lower underpricing. According to Gcrbich (1996), 
during the middle and last part of the expansion, an 1P0 comes into the market every 
2.4 and 2.85 days respectively. During the downturn of the cycle IPOs come onto the 
market in 2.71,3.81 and 5.64 day intervals in the three sub-periods of' the recession 
respectively. During periods when the intervals between two consecutive 1POs is 
low. Gcrhich (1996) finds that first day returns are lower than during periods when 
the time interval between IPOs is longer, establishing an indirect link between 
economic conditions and underpricing. lie does not however report the degree of 
underpricing during upturns and downturns which would have been a more 
appropriate test and would have established a direct and coherent relation between 
underpricing and economic conditions. 
The first hypothesis we are testing is whether the average Initial Public 
Offering has lower first day returns during the upturn of the business cycle relative to 
the downturn of the cycle. 
The Null and alternative hypothesis are: 
H0: The first day returns of IPOs that go public during the Upturn of the 
business cycle are the sinne with the first day returns of' IPOs that go public 
during the downturn of'the cycle. 
He. The first day returns of IPOs that go public during the Upturn of' the 
business cycle are significantly lower than the first day returns of'IPOs that go 
public during the downturn of the cycle. 
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To provide support that the average underpricing is sign iticantly lower during 
the upturn of the business cycle we have to reject the null hypothesis in favour of the 
alternative hypothesis. 
To do so, we compare the average and median first day returns across the 
upturn and downturn of the business cycle. If the average first day returns are 
significantly lower during the upturn of the business cycle we will reject the null 
hypothesis in favour of the alternative and would be able to support the theory that 
adverse selection costs for IPOs as expressed by the average first day returns are 
lower when economic conditions are good. 
5.3. FIRST 1)AV RETURNS ACROSS TIIE BUSINESS CYCLE. 
We find that the average first day return for Initial Public Offers that came to 
the market during the upturn of the business cycle is 12.72% and it is 10.07% for the 
firms that went public during the downturn of' the cycle. The difference was 
statistically significant with a t-statistic of 2.36 ( significant at 5% two tails). The 
medians are 7.04% and 7.14% respectively and not significantly different from each 
other. 
TA13LE 5.3 FIRST DAY RETURNS ACROSS UPTURNS AND 
DOWNTURNS OF THE BUSINESS CYCLE. 
LJI'TURN OF THE DOWNTURN 'I STATISTIC OF 
BUSINESS CYCLE OF THE DIFFERENCE 
BUSINESS BETWEEN 
CYCLE UPTURNS AND 
DOWNTURNS 
AVERAGE First day Returns, 12.72`% 10.07% 2.36 
( number of ( bservations) (769) (490) l 
lest slatisvic of difference of 16.1 14.02 
averages from zero 
MEDIAN First day Returns 7.04% 7.14% 
-0.0972 
rest sicrtis7ic ofdifference (! f 8.98 9.92 
medians rani zero 
Percentage of IPOs with positive 79.9% 79.6% 
returns 
Percentage of IPOs with negative 20.1% 20.4% 
returns 
........................................................................................................................................................................................... 1. the number of observations in upturns and downturns is smaller than the total numher of 
issues in our sample of 1262 because the first cycle starts at march 1981 while the whole sample starts 
Jrum January 1911 
......................... 
,.................................................................................................................. .......................................................... 
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It' we look at table 5.4 or figure 5.3 we can see that the average first day 
returns (solid green line) per month are low at the first part of the expansion with the 
average IPO firm having a first day return of 7.86% but increase in the middle ol'the 
expansion to 19.65%. Before the peak of the cycle the average first day return is 
10.14% per month and drops further after the economy enters a recession to 9.74%. 
In the middle part of the recession, average first day return is 13.88% and drops in 
the last phase of the recession just before the trough to 7.98%. 
Median first day returns exhibit a similar pattern to the average first day 
returns with the early part of the expansion having a median first day return of 
4.89`%,. In the middle part of' the recession, median first day returns reach the higher 
level with 12.17% and the period before the peak has median first day returns of 
5.98%. After the economy has started the downturn, median first day returns are 
7.54% and remain at the same level in the middle of the recession with 8.81 `%. Just 
betöre the end of the recession median first day returns dip to a low of 4.65%. 
TA13LE 5.4: FIRST DAY RETURNS ACROSS DIFFERENT PHASES OF THE 
BUSINESS CYCLE 
PHASE OF TILE UPTURN UPTURN UPTURN D(* WNTt! RN DOWNTURN D(WNTURN 
BUSINESS CYCLE 1 2 3 1 2 3 
AVE, RAOF. First day 7.86% 19.65% 10.14% 9.74% 13.88% 7.98% 
Returns, ( number of (207) (259) (303) (196) (123) (I(I ) 
observations) 
Test statistic of 7.09 11.8 9.1 4 10.4 8.? 
difference of average 
from zero 
Percentage of 7.5% 81% 82% 79% 85% 76% 
positive returns 
Percentage of 25% 19% 18110 21% 15% 24% 
negative returns 
Median First day 4.89% 12.17% 5.98% 7.54% 8.81% 4.65% 
Returns 
Test statistic of 4.42 7.36 5.36 5.78 6.63 4.83 
difference of 
medians from zero 
The period of the business cycle with the higher first day returns, both in 
terms of averages and medians, is the middle of the expansion and the period with 
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the lower first day returns is the start of the upturn for the averages and the end of the 
recession for the medians. 
We also investigate whether the higher first day returns we find during the 
upturn of the business cycle is caused by a specific expansion period. In table 5.5 we 
present the average and median first day returns across the individual business cycles 
from March 1981 to Dec 1996. In two out of the three expansion phases, average 
first day returns are significantly higher than the average first day returns during the 
subsequent downturn phases of the cycle. 
In the first upturn, from February 1981 to February 1984, the average first day 
returns of the 170 IPOs that went public in that period was 15.5% (median is 4.9%). 
In the recession that followed, the average first day returns were 10.7%, the 
difference was significant with a test statistic of 1.91 ( median was 6.01% and the 
difference was not significant). In the second cycle, that started at December 1985, 
the average first day returns were 14.2% during the upturn and 10.2% during the 
downturn a difference which was significant with a test statistic of 2.77 (medians 
were 9.2% and 8.4% respectively but the difference in the medians was not 
significant). Only in the last cycle are the average first day returns lower during the 
upturn ( average 8.1 %) relative to the downturn that followed (average 9.1 %) but not 
statistically significantly ( test statistic was 
-0.59). 
TABLE 5.5: FIRST DAY RETURNS ACROSS BUSINESS CYCLES IN THE 
UK 
Period of the UDturn Average Median 
of the Business First Day First Day 
Cycle returns returns 
March/1981 to 15.5% 4.9% 
Feb/1984 (170 IPOs) 
January 1985 to 14.2 % 9.2% 
September 1988 (378 IPOs) 
May 1992 to 8.1% 4.6 % 
October 1994 (221 IPOs) 
Period of the Average Median 
Downturn of the First Day First Day 
Business Cycle returns returns 
March 1984 to 10.7 % 6.01% 
December 1985 (177 IPOs) 
October 1988 10.2%, 8.4% 
to April 1992 (156 IPOs) 
ovember 1994 9.1% 5.6 % 
to December (149 IPOs) 
1996 
Overall, average first day returns are not significantly lower during any 
, 
expansion phase of the business cycle in the years from 1981 to 1996. 
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Ritter (1984) reports that there are periods when average first day returns are 
higher. He argues however that this phenomenon is caused largely by the natural 
resources industry. It may be the case that our results are sensitive to the inclusion of 
IPOs from a particular industry that may experience extremely large first day returns 
in the upturn of the cycle and extremely low returns in the downturn of the cycle. 
What we can observe from table 5.6 is that there are 4 industries where the 
first day returns are statistically significantly6 higher during the upturn of the cycle 
and no industry where the first day returns are statistically significantly lower during 
the upturn of the business cycle. The rest of the industries did not have significant 
differences in the average first day returns across the business cycle. From that table, 
we can say that the higher first day returns found during the upturn of the business 
cycle are not caused by a particular industry. No industry has significantly lower first 
day returns during the upturn of the business cycle. To the contrary, 4 industries 
have significantly higher first day returns during the upturn of the business cycle. 
Overall, it seems that first day returns are not lower during the expansion 
phase of the business cycle. Even when we used the abnormal first day returns 
(adjusted for movements in the FT ALL share) the findings remain the same (not 
reported). Underpricing is not lower during expansions. To the contrary, there are 
evidence that average first day returns are significantly higher during the upturn of 
the business cycle. 
To further clarify whether economic conditions affect the degree of 
underpricing in the next section we run regressions where the dependent variable is 
the first day return against measures of business cycle and other variables that have 
been found to have an effect on the magnitude of underpricing. It could be the case 
however that the higher first day returns during the upturn of the business cycle may 
be just a coincidence that arises from a stronger, and more fundamental relation 
between first day returns and other variables. First day returns have been found to-be 
related with a lot of variables such as the market returns, market volatility, and 
issuers characteristics such as market value and the method of issue. 
Statistically significant at least at 10% level one tail tests 
,'`- 
-' 
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TABLE 5.6: NUMBER OF IPOs AND AVERAGE FIRST DAY RETURNS PER 
INDUSTRY ACROSS UPTURNS AND DOWN"I'URNS OF THE BUSINESS 
CYCLE 
tY 
ICAT'ION 
, 
ECTRONIC EQUIPMENf 
......................................................... FORMATION TE: CIINOLOC 
..................................................... JSINFSS SIJI'PORT 
....................................................... 
'AIL. CHAIN STORE 
t'ROPI: RTY DEVELOPERS 
............................................................. 1)11II R BUSINESSES 
............................................................. FOOD I'RODIJCERS 
........................................................... LIý. ISiJRE FACILITIES 
............................................................. 11(11151, BUII. I)INCi 
........................................... OI HER BUILDING MAITRIA 
............................................................ MEDIA ACiE; NC! FS 
............................... PU131, ISIIING 
............................................................ DISTRll3ll FORS IND. 
rflrAI ANIFS 
FIRST DAY FIRST DAY NUMBER OF 
RETURNS RETURNS IPOs 
DURING THE DURING THE I)URING 
UPTURN OF DOWNTURN OF UPTURN OF 
14.1 % 17.1 % 
........................... 22.0% .............................. 13.5% 
........................... 12.6% ........................... 10.1% 
................... 10.9% ................................. 10.6% 
........................... 18.5% .............................. 17.0%** 
........................... 12.3% .............................. 10.4% 
........................... 14.7% .............................. 14.1% 
........................... 17.7% .............................. 13.3% 
5.6% 4.9% 
...................................................... 13.4% 12.7% 
15.5% 12.5% 
...................................................... 12.5% 
. 
11.5% 
...................................................... 22.1 % 13.7% 
52 29 
.......................................... 26 .............................. 21 
................. 22 ............ _. .............. 2ý........... 
.................. ... ... ..... ................ ý ............. 
36 7 
........................................ 21 ......................... 13 
....................................... 18 ........................ 14 
.......... .......... ýý............... ............. ý3............ 
.......................................... 19 .................. ............... 8 
.................... ý.. ............. _. 8 .............. ............ 
................. i................. .............................. 
..................................... 18 ............................. 4 
......................................... 13 .......... .............. 9 
....................................................................... PAPER AND PACKAGING .................................. 13.0 % .................. 5.4%*' 17 4 
.................................................................. ROAD  TRANSPORT ........... . 2.3 % ° 1* *6 
ENGINEERING, GENERAL. 11.8 % 5.0 %* 12 8 
......................................................................... PI [ARM ACEU l ICALS .................................. 15.7 % ..................................  9.5% ........... .. 11 ................................... 8 
.......................................... 
............................ . BROADCASTING .......................... 31.3 % ..................................... 10.2 %** ................... _. 10 .................................. 9 
..................................................................... VEHICLE DISTRIBUTION ................................. ......................... 12.2 % ...... 3.5 % 15 4 
........... ......................................................... DT11FR CONS TRACTION .......................... 10.7 % ..................................... 5.1 % ..... 11 8 
........................... ............................. L': LF, C"1 RICITY .................................. 11.4% ..... .............................. 18.8% ............. .. 1 ...... .......... 17 
..................................................................... ! NI: DICAL PRODUCTS ...... ........... 13.3 % ........... . ...................... 7.5 % ................... 12 Ö 
............. ....................................... .......... __. MISCELANEOUS. FINANCIAL 
1 -. - I .... I ....... I............ ........ ....... ... 
_.............. o .. ............ 12.8% 
............................... 
......................................... 12. d°% a 
........... ..... . _ .................... 
........................ 12 
........................... 
................................... 2 
... ........... .......... 
In table 5.7 we present the results of the ordinary lest squares regression 
analysis where the dependent variable is the first day return of every 1PO and as 
independent variables we use market wide and firm specific characteristics. All the 
firm specific variables are measured prior to the opening of the first trading day. The 
purpose of these regressions is not to find what factors affect the first day returns but 
to see if first day return are lower during the upturn of the business cycle after 
allowing for as many firm specific characteristics. To see the effect of' business 
conditions on underpricing we use two dummy variables. The first dummy takes the 
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value of 1 if the issue takes place during the upturn of the cycle and zero otherwise. 
The second dummy takes the value of 1 if the issue takes place during the second half 
of the upturn and zero otherwise. If these dummies have negative and significant 
coefficients that we can argue that the IPOs that go public in the upturn have lower 
underpricing. 
We find that the market return positively affects the first day returns. The 
higher the 60 day market run up prior to the beginning of the flotation month 
, 
the 
higher the first day returns. The test statistics ranged from 2.52 to 3.32. A potential 
explanation for that could be the time lag between the day the price of the IPO is 
decided and the day the firm is going listed. The price is decided a few weeks before 
the first trading day. If the market has risen in the period in-between then we 
could see higher first day returns for the IPO in order to "catch up" with the market. 
That result is similar with the result of Byrne & Rees (1996) who regress the initial 
return of individual IPOs against the log of the 4 week return of the market. 
TABLE 5.7: ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF THE 
FIRST DAY RETURNS 1981 
-1996 
The regression we run had the following format: 
(First Day return) = Constant + (Market to book value) + (PIE) + (Market value of 
issuer) + (Market run up) + (market Volatility) + (Growth in coincident indicator) + 
(Dummy]) + (Dummv2) + (method ofvavment) 
Constant market Market Market P/E Volatility of Growth in Dummy I Dummy 2 Method of N R 
run up value of to Book 60 trading coincident (1 if upturn (I if second Issue 
60 issuer (real Value days indicator of the cycle half of (I if 
trading terms) 0 otherwise) expansion, 0 placing, 0 
das otherwise otherwise 
1 0.0682 0.191 0.0015 0.0027 0.085 1.58 833 1.4% 
(3.16 (2.52) (0.90) (1.86) (1.82) (2.01) 
2 0.1020 0.2342 0.0050 0.0019 0.0416 1.2492 841 0.76% 
10.03 3.10 (0.20) 1.24 (0.66) (1.50) 
3 0.061 0.1977 0.00014 0.0028 0.0879. 
- 
0.0135 833 1.29% 
3.06 (2.55 (0.82) 1.84 (1.79) (1.05) 
7 0.0964 0.2368 0.0062 0.0019 0.0431 0.0111 841 0.66% 
8.49 3.07 (0.25) (1.29) (0.66) (0.85) 
5 0.063 0.222 0.000151 0.0025 0.0788 0.02958 833 1.7% 
(2.97 (2.87) (0.86) (1.67) = (1.65) 
6 0.0965 0.2541 0.0072 0.0018 0.0383 0.0204 841 0.83% 
9.00 (3.32) (0.29) (1.21) 0.59 1.34 
7 0.0445 0.2 19 0.00027 0.0025 0.078 0.2601 0.0252 833 1.87% 
(1.82) 2.84) (1.33) (1.65) (1.62) (1.67) (1.73) 
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Market to book value, PE ratio and the market value of issuer are measured prior to the opening of the first trading day. 
MARKET RUN UP is the 60 day cumulative returns of the FT All Share measured prior to the beginning of the month of 
the offer, VOLATILITY is the 60 day volatility of the daily returns of the FT ALL SHARE PRICE INDEX measured prior to 
the beginning of the month of the offer. The growth in the coincident indicator is the monthly change in the Coincide,, 
indicator supplied by Central Statistical Office. DUMMY I takes the value of I if the month is classified as Upturn of the 
business cycle and 0 if the month is classified as downturn of the business cycle. DUMMY2 takes the value of I if the month 
is during the second half of the expansion and zero otherwise. Dummy METHOD takes the value of 1 if the IPO is made 
through placing and 0 if it is made with other methods The results are corrected for Heteroscedasticity with the Robust 
method offered by the statistical package TSP. T-statistics are given in parentheses below the coefcients 
We find that the size of the firm does not have an impact on the first day 
returns. A positive relation between the PE ratio and the first day returns is found as 
in Byrne and Rees (1996). We use however the firm specific PE ratio and not the PE 
of the FT500. The market to book value also was positively related with the first day 
return but with less significance than the PE ratio. The market volatility positively 
affects the first day returns even though in some regressions it was not significant. 
The dummy for the method of the IPO was significant indicating that IPOs 
made with the method of placing have higher returns (regression No 7) than those 
made with other methods as found in Levis (1993). A IPO made with the method of 
placing has approximately 2.52% higher first day return than an IPO made with other 
methods once other factors are accounted for. 
The proxies we use for economic conditions have an effect on the first day 
returns. The monthly change rate of the coincident indicator (regressions No 1 and 2) 
have a positive effect on the first day returns indicating that as economic conditions 
are improving, first day returns are increasing. The first dummy (DUMMY 1) that 
takes the value of 1 if the issue takes place during the upturn of the business cycle 
and zero otherwise has a positive coefficient but insignificant indicating that the 
average first day returns do not differ across upturns and downturns if we consider 
the effect of other variables. The second dummy (DUMMY 2 ), that takes the value 
of 1 if the issue took place in the second half of the expansion and zero otherwise, 
was significant. The coefficient of that dummy can be interpreted as that an IPO that 
comes in the market in the second half of the expansion has 2.04% to 2.9% 
approximately higher first day returns than the IPO that comes to the market in all 
other periods, ceteris paribus. 
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Overall, the purpose of the above regressions was to see what is the effect of 
economic conditions and the state of the business cycle on the first day returns after 
allowing for the effect of as many other factors that could also influence the 
magnitude of first day returns 
. 
We find no support, whatsoever that first day returns 
are lower during the upturn of the business cycle as Gerbich (1996) suggests. All the 
evidence we present, point to the direction that first day return are not lower when 
economic conditions are good. We can not provide support to the story of Choe, 
Masulis and Nanda (1993) and Gerbich (1996) that during the upturn of the business 
cycle, adverse selection costs for IPOs are lower. Choe, Masulis and Nanda (1993) 
argue that during periods of improving economic conditions, the uncertainty about 
the intrinsic value of firms' assets and its future growth opportunities diminishes and 
therefore a seasoned equity issue made during the expansion phase of the business 
cycle should be regarded as a less negative signal about the value of the firm relative 
to a SEO made during the downturn of the cycle( for more on this issue see section 
2.3.2). We can not apply that way of thinking in the case of UK IPOs. An 
improvement in economic conditions does not reduce the adverse selection costs 
associated with an IPO as these are expressed by the first day returns. That could 
indicate two things: either that improved economic conditions do not reduce the 
uncertainty about the true value of the IPO and therefore do not reduce first day 
returns or that the magnitude of the underpricing is not affected by the' degree of 
uncertainty. The fact that previous studies provide strong evidence that first day 
returns decrease when the uncertainty for the true value of the IPO diminishes, (Ritter 
1986, Miller & Reilly 1987, James & Weir (1990), Michely &Shaw (1994)) makes 
us - discard the second possibility and believe that the improvement in economic 
conditions does not have a significant effect in reducing the uncertainty surrounding 
the true value of the IPO. 
.. 
ýtfr-.. 1 
,... 
Gerbich (1996) however argues that IPO activity in the UK is higher during 
the upturn of the cycle because the improvement in economic conditions causes a 
reduction in ' the first day returns. He does not establish however a direct relation 
between the state of the business cycle and first day returns as we do in our study but 
" uses an unnecessary "intermediary" Ito prove 
-his point., He argues that during the 
... 
middle and last phases of the expansion, IPOs come in shorter day intervals relative 
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to the downturn of the cycle. On average the number of trading days between two 
IPOs is 2.4 in the middle and 2.85 in the last phase of the upturn. In the first phase of 
the recession, IPOs come every 2.71 days on average and that period increases to 
3.81 and 5.64 days in the last two phases of the recession respectively. Following 
that, he ranks all his IPOs (1089) according to the number of trading days from the 
previous IPOs. The 109 IPOs (10% of his sample) with the lower duration ( on 
average these 109 IPOs come 0.37 days after the previous one) had the lower first 
day returns and the 109 IPOs with the higher duration ( 12.02 days) had the higher 
first day returns. The positive relation between duration and average first day returns 
however exists only between the two extreme deciles and is not monotonic. In other 
words, Gerbich (1996) argues that during improving economic conditions, IPOs 
come into the market in shorter intervals and when IPOs come in shorter intervals, 
first day returns are smaller arguing finally that during improving economic 
conditions average first day returns are smaller. As we find however that is not the 
case. Gerbich's (1996) results are sensitive to the use of the duration methodology. 
An improvement in economic conditions does not reduce the average first day 
return for IPOs and so the high equity financing in the upturn of the business cycle 
can not be driven by reduced first day returns. The question that arises is what drives 
IPO activity in the UK?. The answer is left in the next section where we investigate 
the effect of macroeconomic conditions on the IPO activity. 
5.4. REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF THE IPO ACTIVITY. 
This section tries to find what are the macroeconomic forces that drive the 
IPOs activity. Most importantly however we want to see what is the relation between 
IPO volume and economic conditions and adverse selection costs associated with the 
IPOs after we take into account some important macroeconomic variables which may 
also affect IPO volume. In tables 5.8 and 5.9 we present the results of the monthly 
time-series regression analysis where the dependent variable is the number Of IPOs 
and the amount of capital raised from IPOs per month in real terms excluding 
privatisations (prices December 1996) respectively and as independent variables 'we 
use a number of macroeconomic factors which we treat as control variables. The 
distribution of the number of IPOs per month' and the ; distribution' 'of amount of 
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capital raised from IPOs per month from January 1981 to December 1996 is not 
normal and so we use the Log of the number of IPOs per month and the log of the 
amount of capital raised from IPOs. The log of the number of IPOs per month in the 
above period is normally distributed with a Jarque-Bera test statistic of 5.9 which 
rejects the hypothesis of not normality at 5%7. The log of the amount of capital raised 
from IPOs per month from January 1981 to December 1996 is normally distributed 
with a Jarque-Bera test statistic of 1.62 which rejects the hypothesis of not normality 
at very high levels. 
Interest rates are represented in the regressions by the monthly change rate of 
the 3-month treasury bill and the Long Term Government bonds. As interest rates 
increase, the cost of borrowing increases and therefore managers may look for 
alternative sources of finance such as capital. Therefore the substitution effect 
suggests a positive relation between interest rate changes and IPO activity. 
As a measure of the level of the stock market we use 30,60 and 90 day 
cumulative returns of the FT All Share (MARKET RUN UP). We also use a variable 
that can capture the level of the stock market with regards to its recent past, the ratio 
of the 3-month average over the 3-year average. High market returns and high levels 
of the stockmarket may, create an attractive environment to issue equity since issues 
can be priced at higher levels. So, a positive relation between market returns or the 
level of the market and IPO volume is expected., 
According to Gerbich (1996), market volatility positively affects the amount 
of capital raised from IPOs. Increased market volatility. could indicate high 
information processing and therefore reduced market uncertainty which could lead to 
more, capital raised from IPOs. Byrne, & Rees (1996) however, find a negative 
relation between the market volatility and the number of IPOs. We intend to clarify 
the effect of the volatility on IPO activity by, 
- 
using 30,60 and 180 day market 
volatility (VOLATILITY) to test if volatility has any effect on the IPO activity. 
.-7 
Jarque-Bera is a test statistic for testing whether the series is normally distributed and it measures the 
difference of the skewness and kurtosis of the series from those of the normal distribution. Under the 
null hypothesis of a normal distribution, the Jarque-bera statistic is distributed as X2 with 2 degrees of 
freedom. The reported probability is the probability that a Jarque-Bera statistic exceeds the observed 
value under the null. A small probability value leads to the rejection of the null hypothesis of a normal 
distribution. For the distribution of the log of the number of IPOs per month we can not reject the null 
hypothesis of normality at 5% but we reject the hypothesis of normality at 1%. 
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To test if first day returns are negatively related with IPO activity as Gerbich 
(1996) argues, we use as independent variable the average first day returns of all the 
IPOs that went public in the previous quarter. Similar variables for the previous 6 and 
12 months were also used. If the magnitude of the first day returns is of concern to 
managers in the timing of the IPO we should find a negative and significant relation 
between the average first day returns of the recent IPOs and the IPO volume. 
Last but not least, we use a number of economic indicators to see if the 
- 
improvement in business conditions causes an increase in the IPO activity. Two 
dummy variables are used. The first dummy (DUMMY 1) takes the value of 1 if 
the month is classified as HOT (Upturn of the business cycle) and 0 if the month is 
classified as COLD (downturn of the business cycle). The second dummy 
(DUMMY2 ) takes the value of 1 if the month is during the second half of the 
expansion and zero otherwise. The Cochrane-Orcutt method is used to correct for 
the serial correlation of the errors. T- Statistics are given in parentheses below the 
coefficients. The results are in tables 5.8 ( Number of rights issues per month as 
dependent variable) and table 5.9 ( amount of capital raised per month as dependent 
variable). 
We find that the market return is not significant in explaining the number of 
IPOs per month. We use the 60 day cumulative FTA SHARE PRICE INDEX return 
but it was not significant even though it has a positive coefficient. The use of 30,90 
and 180 day cumulative FTA returns also produced insignificant coefficients(not 
reported). Our results are similar with the result of Byrne & Rees (1996) who find 
insignificant relation between the IPO activity and the market return. Gerbich (1996) 
reports a positive and highly significant coefficient for the market level. He uses 
however the 3-month average of FT ALL SHARE. INDEX to its 3 year average. 
When we used that variable (regressions 5 to 10) instead of the 60-day cumulative 
FTA returns we found similar results with Gerbich (1996). When the market is high 
relative to its recent past, IPO activity increases. The slope for the market level was 
significant usually at 10% level of significance. According to our findings when the 
stock market is high relative to its recent past it affects the timing decision of the 
managers. 
.. 
4, " 
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TABLE 5.8: REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF THE NUMBER OF INITIAL PUBLIC 
OFFERINGS PER MONTH (1981-1996) 
The regressions we run had the following format: 
Log(Number of IPOs) = Constant + Log(1 +Market Run up) + Log(1 +Market Level) 
+Log(1 +change in 3-month treasury Bills)+ Log(1 +change in Government Bonds) + 
Loz(Volatility) + Dummv] + Dummy2 + Loj(1+Average first day returns) 
Constant MARKET Market Change in Change Volatility of DUMMY I DUMMY2 Change in Average R 
RUN UP Level 3 month in 60 trading (1 if (1 if Coinciden First day 
60 days T-Bill Govern. days of FT expansion, Second t indicator returns 
Bonds ALL 0 otherwise half of During 
SHARE expansion, Previous 3 
0 otherwise months 
1 1.47 0.068 
-1.06 0.30 2.02 21.4% 
8.03 (0.07) 
-0.96 (1.93) (1.59) 
2 1.54 0.31 
-1.13 0.46 1.65 22.5% 
9.72 (0.33) (-1.04) (2.35) (1.32) 
3 1.57 0.63 
-0.08 -1.48 0.45 1.24 19.2% 
9.12 (0.06) (-0.82) (-1.37) (2.52) (1.02) 
4 1.68 0.33 
-0.76 -1.47 0.51 0.91 19.4% 
10.7 (0.34) (-0.78) (-1.07) (2.64) (0.74) 
5 
-1.16 3.51 -0.82 0.22 1.06 22.8% 
-0.76 (1.73) (-0.80) (2.20) (0.82) 
6 
-1.41 3.89 -1.03 0.43 0.58 24.3% 
-1.00 (2.12) (-1.04) (2.36) (0.47) 
7 
-0.09 2.22 -0.08 -1.33 0.38 0.63 19.8% 
-0.06 (1.62) (-0.86) (-1.33) (2.08) (0.50) 
8 
-0.67 3.11 -0.08 -1.41 0.47 0.093 20.8% 
-0.48 (1.71) -0.85 (-1.45) (2.56) (0.76) 
9 0.013 1.99 
-0.04 -0.80 0.22 1.29 17.1% 
0.01 (1.91) (-1.13) (-0.78) (2.14) (0.94) 
10 
-0.20 2.31 -0.013 -1.06 0.48 0.95 19.2% (-0.13 (1.65) 13) 1 
-1.08 (2.35) 0.73 
...... -- -- ........ ------------------------------------------------------ The Cohrane-Orcutt method is used to adjust for the serial correlation of the errors. The dependent variable is the lof og the number of 
IPOs per month. MARKET RUN UP is the continuously compounded market returns (FT ALL SHARE) over the 60 trading days prior 
to the beginning of the month of the offering MARKET LEVEL is the 3 month average of the FT ALL SHARE PRICE INDEX over the 3- 
year average of the FT ALL SHARE PRICE INDEX measured prior to the beginning of the offering VOLATILITY is the daily market 
return (FT ALL SHARE) measured over 60 trading days prior to the beginning of the month of the offer. DUMMY I takes the value of 1 
if the month is classified as HOT (Upturn of the business cycle) and 0 if the month is classified as COLD (downturn of the business 
cycle). ' DUMMY2 takes the value of I if the month is during the second half of the expansion and zero otherwise. A VERA GE FIRST 
DAY RETURNS is the average first day returns of all the IPOs that came to the market is the previous quarter prior to the beginning of 
the month. Change in 3-MONTH TREASURY BILLS AND LONG TERM GOVERNMENT BONDS are measured over 3 months prior to 
the month of the oerin 
..................................... _ . _............................................ 
Interest rates do not significantly affect the number of IPOs' per month. An 
increase in long term government bonds from the previous'month'cause a decrease 
in the number of firms making an IPO but was not significant (regressions 9 and 10). 
The change in short-term interest rates is' negatively related to the IPO activity but 
the coefficients are also not significant at any of the regressions (3,4,7 and 8). ' 
Volatility is negatively related to the IPO activity but with no` statistical 
significance. We' used 30,60,180 day windows for the market volatility but none 
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were significant. We can not support the argument of Gerbich (1996) that high 
information processing which causes volatility to rise and information asymmetry to 
drop results to an increase in IPO activity. p, 
Gerbich ( 1996) argues that the IPO activity increases when the average first 
day returns during the previous quarter are low. He reports a negative and highly 
significant relation between the average first day returns of the previous quarter and 
the amount of capital raised from IPOs in the current month. Nevertheless, we do not 
find that the average first day returns of all the IPOs that came into the market in the 
previous quarter have any effect on the IPO activity. In the last column in table 5.8 
we use as an explanatory variable the average first day returns of all IPOs that came 
to the market in the previous term. None of the coefficients are negative. These 
results further strengthen our findings that IPO activity is not driven bylower adverse 
selection costs. We also used the average first day returns of the IPOs that went" 
public during previous 6 and 12 months instead of the previous 3 but none produced 
significant negative results (not reported). The bottom line is that we do not provide 
support to the argument that IPO activity is higher when underpricing is low. To the 
contrary we find that when average first day returns are high IPO activity is high but 
the positive relation is not statistically significant. 
The difference in our results from Gerbich (1996) may be caused by, two 
factors. First, Gerbich's (1996) calculation of the average first day returns of the 
previous quarter is different. He averages the monthly averages of the previous three 
months. So, for example he calculates the average first day returns for July, August 
and September 1989 and he calculates the average first day returns of the previous 
quarter for month October 1989 as the averages of July, August and September. In 
this way however he gives the same weight to the three months irrespective of the 
number of IPOs in each one of them. We calculate the average first day returns as the 
average of all IPOs that went public in the previous quarter and not as the averages of 
the monthly average as Gerbich does. In that way we do not give the same weight to 
a month with low activity with a month with high activity. For example in July 1989 
we had 10 IPOs, in August only 2 and in September 3 IPOs and their average first 
day returns of all the 15 IPOs is 13.5%. By using; Gerbich (1996) methodology 
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average first day return would have been 12.5% (the average of July 11.6% plus the 
average of August 16.8% plus the average of September 9.2% divided by 3). 
In addition to the above, we have extended the sample up until 1996 while 
Gerbich's sample was up to 1993. Furthermore, for the Issues that KPMG provided 
no details about the amount of capita. raised from IPOs we looked up into the 
- 
London Quality of Market monthly and London Stock Exchange Fact Book that 
- 
provide details about new issues. Wherever we found the missing information we 
used them in order to extend the size of the sample. Even though the IPOs for which 
we found additional details were not many they obviously make a difference. 
Therefore, Gerbich's (1996) results appear to be period and sample specific. 
As argued in Choe, Masulis and Nanda (1993) and Gerbich (1996), the equity 
issuance activity increases during the upturn of the business cycle. As economic 
conditions are improving, more firms resort to equity financing. The dummy that 
takes the value of 1 if the month is during the upturn of the cycle was significant. 
That increase seems to concentrate in the second half of the expansion, the dummy 
2 that takes the value of 1 if the IPO takes place in the second half of the expansion 
has higher and more significant coefficients. More firms make an IPO during the 
second half of the expansion relative to all other periods of the cycle as the 
coefficient of the DUMMY 2 suggests. 
In table 5.9 we have the results of the, regressions when the dependent 
variable is the amount of capital raised from IPOs per month in real terms excluding 
the privatisations. The dummy that takes the value of 1 if the month was during the 
second half of the upturn of the' cycle' was statistically ý significant in all the 
regressions with test-statistics ranging from 2.39 to 2.58. Dummy 1 however was less 
significant and in some regressions it was marginally insignificant. - 
The market returns and the market level were not significant in any of the 
regressions. The change in short term interest rates was negatively and marginally at 
10% related with the IPO activity. The coefficients for the volatility are negative and 
highly significant showing that volatility adversely affects, the amount of capital 
raised from IPOs. In the last column of table 5.9 we use'as an additional independent 
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variable the average first day returns of all IPOs that went public in the previous 3 
months. All the coefficients are positive but insignificant showing no relation 
between the magnitude of first day returns for the recent IPOs and the amount of 
capital raised from IPOs in the current month. 
TABLE 5.9: REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF THE AMOUNT OF CAPITAL RAISED 
FROM INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERINGS PER MONTH (1981-1996) 
The regressions we run had the following format: 
Log(Amount of capital raised from IPOs at month t) = Constant + Log(1+Market Run up) 
+ Log(1 +Market Level) +Log(1 +change in 3-month treasury Bills)+ Log(1 +change in 
Government Bonds) + Log(Volatility) + Dummy] + Dummy2 + Log(1+Average first day 
returns) 
Constant MARKET Market Change Change in Volatility DUMMY 1 DUMMY2 Change in Average R. 
RUN UP Level in Govern. of 60 (1 if (1 if Coincident First day 
60 days 3 month Bonds trading expansion, Second indicator returns 
T-Bill days of FT 0 otherwise half of During 
ALL expansion, Previous 3 
SHARE 0 otherwise months 
1 4.24 
-1.65 -6.15 0.65 2.91 14.6% (11.07) (-0.74) (-2.52) (1.67) (1.04) 
2 4.40 
-0.91 -6.27 1.00 2.02 16.3% (13.4) (-0.42) (-2.67) (2.53) (0.74) 
3 4.45 
-1.57 -0.35 -6.08 0.79 2.03 19.7 (10.7) 
-0.69 (-1.55) (-2.47) (1.76) (0.70) 
4 4.59 
-1.03 -0.35 -6.40 1.06 1.29 21.2% (12.8) 
-0.45 (-1.53) (-2.67) (2.48) (0.47) 
5 3.47 1.01 
-5.30 0.60 2.01 14.3% 
1.01 (0.22) (-2.35) (1.46) (0.66) 
6 3.10 1.69 
-5.73 0.99 1.11 16.3% (0.99) (0.41) (-2.65) (2.49) (0.37) 
7 3.43 1.34 
-0.34 -5.32 0.70 1.20 19.4% (0.87) (0.26) (-1.52) (-2.28) (1.48) (0.37) 
8 2.80 2.34 
-0.35 -5.83 1.04 0.26 211% (0.80) (0.51) (-1.53) 
-2.60 (2.39) (0.08) 
9 4.24 
-0.11 0.018 -5.21 0.73 3.17 18.7% (1.02) 
-0.21 (0.06) (-2.24) (1.58) 0.94 
10 4.06 0.28 
-0.069 -5.74 1.23 2.57 20.9% (1.07) (0.056) (-0.24) (-2.581) (2.58) 0.79 
The Cohrane-Orcutt method is used to adjust for the serial correlation of the errors. The dependent variable is the lof og the number of 
IPOs per month. MARKET RUN UP is the continuously compounded market returns (FT ALL SHARE) over the 60 trading days prior 
to the beginning of the month of the offering MARKET LEVEL is the 3 month average of the FT ALL SHARE PRICE INDEX over the 3_ 
year average measured prior to the beginning of the offering VOLATILITY is the daily market return (FT ALL SHARE) measured over 
60 trading days prior to the beginning of the month of the offer. DUMMY 1 takes the value of 1 if the month is classified as HOT 
(Upturn of the business cycle) and 0 if the month is classified as COLD (downturn of the business cycle). DUMMY2 takes the value of I 
if the month is during the second half of the expansion and zero otherwise. A VERA GE FIRST DAY RETURNS is the average first day 
returns of all the IPOs that came to the market is the previous quarter prior to the beginning of the month. Change in 3-MONTH 
TREASURY BILLS AND, LONG TERM GOVERNMENT BONDS and coincident indicator are measured over 3 months prior to the 
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We also used instead of the number of IPOs and amount of capital raised per 
month, the number of IPOs and amount of capital per quarter as dependent variables 
with analogous transformations to the independent variables without getting 
qualitative different results. Economic conditions still had high positive and 
significant coefficients with volatility and interest rates negatively related but 
marginally significant. Also, at no regression that used quarterly data, were average 
first day returns of the previous quarter significant in explaining the number of IPOs 
or the amount of capital raised in the current month. 
Our regression analysis indicates that more firms make an IPO during the 
expansion phase of the business cycle and when the stock market is high relative to 
its recent past. Short term interest rates have little effect on the IPO volume while 
market volatility has a significant negative impact on the amount of capital raised 
from IPO. The degree of underpricing has no effect whatsoever on the timing of IPO 
volume. 
5.5. Do FIRMS TIME THE IPO WHEN THEIR SHARE PRICES ARE OVERVALUED? 
A lot of research has pointed to the exploitation of overvaluation as the 
driving force behind the timing of IPOs. Ritter (1991) and Loughran and Ritter 
(1995) find a significant underperformance for firms conducting an IPO. They 
suggest that firms make an IPO during periods when their stock is overvalued. Spiess 
and Affleck-Graves (1995) also argue that managers time the equity issue when the 
firm is overvalued. They report a significant underperformance of Seasoned Equity 
Offers which is caused by managers deliberately timing the issue at periods when the 
shares are overvalued. Long run IPO underperformance is not a US phenomenon 
only. Loughran, Ritter and Rydqvist (1994) find evidence of' post-IPO 
underperformance in 6 world markets. Levis (1993) reports 'that UK IPOs 
underperform relative to a number of indexes. Levis (1993) does not find however a 
relation between the intensity of IPO activity and their future performance. In other 
words, if firms make an IPO when their shares are overvalued then we should find 
that IPOs that come to the market in years of heavy volume should have the worst 
underperformance. Levis (1993) however, compares the IPO with a market index. He 
uses the FTA share price index and the HGSC small'companies index. ' The last 
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index may take into account the size effect but it does not take into account the 
industry and the market to book effect. 
If exploitation of overvaluation is a major driving force of the time series 
variability of the IPO activity, then IPOs that come in the market in periods of heavy 
volume must be more overvalued and therefore should have higher levels of 
underperformance relative to the IPOs that come to the market in periods of Light 
IPO activity which are periods when IPOs are less overvalued and therefore should 
have lower levels of underperformance. 
In this section we test whether UK IPOs that go public in Heavy IPO periods 
have worst post-IPO performances relative to IPOs that come into the market in light 
volume periods. The null and alternative hypothesis are: 
................................................................................................................................................................................................... Ho: The IPOs that come into the market in Heavy IPO volume periods have 
similar Post-IPO performunces with the IPOs that come into the market in 
Li'ht JPO volume periods 
Ile: The IPOs that come into the market in Heavy IPO volume periods have 
signrficantly worst Post-]PO performances relative to the IPOs that come 
into the market in Lieht IPO volume periods. 
................................................................................................................................................................................................... 
If HOT period IPOs are significantly worst performers relative to COLD 
period IPOs then we will reject the null hypothesis in favour of the alternative one. 
To reject the null hypothesis of similar performance of HOT and COLD period IPOs 
we compare the post-1110 performances of IPOs that came into the market in I leavy 
and light IPO volume periods respectively. In order to classify periods as 1101' or 
COLD we rank all months from January 1981 to December 1996 (192 months) 
according the 3-month moving average of the amount of capital raised from IPOs in 
real terms excluding privatisations. The 48 months (25% of the sample ) with the 
highest IPO activity in terms of capital raised are classified as HOT months. The 48 
months with the lowest 1110 activity are classified as COLD months. The remaining 
96 months are classified as OTHER. 
First we need to find whether IPO firms underperform or not. For this purpose 
we use four measures of post-IPO performance. First we use the monthly buy and 
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hold returns without any adjustments. The second measure of Post-IPO performance 
is the buy and hold returns of IPOs adjusted for the movements in the FTA. The final 
two measures of performance are the buy and hold returns adjusted for industry and 
size and the buy and hold returns adjusted for industry and market to book value. For 
the last two measures the abnormal returns is the difference between the return of the 
IPO and a matching firm. The matching firm is chosen from the same industry as 
with the IPO firms and with similar market to book or market value. More details 
about the ways used to calculate the post-IPO performances are in section 4.4 
The results of Post-IPO performance are presented in figure 5.5 and table 
5.10. We find that UK IPOs exhibit positive buy and hold returns for the 5 post-IPO 
years. IPOs offer a 24.60% buy and hold return by the end of the first year to the 
investors that purchased the IPO at the offer price. The average Buy and Hold return 
to the investors that purchased the IPO at the offer price increases to 30.62% by the 
end of the second year. From that point, average buy and hold returns show no big 
changes and stay around the area of 30% up until month 57. In the last 3 months IPO 
buy and hold returns increase slightly to an average 5 year buy and hold return to the 
investors that purchased the IPO at the offer price of 36.10%. The issue however 
whether investors are able to buy the IPOs at the offer price is'in dispute. During an 
IPO issuing process it is common that the demand for the shares to outstrip the 
supply and therefore a rationing occurs. Investors do not get the full amount in shares 
they required but only a portion of that. Therefore, investors that want to become 
shareholders in the IPOs often have to buy the shares in the aftermärket, during or 
after the first trading day. Therefore, an investors can not always enjoy the very high 
first day returns of the IPOs and the inclusion of these first day returns in the 
calculation of the long run performances is not entirely correct. Therefore, if the large 
first day returns of 11.7% are removed from the long run performances we can see 
that IPOs offer a5 year buy and hold return to the investor that purchased the IPO at 
the end of the first trading day of 24.4%. 
When we adjust the IPO returns for the movements in the FTA the picture 
changes. Relative 
-to 
the FTA, IPO ' returns continue to increase up until month 6 
when the average buy and hold return to the investors that purchased the IPO at the 
offer price is 13.87%. At the end 'Of the first year, average buy and hold return to the 
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investors that purchased the IPO at the offer price and adjusted for the FTA is 
12.11%. Returns drop to 5.60% at the end of the second year and become negative 
by the end of the third year with an average buy and hold return of 
-4.85%. IPOs 
continue to do badly relative to the FTA and average buy and hold returns continue to 
drop reaching 
-15.27% at the end of the 4th year. The lower point is reached at the 
end of month 57 where the average buy and hold return to the investors that 
purchased the IPO at the offer price is 
-22.14% to reach eventually a5 year buy and 
hold average return of 
-19.07%. IPOs start to significantly underperform by the end 
of month 34 if first day returns are accounted for. If the high first day return are not 
taken into account then obviously the IPOs underperformance relative to the FTA is 
increased to 
-16.55% by the end of year 3 and to -30.77% by the end of year 5. The 
use of the FTA as a benchmark however is not the best one since the FTA is a market 
value weighted index and is heavily influenced by the largest companies in the 
London stock exchange while IPO firm are usually small firms. Therefore, the FTA 
is biased for small caps. To correct for this bias we use the industry/market value 
adjusted performance which according to Barber and Lyon (1997) is the only 
unbiased measure of performance. The next measure of performance is more 
appropriate since it takes into account the size of the IPO firm. 
IPOs underperformance that includes the high first day returns is not 
significant when we look at the next two measures of Post-IPO performance. After 
adjusting the IPO returns for industry and market value and taking into account the 
first day returns we find that average buy and hold returns increase until month 8 and 
reach 18.17%. From that point onwards returns follow a downwards slope. At the 
end of year 1 average buy and hold returns that include the first day returns are 
14.12% and become 9.84% at the end of the second year. Average buy and hold 
returns become insignificant from zero by the end of year 3 (1.89%). At the end of 
year 4 average returns that include the first day returns turn negative, 
-3.10% ( the 
lowest point) but are not significantly different from zero. The 5 year average buy 
and hold return that includes the first day returns is 
-1.82%. If the first day returns are 
not accounted for, the buy and hold performances of IPOs after being adjusted for 
the industry and market value are much worst. The average Buy and Hold return by 
the end of year 1 if first day returns are not taken into account is 2.42%. By the end of 
year 3, the average buy and hold returns if first day returns are not taken into account 
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is 
-1.86% and drop to -13.52% by the end of year 5, which is significantly negative 
with a test statistic of 
-1.98. 
When we used the other measure of Post-IPO performance that is adjusted for 
industry and market to book value we find results similar with the previous. IPOs 
average buy and hold returns adjusted for industry and market to book value that 
include the first day returns reach the highest point at month 9 (14.82%) and from 
that point returns follow a downwards slope dropping to 13.77% at the end of year 1 
and to 11.39% at the end of year 2 with the inclusion of first day returns. As with the 
previous measure, average IPO buy and hold returns become insignificantly different 
from zero by the end of year 3, (5.64%). At the end of 4`h year returns drop further to 
-3.83% and reach 0.21% at the end of the year 5 if first day returns are taken into 
account but were never significantly different from zero. If first day returns are not 
taken into account then IPOs buy and Hold performance adjusted for industry and 
market to book value are 2.07% by the end of year 1 and drop to 
-6.06% by the end 
of year 3 which has a test statistic of 
-1.67. The 5 year buy and hold performance, is - 
11.49% if first day returns are not taken into account with a test statistic of 
-2.14. 
The conclusions that can be drawn from the above results is that once the 
high first day returns are accounted for, the issue whether IPOs underperform 
becomes a contested one. Certainly IPOs do not reduce the wealth of their 
shareholders if no adjustments are made. IPOs offer a5 year buy and hold return of 
36.71%. Comparing however IPO returns with a market wide benchmark such as the 
FTA reveals that IPOs are poor investments and the average investor would be better 
off by 20% by investing in a portfolio of the FTA firms relative to a portfolio of 
IPOs. The returns that are adjusted for industry/ market value and industry/market to 
book value however reveal that IPOs underperformance is small and not statistically 
significant. The size of the IPO sample however in the two later cases is reduced 
relative to the full number of the IPOs used in the two other measures of Post-IPO 
performance. That happens due to the lack of information` about the industry 
classification and market to book values and market values for some of the IPOs. 
Therefore, the power of the statistical tests in the last two measures of Post-PO 
performance is slightly reduced. 
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TABLE 5.10: POST IPO PERFORMANCE OF IPOs THAT WENT PUBLIC 
IN THE PERIOD FROM 1981 TO 1996 
Month from NORMAL Test FT Test INDUSTRY Test INDUSTRY Test 
the Listing BUY AND Statistic ADJUSTED Statistic AND Statistic AND Statistic 
HOLD (difference BUY AND (difference MARKET (difference MARKET TO (differenc 
RETURNS from zero) HOLD from zero) VALUE BUY from zero) BOOK e from 
RETURNS AND HOLD VALUE BUY zero) 
RETURNS AND HOLD 
1st Month 12.40% 16.75 10.80% 14.66 11.56% 12.26 10.97% 11.48 
(1019) (1019) (871) (879) 
3rd Month 17.00% 19.68 13.42% 15.32 12.85% 9.98 11.16% 9.53 
(1019) (1019) (949) (958) 
6th Month 20.28% 18.75 13.87% 13.19 15.67% 8.80 12.07% 7.22 
1019 (1019) (948) (958) 
9th Month 22.29% 17.42 12.16% 10.07 15.56% 7.13 14.82% 5.23- 
(1019) (1019) (948) (957) 
12th Month 24.60% 16.73 12.11% 8.59 14.12% 6 45 13.77% 6.26- 
(1019) (1019) (944) (958) 
15th Month 26.33% 16.07 10.91% 6.94 13.14% 5.31 13.09% 5.90 
(1019) (1019) (943) (956) 
18th Month 26.28% 14.41 07.82% 4.45 12.37% 4.76 12.44% 4.86 
(1018) (1018) (942) (956) 
21st Month 27.80% 13.88 05.60% 2.89 10.02% 3.27 11.47% 3.80 
(1017) (1017) (930) (944) 
24th Month 30.62% 14.20 05.60% 2.68 09.84% 
" 
2.82 11.39% 3.37 
997 (997) (907) (926) 
27th Month 30.58% 13.10 02.91% 1.29 06.73% 1.72 09.52% 2.18 
(985) (985) (882) (906) 
30th Month 30.50% 12.22 00.92% 0.38 05.20% 1.34 08.10% 1.72 
(959) (959) (853) (883) 
33rd Month 30.83% 11.73 
-02.41% -0.95 05.22% 1.04 06.53% 1.19 (944) (944) (842) (872) 
36th Month 31.45% 11.27 
-04.85% -1.81 01.89% 0.29 05.64% 0.46 
928 (928) (825) (861) 
39th Month 31.93% 10.92 
-07.63% -2.71 03.72% 0.38 02.85% 0.10 (922) (922) (815) (850) 
42nd Month 30.72% 10.00 
-11.02% -3.71 00.14% 0.27 02.37% 0.07 (911) (911) (791) (833) 
45th Month 30.79% 9.54 
-13.18% -4.20 -02.12% -0.55 -01.09% -0.43 (893) (893) (782) (823) 
48th Month 31.68% 9.58 
-15.27% -4.77 -03.10% -0.64 -03.83% -0.77 (870) (870) (762) (808) 
51st Month 31.47% 9.03 
-17.74% -5.23 -03.07% -0.52 -01.19% -0.90- (849) (849) (729) (779) 
54th Month 30.71% 8.23 
-20.09% -5.53 -02.59% -0.41 -01.38% 
: 0-93- 
(804) (804) (674) (734) 
57th Month 31.67% 8.01 
-22.14% -5.74 -02.65% -0.35 -02.06% -0.98 (769) (769) (647) (713) 
60th Month 36.10% 8.83 
-19.07% -4.77 -01.82% -0.22 - 00.21% 0.65 (728) (728) (612) (681) 
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-- - --- -- -- --- The sample includes Initial Public Offers made with the method of offer for sale, offer for subscription or placings in the 
period Jan-1981 to Dec 1996. The return are calculated as Buy and Hold returns. The FT adjusted returns are calculated 
as the difference between the Normal buy and hold return of IPO i at month t and the buy and hold return of the FT ALL 
share price index at the same month. The industry and market to book adjusted buy and hold returns are made by 
subtracting from the buy and hold return of 1PO i until month t the monthly buy and hold return of a firm in the same 
industry and closest market to book value with the IPO firm. The industry and market size adjusted buy and hold returns 
are made by subtracting from the monthly buy and hold return of ]PO i until month t the buy and hold return of the firm in 
the same industry and closest market value with the IPOfrrm i. 
The look at the percentage of firms that outperformed and underperformed in 
table 5.11 shows that IPOs underperformance is not overwhelming once first day 
returns are accounted for. Only for the buy and hold returns that are adjusted for the 
FTA are the IPOs that underperformed more than the IPOs that outperformed. 55% 
of all IPOs offered inferior buy and hold returns relative to the FTA by the end of 
year 5 with the remaining 45% outperforming the FTA. The use of the two firm 
matching benchmarks however revels no significant differences in the percentage of 
firms that underperformed and outperformed by the end of years 4 and 5. 
Approximately 50% of IPOs outperformed and 50% underperformed relative to the 
industry/market value and industry/market to book value by the end of year 5. 
Whether however first day returns should be used in calculations of Post-IPO 
performances is an issue in dispute. Investors can benefit from the high first day 
returns if they are able to buy the IPOs at the offer price. However, it is common to 
see the demand for the new shares to outstrip the supply. Therefore a rationing occurs 
and each investor takes a portion of the shares he/she demanded. For investors unable 
to buy the IPO at the offer price it makes no sense to say that IPOs do not 
underperform since those that buy at the end of the first day are significantly worst 
off since they do not benefit from the last first day returns and, by the end of the fifth 
year they are worst off by as much as 30% ( adjusted for FTA) and 10% for industry 
and market to book or market value adjusted. 
tý 
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TABLE 5.11: PERCENTAGE OF IPOs THAT UNDERPERFORMED AND 
OUTPERFORMED RELATIVE TO VARIOUS INDEXES 
Month Relative to the Listing 12 24 36 48 60 
Percentage of IPOs that outperformed 71% 70% 67% 67% 66% 
WITH NO ADJUSTMENTS 
Percentage of IPOs that 29% 30% 33% 33% 34% 
underperformed WITH NO 
ADJUSTMENTS 
Percentage of IPOs that outperformed 61% 55% 49% 46% 45% 
relative to the FTA 
Percentage of IPOs that 39% 45% 51% 54% 55% 
underperformed relative to the FTA 
Percentage of IPOs that outperformed 60% 57% 51% 49% 51% 
relative to the industry and market value 
Percentage of IPOs that 39% 43% 49% 51% 49% 
underperformed relative to the Industry 
and market value 
Percentage of IPOs that outperformed 60% 58% 53% 50% 51% 
relative to the Industry and market to 
book value 
Percentage of IPOs that 39% 42% 47% 50% 49% 
underperformed relative to the Industry 
and market to book value 
The hypothesis we test here however is not whether IPOs underperform or not 
but whether there is relation between the intensity of IPO activity and the post-IPO 
performance. If IPO volume is driven by overvaluation exploitation, we should 
expect that periods when managers are able to achieve more overvalued prices for 
their IPOs should be periods of heavy IPO volume. If that is the case, then the IPOs 
that went public in periods of heavy volume (and therefore have exploited 
overvaluation the most) should have worst post-IPO performances relative to IPOs 
that went public in periods of light IPO activity ( and so are less overvalued). We 
investigate the relation between the IPO volume and underperformance. next. We 
calculate the average post IPO performance of all IPOs that came to the market at 
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HOT, COLD or OTHER periods. The results are in table 5.12 and figures 5.5,5.6, 
5.7 and 5.8 for the four measures of performances respectively. 
In panel A of table 5.12 we have the Post-IPO buy and hold returns without 
any adjustments of HOT, COLD and OTHER period IPOs. These performances are 
also plotted in figure 5.6. We find that HOT market IPOs have significantly worst 
performances than COLD market IPOs even from the first year after the listing. The 
average buy and hold return of HOT market IPOs by the end of year 1 is +16.80% 
and the average buy and hold return of COLD market IPOs for the same period is 
+30.87% significantly higher than the return of HOT IPOs with a test statistic of 
2.50. The spread between HOT and COLD market IPOs increases to 
-34% in the 
second year a difference which has a test statistic of 
-4.82. By the end of the third 
year the difference between HOT and COLD market IPOs increases to 
-43%. At the 
end of year 4, HOT market IPOs have an average buy and hold return of 13.51% 
while COLD markets IPOs have an average buy and hold return of 60.22%. The 
negative spread between HOT and COLD markets IPOs is 
-46.26% by the end of the 
5 year period, a difference with a test statistic of 
-4.16. HOT market IPOs have 
significantly worst performances not only when compared with COLD market IPOs 
buy also when compared with all the rest of the IPOs ( both COLD and OTHER 
periods IPOs). The test statistics of the difference between HOT and, the rest of the 
IPOs ( both COLD and OTHER periods IPOs) are in the bottom row of Panel A and 
range from 
-3.22 to -4.51. Overall, our results on the Post-IPO buy and hold 
performance of HOT and COLD markets IPOs reveals that HOT market IPOs are 
significantly worst long run performers relative to the COLD market IPOs. That can 
be clearly seen in figure 5.6. The performance of HOT market IPOs is represented by 
the red line and the performance of COLD market IPOs by the blue line. There is a 
clear difference between the performances of the two group of IPOs. COLD market 
IPOs significantly outperform the HOT market IPOs. 
Similar conclusions are drawn when we look at, the Post-IPO performance 
adjusted for movements in the FTA (panel B of table 5.12 and figure 5.7). From year 
2 onwards we find the HOT markets IPOs are significantly worst performers relative 
to the COLD market IPOs. The negative spread ranges from 
-20.64% by the end of 
year 2 to 
-37.65% by the end of year 5. In figure 5.7 we have plotted the FTA 
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adjusted post-IPO buy and hold performances of HOT and COLD IPOs. It is visually 
clear that the HOT period IPOs ( Red line) perform worst than the COLD market 
IPOs (blue line). 
The negative spread in the buy and hold return between HOT and COLD 
market IPOs remains even when we use the industry and market value adjusted 
returns( Panel C of table 5.12) 
. 
COLD market IPOs outperform HOT market IPOs 
by 9.26% at the end of year 1 and by 5.47% by the end of year 2. COLD market IPOs 
continue to outperform HOT market IPOs by 13.3% at the end of year 3 and by 
22.59% at the end of year 4. The 5 year difference between COLD and HOT IPOs is 
22.7% in favour of COLD market IPOs. The difference in the performance between 
HOT and COLD market IPOs is statistically significant from the end of year 3 
onwards. 
HOT market IPOs perform worst than COLD market IPOs even when we use 
the industry and market to book value adjusted buy and hold return with a5 year 
spread of 39.04% in favour of COLD IPOs (panel D of table 5.12). In figure 5.9 we 
have plotted the post-IPO performances adjusted for industry/market to book value. 
The performance of HOT market IPO is represented by the red line and that of the 
COLD market IPOs by the blue line. COLD market IPOs perform better than HOT 
market IPOs especially after the third year. The differences in the post-IPO 
performances of HOT and COLD market IPOs are less statistically significant when 
we use the industry/market value or industry/market to book value adjusted returns 
from the FTA adjusted returns partly because of the reduced size of the sample and 
partly because the higher variance of the abnormal returns that are industry/ market 
value and industry /market to book value adjusted is higher. For example, the 
variance of the five year buy and hold returns adjusted for the FTA is 1.09 for HOT 
and 0.95 for cold IPOs but increases to 8.82 and 3.88 respectively for the industry 
and market to book value returns. That happens because in the adjustment procedure 
when we use a matching firms, apart form the variance for the returns of the IPOs we 
also have the variance from the returns of the matching sample which is bound to be 
higher from the returns of a market index which does not have as big fluctuations 
from month to month as the individual stocks. 
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TABLE 5.12: POST IPO PERFORMANCE ACROSS HEAVY AND LICHT IPO VOLUME 
PERIODS 
PANEL A 
POST IPO BUY AND HOLD PERFORMANCE of 
HOT, COLD and OTI IFR period IPOs 
Month from the Listing 12th Month 24th Month 36th Month 48th Month 60th Month 
PERFORMANCE OF IPOs THAT 16.80% 21.98% 17.56% 13.51% 12.22% 
WENT PUBLIC IN HOT PERIODS (388) (369) (328) (312) (184) 
Test statistic (dil)i-rcnt /i"urn _ero) 7.89 6.60 4.13 2.66 1.60 
PERFORMANCE OF IPOs THAT 28.90% 29.01% 31.50% 34.78% 38.64% 
WENT PUBLIC IN OTHER (474) (473) (445) (403) (392) 
PERIOD 
Test statistic (d 1 rent /rwn _cro) 12.29 8.81 7.26 6.75 6.62 
PERFORMANCE OF I POs TI IAT 30.87% 56.10% 60.71% 60.22% 58.48% 
WENT PUBLIC IN COLD (157) (155) (155) (155) (152) 
PERIODS 
Test statistic (difýereni fron! zero) 9.09 11.50 10.25 8.34 ß. 3I 
TEST STATISTIC of dillerence in 
erformance of HO"T from COLD IPOs 
-2.50 -4.82 -5.32 -5.10 -4.16 
TEST STA"TIS"TIC of difference in 
perfornmance of HOT from both COI, D 
and OTHER IPOs 
-4.51 -3.22 -3.99 -4.42 -3.55 
PANEL B 
POSTIPO BUY AND HOLD PERFORMANCE ADJUSTED for FTA 
of I IOT, COLD and OTHER period IPOs 
Month from the Listing 12th Month 24th Month 36th Month 48th Month 60th Month 
PERFORMANCE OF IPOs TLIAT 
WENT PUBLIC IN HOT PERIODS 
9.14% 
(388) 
1.95% 
(369) 
-11.72% 
(328) 
-29.54% 
(312) 
-34.08% 
(184) 
Test statistic /dit/creni Thm, 
--ero) 4.36 0.61 -2.81 -5.89 -4.41 
PERFORMANCE OF II'Os THAT 
WENT PUBLIC IN OTHER 
PFRIODS 
14.10% 
(474) 
2.87% 
(473) -7.77% (445) -11.27% (403) -18.03% (392) 
Test statistic (cli11ere nljroin _ero) 6.31 0.90 
-1.87 -2.59 -3.18 
PERFORMANCE OF IPOs TIIAT 
WENT PUBLIC IN COLD 
PERIODS 
13.43% 
(157) 
22.59% 
(155) 
18.10% 
(155) 
6.92% 
(155) 
-3.57% 
(152) 
Test statistic lýlrý)ýrýin /i nný -cru) 3.9S 4.98 3.13 0.96 
-0.45 
TEST STATISTIC of difference in 
-0.76 
-2.89 -3.73 -4.04 -2.73 
erformance of HOT frone COLD IPOs 
TEST STATISTIC of difference in 
-1.14 
-0.60 -1.05 -2.60 -1. 
SO 
performance of HOT from both COLD 
land 0HIf, R IPOs 
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P"\Nfil. C 
POST IPO BUY AND HOLD PERFORMANCE ADJUSTED BY INDUSTRY ANI) MARKET VALIDE 
of I IOT. ('OLD and 011 IFR period IPOs 
Month from the Listing l2th Month 24th Month 36th Month 48th Month 60th Month 
PERFORMANCE OF IPOs THAT 6.93% 8.30% 
-1.36% -9.46% -11.28% WENT PUBLIC IN HOT PERIODS (357) (330) (288) (270) (148) 
Test statistic (drl/L'rL'; u jrom _eru) 2.07 1.68 
-0.21 -0.89 -0.38 
PERFORMANCE OF IPOs THAT 19.32% 9.62% 0.39% 
-5.14% -3.36% 
WENT PUBLIC IN OTHER (432) (425) (386) (343) (321) 
PERIOD 
Test statistic (di/)erent froin _ero) 5.85 1.79 0.06 
-0.48 -0.29 
PERFORMANCE OF IPOs THAT 16.19% 13.77% 11.94% 13.13% 11.42% 
WENT PUBLIC IN COLD (155) (152) (151) (149) (143) 
PERIODS 
Tent statistic (dijferenh troll : ru) 2.95 1.31 0.91 0.86 (L 68 
TEST STATISTIC of difference in 
-1.44 -0.47 -2.63 -2.67 -1.62 
performance of HOT from COLD IPOs 
TI, ST STATISTIC of difference in 
-1.58 -0.55 -1.56 -1.89 -1.38 performance of HOT from both COLT) 
and OTHER IPOs 
PAN[t. I) 
POST IPO BUY AND HOLD PERFORMANCE ADJUSTED BY INDUSTRY AND MARKFT TO 
BOOK VALUE o1' I RI! '. COLT) and 0'! 'I II: R period IPOs 
from the listing I 2th Month I 24th Month )6th Month 14th Month 160th Month 
PERFORMANCE OF IPOs TLIAT 9.00% 9.04% 3.38% 
-11.39% -15.96% WENT PF1BLIC IN HOT PERIODS (370) (349) (321) (309) (231) 
Test statistic (dif)ý rýýný /i ýým zero) 2.54 1.67 0.39 
-1.00 -0. S2 
PERFORMANCE OF II'O, I11A'I 15.53% 14.85% 3.87% 
-1.81% 2.52% 
WEHE PUBLIC IN OTHJ R (433) (423) (394) (358) (319) 
PERIOD 
Test 
. 
statistic (di/jerertt li unr zero) 4.82 3.51 0.58 
-0.24 0.26 
PERFORMANCE OF IPOs THAT 20.25% 7.20% 15.41% 7.62% 23.08% 
WENT PUBLIC IN COLD (155) (154) (146) (141) (131) 
PERIODS 
Test statistic (different firm 
. 
-crH) 4.09 0.82 1.31 0.5S 1.34 
'I I'NI S 'l Al ISTIC of ditterence in 1.8J 0.18 ?. 60 '. 58 
-2.53 performance of HOT frone COLD IPOs 
'I ES F STATISTIC of difference in 
-1.74 -0. j6 -1.07 -1.8-5 1.1'? 
performance of HOT from both COLT) 
and OTHER IPOs 
Ilir 1101 'and COLD pcriud are c"lu. isIJiccl urcw'clüi, tu the thi-rr-nlUnth niut'irt1, uiv1'1L, r (1/ the uiunlhh' unluunl u/ cupitul 
raised from Initial Public OJfcrs made with thc_ method of fJcr Jor sale or offer for subscription in thc. period Junuuriý_ 198 / to 
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............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................ December 1996 (192 months) excluding privatisations and are in Dec 1996 prices. The 25% of all months (48 months) with 
the highest IPO activity are classified as HOT. The 48 months with the lowest IPO activity are classified as COLD. The 
remaining 96 months are class fed as OTHER. 
............... .... ....................................................................................................................................................................................................... 
Our findings strongly suggest that that firms that go public in period of heavy 
IPO volume have significantly worst post-IPO performances relative to firms that go 
public in low volume periods. Such results suggest that more capital is raised from 
IPOs in periods when issuers can achieve higher valuations for their equity offers. 
HOT market IPOs have more overvalued issues than COLD market IPOs indicating 
that investors' sentiment is important in the timing of equity issues. Periods of 
favourable market sentiment create a "window of opportunity" when equity issues 
can be raised in more favourable terms. 
In chapter 8 we make another attempt to see whether the sentiment timing 
theory can explain the variations in the IPO activity. We use financial analysts' 
earnings forecasts as a proxy for the market sentiment and see whether more capital 
is raised from IPOs when analysts optimistic is high. 
5.6. CONCLUSIONS 
In this chapter we tried to find what are the driving forces behind the 
variability in the IPO activity across time. We focus on two theories that have 
previously been proposed as being responsible for the time series variation of IPO 
activity and we conducted our own tests. The first theory argues that variation in 
investors' sentiment is the driving force behind the variation in IPO activity. We find 
evidence in favour of that theory. Our sample of IPO firms exhibit underperformance 
relative to the firms in the same industry and similar market to book or market values 
once the initial first day returns are not taken into account. If we include the first day 
returns, IPO firms do not underperform relative to the firms in the same industry and 
similar market value or same industry and similar market to book value. There are 
significant variations however in the underperformance according to the intensity of 
the IPO activity. 
Firms that come to the market in periods of heavy : IPO volume have 
significantly worst post IPO performances relative to IPOs that come to the market in 
periods of low IPO activity indicating that managers see a window of opportunity to 
go public during periods when investors are willing to pay higher prices for the new 
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issues. That finding suggests that the sentiment timing theory that Loughran and 
Ritter (1995) support for the US IPO is also valid for the UK IPOs. That has 
significant implications both for managers and investors. From the managers' point 
of view, that gives them an opportunity to time the IPO in periods of heavy volume 
since at these periods they will be able to achieve higher prices for their offers thus 
reducing their cost of capital. From the investors' point of view, the message is to 
stay clear of IPOs during period of high activity. Investing in a HOT market IPO will 
give them a return of 12.22% by the end of fifth year while the COLD market IPOs 
will offer a5 year return of 58.48%. 
Another theory for the variation in IPO volume over time emphasises the 
importance of information asymmetries and adverse selection costs that are 
associated with equity issues as a crucial factor for the timing of equity issues. 
According to that, managers want to see the lower possible underpricing and in doing 
so they opt to make the IPO in periods with low pricing uncertainty which leads to 
lower underpricing. These information asymmetry models suggest that IPO activity is 
driven by lower underpricing. 
We find that managers do not "time" the IPO during periods when the 
average first day returns are lower. The magnitude of underpricing has no effect on 
the amount of capital raised from Initial public Offers making as conclude that the 
degree of underpricing is not the main factor that is of concern to managers in the 
timing of IPOs. We find a strong business cycle effect on the IPO activity in the UK. 
During the upturn of the business cycle, more firms make an IPO and more capital is 
raised from Initial Public offers. 
Studies from the SEO literature find that an improvement in economic 
conditions not only is responsible for an increase in equity financing but it also 
reduces the uncertainty about the true value of issuers causing a reduction in adverse 
selection costs. The favourable economic conditions however do not have a negative 
impact on adverse selection costs associated with IPOs as the SEO literature 
suggests. Firms that make an IPO during expansions do not face smaller underpricing 
relative to the firms that make the IPO during the downturn. 
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CHAPTER 6: THE TIMING OF SEASONED EQUITY 
OFFERINGS IN THE UK 
6. I. INTRODUCTION 
Research in the US has shown that seasoned equity issuance activity is not 
constant across time. Significant variations occur in the number of firms that make a 
seasoned equity issue and in the amount of capital that firms raise. 
Many theories have been put forward to explain the time-series varying 
pattern of equity issuance volume. Loughran & Ritter (1995) argue that the 
variations is equity issuance activity are driven by variations in investors' sentiment 
with more capital raised when investors are willing to pay high prices for the issues. 
Lucas & McDonald (1990), argue that the existence of information asymmetries 
between managers and outside investors gives managers the opportunity to make the 
issue when shares are overvalued. By doing so they minimise the cost of capital and 
maximise the utility of existing shareholders who lose a smaller portion of the firms' 
ownership to new shareholders. Loughran and Ritter (1995) also find that firms issue 
equity when their shares are overvalued. They document a significant 
underperformance of issuers relative to non-issuers suggesting that the share price of 
the issuer at the time of the issue is higher than its intrinsic value. When investors 
gradually realise that the price they paid for the issue was higher than the intrinsic 
value, they mark down the share price of the issuer to correct that overvaluation 
creating the underperformance. 
Loughran & Ritter (1995) not only argue that firms that make a SEO are 
overvalued at the time of the issue but also that periods with high SEO volume are 
periods when issuers are more overvalued than periods when activity is low. They 
find big differences in the post announcement performance of SEO firms that make 
the announcement in Heavy volume periods and Low volume periods. In fact, only 
Heavy volume periods SEOs underperform significantly while Light volume periods 
SEOs do not underperform. All these results make Loughran & Ritter (1995) to 
41 conclude that variations in issue volume are driven by overvaluation exploitation. 
. 
_}'_' 
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It is not possible however to argue that issuers sell overvalued shares to new 
shareholders for the benefits of existing shareholders when the SEO is made with the 
method of a rights issue. In rights issues, the new shares are offered first to existing 
shareholders who have the right to buy the shares or sell their rights to the market. In 
rights issues, it does not matter what the price of the issue is because the existing 
shareholders will have the same portion of the firm after the issue and their wealth 
will not be affected (see endnote 1 for a numerical illustration of that). The timing of 
a rights issue in periods when investors are overpaying will not benefit existing 
shareholders. The only party that stands to benefit from such a timing are the 
managers. 
Under the agency costs theory managers might be exploiting overvaluation 
not for the benefits of their shareholder but for their own. An overpriced issue can 
raise more money and therefore more funds will be at the disposal of managers. If 
their remuneration or their personal satisfaction increases with the size of the firm 
they manage then managers will be tempted to make the issue in periods when 
investors are willing to pay higher prices. Overall however, the scope for managers 
to exploit investors by issuing during periods when shares are overvalued is limited 
when the SEO is made with the method of rights issues. 
In this chapter we test whether rights issue activity is driven by overvaluation 
exploitation. We use four different ways to calculate the post-announcement 
performance of firms that made a rights issue in order to find whether post-SEO 
performance is affected by the volume of SEO activity. If managers deliberately time 
the issue during periods when their shares are overvalued then firms that issue during 
periods of heavy activity must have the most overvalued issues and the worst post- 
SEO performances. On the other hand during periods of low activity, shares should 
not be overvalued and issuers must have better post-SEO performances. 
Overvaluation exploitation is not the only driving force that has been 
proposed for the time series variation in SEO volume. Other studies link the timing 
of the equity issue with the magnitude of the adverse selection costs associated with 
the SEO announcements. Numerous studies have shown that the announcement of a 
Seasoned equity offering is accompanied by a significant drop on the share price of 
the issuer, a drop which is around 3%. Such a large drop reduces the market value of 
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the issuer and in some cases the loss of the market value can wipe out a large portion 
of the proceeds from the issue creating an indirect cost for the issuer. It is for the 
benefit of the firm to have the smaller price drop on the announcement of the issue 
but that does not automatically mean that the magnitude of the adverse selection 
costs is of paramount importance to issuers. Choe, Masulis and Nanda (1993) report 
that when SEO volume is high, announcement period returns are less negative. 
Bayless & Chaplinsky (1996) also find that the magnitude of adverse selection costs 
is important in the timing of SEO with more capital raised during periods when the 
announcement period returns are low. Therefore, there are evidence that managers 
care about the magnitude of the drop on the announcement of the issue. Periods when 
the price drop is smaller should attract the attention of more issuers, ceteris paribus. 
No study has provided international evidence on that issue. This chapter investigates 
the effect that adverse selection costs have on the timing of the rights issues. If 
managers really do care about the magnitude of these costs they will raise more 
capital in periods when the market reacts less adversely to the announcement of the 
rights issue. 
Managers, who pursue the interests of existing shareholders, in order to 
minimise the cost of capital can exploit inside information about the true value of the 
firm and make the issue when the share price is overvalued. Investors are aware of 
managers' incentives to make an issue when shares are overvalued and on the 
announcement of the issue they mark down the price of the issuer. During periods 
when investors' concerns that managers may exploit overvaluation ease, the average 
price reaction should be less negative. Choe, Masulis and Nanda (1993) argue that 
issuers face less negative announcement period returns when they announce the 
equity offer during an expansion and these smaller adverse selection costs account 
for the increase in equity financing they document during the upturn of the business 
cycle. The reason behind that difference in the announcement period return across 
upturns and downturns of the business cycle according to Choe Masulis and Nanda 
(1993), is that firms have more prominent investment opportunities during the upturn 
and therefore an equity issue should create less concerns to investors that-the issue 
will convey negative information for the current value of assets., 
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The rights issue however as " we described earlier is unique because it 
eliminates managers' incentive to exploit overvaluation for the benefit of existing 
shareholders and so the market should not react negatively on the announcement of a 
rights issue due to overvaluation timing concerns. Nevertheless, studies on rights 
issues document a significant price drop on the announcement period. The negative 
price response on the announcement of rights issue can not in theory be explained by 
investors' fears that managers exploit overvaluation in pursue of the interests of their 
shareholders. 
- 
The proposed explanations for this significant price drop on the 
announcement SEO are many more and rely not only on overvaluation exploitation. 
The price pressure hypothesis argues that the drop is caused by the increase in the 
supply of shares and since the demand for the shares is assumed to stays the same, 
the price should drop. According to the debt coinsurance theory, an equity issue 
reduces the bankruptcy risk and therefore increases the value of the bondholders. 
Since the shareholders claims on the firm's assets are the residual of what is left after 
the debtholders claims are satisfied, an increase in debtholders' wealth should 
represent a decrease in shareholders' wealth. Hence the price drop on the 
announcement of the issue. The agency costs theory. assumes that managers will use 
the proceeds of the issue to fund negative net present value projects and will engage 
in asset substitution that will increase their own utility and remuneration package but 
will damage shareholders value. Miller and Rock's (1985) model proves that changes 
in debt to equity ratio sends signals about the future profitability of the issuer. An 
equity issue reduces the leverage and sends signals of similar changes in the future 
earnings. ( For a thorough analysis of all the theories see section 2.3. ) 
During the upturn of the business cycle there are more positive NPV projects 
and the NPV of projects is likely to be higher and so a rights issue should create less 
concerns that managers will undertake negative NPV projects. During the downturn 
of the cycle on the other hand, the investment opportunities are few, and there are 
more negative NPV projects increasing the likelihood that managers may undertake 
projects that decrease the firm's value. It is also the case that during the upturn of the 
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cycle earnings increase and so an equity issue should also be less likely to be 
motivated due to managers foreseeing a deterioration in earnings. Furthermore, the 
bankruptcy risk is higher during the downturn of the cycle when the business 
environment is gloomy. During the upturn on the other hand, the bankruptcy risk that 
debtholders face is smaller and so the equity issue will result to a smaller transfer of 
wealth from shareholders to bondholders causing a less negative price reaction. 
During the downturn, debtholders gain more from equity issues and so the price drop 
should be more negative if the debt co-insurance theory can explain the drop on the 
share price of the issuer. So, after all, there is a theoretical rational for rights issues to 
have less negative price reaction during the upturn of the cycle. We investigate in this 
chapter the relationship between economic conditions and the adverse selection costs. 
If investors' concerns about the true value of the share price of the issuer and the 
level of future earnings are smaller during the upturn or the transfer of wealth from 
shareholders to debtholders is smaller during the upturn of the business cycle then the 
improvement in business conditions should reduce the adverse selection costs. In 
order however to differentiate between the 3 theories that could account for such a 
difference between upturns and downturns, we look at whether these overvaluation 
exploitation, the debt-coinsurance and the timing prior to earnings deterioration 
theories can explain the significant negative reaction on the announcement of the 
rights issue. 
By using a data set never used before, the Rights Issue activity in the UK 
from 1975 to 1996, we are able to test the competing theories about the variability in 
Seasoned Equity offering activity. The first objectives of this chapter is to investigate 
the effect of the adverse selection costs, associated with the announcement of a rights 
issue, on the rights issues volume. The second objective is to see whether 
overvaluation exploitation is a major driving force in the variability of SEO volume 
in the UK: The last objective of this thesis is to see the effect of business cycle on the 
magnitude of adverse selection costs. 
ý"ýi 
This chapter extends the Seasoned equity offerings literature by documenting 
the differences in the announcement period returns of. rights issues in the UK across 
the business cycle and the relation between adverse selection costs and the volume of 
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seasoned equity offerings in the UK. The final contribution of this chapter is that it 
investigates the relation between the intensity of SEO volume in the UK and the long 
run performance of issuers. The use of industry/ market to book value and 
industry/market value adjusted post announcement performances adds to the validity 
of our conclusions. 
Our findings suggest that: 
1. Rights issue activity in the UK is weakly affected by economic conditions. More 
firms announce a rights issue during the upturn of the business cycle especially in 
the second half of the expansion but the difference between upturns and 
downturns is marginally significant. The median number of rights issues per 
month and the amount of capital raised per month does not differ between upturns 
and downturns. 
2. During the expansion phase of the business cycle, firms face lower adverse 
selection costs relative to the downturn of the cycle and the magnitude of adverse 
selection costs has a significant effect on the rights issue activity. Periods when 
the adverse selection costs of the previous quarter are low, are periods when more 
firms announce a rights issue and more capital is raised. 
3. SEO volume in the UK is not driven by overvaluation exploitation. Although we 
find that issuers underperform after the issue there is no significant difference in 
the Post-SEO performance between the SEOs that made the issue in Heavy or 
Light volume periods. Both group of issuers exhibit similar performances 
showing that periods of heavy volume are not periods when the issuers can 
achieve more overvalued prices. 
In general, our evidence support the theory that more firms announce a rights 
issue during periods when adverse selection costs are lower but not during periods 
when they can achieve prices which are above their fundamental value. 
The structure of this chapter is as following. Next we present our findings 
about the rights issue activity in the UK across time, followed by an analysis of the 
effect of business cycle on rights issue volume and on the adverse selection costs. 
After that, the relation between adverse selection costs and the volume of rights 
issues is investigated. In the last part, we look at the post-announcement performance 
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of rights issuers and especially the differences in the performances across heavy and 
light volume periods. 
6.2. RIGHTS ISSUE ACTIVITY IN THE UK 
Rights issue activity in the UK is not constant across time. In table 6.1 we 
report the number of rights issues of common equity per year that. In total 2991 
rights issues announcements were made in the period from 1975 to 1996, according 
to DATASTREAM TM. In figure 6.1 we can see that the number of rights issue 
announcements per month varies across time. Table 6.1 reports the annual 
distribution of the rights issue activity. On average 136 rights issues are announced 
per year. There are periods however when the activity soars. 260 rights issues were 
announced in 1987 while in 1982 we had only 75 issues. From all the companies in 
the datastream population, we were able to calculate the abnormal announcement 
period returns for 1569 firms8. 
The amount of capital raised from rights issues also varies across time. In 
figure 6.2 we have plotted the monthly amount of capital raised from rights issues. 
The most active year was 1993 with £7.8 billion raised. 
Significant time series variations occur in the average announcement period 
returns as well as the last column of table 6.1 indicates. There are year when the 
average announcement period abnormal returns are positive and significant, such as 
1975 with an average return of +1.14%, and years when the average return is 
negative and highly significant. 1990 and 1991 were the years with the most negative 
returns with 
-4.88% and -5.11% respectively. 
Unavailability of Datastream mnemonics, no share price data on the announcement of the issue, no 
data in the pre-announcement period to enable us to calculate the abnormal announcement period 
returns according to the market model and the simultaneous announcement of a takeover bid were the 
reasons for the exclusions of rights issues from the sample. 
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TABLE 6.1: ANNUAL VOLUME OF RIGHTS ISSUES AND AVERAGE 
ABNORMAL ANNOUNCEMENT PERIOD ABNORMAL RETURNS 
(1975-1996) 
YEAR NUMBER OF 
RIGHTS 
ISSUES 
(datastream 
population) 
NUMBER 
OF RIGHTS 
ISSUES 
(Our sample) 
AMOUNT OF 
PROCEEDS 
(datastream 
population) 
(Real terms, prices 
Dec 1996 in £m 
AVERAGE 
ANNOUNCEMENT 
PERIOD ABNORMAL 
RETURNS 9 
(days 
-1 to +1) 
1975 162 72 2,386 1.14% * 
1976 119 45 1,521 
-3.16% * 1977 126 54 1,267 0.30% 
1978 80 35 807 0.03% 
1979 95 43 3,349 
-0.12% 1980 95 36 1,281 
-3.79% * 1981 108 51 1,995 
-2.60% * 1982 75 35 1,021 
-2.18% 1983 132 52 2,093 
-1.51% 1984 112 53 1,371 0.027% 
1985 135 71 3,036 
-0.89% 1986 184 89 4,678 
-2.94% * 1987 260 85 6,325 
-1.30% * 1988 174 83 4,612 
-1.31% *** 1989 177 72 2,974 
-2.18% * 1990 149 74 3,108 
_4.88% * 1991 186 112 6,655 
-5.11% * 1992 95 54 2,228 
-3.44% 1993 188 140 7,809 
-0.43% 1994 151 126 5,115 
-2.98% * 1995 83 82 2,867 
-1.28% 1996 105 105 3,253 0.17% 
.................................................................................................... 
_............. 
_ ........... _ .... _.. _. _. __.................................................................... ý ****** denotes significance at 1%, SY. and 10% one tail, respectively_ s 
...........:......................................... ................................................................... 
Numerous studies have documented that the announcement of a seasoned 
equity offering is accompanied by a significant drop on the share price of the issuer. 
In table 6.2 we present the average abnormal announcement day returns from day 
-2 
to day +2 where day 0 is the day of the announcement of the rights issue, and the 
cumulative abnormal period returns for the periods "-1 to +1" and "0 to +1". 
9 the average announcement period abnormal returns are calculated according to the market model. For 
more details see section 4.2 
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TABLE 6.2: ABNORMAL ANNOUNCEMENT PERIOD RETURNS AROUND A 
RIGHTS ISSUE ANNOUNCEMENT 
DAY 
-2 -1 012 -1 to +1 0 to +1 
AVERAGE 0.087% 
-0.104% -1.423% -0.268% 0.143% -1.79% -1.69% 
EQUALLY WEIGHTED 1.31 
-1.62*** -7.69* -1.92** 1.45 -7.36* -7.21* 
(TEST STATISTIC OF 
DIFFERENCE FROM ZERO) 
MEDIAN RETURN 
: -0.078%:: -0.098%: -0.99% -0.076% -0.063% -1.16% -1.06% 
AVERAGE 
: -0.272%:: -0.464%:: -2.317%:: -0.310%: -0.186% -3.09% -2.62% MARKET VALUE 
-6.92* -6.28* 
WEIGHTED IN REAL TERMS ! 
PERCENTAGE OF FIRMS 42% 41% 34% 46% 44% 36.3% 35.9% 
WITH POSITIVE 
RETURNS 
PERCENTAGE OF FIRMS 58% 59% 66% 54% 56% 63.7% 64.1% 
WITH NEGATIVE 
RETURNS 
Abnormal announcement day returns of asset i at day t AR(,,, ) are calculated according to the market model where the 
abnormal returns are the difference between the actual returns of asset I at day t and its expected return. AR(,, J= R,, r - 
E(R, ) and the expected return is calculated according to the market model, E(R, = a, + PRm, rr 
The a and ßare estimated from cross-sectional regression of the return on asset i against the return of the market (FT 
ALL SHARE PRICE INDE) from an estimation period of 
-260 trading days to -40 trading days before the event day. 
Average Abnormal Returns (AARt) for each day 
, 
t, from 
-2 to day +2 are calculated as AAR, =1 
=1 ARt 
n 
where n is 
the number offirms 
***, *** denotes significance t  at 1 % S% l0% res ectivel 
.............................................., 
%.......................... 
............ ...... 
P............................ 
_....... _....................................................................... .. .............. We find a negative and significant price reaction on the announcement of the 
rights issue. The share price of the issuer drops by an average of 1.42% at day 0 with 
a t-statistic of 
-7.69 (significant at 1%). The median return is -0.99% and the market 
value weighted return at day 0 is 
-2.331%. 66% of all firms have negative returns at 
day 0. Negative and significant returns are found also for days 
-1 and +1. In the 
event window 
-1 to +1, cumulative abnormal returns are negative, -1.796% with a 
test statistic of 
-7.36. Only 36% of all rights issue announcement had positive returns 
in the event window "-1 to +1" with the remaining 64% having negative returns. 
Value weighted announcement returns were more negative (-3.09%) than the equal 
weighted returns but with similar test statistics (-6.92) 
.: while median 
cumulative 
returns were also negative and significant, 
-1.16%: 
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Our evidence are similar with the findings of US studies which all document 
a significant negative reaction on the announcement of the SEO. Even previous UK 
studies find a negative and significant reaction_ on the announcement of UK rights 
issues. Levis (1995) finds that the announcement of rights issues in the UK causes 
the share price of the issuer to drop by 1.33% which is significantly different from 
zero. Shah (1995) investigates 369 UK rights issues in the period 1981 to 1988 and 
finds that the average announcement period return is 
-1.63% with 67% of all issues 
having negative returns. 
In table 6.3 we report the three-day cumulative abnormal announcement 
period returns partitioned by the use of the proceeds. As with other studies, we find 
big differences in the impact the SEO announcement has on the share price of the 
issues according to the reason for the issue. Rights Issues made to fund investments 
have the least negative returns ( 
-0.99%). Rights issues made to reduce debt and 
finance expansion and issues made to aide the restructuring of the company have the 
more negative returns with 
-7.7% and -6.4% respectively. Rights issues to fund an 
acquisition had an average return of 
-1.69% significantly different from zero with a 
test statistic of 
-3.69 and issues made to repay debt had an average return of -4.83%. 
Due to the big size of the sample and its time span, for almost half of the sample 
either no data on the use of the proceeds are available or DATASTREAM TM gave 
no reason for the issue 10 
TABLE 6.3: AVERAGE ABNORMAL ANNOUNCEMENT PERIOD RETURNS 
PARTITIONED BY THE USE OF THE PROCEEDS OF THE ISSUE 
Use of the Proceeds 
INVESTMENTS 
ACQUISITIONS 
REPAY DEBT 
CAPITAL 
ACQUISITIONS & DEBT 
REDUCTION 
STRENGTHEN BALANCE 
SHEET 
RESTRUCTURING 
REDUCTION OF DEBT & 
EXPANSION 
NUMBER ¬ ANNOUNCEMENT T-STATISTICS 
OF RIGHTS 
ISSUES 
; PERIOD RETURNS 
(days 
-1 to +1) 
OF 
DIFFERENCE 
FROM ZERO 
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-0.99% -0.65 
334 
-1.69% -3.69 
175 
-4.83% -5.45 
34 
-3.5% 
! 
-2.37 
15 
-5.2% -1.87 
13 
-5.9% -1.99 
21 
-6.4% -3.12 
16 
-7.7% -1.62 
10 Datastream starts giving reasons for the issue at 1986 and stops at 1995 
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The reasons for such a significant negative price reaction on the 
announcement of a SEO has been puzzling academia for a long time. A number of 
explanations for that drop have been proposed. One theory argues that the price of the 
issuer drops because the equity issue increase the supply of shares and according to 
the, supply and demand law, since the demand stays the same, the price drops. 
According to the price pressure theory as it is called, larger issues in terms of the 
size of the company will increase the supply of shares by a larger percentages and 
therefore the drop on the share price will be higher. Furthermore, the price pressure 
theory does not explain why the price reaction differs according to the use of the 
proceeds. An issue made by a company to fund an acquisition should cause a similar 
drop with an issue of similar size that is made to reduced debt. We find that the 
issues that were used to fund investments or acquisitions have relative sizes (amount 
of proceeds over market value of issuer at the time of the issue) similar with the 
relative sizes of the issues that were used to repay debt. Both issues increase the 
supply of shares by the same amount and according to the price pressure theory they 
should cause the same drop. The findings here and in other studies however suggest 
differently. 
Another theory argues that the negative return is caused by the reduction in 
the debtholders risk that results from the increase in the equity capital from the issue. 
The debtholders have priority over shareholders over the firms' assets in the case of 
a bankruptcy. Shareholders only get what is left after all the debtholders get paid. The 
bankruptcy risk is reduced after an equity issue because the debtholders have more 
equity from which they can satisfy their claims in case of a bankruptcy. Therefore, 
an equity issue leaves the debtholders better off. But since, the shareholders claims 
over the company assets are the residuals over what is left from debtholders, what 
debtholders gain represents a loss to the shareholders. Therefore. the share price of 
common equity drops on the announcement of a SEO. According to the 
. 
debt- 
coinsurance theory, issues that are made to reduce the, debt to equity ratio should 
have more negative response relative to issues that are made to fund an acquisition or 
future growth. In the first case, the debt to equity ratio will be reduced not only 
because the denominator will increase but also because the. nominator will decrease. 
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In the case of funding a future investment the issue will reduce the debt to equity only 
because the denominator will increase' 
. 
Therefore issues that are used to repay debt 
will have worst announcement period returns relative to issues that are used to fund 
expansion which is what the findings suggest. As with the price pressure theory 
however, large issues cause larger reductions in the debtholders' risk and therefore 
should be accompanied by larger price drops. Asquith and Mullins(1986) is the only 
study which documents that the ratio of amount of proceeds over market value of 
common equity is negatively and significantly related with the announcement 
returns. According to Asquith and Mullins(1986), large issues cause a larger drop on 
the announcement. Dennis (1994) finds that a negative but insignificant relation 
between the relative size of the issue ( number of new shares over number of shares 
prior to the issue) and the announcement period returns. Jung et all (1996) find a 
positive but insignificant relation between the ratio of the amount of proceeds over 
total market value of common stock. The literature evidence on that debt- 
coinsurance theory are mixed and rather unconvincing. We are able to test the 
validity of this theory using our data later on in this chapter. 
The most widespread theory that can explain the negative price reaction on 
the announcement of the issue is the one that is based on information asymmetries 
and managers' incentives to exploit the superior information they have over the true 
value of the firm relative to outside investors. Managers can estimate with greater 
accuracy relative to outside investors whether the current price of the share is higher 
than its intrinsic value. Under the assumption that managers seek to maximise their 
shareholders' utility and that the new shares will be purchased by new shareholders, 
the firm will be better off to make an-issue when the share price is overvalued. More 
money can be raised in such situations with a smaller portion of the firm's ownership 
lost to new shareholders. Outside investors are aware of managers incentives and 
perceive an equity issue as an attempt to exploit overvaluation hence, they mark 
down the share price of the issuer. According to the information asymmetry models, 
when there is less information asymmetry or when there are less concerns that the 
issuer exploits overvaluation the drop on the announcement should be smaller or 
11 Suppose that we have a company with Im debt and 5m equity and makes an issue of 0.5m. If the 
issue is used to fund investment the debt to equity ratio after the issue will be I m/5.5m =18%. If the 
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even a positive return should occur. Evidence of other studies indicate that issuers 
with high growth opportunities, which indicates that managers' incentives behind the 
issue are not to exploit overvaluation but to fund their growth opportunities, have less 
negative price reactions and the issues with large price run-ups to the announcement 
of the issue, which are more likely to be overvalued than firms with smaller price 
run-ups, have more negative announcement period returns. 
As we saw earlier in the introduction however, in the case of a rights issue 
managers incentives to exploit overvaluation in pursue of the interests of existing 
shareholder diminish and overvaluation exploitation can be a valid explanation for 
the drop on the announcement only if managers pursue the satisfaction of their own 
utility and not theirs shareholders. The agency costs theory argues that managers do 
not pursue their shareholders' interests but their own and they can use the proceeds of 
the issue to fund negative net present value projects that damage shareholders' value. 
Therefore the market reacts negatively because of the probability that managers may 
undertake such actions. 
Information asymmetries between managers and investors do not exist only 
about the true value of assets. Miller and Rock (1985) argue that managers that 
expect a decrease in earnings will be better off to make an equity issue before the 
decrease in earnings is revealed to the market. The negative price reaction is justified 
by investors who regard an equity issue as a signal that the future profitability of the 
firm is in danger. Brous (1992) finds that financial analysts regard an equity issue as 
a turning point in the profitability of the firm. On the month of the announcement of 
the issue, analysts revise downwards their forecasted earnings per share, a trend that 
't 4e 
continues for many month after the issue. 
Overall, many theories can explain the' negative price reaction on the 
announcement of a Seasoned equity offer. Later on in this chapter, we regress the 
announcement period returns against various firm specific"characteristics` that will 
enable us to distinguish between the theories. Prior to that, ' we investigate the effect 
of the business cycle on the rights issue activity. 
"1' 
issue is used to repay the debt the new debt to equity ratio will be 0.5m/5.5m °9.9% 
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6.3. RIGHTS ISSUE ACTIVITY ACROSS THE BUSINESS CYCLE. 
In chapter 5 we found that the economic conditions have a significant impact 
on the Initial Public Offerings activity. More firms make an IPO and more capital is 
raised when the economy is in the phase of the expansion. Choe, Masulis and Nanda 
(1993) also report that more capital is raised from SEOs in the US during the upturns 
of the business cycle. Hickman (1953), Moore (1980), and more recently Berkovich 
& Narayanan (1993) also document that the number of firms that issue common 
stock increases when the economy is in the phase of an expansion. 
In table 6.4 we give the mean and median number of rights issues 
announcements per month across the business cycle. The number of rights issues that 
announce a rights issue per month differs between upturns and downturns of the 
business cycle, 11.61 issues in upturns relative to 10.62 issues in downturns. The 
difference has a test statistic of 1.42 which is marginally significant only at 10% one 
tail tests. The median number of rights issues however in an expansion does not 
differ from the median number of firms that announce a rights issue during a 
recession. (10 companies both in upturns and downturn). 
TABLE 6.4: MONTHLY RIGHTS ISSUE ACTIVITY ACROSS UPTURNS 
AND DOWNTURNS OF THE BUSINESS CYCLE IN THE UK 
UPTURN OF THE; DOWNTURN T STATISTIC OF -1 
: BU SINESS CYCLE. OF THE DIFFERENCE 
BUSINESS BETWEEN 
CYCLE UPTURNS AND 
DOWNTURNS 
AVERAGE Number of Rights 11.61 10.62 1.42 
issues per month 
MEDIAN Number of rights issues 10 10 
per month 
AVERAGE Amount of capital 281 244 1 1.01 
raised from Rights issues per 
month (prices Dec 1996 in £m 
MEDIAN Amount of capital raised : 123 161 
-0.74 
from Rights issues per month 
(prices Dec 1996 in £m 
1. The upturn and Downturn of the business Cycle is determined according to the Coincident maicator 
The average amount of capital raised per month is also higher during the 
upturn of the Business Cycle with £ 281m raised per month during the upturn of the 
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cycle and £ 244 m during the downturn but the difference is not statistically 
significant with a test statistic of 1.01. In fact, using the median amount of capital 
raised per month we see that more capital is raised from-rights issues during the 
downturn of the cycle when £161m is raised relative to the upturn of the cycle where 
the median is £123m. 
If we look at the rights issue activity across the 4 business cycles that 
occurred in the UK economy from 1975 to 1996, we find that the period between 
January 1986 to April 1992 was the most active cycle with both the upturn and the 
downturn exhibiting large numbers of firms making a rights issues and large sums of 
capital raised. In the first third and fourth cycles, rights issuance activity is higher 
during the upturns relative to the following downturn. 
TABLE 6.5: RIGHTS ISSUE ACTIVITY AND UK BUSINESS CYCLES FROM 
1975 TO 1996 
Upturns of the Business Cycle Downturns of the Business Cycle 
1S` cycle Augustl975-June 1979 (47 months) July 1979-Feb 1981 (20 months) 
Augustl975-Feb 9.04 rights per month 7.3 rights per month 
1981 (67 months) £ 167 m raised er month £ 85 m raised er month 
2" cycle March 1981-Feb1984 (36 Months) March 1984 
-Dec1985 (22 months) 
March 1981 
- 
8.69 rights per month 10.86 rights per month 
December 1985 £ 137 m raised per month £ 202 m raised per month 
58 Months) 
3` cycle Jan 1986 
- 
Sep1988 (33 months) Oct 1988-Apr 1992 (43 months) 
January 1986 
-April 17.45 rights per month 13.69 rights per month 
1992 (76 months) £ 442 in raised er month £ 320 m raised er month 
4 cycle 
- 
May 1992 
- 
Oct 1994 (30 months) Nov 1994 
- 
Dec 1996 (26 months) 
May 1992 
- 
12.73 rights per month 7.88 rights per month 
December 1996 (56 £ 467 m raised per month £ 264 m raised per month 
months) 
. - 
The insignificant differences in the number of rights issues per month and the 
amount of capital raised between upturns and downturns result from an increase in 
the rights issue activity in the last phase of the recession, just before the economy 
enters officially the expansion phase. That can be seen in table 6.6, where, we have 
split each upturn and downturn into three sub-periods of the same length to create 6 
sections of the cycle. So, the first upturn August 1975 to June 1979 had a duration 
of 47 months. We split this period into three and we have three sub- periods ( upturn 
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1, upturn 2 and upturn 3) of 16,15 and 16 months respectively. The results are also 
presented in figure 6.5. 
TABLE 6.6: RIGHTS ISSUE ACTIVITY ACROSS DIFFERENT PHASES OF THE BUSINESS 
CYCLE IN THE UK 
PHASE OF THE BUSINESS UPTURN UPTURN UPTURN DOWNTURN DOWNTURN DOWNTURN 
CYCLE 1 2 3 1 2 3 
AVERAGE Number of Rights 10.70 12.94 11.46 10.03 9.63 11.92 
issues per month 
MEDIAN Number of Rights 10 10.5 10.5 9.5 8 11 
issues per month 
AVERAGE Amount of capital 253 303 290 182 235 315 
raised from Rights issues per 
month (prices Dec 1996 in £m 
MEDIAN Amount of capital 143 150 109 128 163 215 
raised from Rights issues per 
month (prices Dec 1996 in £m 
We can see more graphically at figure 6.5 that the number of rights issues per 
month follow a pattern similar to the business cycle. As the economy enters the phase 
of an expansion, the rights issue activity is 10.70 issues per month. As economic 
conditions improve further 
, 
activity increases to 12.94 issues per month in the 
middle of the expansion and to 11.46 issues per month in the period before the peak. 
Activity drops after the peak of the cycle to 10.03 issues per month. As the economy 
moves deep into a recession, activity drops further to 9.63 issues per month and starts 
going up at the last phase of the recession just before the trough to 11.92 issues per 
month. 
The amount of capital raised from rights issues also exhibits a pattern similar 
to the variation of the number of rights issues per month across different phases of 
the business cycle (figure 6.6) 
. 
£253 million are raised per month in the first part of 
the upturn, £303 million in the middle and £290 in in the last part of the upturn. 
Volume drops to £ 182 million per month at the first part of the recession and 
increases to £235m in the middle of the recession 
. 
Rights issue activity in terms of 
capital raised per month, reaches the peak at the last phase of the recession when £ 
315 million is raised per month. That may be explained by the fact that during the 
last months of the recession it is usually the case that the end of the recession is 
"visible". Firms may be preparing for the "imminent" improvement of the economic 
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conditions and those firms that want to "grab" the early opportunities for expansion 
of their business may be persuaded to make the issue announcement in those days 
even though the economy is still officially in a recession. 
The results above provide weak evidence that there is a positive relation 
between economic conditions and the intensity of rights issue activity. Of course 
such a relation should not be something extraordinary. During the expansion phase of 
the business cycle firms face increased demand for their products. More investment 
opportunities appear and the Net Present Value of the projects is likely to be higher 
during that time relative to periods when the demand is low, therefore inducing firms 
to invest more heavily. The issue of capital is an option that managers should 
consider. The fact that firms face better investment opportunities during the upturn of 
the cycle however also means that these firms should find it easier to acquire credit to 
fund such projects. An improvement in economic conditions should not 
automatically lead firms to announce a rights issue just because demand increases. 
Other factors may well affect the equity issue decision. 
6.4. ADVERSE SELECTION COSTS AND THE BUSINESS CYCLE. 
As we have seen in the introduction of this chapter, Choe, Masulis and Nanda 
(1993) argue that the cause of the increase in equity financing during the upturn of 
the business cycle is that issuers of common stock face lower adverse selection 
costs when they announce the equity issue during an expansion. No study has been 
done in the UK to see whether the adverse selection costs associated with the 
announcement of a rights issue in the UK are lower during the upturn of the business 
cycle. Therefore, before we test if the magnitude of adverse selection costs have an 
effect on the timing of rights issue we have to investigate whether the announcement 
period returns are less negative during the upturn of the cycle as Choe, Masulis and 
Nanda (1993) argue. 
The null and alternative hypothesis are as follows: 
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............................................................................................................................................................................................................. HO: The announcement period abnormal returns of a rights issue announcement 
that is made during the upturn of the business cycle are the same as with the 
announcement period abnormal returns of a rights issue announcement 
that is made during the downturn of the business cycle. 
lie: The announcement period abnormal returns of a rights issue announcement 
that is made during the upturn of 'the business cycle are significantly higher 
than the announcement period abnormal returns of'a rights issue 
announcement that is made during the downturn of the business cycle. 
.............................. 
.................................................................................................................................................................................. 
To support the story that periods of the upturn of the business cycle are 
associated with higher announcement period returns we have to reject the null 
hypothesis in favour of the alternative one. To do so, we compare the mean and 
median announcement periods abnormal returns of rights issues announcements 
across the upturn and downturn of the business cycle. If they are significantly higher 
during the upturn then we can argue that adverse selection costs are lower when 
business conditions are good. 
In table 6.7 we present the cumulative three-day abnormal announcement 
period returns across periods with different economic conditions. Abnormal 
announcement period returns are higher, even though still negative, during the 
upturn of the business cycle relative to the downturn of the cycle. Average three-day 
cumulative abnormal returns are 
-1.53% during the upturn of the cycle. When the 
economy is in a recession, average announcement period returns drop to an average 
of 
-2.47%. Both were significantly different from zero with test statistics higher 
than 5. Median returns were 
-1.48% and -1.88% for the two periods respectively and 
were also significantly different from zero. The difference in the average 
announcement period returns between the upturns and downturns was statistically 
significant at 5% one tail tests with a T-statistic of 1.84. The difference in the 
medians however was not significant with a test statistic of 0.77. 
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TABLE 6.7: ABNORMAL ANNOUNCEMENT PERIOD RETURNS OF RIGHTS 
ISSUES ACROSS UPTURNS AND DOWNTURNS OF TIIE BUSINESS 
CYCLE 
UPTURN OF "I'HF, : DOWNTURN OF. TEST STATISTIC 
BUSINESS CYCLE THE BUSINESS OF I)11A-T'RIACI: 
CYC I. F, ßl. l'WI'T'N 
UPTURNS AND 
DOWNTURNS 
Average Abnormal Announcement 
-1.53% -2.47% 1.84 
returns, Period 1 to+l 
, 
(862 firms) (660) 
( number of observations) 
lest statistic of ditterence of average 
-5.54 -5.79 
ih, i>> /ero 
Median Abnormal Announcement 1.12iý 1.88°ýý U. 
returns(Period 
-1 to +I 
Test statistic of'difference of 
-5.38 -4.42 
medians from ICR) 
Percentage of huýiti\e returns 36% 
Percentage of negative returns 64% 65% 
................................................................................................ .................................................................................................. _ 1. the number o/'observationc in upturns and downturns is smaller than the total number u/issues in 
our sample (? f'1570 because the first evele starts at August 1 9,75 while the whole sample starts from 
Januare' 1975 
.......................................................................................................................................................... ................. .............................. 
In table 6.8 we see how the abnormal announcement period returns behave 
across the whole duration of the cycle. The results are also plotted in ligure 6.5 ( 
solid red line). Announcement period returns are negative through all 6 phases of the 
cycle. At the beginning of-the upturn the average return is 
-2.10% and increases to - 
0.87% in the middle part of the expansion and becomes 
-1.64% in the last part of the 
upturn. After the economy enters the recession, the average announcement period 
return drops further to 
-1.86% in the first and -3.04% in the middle part of the 
recession. In the period before the trough the average return is 
-2.50%. 
Median returns per month also exhibit a similar pattern with months in the 
early part of the expansion having a median return of 
-2.02% and the middle part a 
median return of 
-1.09%. At the last part of the expansion the median return per 
month is 
-1.42% and it deeps to a low of 
-2.81 % in the first part of' the recession. In 
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the last two phases of the recession median returns per month are 
-1.55% and - 
1.42% respectively. 
TABLE 6.8: ABNORMAL ANNOUNCEMENT PERIOD RETURNS ACROSS 
DIFFERENT PHASES OF THE BUSINESS CYCLE 
PHASE OF THE UPTURN UPTURN UPTURN DOWNTURN DOWNTURN DOWNTURN 
BUSINESS CYCLE 1 2 3 1 2 3 
Averse Abnormal 
-2.10% -0.87% -1.64% -1.86% -3.04% -2.50% Announcement returns, (278) (287) (297) (196) (190) (274) 
Period 
-1 to+1. ( number of 
observations) 
Test statistic of difference of 
-4.1 -2.1 -3.18 -2.58 -2.45 -4. 
TT- 
average from zero 
Percentage of positive 33% 40% 36% 27% 39% 38% 
returns 
Percentage of negative 67% 60% 64% 73% 61% 62% 
returns 
Median Abnormal 
-2.02% -1.09% -1.42% -2.81% -1.55% -1.42% Announcement returns, 
er month Period 
-1 to+l 
Test statistic of difference of 
-4.05 -2.63 -2.75 -3.9 -1.4 -2.32 
medians from zero 
These descriptive statistics seem to prove that adverse selection costs are 
lower in periods when economic condition are good. Average announcement period 
returns are higher during the upturn while medians announcement period returns 
during upturns are higher than downturns but insignificantly so. It may be the case 
however that the different response to the announcement of a rights issue during 
good economic conditions may arise from the fact that firms that make an issue 
during these periods have different characteristics from firms that make an issue in 
other periods. More noticeably, it could be the case that announcement day returns 
are higher during the expansions because we have more rights issues to fund an 
acquisition or an investment in these periods which 
, 
as we have shown in table 6.3 
are associated with less negative announcement day returns. In the same way, more 
negative announcement day returns in recessions could result from more rights 
issues used to reduce debt in these periods which are associated with more negative 
returns. 
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In Panel A of table 6.9 we present the number of rights issues partitioned by 
their reason of the issue across upturns and downturns of the business cycle and the 
percentage of each group relative to all the number of rights issues that information 
about the use of the proceeds has been found. There are no significant differences 
between the upturns and the downturns of the cycle. 42.81% of all firms that 
announced a rights issue during an expansion did so to fund an acquisition while 
45.36% of all rights issues announced in the downturn were used to fund an 
acquisition. The percentage of firms that used the issue proceeds to repay debt was 
22.5% in the upturn of the cycle and 23.9% in the downturn of the cycle. 
Overall, the higher returns across upturns of the cycle are not driven by more 
rights issues announced to fund investments or acquisitions during the upturn or 
more firms announcing a rights issue to repay debt in the downturn. Indeed as panel 
B of table 6.9 shows, rights issues that were used to 
-finance acquisitions had higher 
returns when the announcements were made during the expansion. The issues that 
were used to fund an acquisition during the upturn have an average announcement 
return of 
-0.70% while the issues that were used to fund an acquisition during the 
downturn have an average return of 
-2.58% significantly more negative than the 
upturn. Even in the cases when the issue proceeds were used to repay debt we find 
that the issue announcements made during the downturn have significantly more 
negative (-6.58%) relative to the upturn (-2.88%). 
TABLE 6.9: NUMBER OF FIRMS THAT ANNOUNCED A RIGHTS ISSUE ACROSS 
UPTURNS AND DOWNTURNS OF THE BUSINESS CYCLE PARTITIONED BY 
THE USE OF THE PROCEEDS 
PANEL A 
{ 
UPTURN DOWNTURN 
INVESTMENTS " 65 81 
(17.61%) (20.87%) 
ACQUISITIONS 158 176 
.. 
(42.81%) 
REPAY DEBT, 82 93 
-' (22.49) (23.96%) 
in parentheses we have the percentage of each category overall the issues that we found the use of the 
:. Proceeds 
.................................................................................................................................................................................................... 
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PANEL B 
RETURNS RETURNS DURING t stats of difference 
DURING DOWNTURNS between upturn 
UPTURNS and downturn 
ISSUE MADE TO FUND ACQUISITIONS 
AVERAGE 
-0.70% -2.58% 2.29 
Announcement period 
return 
MEDIAN Announcement 
-0.65% -2.29% 2.01 
period return 
ISSUE MADE TO FUND EXPANSION 
AVERAGE 
-0.48% -1.41% 0.57 
Announcement period 
return 
MEDIAN Announcement 
-1.63% -3.33% 1.04 
period return 
ISSUE MADE TO REDUCE DEBT 
AVERAGE 
-2.88% -6.58% 2.36 
Announcement period 
return 
MEDIAN Announcement 
-3.04% -4.07% 0.65 
period return 
The results in panel B provide strong support that periods of good economic 
conditions are periods with lower adverse selection costs irrespective of the use of 
the proceeds from the issue. 
The price reaction on the ann6uncement of a Seasoned Equity Offer has been 
found to differ according to the growth opportunities of the issuer. Firms that have 
better growth opportunities suffer a less negative price reaction on the announcement 
of the issue. So, the difference in the announcement day returns that we observe 
across upturns and downturns could be driven by differences in the growth potentials 
of the issuers. Firms that make an issue during the upturn could be characterised by 
better growth opportunities 
In table 6.10 we present various firm specific characteristics of issuers across 
the business cycle. It turns out that during upturns the average issuer has a slightly 
larger market value than the average issuer during downturns ( £241.3m and 
£231.8m respectively) but they issue smaller amounts of capital in absolute values ( 
£50.01m and £55.5m respectively) ( All figures are in real terms). Firms that issue 
during an expansion have lower market to book values ( 2.10 relative to 2.75 
, 
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difference which is significant at 5% ) and lower Q ratios ( 1.97 and 2.10 
respectively). Overall, it seems that the differences in adverse selection costs 
between upturns and downturns are not driven by firm specific characteristics. 
Measures of growth opportunities such as the market to book value and the Q ratio 
are not higher in expansions. 
TABLE 6.10: AVERAGE RIGHTS ISSUERS' CHARACTERISTICS ACROSS 
UPTURNS AND DOWNTURNS OF THE BUSINESS CYCLE 
UPTURN OF THE DOWNTURN OF 
BUSINESS CYCLE THE BUSINESS 
CYCLE 
MARKET TO BOOK VALUE 2.10 2.75 
QRATIO 1.97 2.10 
PROCEEDS OVER MARKET VALUE 20.7% 23.8% 
AVERAGE AMOUNT OF CAPITAL RAISED 50.019 55.520 
IN REAL TERMS per issue £m 
AVERAGE MARKET VALUE OF ISSUER IN 241.303 231.831 
REAL TERMS (£000) 
1 All the variables are measured at 5 days prior to the announcement of the issue. The q ratio is 
calculated as the market value of common equity plus the book value of preferable equity and 
debt over the book value oe ui common and re erable and debt. 
The less negative price response on the announcement of a rights issue 
during the expansion phase of the business cycle or in the peak of the cycle seems 
that it can not be explained by differences in firms' growth opportunities. Choe, 
Masulis and Nanda (1993) argue that these periods offer a unique advantage. During 
these periods firms experience lower adverse selection costs irrespective to the 
characteristics of the issuer such as growth potentials. In order to test this hypothesis 
we run regressions where the dependent variable is the three-day cumulative 
abnormal announcement returns and as independent variable we use various firm 
specific characteristics, macroeconomic variables and economic indicators. In order 
to see if periods of good economic conditions are associated with lower adverse 
selection costs, after allowing for the effect of other characteristics, we use a dummy 
variable. The dummy takes the value of 1 if the issue announcement was made 
during an expansion and zero if the announcement was made during a recession. If 
the dummy variable has a positive and significant coefficient in all the regressions 
that can be interpreted as strong evidence that these periods offer a unique 
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opportunity for the average issuer to experience a less negative price drop on the 
announcement of the rights issue. 
In Table 6.11 we present the regressions where the dependent variable in the 
three day (-1 to +1) cumulative abnormal announcement day returns. The type of 
regressions is weighted least squares "here the weights of the regressions are the 
inverse of the variance of the residuals as estimated from the market model. The 
weighted least squares has the benefit of giving higher weight to the companies 
whose returns can be explained by the movements in the market with higher R2. 
Suppose that we have two companies. Firm A, that it's returns before the 
announcement exhibit a smooth pattern and move in line with the market. The 
regression of firm's A returns with the returns of the market will have a high R2 and 
therefore the variance of the residuals will be low. Firm B that the price movements 
before the announcement are very erratic, there is big fluctuation and the regression 
of firm B returns with the returns of the market will have a low R2 and the variance 
of the residuals will be high. The Ordinary Least squares type of regression gives to 
the two firms the same weight. The weighted least squares assigns higher weight to 
the firm A because its returns are more predictable that the returns of firm B. 
Therefore a drop on the price of firm A on the announcement of the rights issue will 
be more unexpected than the drop on the price of firm B. Firm B exhibits a more 
erratic pattern relative to firm A and so a drop on the announcement may not indicate 
the generation of new information but may be a price movements like the many 
observed prior to the announcement of the issue. Firm A however is less likely to 
have erratic movements before the announcement and therefore a price drop on the 
announcement is more likely to be caused by the new information generated by the 
issue and not to be an random incident. The observation with the higher weight was 
2.56% but the exclusion of that observation from the sample did not alter the results. 
The description of the independent variables is in the bottom of the table. 
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TABLE 6.11: REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF THE ABNORMAL ANNOUNCEMENT 
PERIOD RETURNS AGAINST ISSUERS CHARACHTERISTICS, 
MACROECONOMIC VARIABLES AND BUSINESS CYCLE INDICATORS 
(1975 
-1996) 
Constant 3 MONTH 3 MONTH MTBV QRATIO PROCCEDS PROCEEDS DEBT TO DUMMYI CHANGE IN Growth in N R 
MARKET FIRM /MARKET OVER EQUITY (I if month COINCIDENT earnings 
RUN UP ABNORM VALUE BOOK is during INDICATOR 
AL VALUE OF expansion 
RUNUP EQUITY zero 
otherwise) 
1 
-0.0109 -0.052 0.018 0.00025 -0.00046 0.435 1139 1.1% (-5.26) (-2.38) (1.44) 2.56 (-0.17) (2.01) 
2 
-0.009 -0.046 0.00024 -0.0050 0.4058 1139 1.0% (-5.06) 
-2.15 (2.42) (-0.19) (2.68) 
3 
-0.011 0.01302 0.00033 -0.00062 0.562 1139 1.1% (-6.28) (1.01) (3.50) (-0.23) (2.68) 
4 
-0.0189 -0.0396 0.0244 0.00017 -0.0013 0.0154 1139 3.86) (-7.73 (-1.84) (1.91) (2.52) (-0.51) (6.02) 
5 
-0.02 0.022 0.00018 0.00053 0.052 1139 3.7% 
-9.87 (1.79) (2.02) (0.72) (5.40) 
6 
-0.027 0.063 0.659 -0.00044 0.0074 748 2.3% 
-5.66 (0.92) (4.12) -0.25 (1.77) 
7 
-0.027 0.659 -0.00047 0.0073 748 2.4% 
-5.98 (4.16) (-0.27) (1.75) 
8 
-0.0189 0.01415 0.0697 -0.029 0.0086 753 7.6% 
4.82) (0.49) 4.54 (-5.87) (2.13) 
9 
-0.018 0.071 -0.029 0.0084 753 7.6% 
-4.84 (4.72) (-5.89) 2.08 
10 
-0.022 0.0706 0.0046 -0.0309 0.0148 753 8.9% 
-5.77 (4.04) (1.02) (-5.78) 3.50 
11 
-0.0009 0.1019 -0.0094 838 3.4% 
-0.03 (4.93) (-2.68) 
12 
-0.0017 0.1053 -0.0061 716 4.2% 
-0.48 (4.32) (-3.89) 
13 0.0060 0.0849 
-0.0105 641 1 116.1% 
1.84 (3.42) (-9.35) 1 
Weighted Least Squares of the 3-day abnormal announcement day returns where the weights are the market model residuals The 
Cohrane-Orcutt method is used to adjust for the first order serial correlation of the errors. MARKET RUN UP is the 3 and 6 
month returns of the FT All Share prior to the beginning of the month 
. 
DUMMY I takes the value of 1 if the month is classified as 
Upturn of the business cycle and 0 if the month is classified as downturn of the business cycle. DUMMY2 takes the value of I if 
the month is during the second half of the expansion and zero otherwise. 3 and 6 month firm run up are the 3 and 6 month 
abnormal firm returns where the abnormal returns are calculated as the return of security i at month t minus the expected return of 
security i at month t AR,,, = R,,, - ft Rm,, where Rm,, is the monthly return of the FT ALL SHARE PRICE INDEX and 
,6 
is calculated 
from the period 
-36 to -6 months relative to the announcement of the issue. MTB V is the market to book value of the issuer. Qratio 
is the ratio of the market value of equity and book value of debt and preference shares over the total value of assets. DEBT TO 
EQUITY is the debt to equity ratio. For all the accounting variables we allowed for 6 months lag between the end of the financial 
year and their publications. If an issue took place less than 6 months after the year-end date, we used the accounts of the previous 
We find that-the market return is negatively related with the announcement 
period returns. An increase in the FTA share price index'returns in the 3 months up to 
the beginning 'of the' month of the announcement ' causes more negative 
announcement returns. Masulis and Kor-war (1986) find positive and significant 
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coefficients for the market return and so does Dennis (1994) and Choe, Masulis and 
Nanda (1993). Bayless and Chaplinsky (1996) however find significant negative 
coefficients for the market return of the year prior to the issue. 
We also find that the pre-announcement 3 month abnormal returns are 
positively related with the announcement day returns in contrast with the empirical 
findings of US studies on SEOs. Masulis and Korwar (1986), Choe, Masulis and 
Nanda (1993) find significant negative coefficients for the firm abnormal return and 
so does Dennis(1994). Shah (1996) however who investigates the announcement 
period returns for 369 rights issues in the UK in the period 1981 to 1988 also finds a 
positive coefficient for the abnormal 1-year and 2 year return prior to the issue. We 
also used longer periods such as the 6,9,12 and 15 month abnormal price run-up but 
we find that in most of the cases the coefficients were positive and significant. 
The positive relation between firm specific abnormal price run up we 
document here is in contrast with the story which argues that firms that make an 
equity issue are overvalued firms. If firms are overvalued and investors interpret an 
equity issue as an attempt to exploit overvaluation, then the larger the pre- 
announcement price run up the higher the drop on the announcement should be. 
Firms that have a big run-up are more likely to be overvalued relative to firms with a 
small run-up. So, the price reaction should be more negative for the former firms. 
Nevertheless, we observe that firms with high run-up have higher returns on the 
announcement of the issue. That means that the market does not perceive a rights 
issue after a big price run-up as an exploitation of overvaluation. The correlation 
between the abnormal announcement period returns and the 3 and 6 month firm price 
-,, 
run up were positive, 0.137 and 0.105 respectively. These figures show that there is', 
not a negative relation between the announcement period returns and the pre = 
announcement price run-up. 
The market to book is considered to be a proxy for growth opportunities. 
Firms with high market to book are regarded as "growth stocks". One would expect 
to find that firms with high market to book values experience higher announcement 
day returns. Investors who look at proxies for growth such as market to book would 
consider a rights issue by a firm with high growth potential as better news than a 
rights issue by a firm with lower growth potentials. Denis (1994) finds a positive but 
160 
insignificant relation between market to book value and the q ratio with the 
announcement period returns. Bayless and Chaplinsky (1996) report a significant 
positive coefficient for Q ratio. Our results are in line with this argument since 
market to book is positively related to the announcement day returns with test 
statistic ranging from 2.02 to 3.50. The higher the market to book value of the issuer, 
the smaller the price drop on the announcement of the rights issue. In contrast with 
the market to book value, the Q ratio, another proxy widely used for growth 
opportunities which is defined as the market value of equity plus the book value of 
debt and preference shares over the total assets, was not significant. We have to note 
however that due to lack of data in the regressions where we used the q ratio the size 
of the sample is reduced to 748 firms from 1139 where the market to book value is 
used. 
According to the price pressure theory, an equity issue increases the supply of 
shares and causes a drop on the share price since the demand for the shares will be 
the same. Bayless and Chaplinsky (1996) find a significant negative relation between 
the value of the proceeds over total market value of the firm and the announcement 
period returns and so do Asquith and Mullins (1986). Dennis (1994) reports 
insignificant even though still negative coefficients. We find a negative relation 
between the ratio of amount of proceeds over market value of common equity but its 
is not significant. We also used the ratio of the amount of proceeds over book value 
of equity but the coefficient was also not significant. In no regression did we find that 
the relative size of the issue is related to the magnitude of the announcement returns. 
The leverage is another variable that has been found to be able to explain the 
announcement day returns. In our tests, the debt to equity ratio was the variable with 
the higher negative relation with the announcement day abnormal returns and with 
very strong significance even though the size of the sample drops to 753 compared 
with the 1139 of. the previous : regressions.: That : result 
. 
indicates that. investors 
perceive an equity issue from firms with high levels of debt which indicates serious 
,`- 
financial distress as a more negative signal than the issues from firms with low debt 
. 
to equity ratios. "A firm with a debt, to equity ratio of 1 will have an approximately 
1.45% larger drop on the announcement of the issue relative to a firm with a ratio of 
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0.5. When the debt to equity ratio is high then the bankruptcy risk is high and the 
reduction of the bankruptcy risk that the equity issue causes will benefiting 
debtholders the most. If the debt to equity ratio is low then the bankruptcy risk is low 
and the further reduction of this risk will be of lesser importance to the debtholders. 
Our finding that firms with large debt to equity ratios have more negative price 
reactions suggest that the debt co-insurance theory may explain the negative price 
reaction. Nevertheless, a larger equity issue should reduce the leverage by a higher 
percentage and therefore the reduction of risk for the debt should be greater. The ratio 
of proceeds over the market value of the firm as we saw is not significantly related 
with the announcement day returns. In other words larger issues which reduce the 
leverage by greater proportions and transfer more wealth do not induce more 
negative returns on the announcement of the rights issue. Therefore we can not 
support the story that the negative returns on the announcement of an equity issue can 
be explained by the transfer of wealth between equity holders to debtholders. 
That coefficient for the debt to equity reveals that an equity issue by firms in 
financial distress is perceived as a bad signal by the market. The issuer may be 
expecting bad times in terms of the level of the future earnings in the near future and 
therefore managers may think that the current levels of debt may be too difficult to be 
serviced. An equity issue will reduce the debt to equity ratio and will provide funds 
that could be used to repay debts. In other words, the market may be reacting 
negatively because they believe that managers foresee a deterioration in the future 
earnings. The best way to see whether the market thinks that the equity issue 
announcement is perceived by the market as a signal that the future earnings will 
decrease is by looking at how analysts revise their earnings forecasts around the 
rights issue announcement. That issue is investigated in chapter 9. 
The variable with the most significant positive coefficient is the dummy 
variable we use for the upturn of the business cycle periods (DUMMYI).. The results 
show that an issuer that made the announcement during the upturn of the business 
cycle experienced higher returns ranging between 0.5% to 1.7% than the issue that 
was announced during the downturn of the cycle. The change in the coincident 
indicator also had positive and significant coefficients. 
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We believe that the coefficient of the dummy variable is the strongest 
evidence that the upturn of the business cycle is a period when adverse selection 
costs are lower. That is because the dummy remains significant even when we take 
into account the firm specific characteristics and macroeconomic factors that may 
have an effect the magnitude of adverse selection costs. The expansion phase of the 
business cycle is a period when the announcement of a rights issue is accompanied 
by lower adverse selection costs. So, we reject the null hypothesis in favour of the 
alternative. Periods of the upturn of the business cycle are periods when the average 
announcement period returns are less negative. 
In the regressions 11,12 and 13 of the table 6.11 we run three additional 
regressions where the independent variable is the earning per share growth form the 
previous 1,2 and 3 years respectively 
. 
The 1-year growth in earnings per share for 
example is the growth in the earnings per share between the period 5 days prior to the 
announcement of the issue and the previous year. We find negative and significant 
coefficients for the 1,2 and 3 year growth in earnings per share. What these 
coefficients indicate is that firms with high growth in earnings in the period prior to 
the announcement of the rights : issue have more negative price response on the 
announcement of the issue. If the market was expecting that the growth in earnings to 
continue after the issue then there is no reason to react adversely to issuers with high 
growth in earnings. It seems that the market's view is that firms with a high growth 
in earnings can not sustain that growth.. Hence, the more negative price response to 
the announcement of issues by firms with high growth in earnings. 
Apart from, testing ý whether. the announcement period returns 
-are 
higher 
during the upturn of the business cycle, this section gave us useful insights on the 
reasons for the negative response on the announcement of the rights issue. We find 
evidence against the price pressure and the, debt coinsurance theories since the 
magnitude of the drop is not related with the size of the issue as these theories 
predict.. We also find, that investors 
, 
do not regard a, rights issue as an attempt to 
exploit overvaluation since no negative relation between the magnitude of the price 
drop and the price runup exists.. We find that firms with good growth opportunities 
have less negative price reaction. The most interesting results however is the negative 
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relation between the pre-announcement growth in earnings and the announcement 
period return. That provides support to the theory of Miller and Rock (1985) that 
equity issues signals changes in the future earnings. A more complete investigation of 
that theory can be made by looking at how the market views that the equity issue will 
affect the profitability of these firms. That can be done by looking at how financial 
analysts revise their earnings forecasts around the rights issue period. We will draw 
our attention to this issue in chapter 9 where we look at analysts forecast revisions 
around the announcement of a rights issue. 
6.5. TIMING OF RIGHTS ISSUE ACTIVITY. 
In the previous section we found evidence that adverse selection costs are 
significantly lower during the upturn of the business cycle. The fact that during the 
upturn of the cycle adverse selection costs are lower does not automatically mean 
that more firms time their equity issue in an expansion because in that period these 
costs are lower. It may be a coincidence that lower adverse selection costs are lower 
when activity is high and adverse selection costs may not have a direct effect on the 
volume of rights issue activity. 
This section tries to find what is the direct effect of adverse selection costs on 
the timing of Rights Issue activity. For this purpose we run two groups of time series 
regressions where in the first the dependent variables are the number of rights issues 
per month and the amount of capital raised per month in real terms in the second 
group, against a number of macroeconomic variables. Apart from macroeconomic 
variables which we use as control variables, we use as independent variable the 
average announcement period abnormal returns of the previous quarter. If the 
coefficient of the announcement period abnormal returns is positive and statistically 
significant that will indicate that as the announcement period returns of the previous 
quarter increase ( become less negative), and therefore adverse selection costs 
decrease, more firms make a rights issue and more capital is raised from rights issues 
at the current month. The results of the regressions are in table 6.12 ( number of 
rights issues per month ) and 6.13 (amount of capital raised per month). 
The monthly distribution of the number of rights issues announcement from 
January 1975 until December 1996 is not normally distributed but the distribution is 
log-normal. Therefore, we use as dependent variable the Log of the number of rights 
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issues announcement per month, which is normally distributed with a Jarque-Bera 
statistic which rejects the hypothesis of not normality at 5%. The monthly 
distribution of the amount of capital raised from of rights issues from January 1975 
until December 1996 (in Dec 1996 prices) is also not normally distributed but the 
distribution is log-normal. Therefore, e use as- dependent variable the Log of the 
amount of capital raised form rights issues per month, which is normally distributed 
with a Jarque-Bera statistic which rejects the hypothesis of not normality at 5%. 
As independent variables we use a number of macroeconomic factors. Interest 
rates are represented with two variables. We use the monthly change in the 3- 
month treasury bills and the monthly change of the Long Term Government bonds. 
As interest rates increase, the cost of borrowing increases and therefore managers 
may look for alternative sources of finance such as common equity capital. 
Therefore as interest rates go up 
, 
equity issue activity should go up. So, a positive 
sign for interest rates coefficients is expected if the substitution effect is strong. 
As a measure of the level of the stock market we use 30,60 and 90 trading 
day cumulative daily compounded returns of the FT All Share Price index 
(MARKET RUN UP). Rising markets have been associated with an increase in 
Seasoned equity offers but rising market have also been associated with periods of 
good economic conditions so we expect to find a significant and positive relation 
between the rights issue activity and the market run up. 
It has been cited in the literature (Choe, Masulis & Nanda 1993) that volatility 
adversely affect the ratio of equity offers over all the securities offered because 
11 volatile markets would indicate a greater uncertainty about the firm's value. We use 
11 1 
30,60 and 180 day volatility to see if high volatility results in lower rights issue 
activity. 
.,., .. 
We use a number of economic., indicators to 
. 
see ; if, the improvement in 
business` conditions cause rights issue activity to increase.. The indicators. we use is 
the monthly change in the Coincident and Short leading indicator supplied by Central 
Statistical Office. In addition to the economic indicator, two dummy variables are 
used. The first dummy takes the value of I if the month is classified as Upturn of 
the business cycle and 0 if the month is classified as downturn of the business cycle. 
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The second dummy takes the value of 1 if the month is classified as being in the 
second half of the expansion phase of the business cycle and 0 otherwise. We expect 
to find a positive relation between the change in economic indicators and the rights 
issue activity. If rights issue activity is higher during the expansion then the 
coefficients of the two dummy variables should be positive and significant. 
Last but not least, one more variable is used to test whether the magnitude of 
adverse selection costs have an effect on the timing of rights issue activity. This 
variable is the average announcement period abnormal returns of all issues that were 
announced during the 3-month period prior to the beginning of the current month. If 
adverse selection costs have an important role in the timing of equity issues we 
should find a positive and significant relation between the magnitude of these costs 
and SEO volume. The Cochrane-Orcutt method is used to correct for the first order 
serial correlation. T- Statistics are given below the coefficients. 
The results of the regressions where the dependent variable is the log of the 
Number of rights issues per month are in table 6.12. Rights issue activity is positively 
affected by the stock market performance. An increase in the stock market return 
results to an increase in the rights issue activity. The higher the continuously 
compound FT All Share returns over the 60 trading days prior to the beginning of 
the month of the stock offering, the larger the number of rights issue announcements 
in that month. The coefficients were significant usually at 5% level or higher. Using 
30 and 90 day periods instead of the 60 also produced significant positive 
coefficients (results not reported). 
We find that changes in short-term interest rates positively affect the rights 
issue activity but the coefficients are insignificant. Changes in Long-term interest 
rates are also positively related with the rights issue activity but this time the 
coefficients are significant with test statistics higher than 2.40. That result suggests 
that as long term interest rates go up, rights issue activity increases which shows that 
the timing decision of an equity issue is driven by considerations about the 
alternative sources of finance. When long term interest rates rise, debt becomes more 
expensive and equity issuance activity increases significantly. 
ý 
... 
166 
TABLE 6.12: REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF THE NUMBER OF RIGHTS ISSUES 
PER MONTH (1975 
-1996) 
The regressions we run had the following format 
Log(Number of RIGHTS) =C +Log(1+change in 3-month T bills)+ Log(l+change in 
Government bonds) + Log(1+Market run up) + Log(volatility) + Log(l+change in 
coincident indicator)+ Log(l+change in short leading indicator)+ +DUMMY I+ DUMMY 
2+ Log( l+adverse selection costs) 
Constant (60 day 3 month long term (60 day Change in Change in DUMMY 1 DUMMY2 ADSC R 
cumulative T-Bill) Gov. Bonds volatilityof Coincident Short (1 if month is (1 if month is ( average FT ALL FT ALL Indicator Leading during during second abnormal SHARE) SHARE) Indicator expansion half of announcemen 
zero expansion and t returns 
otherwise) zero otherwise) during 
previous 
term) 
1 2.29 1.08 
-0.37 6.24 3.17 33.6% (24.96) (2.22) 
-0.54 0.83 (2.12) 
2 2.33 0.72 
-0.63 13.90 3.43 35.1% 
25.19 (1.47) (-0.92) 2.56 (2.34) 
3 2.29 1.03 
-0.40 0.02 3.37 33.4% (20.28) (2.13) 
-0.58 (0.11) (2.28) 
4 2.25 1.06 
-0.45 0.17 3.17 33.8% (22.3) (2.18) 
-0.66 1.34 (2.13) 
5 2.30 1.04 0.90 
-0.35 6.18 3.17 33.5% (25.1) (2.13) (0.92) 
-0.52 (0.83) (2.12) 
6 2.. 33 0.70 0.79 
-0.61 13.63 3.42 35.0% (25.36) (1.41) 0.81 (-0.89) (2.52) (2.34) 
7 2.29 1.00 0.91 
-0.38 0.02 3.37 33.4% (20.39) (2.04) (0.93) (-0.55) (0.14) (2.27) 
8 2.25 1.01 0.86 
-0.44 0.13 3.18 33.7% 
22.36 (2.06) (0.88) (-0.64) (1.32) (2.14) 
9 2.30 1.03 1.01 
-0.37 5.49 2.94 34.8% (25.04) (2.13) (2.44) 
-0.55 (0.74) (1.98) 
10 2.33 0.68 1.09 
-0.63 14.74 3.13 36.2% (25.5) (1.39) (2.67) 
-0.94 (2.75) (2.16) 
11 2.29 0.99 1.02 
-0.40 0.016 3.11 34.7% (20.3) (2.05) (2.48) (-0.58) (0.13) (2.11) 
12 2.26 1.00 0.99 
-0.46 0.16 2.95 34.9% (22.3) (2.06) (2.42) (-0.67) (1.23) 2.00 
---- - ----- ---- --- ----------------  - -- -------------  The Cohrane-Orcutt method is used to adjust for the first, order serial correlation of the errors. The dependent 
variable is the log of the number of rights issues per month. MARKET RUN UP is the 60 day cumulative returns of 
the FT All Share prior to the beginning of the month 
. 
VOLATILITY is the 60 day volatility of the daily returns of the 
FT ALL SHARE PRICE INDEX prior to the beginning of the month. Change in the coincident and short leading 
indicators is the monthly change in the Coincident and Short leading indicator, supplied by Central Statistical Office 
measured over three months prior to the month of the offer. DUMMY I takes the value of 1 if the month is classified 
as HOT (Upturn of the business "cycle) and 0 if the month is classified as COLD (downturn of the business cycle). 
DUMMY2 takes the value of I if the month is during the second half of the expansion and zero otherwise. ADVERSE 
SELECTION COSTS is the average of the abnormal announcement day returns of the issues that were announced in 
the previous 3 months. 
............................................................... ..... ...... ....... .......... .............................. _.................................................... ................. 
In contrast with Choe, Masulis and Nanda (1993) weA find insignificant even 
though still negative coefficient for the volatility. 60-day volatility as measured over 
the 60 trading days prior to the beginning of the month had negative but 
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insignificant coefficients in most of the regressions So, was the 30-day volatility 
while the 180-day volatility had positive but totally insignificant coefficients 
(Results with these variables not reported). 
As a proxy for economic condition we use the monthly change of the 
coincident and short leading indicator measured over three months before the month 
of the announcement. The change in the coincident indicator was positively related 
with the rights issue activity but not significantly so. The change in the short leading 
indicator was positive and significant at 1% level of significance. However, the 
dummy that takes the value of 1 if the month is during the expansion phase of the 
business cycle and 0 if the month is during the recession was not significant showing 
that when we take into account the rising markets and interest rates, we can not 
argue that more firms make a rights issue announcement during the whole expansion 
phase of the business cycle. As the coefficient of the second dummy (DUMMY 2) 
that takes the value of 1 if the month is during the second phase of the expansion 
shows however 
, 
the rights issue activity is also not significantly higher during the 
second half of the expansion phase of the business cycle 
The last independent variable that we use is the adverse selection costs in 
order to see what is their effect on the timing of rights issue activity. The variable 
adverse selection costs is the average abnormal announcement period returns of all 
the issues that were announced in the previous term. In all the regressions, the 
magnitude of adverse selection costs was statistically significant and with a positive 
coefficient, indicating that as the announcement day returns of the previous 3 months 
increase ( become less negative) the rights issue activity at the current month 
increases. Most of the coefficients for the adverse selection costs were significant at 
5% level two tail tests. The coefficients of the adverse selection costs indicate that 
these costs have a role to play in the timing of rights issues. More firms make a rights 
issue in a month when the adverse selection costs of the previous quarter are low. 
The R2 of the regressions are above 30% which shows that our results are 
economically significant apart from statistically significant. 
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Table 6.13 presents the results of the regressions when the dependent variable 
is the log of the amount of capital raised from rights issues per month in real terms. 
As with the results of the regressions of the number of rights issues per month in 
table 6.12, rising markets lead to more equity being raised. Volatility adversely and 
significantly affects the amount of capital raised while interest rates are insignificant. 
The change in the coincident indicator was insignificant while the change in the 
short leading indicator was significant. The dummy variables however were not 
significant showing that the amount of capital raised does not differ between upturns 
and downturns nor between the second half of the expansion and the rest of the 
periods. Interest rates were also not significant. 
As a last independent variable we add the adverse selection costs. As with 
the regressions where the dependent variable was the number of rights issues per 
month, we find that the magnitude of abnormal announcement day returns positively 
affects the amount of capital raised from rights issues. The higher the returns on the 
announcement of the rights issue in the previous three months were, the higher the 
amount of capital raised in that month. The coefficients however were marginally 
significant at 10% level one tail tests. The Adjusted R2 add economic significance in 
the results since they are around 15% which is lower than the R2 in the regression of 
the number of rights issues per month but that can be attributed to the fact that the 
amount of capital raised per- month exhibits higher fluctuations from one month to 
the other thus making the attempt to model it more difficult 
. 
H 
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TABLE 6.13: REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF THE AMOUNT OF CAPITAL 
RAISED (REAL TERMS) FROM RIGHTS ISSUES PER MONTH (1975 
-1996) 
The regressions we run had the following format 
Log(Amount of capital raised from RIGHTS) =C +Log(l+change in 3-month T bills)+ 
Log(1+ change in Government bonds) + Log(1+Market run up) + Log(l+volatility) + 
Log(1+ change in coincident indicator)+ Log(1+ change in short leading indicator)+ 
+DUMMY 1+ DUMMY 2+ Log( 1+adverse selection costs) 
Constant (60 day 3 month T- long term (60 day Change in Change in DUMMY 1 DUMMY2 ADSC R 
cumulative Bill) Gov. volatility of Coincident Short (I if month is (I if month is ( average FT ALL Bonds FT ALL Indicator Leading during during second abnormal SHARE) SHARE) Indicator expansion half of announcemen 
zero expansion and t returns 
otherwise) zero otherwise) during 
previous 
term) 
1 4.91 2.54 
-2.11 12.08 3.77 14.2% (32.48) (2.56) 
-1.85 (0.90) (1.55) 
2 4.97 1.87 
-2.44 19.14 4.73 15.2% 
(33.05) (1.84) (-2.13) (1.92) (1.62) 
3 4.93 2.37 
-2.16 -0.0109 4.51 13.9% 
(264) (2.39) 
-1.86 (0.05) (1.52) 
4 4.97 2.32 
-2.12 0.13 3.17 14.1% 
(29.98) 2.34 
-1.84 0.62 (2.13) 
5 4.91 2.45 2.08 
-2.12 11.77 3.76 14.2% 
(32.41) (2.45) (0.95) (-1.86) (0.87) (1.54) 
6 4.98 1.79 2.16 
-2.45 19.23 4.70 15.1% 
(33.08) (1.75) 0.99 
-2.14 (1.93) (1.62) 
7 4.94 2.29 2.12 
-2.17 0.048 4.47 13.9% 
26.4 (2.29) (0.97) (-1.87) 0.17 (1.50) 
8 4.98 2.23 2.15 
-2.13 0.14 4.78 14.1% 
29.97 (2.22) (0.98) 
-1.85 (0.64) (1.62) 
9 4.90 2.54 0.13 
-2.11 12.01 3.72 13.94 
32.38 (2.55) (0.12) (-1.88) (0.89) (1.52) 
10 4.97 1.85 0.46 
-2.45 19.82 4.55 14.9% 
(32.97) (1-82) 1 0.45 
-2.13 (1.96) (1.55) 
11 4.93 2.37 0.17 
-2.16 0.015 4.44 13.6% 
26.3 (2.38) (0.16) (-1.86) 0.54 1.48 
12 4.97 2.31 0.20 
-2.12 0.19 4.81 13.7% 
(29.9 2.33 (0.21) 
-1.84 (0.63) (1.59) 1 
The Cohrane-Orcutt method is used to adjust for the first order serial correlation of the errors. The dependent 
variable is the alog of the number of rights issues per month. mount of capital raised from rights issues per month in, 
real terms. DINTI and DINT2 are the monthly growth rate of 3-month treasury bills and the monthly growth 
rate of the Long Term Government bonds respectively. MARKET RUN UP is the 60 day cumulative returns of the FT 
All Share prior to the beginning of the month. VOLATILITY is the 60 day volatility of the daily returns of the FT ALL 
SHARE PRICE INDEX prior to the beginning of the month. Change in the coincident and short leading indicators 
GCOINC and GLEAD is are the monthly change logarithmic growth rate in the Coincident and Short leading 
indicator supplied by Central Statistical Office measured over three months prior to the month of the offer, DUMMY 
1 takes the value of 1 if the month is classified as HOT (Upturn of the business cycle) and 0 if the month is class fed 
as COLD (downturn of the business cycle). DUMMY2 takes the value of I if the month is during the second half of 
the expansion and zero otherwise ADVERSE SELECTION COSTS is the average of the abnormal announcement day 
returns of the issues that were announced in the previous 3 months. 
................. 
Our results from the regression analysis of the rights issue volume indicate 
that the magnitude of adverse selection costs has an important role to play in the 
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timing of Seasoned Equity offering activity in the UK. When these costs are high, 
fewer firms decide to raise capital through a rights issue and the amount of capital 
they raise decreases. 
6.6. Do MANAGERS TIME THE RIGHTS ISSUE WHEN THE SHARES ARE OVERVALUED? 
One theory about the timing of seasoned equity offering argues that issuer 
exploit overvaluation. Variations in equity issuance activity is driven by variation in 
investors' sentiment. Firms issue seasoned capital when investors are willing to pay 
prices for the issues that are above the fundamentals. Loughran & Ritter (1995) are 
among the advocates of such a theory. They document a significant 
underperformance of firms that make a SEO for up to 5 years after the issue which 
indicates that the issuer was overvalued at the time of the issue. According to them, 
SEO volume is driven by overvaluation exploitation and to support that they find 
that the underperformance is higher for the issuers that made the issue in heavy SEO 
volume periods indicating that in periods of heavy volume issuers are more 
overvalued than periods of light volume. In chapter 5 we also found evidence that the 
IPO activity in the UK is also driven by variations in investors' sentiment. Periods of 
heavy IPO activity are periods when investors pay higher prices for the new issues. 
Managers who act on behalf of the interests of existing shareholders may be 
tempted to make an equity issue when the current share price is higher than its 
intrinsic value. In such cases more capital can be raised from the issue with a smaller 
portion of the old shareholders ownership lost to new shareholders. That theory can 
only explain however the poor long run performances of SEO firms only if the new 
shares are offered to new shareholders. 
The case of rights issues is a very interesting one because the new shares go 
to existing shareholders. The wealth of existing shareholders is not affected by how 
much is the price of the issue. Even if the issue is overpriced or underpriced, the 
existing shareholder will still own the same proportion of the firm after the issue and 
that will leave them no better off if the issue is overpriced, Managers that make an 
equity issue with the method of rights issue have, no incentive to make the issue at 
periods when investors are overpaying. 
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It has been argued however that managers do not necessarily act on behalf of 
their shareholders' interests but sometimes they seek to maximise their own utility. If 
the satisfaction they get and their personal remuneration package is linked to the size 
of the company and the assets they manage, managers will be better off to issue new 
shares when they are overvalued because more capital will be raised and therefore the 
company's assets will gave a larger growth. If managers care for their own 
satisfaction then the timing of the issue at a period when investors are overpaying 
will enable the firm to raise larger amounts of capital with greater ease. No study has 
been done in the UK to see whether rights issuance activity in the UK is driven by 
overvaluation exploitation. To support that overvaluation exploitation in a major 
driving force in the rights issuance activity we have to find significant 
underperformance after the issue and significant differences in the post-issue 
performances according to the intensity of the SF. O activity. 
We test whether UK SEOs that were announced during Heavy issuance 
periods have worst post-SEO performances relative to SEOs that were announced in 
light volume periods. The null and alternative hypothesis are: 
......................................................................................................................................................................................... Ho: The. /irms that announced a SEO during heavy SEO volume periods have 
similar Post-SEO performances with, ßrms that announced a SEO during 
periods of Light SEQ volume periods 
tfe: The firms that announced a SEO during heavy SEO volume periods have 
significantly worst Post-SEQ performances than. firms that announced u SEO 
during periods of Light SEO volume periods 
......................................................................................................................................................................... 
To reject the null hypothesis of similar performance of Heavy and Lights 
period SEOs we compare the post-SEO performances of firms that announced the 
issues in Heavy and light SEO volume periods respectively. In order to classify 
periods as Heavy or light we rank all months from 1/1975 to 12/1996 (264 months) 
according the 3-month moving average of the amount of capital raised from SEOs in 
December 1996 prices. The 66 months (25% of the sample) with the highest SEO 
activity in terms of capital raised are classified as 110 ! months. The 66 months with 
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the lowest SEO activity are classified as COLD months. The remaining 132 months 
are classified as OTHER. 
In figure 6.7 we have plotted the rights issue Buy and Hold and FTA adjusted 
Buy and Hold performance in the period 60 months before and up to 60 months 
after the issue announcement. These returns represent the buy and hold return of an 
investor that had bought the shares at the end of month 
-60 and kept them until 
month t. 
As with the SEO findings in the US, we find that firms that make a SEO in 
the UK exhibit a large price run up prior to the issue. The investor that bought the 
issuer's share at month 
-60 would have zero FTA adjusted buy and hold return if 
he/she has kept the shares until month 
-15. From that point there is a steep rise in the 
FTA adjusted returns of 20% up until month 
-1. At the month of the announcement, 
we observe a small drop on the returns but after the month of the announcement, 
returns continue to rise until month +2. Despite the small drop on the month of the 
announcement, investors that bought the share at month 
-60 and have kept it until the 
end of month 0 would have a total FTA adjusted buy and hold return of 22.3% 
almost all of which results from the large price run up that starts from month 18 prior 
to the announcement. 
After the announcement of the issue, returns continue to rise for 2 more 
month but from that point onwards the returns start to decline. The 
, 
post- 
announcement decrease in returns however is not as steep as the pre-announcement 
price run up. In table 6.14 we have the average buy and Hold returns of an investor 
that purchased the shares of the issuer at the end of month 
-1 relative to the issue. In 
the first year after the announcement of the issue, shareholders would have lost 
1.99% of their total buy and hold return relative to the FTA and 10.17% is lost by the 
end of year 2 after the announcement of the issue. In : the 3`d year after the 
announcement of the issue, shareholders would have lost 14.03% of their returns. In 
fact, by the end of year, +3 almost all the pre-announcement gains that investors 
made relative to the FTA, are lost. Furthermore, returns continue to decrease in the 
fourth year by to reach a buy and hold return to an investor that purchased the shares 
of the issue at month 
-1 relative to the announcement to, -21.25% and reach a5 year 
buy and hold return of 
-25.13%. The negative post-, issue performance is statistically 
173 
significant at a level of 10% or higher from month +16 onwards. So, firms that make 
a rights issue underperform relative the FTA in the post- issue period. 
Rights issuers also underperform in the period after the issue when we use the 
industry/ market to book value adjusted performance as well (Panel B of table 6.14). 
By the end of month 24, an investor that purchased the shares of the issuer at the end 
of month 
-1 will have a negative buy and hold return of -5.49% which is marginally 
significantly negative at 10% one tail tests. By the end of month 36, an investor that 
purchased the shares of the issuer at the end of month -1 will have a negative Buy 
and hold return of 
-7.59% which has a test statistic of -1.88 and by the end of month 
48 the buy and hold performance decreases further to 
-8.49% with a test statistic of - 
2.01. The 5 year buy and hold performance is 
-12.07% significantly negative at 5% 
two tail tests. 
TABLE 6.14: POST SEO PERFORMANCE 
month after the 12 24 36 48 60 
announcement of the issue 
PANEL A 
ADJUSTED BY THE FTA 
Buy and Hold Post SEO 
-1.99% -10.17% -14.03% -21.25% -25.13% 
performance of ALL rights -1.61 -2.59 -3.09 -4.15 -5.48 
issuers. 
PANEL B 
ADJUSTED BY INDUSTRY AND MARKET TO BOOK VALUE 
Buy and Hold Post SEO 0.99% 
-5.49% -7.59% -8.49% -12.07% 
performance of ALL rights 0.12 
-1.47 -1.88 -2.01 -2.1 S 
issuers. 
PANEL C 
ADJUSTED BY INDUSTRY AND MARKET VALUE 
Buy and Hold Post SEO 0.06% 
-6.65% -7.26% -10.16 -10.72% 
performance of ALL rights 0.05 -1.59 -1.66 -2.16 -2.09 
issuers. 
The use of the industry/ market value adjusted performance also produced 
similar underperformance for the rights issuers (panel C of table 6.14). By the end of 
month 24, an investor that purchased the shares of the issuer at the end of month -1 
will have a negative Buy and hold return of -6.65%. By 
-the end of month 36, an 
investor that purchased the shares of the issuer at the end of month -1 will have a 
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negative Buy and hold return of 
-7.26% which has a test statistic of -1.66 and by the 
end of month 48 the buy and hold performance decreases further to 
-10.16% with a 
test statistic of 
-2.16. The 5 year buy and hold performance is 
-10.72% significantly 
negative at 5% two tail tests. Therefore, the use of the industry/ market value 
adjusted performance provides further evidence that rights issuers underperform in 
the period after the issue. 
The fact that rights issuers underperform after the issue does not in itself 
indicate that the reason behind this underperformance is that managers deliberately 
time the offer at periods when the share price of the firm is at the peak and that the 
drop afterwards is due to investors' concerns that the firm is overvalued. Neither it 
also indicates that periods of heavy volume are attractive because in these periods 
issuers' prices are more overvalued. To argue that variations in rights issue volume 
across time is driven by variations in the degree that these shares are overvalued 
would require evidence of significant differences in the post-announcement 
performance of issuers that made the announcement in Heavy and Light volume 
periods. 
Next we compare the Post-SEO performance of Heavy and Light volume 
period issuers. In table 6.15 we have the industry/market to book value (PANEL A) 
and industry/market value (PANEL B) adjusted buy and hold post-announcement 
performance of HOT and COLD market issuers. We find no significant differences in 
the post-announcement performances of HOT and COLD market issuers. 
When we use the industry/market to book value adjusted returns (panel A of 
table 6.14 and figure 6.8) we find that the two group of issuers have indistinguishable 
performances up until the end of month 30 after the announcement. At the end of 
year 1, HOT market issuers have a buy and hold return of 0.06% while COLD 
market issuers have 'a negative return of 
-4.46%. These returns represent the buy and 
hold return to an investor that has purchased the Rights ' issuer share at the end of 
month =1, relative to the announcement... By the end of year 2, HOT market issuers 
have an average buy and hold return of 
-3.08% and COLD market issuers have an 
average buy and hold return of 
-10.11%. ' HOT market issuers' returns continue to 
deteriorate in the third year and reach an average buy and hold return of, 
-9.03% 
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while COLD market issuers an average buy and hold return are -2.47%. We have to 
note however that the number of firms in the COLD markets group is small ( 86 to 73 
firms) while in the HOT markets the number of firms more than 6 times larger ( 523 
to 397). That leaves the COLD market group more prone to outliers and hence the 
more erratic movements in the performances. After year 3, COLD market issuers 
have significantly worst performances than HOT market issuers. By the end of year 
5, HOT market issuers underperformed ( not significantly though) firms in the same 
industry and similar market to book values by 11.20% while COLD market issuers 
significantly underperform by 34.64%. The difference however between the two 
groups is not significant with a test statistic of 1.26. We have to note however that 
due to the data requirement to calculate industry and market to book value adjusted 
returns (industry classification for issuer and market to book data), the number of the 
COLD market issuers by the end of year 5 is only 73 firms. When we compare the 
performance of HOT market issuers with the performance of all the remaining issuers 
( both OTHER and COLD market issuers) in order to increase the size of the group 
with which we compare the HOT markets issuers, we find no significant differences. 
The post announcement of HOT market rights issuers ( red line in figure 6.8 ) is 
almost identical with the post-announcement performance of the rest of the issuers 
(black line with yellow stars in figure 6.8). 
In panel B of table 6.14 we have the industry and market value adjusted buy 
and hold returns across HOT and COLD markets (also available in figure 6.9). 
Again we find no differences in the post announcement return of HOT and COLD 
- 
market issuers. The 2 year average buy and hold return of HOT market issuers is - 
4.55% and the average buy and hold return of COLD market issuers is 
-15.03%. By 
the end of year 3, the HOT market issuers have an average buy and hold return of = 
4.27% and COLD market issuers have an average buy and hold return of 
-8.74%. At 
no point of time are the HOT. market issuers worst performers than COLD market 
issuers. Again however we have to stress the small number of issuers in the COLD 
markets group. However, as with the industry/ market to book value adjusted returns,,, 
we find that HOT market issuers ( red line in figure 6.9) are not worst performers 
relative to all remaining (both OTHER and COLD) issuers (black line with yellow. 
stars in figure 6.9).. 1 
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TABLE 6.15: POST SEO PERFORMANCE ACROSS HEAVY AND LIGHT SEO 
VOLUME PERIODS 
PANEL A 
MATCHED BY INDUSTRY AND MARKET TO 1300K VALUE 
month alter the announcement of the 
issue 
1 24 36 48 60 
Buy and hold Performance of 
HOT Market Issuers 
0.06% 
(523) 
-3.08% 
(512) 
-9.03% 
(475) 
-7.84% 
(466) 
-11.20% 
(397) 
te. s'l slulislic of cli/ference. train zero 0.02 
-0.73 -1.62 -1.19 -1.25 
Buy and hold Performance of 
OTHI R Market Issuers 
3.15% 
(513) -4.79% (506) 
-8.32% 
(452) 
-6.82% 
(388) 
-8.41% 
(356) 
ferencc fiurn zero lest s"luli. clic of dit 1.11 
-1.04 -1.20 -0.77 -0.81 
Buy and hold Performance of 
COLD Market Issuers 
-4.46% 
(86) 
-10.11% 
(85) 
-2.47% 
(79) 
-27.40% 
(73) 
-34.64% 
(73) 
lest 
. 
stulistic o/ cli//erence, fi"orn zero 
-0.76 -1.14 -0.22 -1.82 -2.11 
test stati. s'tic o/ cli f ference o/ HOT 
a >ainst COLD 
0.69 0.72 
-0.52 1.19 1.26 
PANEL B 
MATCHED BY INDUSTRY AND MARKET VALUE 
month alter the announcement of the 
issue 
12 24 36 48 60 
Buy and hold Performance-of 
HOT Market Issuers 
-00.20% 
(522) 
-04.55% 
(506) -04.27% (468) 
-06.47% 
(457) 
-08.95% 
(380) 
lest 
. 
ti'tuli. tilic of difference, from zero 
-0.08 -0.77 -0.81 -1.19 -1.41 
Buy and hold Performance of 
OTHER Market Issuers 
01.39% 
(509) 
-05.23% 
(502) -08.69% (447) 
-13.91% 
(384) 
-11.14% 
(350) 
ie. s/ s/wis/ic ut difference from zero 0.50 -1.15 -1.27 -1.58 -0.99 
Buy and hold Performance of 
COLT) Market Issuers 
-02.98% 
(82) 
-15.03% 
(79) 
-08.74% 
(73) 
-14.59% 
(68) 
-18.58% 
(67) 
test 
. 
statistic o/ difference from zero -0.46 -1.13 -0.58 -1.02 -1.18 
lest sluýi, ýlir of difference of HOT 
a ainst COLD 
0.40 0.72 0.28 0.53 0.57 
lest statistic of difference of HOT 
against all remaining ( both OTHER 
and COLD 
1.05 1.72 0.79 1.34 1.32 
............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... The HOT und (OLD periods are elussifred according to the three-month moving average of the monthh, amount of 
capital raised from Rights Issues in the period January 1975 to December 1996 (264 months) in Dec- 1996 prices. The 
25% o/ all months (66 months) with the highest SEO activity are classified as HOT The 66 months With the lowest STO 
uctivitV are classified as (Y)LD. The remaining 132 months are elussitied as OTHER. In parentheses we have the 
nun her uJ observations 
..................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 
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We reach the same conclusion when we use the FTA adjusted post- 
announcement performances (results not tabulated). The FTA adjusted performances 
have the benefit of an increased size sample because no market to book or market 
value data are required. In figure 6.10, we have plotted these performances and we 
find that the HOT and COLD market issuers have similar performances almost 
thought out the whole 5 year period. By using the Normal (with no adjustments) 
post-announcement buy and hold performances in figure 6.11 we also find no 
differences in the post-announcement buy and hold returns of HOT and COLD 
market Issuers 
. 
Our results indicate that overvaluation exploitation is not a driving force in- 
. 
'" 
the timing of Seasoned equity issues in the UK. Firms that announce a rights issue in i 
periods of heavy activity do not have more overvalued share prices relative to firms 
that announce a rights issue in periods of light activity. Heavy volume periods do not 1" 
offer the advantage to the issuer to issue at higher prices. That result is in line with-, 
our findings earlier in the chapter that investors do not see a rights issue 
announcement as an attempt to exploit overvaluation and do not mark down the price -. 
of an issuer that has a large price run up. That finding is also in line with the 
, 
, 
theoretical framework of rights issues. Rights issues eliminate the potential of-', - 
exploiting overvaluation for the benefits of existing shareholder. Shareholder do not, 
benefit from timing the issue at periods when the share prices are overvalued. the 
, 
,, 
question however that arises and has to be dealt by future research is why do rights 
issuers underperform in the long run. 
6.7. CONCLUSIONS 
Seasoned equity offering activity in the UK varies across time. The most 
established theory about the time series variation in the volume of US SEOs is, that 
managers, in order to minimise their cost of capital, exploit the new shareholders in 
favour of existing ones by timing the issue at period when share prices are above 
their intrinsic values. The time varying pattern of UK SEOs however challenges that 
theory since, in the UK, the rights issue method of issuing new shares, eliminates the 
potential of managers exploiting outside investors for the benefits. of existing 
shareholders. Therefore, we can not say that firms time the rights issue when the 
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shares are overvalued to benefit their existing shareholders against the new ones. In 
line with this argument we find evidence that a rights issue is not considered by 
investors as an attempt to exploit overvaluation. Equity issues by firms which are 
more likely to be overvalued, that is firms with large price run-up in the period prior 
to the announcement, have more positive announcement returns relative to firms 
with small price run-ups which are less likely to be overvalued. Even stronger 
evidence against the overvaluation exploitation in the timing of rights issues comes 
from the post-announcement performance of issuers. Even though we find that the 
issuers underperform, we find no relation between the intensity of SEO volume and 
performance. Rights issues announced in periods of heavy SEO activity are not more 
overvalued than issues announced in periods of light SEO volume. SEO volume in 
the UK is not driven by overvaluation exploitation. 
In contrast with the overvaluation exploitation theory we find evidence in 
favour of the effect that adverse selection costs have on the timing of SEOs. As with 
the SEOs in the US, the announcement of a rights issue causes the share price of the 
issuer to drop by 1.79% on average. The magnitude of the drop has a significant 
impact on the rights issue volume. More firms make a rights issue and more capital is 
raised from rights issues during periods when the average adverse selection costs of 
the previous quarter are smaller. 
This chapter also examined the reasons behind the negative price reaction on 
the announcement of the rights issue. We find evidence against the price pressure and 
debt coinsurance theories since these stories predict larger price drops for larger 
issues and we find an insignificant relation between the size of the issue and the 
magnitude of the price decline. Overvaluation exploitation is also not powerful to 
explain the negative price reaction since firms with larger price run-ups in the period 
prior to the issue which are more likely to be overvalued have less negative 
announcement returns which is against the predictions of the overvaluation theory. 
We find however that the market views a rights issue as a bad signal for future 
earnings. Firms with high growth in their earnings in the years prior to the 
announcement have the larger price drops and firms with high leverage also suffer 
significant negative returns on the announcement of the issue. The market reacts 
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more negatively to rights issues announced by firms with large earnings growth in the 
pre-announcement years and that is consistent with the market taking a view that the 
high earnings growth may not continue in the future. 
In line with the findings of Choe, Masulis and Nanda(1993) we report that 
announcement period returns are higher (less negative) during the upturn of the 
business cycle relative to the downturn of the cycle. The average issuer can achieve 
1.0% higher returns on the announcement of the rights issue if that takes place during 
the expansion which is translated to a save of £2.3m in terms of its market value or 
4.7% of the amount of capital that is raised for the average issuer (prices of 
December 1996). This difference in the adverse selection costs between upturns and 
downturns of the business cycle is not caused by differences if issuers' growth 
opportunities or other firm characteristics. This difference is also not caused by 
more rights issues being announced during an expansion to fund acquisitions or 
future development which have higher announcement returns. Choe, Masulis and 
Nanda(1993) argue that the reason beh: nd that difference is that investors are less 
concerned that managers may be exploiting overvaluation with the new issue during 
the upturn of the cycle when the growth opportunities are better relative to the 
downturn when investment opportunities are few. We do not find that the negative 
price reaction is caused by investors concerns that the issuer is overvalued but that 
the market fears that the profitability of the firm will be hit after the issue. Therefore, 
the differences in the announcement period returns across the upturn and downturn of 
the business cycle should be driven by less concerns about the future profits of the 
issuers. It is not illogical to assume that the earnings are more likely to be hit during 
periods of deteriorating economic conditions and therefore a more negative price 
response should take place during the downturn of the cycle. 
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CHAPTER 7: THE TIMING OF UK TAKEOVER BIDS THAT 
ARE FINANCED WITH EQUITY 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
Initial public offerings and seasoned equity offerings are not the only 
corporate actions that exhibit large variations in the volume of activity across time. 
Takeover activity also has been found to exhibit similar patterns. There are periods 
when the number of firms that engage in takeover bids increases dramatically and 
other periods when the number of bids diminishes, see Sudarsanam (1995), Weston 
(1996) and Golbe &White (1988) among others. 
Not only do we see that the number of takeover bids varies across time but 
also significant variations in the preferred method of payment for the proposed 
takeover bid. In some periods, most bidders prefer to use cash to finance the deal 
while in other periods bidders tend to use equity. Sudarsanam (1995) presents 
evidence that cash offers is the most preferred method of payment in the period 1972 
to 1992 in the UK but there are years such as 1986 and 1987 where the majority of 
the takeovers were financed with equity. Frank, Harris & Mayer (1988), find similar 
variations in the US. From 1970 to 1974 60% of bids were financed with equity 
while in 1980 to 1984 only 23% of bids were financed with equity. 
Numerous factors can affect the choice of the method of payment of the 
takeover bid. Obviously firms with little cash in their availability are less likely to use 
cash to finance the bid while cash rich companies have that option open. Tax 
considerations, leverage ratios and the choice of accounting policies that the bidders 
employ for the acquisition are also factors that may affect the choice of payment. 
Legislation may also affect the method of payment since in the UK and for certain 
types of bids the bidders are not able to use only equity but have to offer a cash 
alternative as well. The mood of the bid also has a significant effect on the method of 
payment with hostile offers usually being financed with cash while friendly bids are 
usually financed with equity. Large institutional shareholdings in the bidder decrease 
the probability of an equity financed takeover bid and bidders that have high growth 
and investment opportunities use more equity to finance the- bid while bidders with 
high levels of tangible assets are inclined to use more debt and cash financing. If the 
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bidders' management want to maintain their control of the firm at the same level they 
will not use equity to finance the bid but cash. Economic conditions and the state of 
the stock market also affect the 
-choice of payment. During bull markets equity is 
more likely to be used while cash is dominant in bearish markets. The method of 
payment for the takeover bid might also be determined according to what method 
minimises the cost of the acquisition. If managers think that using cash will result to 
a lower cost of the takeover then cash will be used to persuade the target firm' s 
shareholders to sell their shares. If equity reduces the cost of the acquisition, then 
managers will propose equity as a mean of payment to the target firm's shareholders 
and it's managers. The choice of the method of payment is a trade off between the 
various factors above. 
The existence of market imperfection such as information asymmetries 
creates an environment where managers could exploit the inside information they 
posses which allows them to estimate the intrinsic value of the firm with greater 
- 
accuracy relative to outside investors. Under the assumption that managers seek to 
maximise the utility of their shareholders, the bidder's shareholders will benefit if the 
method of payment is an overvalued stock. Suppose for example that a bidder can 
acquire a target by offering Elm in cash or, if the current share price of the bidder is 
£1, by offering lm shares. If managers, using the inside information they have, 
estimate that the true value of the share is for example £0.90 then they will be better 
of using equity to finance the deal. In such a case they will offer to the target firm's 
shareholders, shares that are currently worth Elm but their true value is only £0.9m. ' 
How often equity is used as a method of payment at different points of time 
should be determined by how attractive that option is at these points of time. As we 
said earlier, a larger number of factors can affect the choice of payment. The issue 
however is how the factors that affect the method of payment can explain the time 
series variation in the equity financed takeover bids. Tax considerations indicate that 
in some acquisitions, the target firms' shareholders may be better off by receiving 
shares rather than cash. By receiving shares they defer the payment of capital gains 
tax which is paid immediately when they receive cash. There are investors however, 
such as pension funds, charity trusts, as well as individual investors for up to a 
maximum amount, that do no pay any capital gain tax. So, whether cash or equity 
182 
.. 
ý: ', 
will be more beneficiary for target firms shareholders than cash and therefore more 
likely to be accepted depends on the shareholder "profile" of each target. We see no 
reason that the tax consideration may exhibit such large time series variation that can 
account for the variability in equity financing over time. i 
Cash availability and leverage rations should also play an important role in 
the method of payment. Firms with deficient amounts of cash and high leverage 
ratios which are in difficulties in borrowing money from banks are more likely to 
resort to equity financing for the takeover bids. The amount of cash available and the 
debt to equity ratios are not stable across time. Even though firms have in mind a 
long term target leverage ratio, variations can occur over time. Periods when 
economy is booming are periods when firms are more likely to generate cash from 
their operations and also periods when banks are more willing to lend money. On the 
other hand, during periods of gloomy economic conditions, cash availability is 
minimised and bank lines of credit more difficult to get. If cash availability and 
leverage ratios affect the method of payment then more cash financed bids should be 
observed during periods of improving economic conditions. Sudarsanam (1995) 
reproduces evidence from the UK central statistical office that in years 1985 to 1987, 
when the UK economy experienced an economic boom, the equity financed bids is 
more that 52% of all bids and cash bids are less than 35% of all bids creating doubts 
whether cash availability and leverage rations can explain the time series variation in 
the volume of equity financed bids. 
Firms that have high intangible assets are more likely to use equity to finance 
the bid. Those firms are firms whose value is based on the future investment 
opportunities. This firms with high Q ratios and market to book values are regarded 
as growth and glamorous stocks. It is usually the case that these stocks have 
experienced an increase in their share prices in the recent past. Firms are more likely 
to have good future prospects when the economy is booming. During the expansion 
phase of the business cycle, share prices are rising, market to book values are rising 
and investors are prepared to pay high multiples. Therefore, firms are more likely to 
use equity during periods when economic conditions are improving. 
The mood of the bid has a significant effect on the choice of payment. Hostile 
offers are financed predominantly with cash 'and friendly. bids are financed with 
>>, equity. If there are periods when most bids are friendly then those periods should be 
183 
periods when more equity financing should occur. Large institutional shareholdings 
and managers' will to maintain control increase the likelihood of cash offers but we 
can not see how these two factors can explain the significant variation in equity 
financed takeover activity across time. 
One more factor that might affect the choice of payment is the management' 
incentives to minimise the cost of the acquisition. If there are periods when the use of 
equity results to a lower cost of the acquisition then equity might be more intensively 
used in these periods. Managers that look at ways of minimising the cost of the 
acquisition are tempted to use equity to fund the acquisition when the equity is 
overvalued. Loughran & Ritter (1995) argue that significant time series variation in 
investors' sentiment cause a variation in the degree of overvaluation. Periods when 
investors' sentiment is high are periods when shares are overvalued and more firms 
resort to equity issues to exploit that overvaluation. If the magnitude of overvaluation 
varies across time, and the motive behind equity takeover bids is to exploit 
overvaluation, then we should see that more firms will finance a bid with equity in 
periods when their shares are more overvalued. 
Even though managers, in theory, could be exploiting overvaluation when 
they use equity to finance a takeover bid, that does not necessarily mean that they do 
so. To argue that managers use equity to finance a bid only when the current share 
price is higher than its intrinsic value, would require evidence of a significant 
underperformance of the bidders after the bid. Investors are aware of managers' 
incentives to use equity as a method of payment to finance the bid if equity is 
overvalued. If bidders that use equity to finance the bid exploit overvaluation, the 
announcement of an equity financed bid could send signals to the market that the 
firm is currently overvalued. Therefore, a correction in firms' valuation by the market 
should occur. Bidders that exploit overvaluation should underperform after the bid 
as investors realise that the price of the bidder on the announcement of the takeover 
proposal was 
. 
higher than its fundamental value and mark down the price of the 
bidder. 
Previous research has documented that bidders perform badly after the bid. 
Aggarwal, Jaffe and Mandelker (1992) report a5 year Cumulative abnormal return 
adjusted for firm size and beta risk of 
-7.38%. Frank & Harris (1989) find that after 
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controlling for size, bidders perform badly in the 2 year after the takeover. The 
smaller bidders underperform by 20.8% and the larger bidders by 11.7%. ( for a more 
comprehensive review of post-bid performance of bidders see section 2.4.3). 
Significant variations in the post-takeover performance exist according to the method 
of payment. Frank, Harris and Mayer (1988) report that bidders that financed the bid 
with equity have significant negative abnormal returns for up to 2 years after the 
issue. Frank, Harris and Titman (1991) also find that the equity financed bids have 
negative monthly returns in the 36 months after the takeover but different 
benchmarks produced different results with some producing significant negative 
performances and other insignificant ones. The difference in the monthly returns 
between all cash and all equity bids ranged from 0.44% to 0.72% per month and the 
test statistics were from 1.37 to 2.57 varying according to the methodology used. 
The difference in the post-announcement performance between equity and 
cash financed takeover bids is very interesting. We are unaware of any studies that 
establish a link between the choice of method of payment and the profit potential of 
the takeover bid. In other words, there is no evidence that equity is used to finance 
takeover bids that are seen by managers as less profitable a priori than takeover bids 
that are financed with cash. If that was the case then we could have argued that the 
poor performance of equity bidders can be attributed to the low quality of the 
proposed bid. There are also no evidence suggesting that equity financed bids are less 
successful than cash financed bids. In fact, Travlos (1987) finds that 32 % of cash 
financed bids are unsuccessful and only 16% of equity financed bids are 
unsuccessful. - 
If firms that make a takeover bid financed with equity underperform and 
those that use cash do not underperform, we could argue that the reason behind the 
underperformance is that the method of payment reveals to investors the true value of 
the bidder. The market might perceive bidders that use equity to finance the bid as 
overvalued and they mark down their share prices ' while bidders that use cash are 
considered to be undervalued and therefore investors increase their valuations of 
those companies. 
.,, 
The poor long run performance of bidders that use equity to finance the bid 
alone however does not automatically indicate that overvaluation exploitation is the 
driving force behind the variability inequity financed takeover volume. Firms might 
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use equity to finance a bid when they are overvalued but that does not explain why 
more firms use equity in certain periods of time. These high volume periods should 
have something special, they must offer higher degree of overvaluation than periods 
when volume is low. If volume of equity financed takeover bids is driven by 
overvaluation exploitation we should see that periods of heavy equity financed bids 
activity should be periods when bidders are more overvalued relative to periods of 
"Light" equity financed bids activity. If during periods of heavy volume bidders are 
more overvalued then those bidders must have worst port-announcement 
performances relative to bidders that make the announcement during low volume 
periods and therefore are less overvalued. To safely argue that the volume of equity 
financed takeovers is driven by overvaluation exploitation we should find significant 
differences in the post-bid performances of bidders that make the bids in heavy and 
light volume periods. 
This chapter investigates whether the time series variation in the takeover 
bids that are financed with equity is driven by overvaluation exploitation. The main 
question we try to answer is whether periods when the percentage of bids that are 
financed with equity is high are periods when bidders are more overvalued than in 
periods when fewer firms use equity as the method of payment. 
Several studies have found that on the announcement of a takeover bid a mark 
down on the share price of the bidder occurs. Servaes (1991) reports a significant at 
5% drop of 1.07%. Firth (1980) finds that bidders in the UK in the period from 1969 
to 1975 have significant negative return on the month of the announcement of the 
bid. Successful bidders experience a drop of 6.0% and unsuccessful bidders have a 
slightly larger drop by 6.3%. The method of payment however has a significant effect 
on the magnitude of the announcement period returns. Servaes (1991) finds that the 
average cumulative return between the announcement day and the delisting or the 
effective day for 142 takeover bids financed with equity is -5.86% while for 172 
bids that were financed with cash the returns were +3.44%. In 66 bids where a 
mixture of cash and equity was used the average cumulative abnormal return was - 
3.74%. Eckbo and Langhor (1989) find that takeover bids in France that are financed 
only with cash have a positive impact on the price of the bidder while bids financed 
with equity have a negative impact 
. 
Travlos, (1987) finds that in the announcement 
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period returns for cash offers is 0.24 % not significant from zero (Z= 1.11) and for 
equity offers the return is 
-1.47% which is highly significantly different from zero (Z 
=-5.07). Travlos (1987) also finds that the two day cumulative abnormal returns were 
higher when the proportion of the transaction funded through the offer of shares is 
high. Amihud, Lev and Travlos (1991) report a drop of 1.19% for equity offers and 
an increase of 0.44% for cash offers. and Brown & Ryngaert (1991) also find 
negative and significant returns of 
-2.48% for equity offers and insignificant returns 
for cash offers of 
-0.06%. Harris & Titman (1991) document that cash bids have a 
positive but insignificant effect on the price of the bidder while equity bids reduce 
significantly the price of the bidder by 3.15%. 
A number of explanations have been proposed to explain that difference in 
the announcement period returns of equity and cash offers. One theory argue that if 
the bidder intends to finance the equity offer with a new issue of shares that will 
result to a transfer of wealth between the debtholders and the shareholders. 
Debtholders will gain from the reduced bankruptcy risk that results from the 
reduction of the leverage that results from the new equity issue. What debtholders 
gain represents a loss to the shareholders, hence the drop on the announcement of the 
bid. The drop for the bidder however should be larger if the size of the target relative 
to the size of the bidder is large. Targets which are large relative to the bidder require 
a larger issue of new shares and therefore the transfer of wealth from shareholders to 
bondholder is greater in cases when the target is a larger company. If the difference in 
the announcement period returns between cash and equity bids can be explained by 
the transfer of wealth from shareholders to debtholders then a larger drop should be 
expected in larger acquisitions. Servaes (1991)however finds that the size of the 
target over the size of the bidder is positively related to the announcement period 
returns. Travlos (1987) finds a negative relation between the relative size of the 
target of the bidder but 
. 
the relation is not statistically. significant. Furthermore, 
Travlos (1987) 
- 
finds that the announcement of an equity- financed takeover bid 
reduces the value of the corporate bonds of the bidders 
-while cash financed bids 
increase the value of the corporate bonds of the bidder. If the equity, financed bids 
enhances debtholders value due to the transfer of wealth from'shareholders then 
bonds values should increase and not decrease as Travlos (1987) finds. 
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Another theory argues that the drop on the share price of the bidder on the 
announcement of the equity financed bid is caused by the increase in the supply of 
shares. The new issue of shares will increase the supply and since the demand for the 
firm's shares stays the same, according to the supply and demand law, the prise 
should fall. This price pressure theory as it is called however predicts that the 
acquisition of larger targets that increase the supply of shares by larger percentages 
should be accompanied by more negative price reaction for the bidder. As we saw 
earlier however, the evidence do not suggest that a strong negative relation between 
the size of the acquisition and the market reaction exists. 
The most publicised reason for the drop on the announcement of bids that are 
financed with equity relies on the existence of information 
-asymmetries between 
managers and investors. As we saw earlier, investors and target firms' shareholders 
are aware of managers' incentives to use equity when the shares are overvalued and 
so they perceive an equity financed bid as an attempt to exploit information 
asymmetry and overvaluation. Hence, they mark down the share price of the bidder to 
correct for the overvaluation. That drop reduces the market value of the bidder and 
represent an indirect cost to the acquisition for the bidder, and adverse selection cost. 
While in the SEO literature there are studies that link the decision to issue 
equity with the magnitude of adverse selection costs, in the takeover literature that 
issue has not been researched. In chapter 6 we found a significant relation between 
the rights issue volume, both in terms of number of firms per month and the amount 
of capital raised per month, and the average announcement period abnormal returns 
of the previous quarter. Periods when the adverse selection costs are low are periods 
when SEO volume is high. If adverse selection costs are of paramount importance for 
the timing of equity financed takeover bids, we should see more firms using equity 
as a method of payment in periods when adverse selection costs are lower. This 
chapter investigates the relationship between the magnitude of adverse selection costs 
associated with takeover bids that are financed with equity and the volume of equity 
financed bids. 
- 
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Evidence from the SEO literature suggest that adverse selection costs 
associated with the announcement of a SEO are lower when the economy is during 
the phase of an economic expansion. That happens because during periods of 
improving economic conditions firms are more likely to have good growth 
opportunities and the announcement of a SEO creates less concerns that managers 
could be exploiting overvaluation. In chapter 6 we report that the announcement of a 
rights issue is accompanied by less negative returns when that takes place during the 
upturn of the business cycle. If periods of improving economic conditions help 
reduce investors' concerns that managers may exploit overvaluation in the timing of 
equity financed bid then we should find significant lower adverse selection costs for 
bidders that announce the bid during the upturn of the business cycle relative to 
bidders that announce the bid during the downturn of the cycle. The effect of the 
business conditions on the announcement period return of takeover bids that are 
financed with equity is an issue that we also investigate in this chapter. 
This chapter extends the takeover literature by documenting the 
announcement period returns of equity financed takeover bids across different phases 
of the business cycle and the relation between adverse selection costs and the volume 
of equity financed bids. The final contributions of this chapter is to use industry/ 
market to book value and industry/market value adjusted returns to look at the post 
announcement performance of takeover bidders partitioned by the method of 
payment and according to the intensity of equity financed bids volume to see if the 
volume of equity financed takeover bids is driven by overvaluation exploitation. 
The main findings of this chapter can be summarised as follows: 
1. The volume of equity financed takeover bids in the UK varies across time. 
2. Firms are more likely to use equity to finance takeover bids during the upturn 
relative to the downturn of the business cycle., ;. 
3. The announcement of a takeover bid causes the share price of the bidder to drop 
by an average of 1.07%. The equity financed takeover-bids have, significantly 
more negative price reaction than the cash financed takeover bids. 
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4. Adverse selection costs associated with the announcement of an equity financed 
takeover bid are lower during periods of improving economic conditions but have 
no impact on the equity financed takeover activity. The percentage of bids that are 
financed with equity does not increase when adverse selection costs are lower. 
5. Bidders have a3 year buy and hold underperformance of 7% relative to firms in 
the same industry and similar market to book value or similar market value. 
6. Firms that use equity to finance a takeover bid have significantly worst 
performances relative to firms in the same industry and similar market to book or 
market values. The 3 year buy and hold underperformance of equity bidders is 
15% to 18%. They also have worst performances than bidders that use cash to 
finance the bid which indeed outperform the benchmarks used. 
7. There is no relation between the volume of equity financed takeover bids and the 
bidders post-announcement performance. We find no differences in the post 
announcement performance of bidders that use equity to finance the bid in heavy 
volume periods relative to the post announcement performance of bidders that use 
equity in low volume periods. Heavy volume periods are not periods when bidders 
that use equity are more overvalued than all other periods. 
The remaining of the chapter follows like this. In the next section we present 
our evidence on the takeover activity in the UK followed by an analysis of the effect 
of the business conditions on takeover activity and on the adverse selection costs 
associated with the announcement of an equity financed takeover bid. In the last part 
we present our evidence on the post-bid performance partitioned by the method of 
payment and the relation between takeover volume and post-announcement 
performance. 
I 
7.2. TAKEOVER ACTIVITY IN THE UK ACROSS TIME 
The prevailing belief in the mergers and takeover literature is that mergers 
and takeovers come in waves. From our investigation of the takeover activity in the 
UK we provide evidence supporting that wave pattern. In table 7.1 we present the 
number of takeover bids per year 12. Takeover activity exhibits a high volume in 
years 1986 and 1987 with 241 and 216 bids made in these years respectively. 
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Takeover activity remains quite high at a level of more than 100 bids every year up 
until 1991. From 1992 to 1995 takeover bids decrease in numbers to below 100 per 
year with a sample low of 68 bids made in 1992 and 1993. In total, throughout the 11 
year period of our sample, 1534 firms announced a takeover bid. 
Through the 11 year sample period, 1986 was the year with the highest 
number of takeover bids that were financed with equity, 105 (third column of table 
7.1). Activity of equity financed bids remained high at 1987 with 93 bids while in the 
early 90's equity financed bids are few. In 1994 only 17 bids that were financed with 
equity were announced. In the last column of table 7.1 we present the percentage of 
equity financed bids over all takeover bids in our sample per year. The equity 
financed bids were very popular in 1985 to 1987 when on average around 40% of all 
the bids were financed with equity. The same percentages are plotted in figure 7.2 
(solid vertical bars). In 1990 only 16% of all bids were financed with equity which is 
the lowest in our 11 year sample period. On average, throughout the 1985 to 1995 
period, a third of all takeover bids were financed with equity ( 32.3% using monthly 
data) which is close to the 36% that is reported by Sudarsanam (1995). 
From the sample of 1534 takeover bids, we have excluded those bids for 
which the DATASTREAM mnemonic for the bidder or share prices were not 
available. That excludes 560 bids. From the remaining 974 bids, the method of 
payment was not identified for 63 firms leaving a size of 911 bids. For 11 bids the 
announcement day was not identified and for 57 bidders the abnormal announcement 
period returns could not be calculated due to the lack of data in DATASTREAM or 
because they coincided with the announcement of a rights issue and therefore were 
dropped from the sample. That leaves us with a total sample of 843 takeover bids. 
12 details of the data collection and the source of the sample can be found in section 4.1 
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TABLE 7.1: ANNUAL VOLUME OF TAKEOVER 
ACTIVITY IN THE UK FROM 1985 TO 1995 
YEAR NUMBER OF NUMBER OF PERCENTAGE OF 
ALL TAKEOVER BIDS BIDS FINANCED WITH 
TAKEOVER FINANCED WITH EQUITY OVER ALL 
BIDS EQUITY IN WHOLE OR TAKEOVER BIDS 
IN PART 
1985 139 55 40% 
1986 241 105 44% 
1987 216 93 43% 
1988 187 56 30% 
1989 186 41 22% 
1990 140 23 16% 
1991 115 28 24% 
1992 68 18 26% 
1993 68 22 32% 
1994 72 17 24% 
1995 102 24 23% 
Table 7.2 presents the distribution of the sample of the 843 bids according to 
the method of payment. 105 bids were financed solely with cash, 180 bids were 
financed solely with equity and 83 bids were financed with other instruments mainly 
convertibles. There is however a large number of bids that finance the bid with a 
mixture of cash, debt, and equity in various proportions. So for example, 89 bids 
were financed with cash or loans and for 214 bids the target shareholders were given 
the option to choose between cash or equity. 13 In 64 bids the offer included both 
equity and cash and in 24 the target shareholders were given the option to choose 
equity or equity and cash. In total, 482 bids have used in whole or in part equity to 
finance the bid and this is the sample that we use as the takeover bids that are 
financed with equity. 
" In certain types of bids such as when the bidder acquires shares carrying more than the 30% of the 
voting rights of a company a cash offer or a cash alternative must be offered. 
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Table 7.2 also reports the average and median announcement period abnormal 
returns for all takeover bids in our sample and also partitioned with the method of 
payment. The announcement period is days 
-1 to 0 with day 0 being the day of the 
announcement of the bid. The average announcement period abnormal returns for all 
takeover bids in our sample is 
-1.07% significantly different from zero with a test 
statistic of 
-5.42.65% of all bids were accompanied with negative abnormal returns 
for the bidders and only 35% of the announcements caused positive abnormal 
announcement period returns for the bidder. The median announcement period return 
is 
-0.91% also significantly different from zero. 
We find big differences in the announcement period abnormal returns 
according to the method of the payment. The bids that are financed with cash only or 
with cash or loans are the only group of that are characterised by positive returns on 
the announcement of the bid with 0.55% and 0.23% returns respectively but without 
being significantly different from zero. The bids that are financed with convertibles 
have significant negative average return of 
-1.43%. The bids that are financed only 
with equity have an average return of 
-0.73% which is marginally significantly from 
zero at 10% one tail tests 
. 
Bids where the target firms' shareholders are offered a 
choice between cash or equity have significant negative returns of 
-1.88%. In general, 
the offers that have some form of equity in the financing package of the bid, have an 
average announcement period return of 
-1.54% ( median -1.36%) with a test statistic 
of 
-6.76 indicating that it is highly significantly different from zero. Not only were 
the equity bid announcement period returns significantly different from zero but they 
were also significantly different from the offers that had some form of cash in the 
financing package of the deal with a test statistic of 
-4.65. 
Our results for the cash offers are in line with the literature findings. Travlos 
(1987), Amihud, Lev &Travlos (1991), Frank Harris & Titman (1991) find that cash 
offers, have positive but insignificant announcement period returns. 
The literature findings however for the only equity offers- are different from 
our findings and indicate a significant negative return. Travlos (1987) finds that for 
only equity offers the return is 
-1.47% with a test statistic of -5.1. Amihud, Lev and 
Travlos (1991) and Brown & Ryngaert (1991), Frank Harris & Titman(1991) also 
find significant negative returns for equity offers. We' find that the bids that used a 
mixture of equity and other options have significant negative returns. 
193 
TABLE 7.2: ANNOUNCEMENT PERIOD ABNORMAL RETURNS OF 
TAKEOVER BIDS PARTITIONED WITH THE METHOD OF PAYMENT 
average '. ' t statistics for number of median t statistics for t statistics of 
announcement difference of observations announcement difference of difference of 
period return average dad return medians from ^ some form of 
returns from zero Equity bids 
zer 
o I last a rows) from 
some form of cash 
Bids ( second, third 
and fourth roN 
I. I. RIDS 
-1.07°%ö -5.42 842 (2) -0.91°0 -4.61 
ONLY CAST I OFFERS 0.55% 1.29 105 0.06% 0.14 
'ASH OR LOAN 0.23% 0.74 89 0.017% 0.03 
° 
Ai, i, CASs tja 
-2.14% -3.67 36 -1.64% -2.82 
EQ111'IY I'I IJti (ASlI 
'ONVLRHill Is 
-1.43°rä -2.49 81 -1.37% -2.3, N -2.5, ý 
ONLY 1Q11 FY -0.731% -1.49 
? 
'l; 180 
-0.737°° 1.38 
Ull)S 
I: (1l I lY OR cnsll -1.88% -6.48 214 -1.51% -3.67 -3.58 
OPTION) 
I: QtJI lY AND CASH; t -2.80% -4.81 64 -2.46% -4.23 -4.44 
AI. I. I: QIJITY(OR -1.31% -0.88 24 -0.87°° -0.59 -1.02 
1: 011 1Y ANI) CAST I) 
I11051: "rIIAI IIA VI: 
-I. 54°rö -6.76 482 -I. 367°o -S. 94 -4.65 
1: Q1111 Y IN SOME 
FORM (LAST 4 
ROWS) 
!. the abnormal announcement period returns are calculated according to the market model t wciwti 4.2 jor mere details 
The announcement period is the days -1 to (I when day U is the day of the announcement of the bid. Me returns of day +l 
were not significantly different from zero 
2. The total number of 
bids 
of 842 is not excluded in the categories below. There were 47 more bids that used various forms of 
payments such as debt, debt and equity, debt and cash. for which we do not present their announcement period return. 
3. In the cash or equity case, each shareholder of the target may elect to receive all cash or all equity. the bidder will provide 
fnr its own resources or through an underwriter. In the latter case, the target shareholders tender their shores to the the cash 
bidder which issues new shares to the underwriter; the underwriter then remits the amount prescribed by the cash alternative to 
the tendering stockholders 
........................... 
................. ........................................................................................................................................................................................................... ................ 
.....: 
As we saw earlier, a number of theories has been developed to explain the 
difference in the announcement period returns across equity and cash financed bids. 
The price pressure, debt co-insurance and information asymmetry theories compete 
to explain that interesting price pattern. Later on in this chapter we are able to test the 
various stories using our sample and see which one can provide a strong explanation. 
First we look at how the takeover activity behaves across the business cycle. 
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7.3 TAKEOVER ACTIVITY ACROSS THE BUSINESS CYCLE. 
In chapters 5 and 6 we found that the state of the economy has a significant 
effect on the volume of Initial Public Offerings and a weak effect on the Rights 
issuance activity. More firms make an IPO and a rights issue and more capital is 
raised from IPOs during the upturn from the business cycle. The business cycle may 
be a major driving force of takeover bids volume. 
During the upturn of the business cycle firms face more and better investment 
opportunities. This is the period when firms expand their businesses and their sales 
are more likely to grow. The acquisition of another company provides a quicker and 
easier way for a firm to expand and to take advantage of the new investment 
opportunities rather than expanding internally which requires a lot more planning and 
time to materialise into revenues and profits. 
During the expansion phase of the cycle it is usually the case that share prices 
are rising faster than the downturn of the cycle. Therefore, the attractiveness of equity 
as a method of payment in the upturn should increase relative to the downturn. It is 
expected in some sense to see more equity financed bids during the upturn of the 
cycle. Sudarsanam (1995) reports that the choice of payment is sensitive to the stock 
market conditions. More firms use equity during rising markets. 
In order to test if the level of the economy has an effect on the takeover 
activity, we investigate the number of takeover bids across the upturn and the 
downturn of the business cycle. Table 7.3 reports the results. 
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TABLE 7.3: TAKEOVER ACTIVITY ACROSS THE UPTURN AND DOWNTURN 
OF THE BUSINESS CYCLE 
UPTURN` DOWNTURN t statistic of the 
of the Business of the Business difference 
Cycle Cycle between upturn 
and downturn 
Average number of takeover bids 11.26 10.18 1.02 
er month 
Median number of takeover bids 10 9 0.94 
er month 
Average number of takeover bids 4.61 2.75 3.25 
financed with equity per month 
Median number of takeover bids 3 2 1.75 
financed with e uit per month 
Average Percentage of Takeover 37.2% 27.7% 4.71 
bids financed with equity per month 
Median Percentage of Takeover 37.4% 25.0% 6.12 
bids financed with equity er month 
................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. _..... 3 1. The upturn and downturn of the business c., ycle is determined according to the coincident indicator 
....... _........... ....................... 
_......... _. _.. _.............. 
, 
We find that during the upturn of the business cycle we have 11.26 takeover 
bids per month and we have 10.18 bids per month in the downturn of the cycle. The 
difference between the upturn and downturn is not significant with a test statistic of 
1.02. When we look at the takeover bids financed with equity at least in part we find 
that 4.61 firms per month on average make a takeover bid financed with equity 
during the upturn of the business cycle (median 3) while in a recession only 2.75 
firms do so (median 2). The difference is significant at 1% level of statistical 
significance with a test statistic of 3.25. The difference in the medians is also 
significant with a test statistic of 1.75. 
In terms of the percentage of bids that are financed with equity over all 
takeover bids, we find that during the upturn of the cycle 37.2% of all takeover bids 
per month are financed with equity while in the downturn of the cycle, the percentage 
of bids that use equity over all takeover offers per month drops to 27.7%, a difference 
of 10% from the upturn which is highly significant with a test statistic of 4.71. The 
evidence presented here support the argument that, if no control variables are taken 
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into account, equity financed takeover activity is significantly higher during the 
upturn of the cycle. 
When we look across the whole duration of the business cycle (vertical bars 
in figure 7.3) we see that the in the first part of the upturn 35.65% of all bids are 
financed with equity, in the middle part of the expansion the percentage increases to 
44.21% and just before the peak 32.46% of bidders include equity in the payment 
package in the takeover proposals. As the economy enters the recession, the 
percentage drops to 26.18% and drops even further to 23.77% in the middle of the 
recession. Just before the end of the downturn, equity bids increase relative to all bids 
to 33.08%. 
These results shows that the whole takeover activity is not significantly higher 
during the upturn of the business cycle but that the takeover activity that is financed 
with equity exhibits a significantly higher intensity during the upturn of the business 
cycle. Approximately 10% more firms use equity to finance the bid in the upturn 
relative to the downturn of the business cycle. 
Such a result is not extraordinary. As we said earlier the rising stock markets 
during the upturn and the resulting lower cost of the equity financed acquisition 
could account for such an increase. The SEO literature however provides an 
alternative explanation for the increase in SEO activity during the upturn of the cycle. 
Choe, Masulis and Nanda (1993) argue that for the SEOs, the increase in equity 
financing during the upturn of the cycle is caused from the fact that these periods are 
characterised by lower adverse selection costs. In chapter 6 we found that the number 
of rights issues in the UK is slightly higher during the upturn of the cycle and that the 
adverse selection costs associated with the rights 
_ 
issue are lower during the 
expansion phase of the cycle. No research has been done to see whether the increased 
equity financed takeover activity during the upturn of the cycle is caused by less 
negative price reactions on the announcement of the equity financed bids during the 
upturn. In the next part we seek to find if that story can be applied to takeoyers. 
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The null and alternative hypothesis we test is the following. 
............................................................................................................................................ .., The announcement period abnormal returns of a takeover bid that is 
ed, in whole or in part, with equity and is made during the upturn of'the 
mess cycle are the same as with the announcement period abnormal returns 
of'a takeover hid that is financed, in whole or in part, with equity that is made 
the downturn of the business cycle 
The announcement period abnormal returns of 'a takeover hid that is 
ced, in whole or in part, with equity and is made during the upturn of the 
ss cycle are significantly higher than the announcement period abnormal 
ns of a takeover hid that is financed, in whole or in part, with equity that is 
during the downturn o/'lhe business cycle 
..................................................................................................................... ............................... We seek to reject the null hypothesis in favour of the alternative. 'IIo do so, we 
compare the average and median announcement period abnormal returns of bids that 
are financed with equity across the upturn and downturn of the business cycle. If 
average and median returns are significantly higher during the upturn of the cycle we 
will reject the null hypothesis in favour of the alternative. 
7.4 ANNOUNCEMENT DAY RETURNS OF TAKEOVER BIDS ACROSS THE BUSINESS 
CYCLE. 
In table 7.4 we present the announcement period abnormal returns across 
upturns and downturns of the business cycle. We find that a takeover bid that is 
financed with equity is accompanied by higher returns when the announcement is 
made during the upturn of the business cycle. The average announcement return is 
- 
1.121 % during the upturn of the cycle and 
-2.229% during the downturn of the cycle. 
The difference is significant with a test statistic of 2.55. Median returns were also 
higher in the upturn, 
-1.109%, relative to the downturn, -1.629%, a difference with a 
test statistic of 1.74. During the upturn of the cycle 67% of equity financed bids are 
accompanied by negative returns while in the downturn of the cycle the percentage of 
equity bids with negative announcement returns is 75%. 
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In figure 7.3 we have plotted the announcement period return of equity 
financed bids across the duration of the business cycle (solid blue line ). In the first 
part of the upturn the average return is 
-1.16% and becomes -1.36% in the middle of 
the expansion. The least negative returns are in the last phase of the upturn where the 
equity financed bid is accompanied on average by a drop of 
-0.71 %. In the first part 
of the downturn the average market reaction to a takeover bid is 
-2.31% and 
becomes 
-1.85% in the middle of the recession. At the end of the recession, the 
average announcement period abnormal return is 
-2.70% which is the most negative 
point across the cycle. 
Summarising, we find that firms that announce a takeover bid that is financed 
with equity face less negative returns when the announcement is made during the 
upturn of the business cycle relative to the downturn of the business cycle. This 
difference of 1.1% translates to a save in the market value of the bidder by £ 5.2 m. 14 
if the announcement takes place in the upturn of the cycle. 
TABLE 7.4: ANNOUNCEMENT PERIOD ABNORMAL RETURNS OF 
EQUITY FINANCED TAKEOVER BIDS ACROSS THE UPTURN AND 
DOWNTURN OF THE BUSINESS CYCLE 
PERIOD OF THE CYCLE UPTURN DOWNTURN 
Average Announcement period abnormal 
-1.121% -2.229% 
returns of equity financed takeover bids 
Median Announcement period abnormal 
-1.109% -1.629% 
returns of equity financed takeover bids 
Number of observations 297 185 
Percentage of positive abnormal 33.1% 24.6% 
announcement returns 
Percentage of negative abnormal 66.9% 75.4% 
announcement returns 
Test statistic of difference from zero 
-3.45 -7.08 
Test statistic of difference of averages 2.55 
. between upturn and downturn 
Test statistic of difference of medians upturn 1.74 
and downturn, 
, , 
........... ... ............. ...................... .................. ............. ........ ....... ................. i 1. The upturn an.............................. downturn of the business cycle is determined according to the coincident indicator :............... 
....................... .................................... 
14 the average market value of bidder in real terms in December 1996 prices is £470 m 
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The difference however in the announcement returns between upturns and 
downturns we document here may be caused by differences in the bidders or the 
targets characteristics across the upturn and the downturn of the business cycle. The 
market reaction to the announcement of a takeover bid has been found to be affected 
by a large number of factors such as the growth potentials of targets and bidders. The 
market reaction should be less negative if the benefits for the bidder that arise from 
the proposal are higher. A large number of synergistic gains can arise from the 
takeover. The gains that result from a takeover may be higher during the phase of an 
expansion and so the least negative price reaction during the upturn may indicate the 
higher profitability of the takeover and not necessarily that during the upturn an 
equity financed bid is less likely to be driven by overvaluation exploitation. 
In order to be sure that the lower adverse selection costs that we find during 
the upturn of the cycle for bids that are financed with equity are not driven by 
differences in targets' or bidders' characteristics, we regress the announcement day 
abnormal returns with a number of bidders and targets' characteristics as well as 
business cycle variables. It is well documented in the literature that the market 
reaction to the announcement of a takeover bid and the impact on the bidders' share 
price is determined by how the market views the potential benefits that could arise 
from the takeover. Most noticeable, if the growth opportunities of the target are 
high, the expected profits from the takeover for the bidder will be high. Bidders with 
high market to book values and high q ratios are considered to be glamorous stocks. 
These stocks have usually experienced increasing share prices in the recent past. 
Investors may overpay for firms with high market to book value. If firms with high 
market to book values are overvalued then these firm may have the incentive to use 
equity to finance the bid. If bidders use equity when they are overvalued then the 
market to book value and other measures of growth opportunities must be negatively 
related with the announcement period returns. Firms with high pre-announcement 
increases are more likely to be overvalued relative to firms with small pre- 
announcement price run up. If firms that make equity financed bids are overvalued 
then bidders with high price run ups in the pre-bid period must have more adverse 
price reactions. 
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Apart from the growth opportunities, the size of the bidder and the target has 
implications for the potential benefits for the bidder. On the cases where the bidder is 
a large company the acquisition of a small company is expected to make a smaller 
impact than in the cases where the bidder is a medium or a small capitalisation firm. 
The size of the target also has significant effects on the wealth gains for the bidder. 
The acquisition of larger companies is more problematic than the acquisition of 
young and usually high growth companies. Large companies have larger management 
teams and the co-operation after the bid between the two firms is more difficult than 
the cases when the target is a small firm with less personnel. The announcement day 
returns for the bidder are also affected by the outcome of the bid. Even though the 
exact outcome is not known at the time of the bid, the market has an idea of what are 
the possibilities of the success of the bid. Successful bids indicate good planning and 
effective management team and are expected to have higher returns relative to 
unsuccessful bids. Other factors may well affect the market reaction on the 
announcement of the bid such as if the management is hostile or not to the bid, 
whether the bidder has a toehold in the target or if the bidder and the target are in the 
same industry or not. We were unable however to find data on these issues which 
create limitations in our study. 
In table 7.5 we present the results of the regressions of the announcement day 
abnormal returns of bids that used equity to finance the bid against various 
characteristics of the bidder and the target and two dummy variables for the business 
cycle. The type of the regressions is weighted least squares where the weights are the 
inverse of the market model residuals estimated in the period 
-260 to -40 before the 
announcement of the bid. 15 The purpose of these regressions is not to find what 
factors affect the market reaction on the announcement of the takeover but to 
specifically testwhether announcement day returns for equity financed takeover bids 
are higher during the upturn of the business cycle after allowing for the effect of as 
many bidders' and targets' characteristics. 
15 We checked that no firm has extraordinarily large weight in the regressions. No firm has a weight 
higher than 3.65% 
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In regressions 1 to 4 we use only bidders and target characteristics as 
independent variables with no proxies for the business cycle. We find that the 
higher the growth opportunities of the bidder, the more negative the market reaction 
on the announcement of the bid is. We used the market to book value, the PE ratio 
and the EPS as proxies for growth opportunities and the profitability of the bidder. 
All had negative and significant coefficients. Firms that have high Market to book 
values and PE ratios are regarded as glamorous stocks and have usually experienced 
recent increases in their prices. The negative coefficient is consistent with the 
argument that the use of equity by these overvalued glamorous stocks is an attempt to 
exploit overvaluation. We also find negative coefficients for the 3 month cumulative 
bidder abnormal return indicating that bidders with high price run up to the 
announcement of the bid have more negative returns on the announcement of the bid. 
Again that indicates that bidders with more overvalued shares have more adverse 
price reactions which indicates market fears that the choice of equity is driven by 
overvaluation exploitation. 
We also find that the growth opportunities of the target 
, 
the market to book 
value, have a significant effect on the wealth gains for the bidders. Targets with high 
growth potential positively affect the returns for the bidder. To the contrary however, 
larger targets negatively affect the wealth gains for the bidder indicating that the 
takeover bids for large companies do not increase bidders' shareholders wealth. We 
do not find however that the size of the bidder affects the returns. 
In regressions 5 to 7 we use add the first dummy that takes the value of 1 if 
the bid takes place during the upturn of the cycle and 0 otherwise. The coefficient of 
the dummy is positive and significant without any significant changes in the 
coefficients and the test statistics of the other variables. 
In regressions 8 we use the second dummy that takes the value of 1 if the bid 
takes place during the second half of the expansion and 0 otherwise. The coefficients 
of this dummy is also positive and highly significant showing that during the second 
half of the expansion bidders that use equity to finance the bid face less negative 
announcement returns relative to all other stages of the cycle. 
Even when we use the dummy variables for the outcome of the bid 
successful or not) in regressions 9 and 10 and whether the bid was multiple or not 
, 
regression 11, the coefficients of the dummy for the business cycle is positive and 
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significant. Consistent with other studies we find that the successful bids have a 
positive impact on the bidders returns and multiple bids harm bidders shareholders' 
value. 
In regressions 12 and 13 we use another independent variable, the relative 
size of the target over the bidder. In line with previous studies we find a positive 
coefficient for the relative size of the target with no qualitative changes in the 
coefficients of the remaining variables. This last result lead us to argue that the drop 
on the announcement of equity financed bids is not caused by the transfer of 
wealth from shareholders to bond holders or the price pressure theory. As we have 
argued earlier in this chapter, the debt co-insurance and price pressure theory predict 
a negative relation between the relative size of the acquisition and the magnitude of 
the drop on the announcement of the equity finance bid. Such a relation however is 
not present in our sample. When the target firm is large relative to the bidder, the 
market reacts more positively than when the target is small relative to the bidder. 
Our results support our argument that a takeover bid that is financed with 
equity is accompanied with higher announcement day returns when the 
announcement takes place during the expansion phase of the business cycle. The 
slope coefficients for the DUMMY 1 that takes the value of 1 if the announcement 
takes place during the expansion and zero otherwise is positive and statistically 
significant. The coefficients for the DUMMY 2 that takes the value of 1 if the bid is 
announced during the second half of the expansion and zero otherwise is positive 
with high significance as well. So, the evidence for the takeover bids that are 
financed with equity are similar with our findings for the rights issues. During the 
expansion phase of the business cycle, an announcement of a takeover bid financed 
with equity is associated with lower adverse selection costs. Therefore we reject the 
null hypothesis in favour of the alternative. 
Of course as we said earlier many more factors can affect the market reaction 
to the announcement of a takeover bid. Since we have no data about these factors we 
recognise that the current regression analysis is limited but indicative that the 
announcement period " returns of equity financed 'bids are accompanied by less 
negative price reaction when the ' announcements are made during the upturn of the 
business cycle. ' 
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TABLE 7.5: WEIGHTED LEAST SQUARES REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF 
ANNOUNCEMENT PERIOD ABNORMAL RETURNS OF TAKEOVER BIDS 
FINANCED WITH EQUITY 
The regressions we run had the following format: 
Announcement day returns = Constant + (Market to Book value of Bidder i)+ (PE of Bidder i)+ (EPS of Bidder 
i)+ (Market value of Bidder i)+ (3 month Cumulative Bidder return) + (+ (DUMMY 1) + (Dummy 2) + (Market to 
Book value of Target) + (Market Value of Target) + (Succeed) + (Multiple) +(relative size of target) 
Constant Market to PE of EPS of Market 3 month Dummy I Dummy 2 Market Market Succeed Multip Relativ N R 
Book Bidder Bidder value of Cumulative (1 if (1 if to Book Value of le e size 
value of Bidder Bidder return expansion, second value of Target of 
Bidder 0 half of Target target 
otherwise expansion over 
zero bidder 
otherwise) 
1 0.0016 
-0.0017 -0.0016 -0.0032 432 5.6% (1.39) 
-4.80 (-0.94) (-1.85) 
2 
-0.021 -0.0037 0.0062 -0.0041 365 13.3°/. 
-5.78 (-6.96) (3.52) (-3.67) 
3 
-0.0044 -0.0026 -0.054 396 2.7% 
-3.00 (-1.19) -2.45 
4 0.0059 
-0.0655 -0.044 0.075 -0.0024 393 10.6% 
(2.45) (-5.37) 
-2.03 (5.43) -2.2 
5 
-0.011 -0.0028 0.01286 0.0015 -0.0353 373 22.9% (-6.38) (-6.3) (4.18) (7.34) (-3.37) 
6 
-0.022 -0.00018 0.0133 0.00096 -0.043 365 15.1% (-6.38) 
-2.14 (2.90) (4.57) (-3.93) 
7 
-0.00135 -0.032 0.0167 0.00082 -0.035 393 15.1% (-2.93) (-2.29) 5.01 (5.91) 
-3.32 
8 
-0.016 -0.00016 0.028 0.0010 -0.047 365 19.4% (-4.64) 
-1.42 (5.33) (5.53) 4.45 
9 
-0.04 -0.00015 0.0114 0.0008 -0.038 0.0207 365 17.27. (-6.2) (-1.88) (2.50) (3.80) (-3.57) (3.19) 
10 
-0.020 -0.0026 0.012 0.00138 -0.034 0.009 373 231°x° 
-2.95 (-5.47) 3.90` (6.32) (-3.25) 
__(1.49) 1 1 11 
-0.011 -0.033 0.0147 0.00069 -0.032 -0.027 389 18.6% (-2.40) (-2.42) 1 (4.41) (2.99) (-3.03) 
-3.82 
121 
-0.0163 -0.0029 0.0078 0.0016 0.0029 373 21.4% 
-4.44 (-6.4) (2.33) (8.32) (2.06) 
13 
-0.009 -0.032 0.0014 0.0044 373 20.4. 
-4.008 (-7.70) (8.02) 3.31 
------- -------- --- ----- The type of the regression is Weighted Least Squares of the 3-day abnormal announcement day returns where the weights 
are the market model residuals estimated from a period -260 to -40 trading days prior to the announcement of the bid 
DUMMY 1 takes the value of I if the month is classified as Upturn of the business cycle and 0 if the month is classified as 
downturn of the business cycle. DUMMY2 takes the value of I if the month is during the second half of the expansion and 
zero otherwise. All firms specific variables for the bidder and target are measured 5 days prior to the announcement of the 
bid. Succeed takes the value of 1 if the bid was successful and 0 if not. Multiple takes the value of I if the bid was a multiple 
and zero otherwise. Relative size is the market value of the target over the market value of the bidder 3 MONTH 
CUMULATIVE BIDDER RETURNS is the 3 month cumulative return of the bidder in the 3 months prior to the month of the 
announcement of the bid. A bid is classi ied as MULTIPLE if the target has received a bid from other bidders as well.. 
....... ................... .............. 
Finding a strong relation between business conditions and takeover activity 
and adverse selection costs does not automatically indicate that the higher takeover 
activity we find during the upturn of the cycle is caused by the reduction of adverse 
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selection costs. To support the argument that adverse selection costs have a 
significant effect on the volume of takeover bids that are financed with equity we 
need to make a regression analysis of the equity financed takeover volume and see if 
the average announcement period returns of the previous period have an effect on the 
takeover activity as we did for IYOs and SEOs 
Therefore, the next hypothesis we test investigates whether the magnitude of 
the announcement period abnormal returns of bids that are financed with equity of 
the previous quarter has an effect on the volume of equity financed takeover bids. 
The null and alternative hypothesis we test is the following. 
............................................................................................................................................................................................................... Ho: The volume of' equity financed bids is not related with the average 
announcement period abnormal returns of' equity financed takeover bid of ' the 
previous quarter. 
He. The volume of equity financed bids is positively and significunlly related 
with the average announcement period abnormal returns of' equity. financed s 
takeover bid of the previous quarter. 
........ ........................................................................................................................................................................................ 
We seek to reject he null hypothesis in favour of the alternative one. If more 
firms use equity to pay for the takeover bids when announcement period returns are 
higher we will reject the null hypothesis in favour of the alternative one. 
In order to see if there is relation between equity financed takeover volume 
and the announcement period abnormal returns we run monthly time series 
regression where the dependent variable is the percentage of equity financed bids 
over all number of takeover bids. As an independent variable, among others, we use 
the average announcement period abnormal returns of the previous quarter. If the 
coefficients of the average announcement period returns of the previous quarter are 
positive and statistically significant then we will reject the null hypothesis in lävour 
of the alternative one. 
7.5. REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF THE TAKEOVER BIDS FINANCED wl"1'H EQu i'\ 
This section investigates the determinants of the equity financing choice and 
especially wants to see what is the effect of economic conditions and the magnitude 
of the adverse selection costs on the volume of equity financed bids. As we saw in 
the introduction, the motives that dictate the method of payment in takeovers are 
205 
numerous. Martin (1996) conducted the most extensive study on the motives for the 
method of payment for US bids. He tests how various factors affect the choice of 
payment. He concludes that the mode of the acquisition and the investment 
opportunities faced by the bidder are the most important. Tender offers are cash 
financed and friendly bids are equity financed. Bidders with high growth potentials 
are more likely to use equity. Bidders with high institutional shareholdings and 
blockholdings are more likely to use equity while firms with high cash balances are 
more likely to use cash. 
The story however that Martin (1996) does not test is the effect that the 
magnitude of adverse selection costs have on the equity financed takeover volume. 
Choe, Masulis and Nanda (1993) argue that more firms make a SEO when the 
adverse selection costs that they face are low. Bidders that use equity also face 
significant adverse selection costs which impose indirect costs to the takeover bid. 
No study has previously investigated the significance of these costs on the timing of 
equity financed takeover bids. If these costs are important then the proportion of 
equity financed takeover bids will decrease when these costs are high. 
In table 7.6 we present the results of the regression analysis where the 
dependent variable is the percentage of the number of takeover bids that are financed 
with equity over the total number of takeover bids per month. The lack of adequate 
information about the exact value of the acquisitions and how much is the value of 
the acquisition that is financed with equity does not enable us to use the proportion of 
the total amount of the takeover activity that is financed with equity. In a lot of cases, 
the target firm's shareholders are offered the choice between cash or equity but we do 
not know how many preferred the cash and how many preferred the equity. In 
addition, there are some months with low activity and the lack of data on this months 
may distort the regression results. For example there is a month where out of the 3 
bids that took place 1 was financed with equity and 2 were financed with cash. There 
is information about the value of the acquisition for the 2 cases that were financed 
with cash but not for the value of the acquisition that is financed with equity. 
Therefore, the lack of data does not enable us to use as an independent variable the 
proportion of the values of the acquisitions that were financed with equity. 
The monthly distribution of the proportion of equity financed takeover bids 
over all takeover bids from January 1985 to December 1995 is normally distributed 
206 
with a Jarque-Bera test statistic of 1.84 which means that we can reject the 
hypothesis of not normality at very high levels. As independent variables we use a 
number of macroeconomic factors. Interest rates are represented by the monthly 
change rate of the 3-month treasury bill. As a measure of the level of the stock 
market we use the 60 day cumulative returns of the FT All Share. We also use a 
number of economic indicators to see if the improvement in business conditions 
cause an increase in takeover bids that are financed with equity. As with the 
regressions for IPOs and SEOs, two dummy variables are also used. The first 
dummy (DUMMY 1) takes the value of 1 if the month is classified as HOT (Upturn 
of the business cycle) and 0 if the month is classified as COLD (downturn of the 
business cycle). The second dummy (DUMMY2) takes the value of 1 if the month 
is during the second half of the upturn and zero otherwise. Last but not least we use 
one more independent variable to see the effect that the adverse selection costs have 
on the equity financed takeover activity. This variable is the average announcement 
period abnormal returns of all equity financed bids that were announced in the 
previous quarter. If the adverse selection costs dictate the volume of equity financed 
takeover activity then the coefficients of the adverse selection costs should be 
positive and significant. 
The Cochrane-Orcutt method is used to correct for the serial correlation of 
the errors. The choice of econometric method did not altered the significance of our 
findings. Ordinary Least Squares regressions and TOBIT regressions were also used 
(not reported) without producing results qualitatively different to the ones we report 
here. T- Statistics are given in parentheses below the coefficients. 
Interest rates have an insignificant effect on the proportion of takeover bids 
that are financed with equity. Both short term and long term interest rates have 
insignificant coefficients. The attractiveness of equity as a method of payment 
increases when the stock market rises and that can be seen from the positive and 
significant coefficients of the 60 day market return. An increase in the market (FTA) 
causes more firms to choose equity as a method of payment. That may be caused 
because a rise in the market or a rise in the share price of the bidder may reduce the 
cost of the takeover. 
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Consistent with our earlier findings, the coefficients of the first dummy that 
takes the value of 1 if the month is during the upturn of the business cycle is 
significant indicating that the percentage of equity financed bids higher in the upturn 
relative to the downturn of the cycle. The percentage of bidders that use equity during 
the upturn is 6% higher than the percentage of bidders that use equity during the 
downturn. The coefficients of the first dummy are significant at 10% level of 
significance even though this dummy in the OLS and TOBIT regressions had higher 
test statistics which ranged from 1.95 to 2.3 and from 1.96 to 2.19 in the OLS and 
TOBIT regressions respectively. The statistical insignificance of the coefficients for 
the second dummy shows that equity financed takeover activity is not concentrated in 
the second half of the expansion but it is high through out the whole duration of the 
upturn. 
Contrary to our findings for the rights issues, we do not find that the volume 
of equity financed bids is affected by the magnitude of the adverse selection costs. 
The slope coefficients for the average announcement day returns of the previous term 
in regressions 5 and 6 were positive 
, 
indicating that when the announcement day 
returns of takeover bids financed with equity in the previous quarter are high, 
takeover activity in that month will also be high. The coefficients however are not 
statistically significant with test statistics lower than 1. Changing the length of time 
that we average the average announcement period abnormal returns from 3 months 
to 6 months and 1 year did not produce significant coefficients. Therefore, we can not 
argue that the proportion of equity takeover financed bids over all takeover bids 
increases when the adverse selection costs associated with equity financed takeover 
bids decrease. 
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TABLE 7.6: MONTHLY TIME SERIES REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF PROPORTION OF 
TAKEOVER BIDS FINANCED WITH EQUITY OVER ALL TAKEOVER BIDS 
ANNOUNCED FROM 1985 TO 1995 
The regressions we run had the following format: 
(Proportion of takeover bids financed with equity ) t= Constant + (Interest Rate 
change)t +(change in long term government bonds)t+ (Market Run UP 60 days)t + 
(DUMMY 1)t +(DUMMY 2)t + (average abnormal announcement returns during 
previous term)t 
Constant Change in Change in Market Run DUMMY I DUMMY 2 ADVERSE R 
3 MONTH LONGTERM UP 60 days (1 if (1 if second half SELECTION COSTS 
T-BILL GOVERNMENT of FTA expansion, 0 of expansion ( average abnormal 
BONDS index otherwise) zero otherwise) announcement 
returns during 
previous term) 
1 0.27 0.0255 0.402 0.067 3.5% 
(10.25) (0.17) (2.07) (1.78) 
2 0.307 0.0134 0.4058 0.0123 0.8% 
(12.83) (0.078) (2.02) (0.27) 
3 0.277 
-0.59 0.3968 0.067 3.6% (10.33) (-0.179) (2.01) (1.79) 
4 0.307 
-0.049 0.4021 0.0138 0.9% (12.88) (-0.14) (1.97) ((0.30) 
5 0.288 0.123 0.3668 0.0632 0.497 3.01% 
9.12 (0.69) (1.82) (1.66) 0.72 
6 0.323 0.005 0.352 0.005 0.68 0.6% 
(11.01) (0.03) (1.68) (0.01) 0.95 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- The Cohrane-Orcutt method is used to adjust for the serial correlation of the errors. The dependent variable is 
the Proportion of takeover bids financed with equity over all takeover bids announced in that month. Interest 
rates is the monthly change of the 3 month treasury bill and long term government bonds measured over three 
months prior to the beginning of the month. MARKET RUN UP is the 60 day cumulative returns of the FT All 
Share prior to the beginning of the month. DUMMY 1 takes the value of I if the month is classified as HOT 
(Upturn of the business cycle) and 0 if the month is classified as COLD (downturn of the business cycle). 
DUMMY2 takes the value of I if the month is during the second half of the expansion and zero otherwise. 
ADVERSE SELECTION COSTS is the average abnormal announcement period returns of all takeover bids 
financed with equity and were announced in the previous 3 months. 
.... -- --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Unlike Rights issues we do not find that the magnitude of adverse selection 
costs has any effect on the timing of takeover bids that are financed with equity. 
Managers may look at other factor to determine the choice of payment for the 
takeover bid and how much the market value of the bidder will drop when the equity 
bid is made public is not among the things that they take into account. We 
reconfirm our earlier findings however that economic conditions have an impact on 
the choice of the method of payment. 6% more firms use equity to finance a takeover 
bid during the upturn of the business cycle when interest rates and market returns are 
taken into account, a percentage which is significant at 10% level using two tail tests. 
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7.6 POST-BID PERFORMANCE OF TAKEOVER BIDDERS. 
Several studies that have looked at the post-announcement performance of 
bidders have found that the takeover bid damages the bidders' shareholders. Bidders 
underperform after the bid takes place. According to Frank, Harris and Titman (1991) 
however the results are sensitive to the choice of benchmark in the calculation of 
abnormal long run performances. Different methodologies yield different results. For 
a literature review on that issue see section 2.4.3. 
Even though many reasons could be responsible for such a poor performance 
we can gain more insights on the reasons for the underperformance by looking at the 
post-bid performance of bidders according to the method of payment. The evidence 
suggest that bidders that use equity to finance the bid underperform while bidders 
that use cash do not underperform. The choice of payment can reveal to the market 
the management's view about the intrinsic value of the firm at the time of the 
announcement of the bid. Firms that their current share price is higher than its 
intrinsic value would be better off to use equity to finance the deal, ceteris paribus. 
Firms that are undervalued would look at other options instead such as cash or loans 
since the use of equity for them would not decrease the cost of the acquisition. 
The reasons behind the poor long run performance of equity financed 
takeover bids remain elusive. The literature has not been able to provide a definite 
answer. Especially since some characteristics of equity financed bids are not the same 
as with the characteristics of cash bids. 
If firms that make a takeover bid financed with equity underperform and 
those that use cash do not underperform we could argue that the reason behind the 
underperformance is that equity financed bids are driven by overvaluation 
exploitation. The method of payment might reveal to investors the true value of the 
firm. The market knows that managers might be tempted to use equity to finance a 
bid when the shares are overvalued and so investors regard bidders that use equity to 
finance the bid as overvalued and they mark down their share prices. Bidders that 
use cash are considered to be undervalued and therefore investors increase their 
valuations of the company. The evidence of a significant underperformance of 
bidders that use equity is consistent with that explanation but does not automatically 
indicate that the only reason behind the poor long run performance of equity 
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takeovers is that managers deliberately time the equity financed bid when shares are 
overvalued. Other factors may be responsible for the poor long run performance. To 
argue that bidders use equity to finance a bid solely because their shares are 
overvalued we would have to find that during periods of heavy equity financed 
takeover activity bidders must be more overvalued. On the other hand, during periods 
when equity financed takeover activity is scarce, bidders must be undervalued and 
therefore they should resort to other methods of payment. If the magnitude of 
bidders' overvaluation differs according to the intensity of takeover activity, then 
bidders that were more overvalued would underperform and bidders that were not 
overvalued should not underperform. If the force behind the increase in equity 
financed takeover bids is overvaluation exploitation, then bidders that make the bid 
in heavy volume periods must have worst post-bid performances than bidders that 
time the equity financed bid in light volume periods. 
The investigation however of long run performances is problematic and full 
of computational problems. Recently, Barber an Lyon (1997) tested various 
methodologies on how to calculate long run performances and their robustness. They 
find that the use of benchmark portfolios such as market indexes and size or market 
to book deciles creates bias in the results and suggest that only Buy and Hold returns 
matched by firms with similar market to book or market value is the only method that 
yields unbiased results. For a more detail analysis of that issue see section 4.3. 
Following their recommendations we use industry and market to book matched 
returns and industry and market value matched returns to calculate the abnormal long 
run performances. ( For more details on the issue of calculation of long run 
performances see also at section 4.3) 
In table 7.7 we present our findings of the post-announcement performance of 
takeover bidders. As a measure of performance we use the Buy and Hold returns first 
without any adjustments, second matched by industry and market to book value and 
third matched by industry and market value. These returns represent the return to an 
investor that purchased the shares of the bidder at the end of month 
-1 relative to the 
announcement of the bid. The same results are in figure 7.4. 
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We find that by the end of year 1, bidders offer a 12.99% buy and hold return 
( no adjustments) and that the return increases to 19.21% by the end of year 2. The 
buy and hold return increases further by the end of year 3 to 24.95% and remain at 
this level up until year 5. By the end of the month 60 after the announcement of the 
takeover proposal, the average buy and hold return to an investor that purchased the 
shares of the bidder at the end of month 
-1 relative to the announcement of the bid is 
25.18%. Throughout the 5 year period, the buy and hold returns are highly 
significantly different from zero as the test statistic in the bottom row of panel A 
indicate. They range from 5.82 to 8.56. 
However, in any calculation of log run performances a proper adjustment has 
to be made to reveal the true picture. When we use the buy and hold returns matched 
by industry and market to book value, we find that bidders have negative buy and 
hold returns but these returns are not significantly different from zero until month 10 
onwards and up until month 47 ( significantly negative buy and hold returns at least 
at 10% level one-tail). By the end of year 1, the buy and hold return is 
-2.78% with a 
test statistic of 
-1.34 just marginally significant at 10% one tail test. By the end of 
year 2 the average buy and hold return decreases to 
-5.94% and drops further by the 
end of year 3 to 
-7.60% ( both have test statistics of around -1.70). From that month 
onwards buy and hold returns start to increase and remain insignificantly different 
from zero to reach a5 year buy and hold return of 
-3.39% without however being 
significantly different from zero. 
Similar results are found for the buy and hold returns that are matched by 
industry and market value. The bidders underperform after the announcement but this 
underperformance is significant only in the months 20 to 37. By the end of year 1 the 
average buy and hold return matched by industry and market value is 
-1.81% not 
significant from zero with a test statistic of 
-0.89. By the end of year 2 the average 
buy and hold return is a significantly negative 
-5.03% with a test statistic of -1.61 and 
decreases to 
-7.02% by the end of year 3 with a test statistic of -1.68. Buy and hold 
returns matched by industry and market value start to increase after that point to 
reach an average buy and hold return by the end of year 5 of 
-3.92 which is not 
significant from zero. 
In summary, we find that bidders offer slightly inferior returns to their 
shareholders relative to firms in the same industry and similar market to book value 
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or similar market values. This underperformance however is not significant until the 
end of year 2 and reaches the most negative point by the end of year 3. After that 
point, bidders' returns start to increase again. Our evidence are in line with the 
literature findings that bidders underperform after the issue. The underperformance 
however is modest, only around 7% at the most negative point by the end of year 3 
and is not highly significant. 
TABLE 7.7: POST- BID PERFORMANCE OF BIDDERS 
Month from the announcement 12 24 36 48 59 
PANEL A 
(NO ADJUSTEMENTS) 
Post-Bid performance of bidder 12.99%- 19.21% 24.95% 27.04% 25.18% 
Number of observations 795 793 781 744 719 
Test statistic of difference rom zero 8.56 5.70 6.72 5.82 6.28 
PANEL B 
MATCHED BY INDUSTRY AND 
MARKET TO BOOK VALUE 
Post 
-Bid performance of bidders -2.78% -5.94% -7.60% -5.46% -3.39% 
Adjusted for Industry and 
Market to Book Value 
Number of observations 738 733 727 689 653 
Test statistic o di Terence from zero -1.34 -1.72 -1.76 -1.10 -0.68 
PANEL C 
MATCHED BY INDUSTRY 
AND MARKET VALUE 
Post-Bid performance of bidder 
-1.81% -5.03% -7.02% -2.60% -3.92% 
Adjusted for Industry and 
Market Value 
Number of observations 693 690 687 655 634 
Test statistic of difference from zero -0.89 -1.61 -1.68 . -0.53 
-' -0.81 
We may have found that takeover bidders underperform in the long run after 
the announcement but we report significant variations in the post-announcement 
performance of bidders according to. the method of financing the deal. In table 7.8 we 
present the post-announcement performance of bidders partitioned by the method of 4i 
payment. -Highlighting the main findings we can say ` that cash ' bids' significantly 
outperform the equity bids. 
The 3 year buy and hold performance of bidders that used only cash 'to 
finance the deal is +51.67%, significantly different from 'zero with a test statistic of 
3.53 while the bidders that use only equity have a3 year return of 18.25% also 
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significantly positive with a test statistic of 2.39. The difference in the returns 
between the two groups is 33.42% which is significantly different from zero with a 
test statistic of 2.36. Even when we compare the returns of the bidders that use cash 
in whole or in part to finance the deal and those that use equity in whole or in part 
, 
the equity bidders have significant worst performances than cash bidders. The 
bidders that used some form of equity in the bid had a3 year buy and hold 
performance of 15.99% while the bidders that use some cash in the bid had a3 year 
buy and hold performance of 29.62% a difference of 13.63% with a test statistic-of 
1.83 (results on the buy and hold performance of cash Vs equity bids are also plotted 
in figure 7.5) 
TABLE 7.8: BUY AND HOLD POST- BID PERFORMANCE OF BIDDERS 
PARTITIONED BY THE METHOD OF PAYMENT 
PANEL A 
BUY AND HOLD WITH NO ADJUSTMENTS 
MONTH FROM THE 
ANNOUNCEMENT 
12 24 36 48 60 
ONLY CASH BIDS 15.00% 44.14% 51.67% 61.04% 60.24% 
test statistic of difference 
fron] 7erQ 
3.42 2.42 3.53 3.67 4.64 
- 
ONLY EQUITY 11.30% 11.30% 18.25% 22.34% 7.82% 
test statistic of difference 
from 
7era 
3.22 2.58 2.39 1.96 1.02 
, 
SOME FORM OF CASH 15.28% 25.57% 29.62% 32.45% 32.18% 
test statistic of difference 7.27 4.39 5.66 5.09 62i. 
SOME FORM OF EQUITY 12.92% 13.21% 15.99% 15.76% 11.45% 
test statistic of difference 
from Zero 
6.38 4.83 4.18 3.05 2.63 
test statistic of difference 
only cash versus only equity 
0.43 1.67 2.36 2.60 3.56 
test statistic of difference 
between some form of cash 
versus some form of equity 
0.53 1.75 1.83 1.84 2.73 
- 
AVERAGE BUY AND HOLD 
RETURN OF ALL BIDDERS 
12.99% 19.21% 24.95% 27.04% 25.189,6 
When we use the returns that are adjusted for industry and market to book 
` value ( panel B of table 7.8) we also find significant differences in the post-bid 
. 
performance of equity and cash financed bids. The 3 year buy and hold performance 
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of bidders matched by industry and market to book value that used only cash to 
finance the deal is +26.60% significantly different from zero with a test statistic of 
1.73. (results for the industry/ market to book value adjusted performance 
partitioned by the method of payment are also plotted in figure 7.6). Bidders that use 
only equity to finance the deal underperform by the end of year 3 by 30.11%. The 
underperformance of equity bids starts to be significant from month 7 and by the end 
of year 1 it is 
-11.65%. By the end of year 2, equity financed bids underperformance 
has increased to 
-19.30% and reached -30.11% by the end of year 3. In the 4t' and 
5`h years after the bid, equity financed bidders' performance does not deteriorate 
further and it slightly improves to a4 year buy and hold return of 
-25.83% and - 
28.61% by the end of year 5. The difference in the post-bid performance between 
bidders that finance the deal only with cash and those that financed the deal only with 
equity by the end of year 1 is 17.75% in favour of cash bids and increases to 33.44% 
and 56.71% by the end of year 2 and 3 respectively and remains at the area of 60% 
for the 4th and 5th years. This difference is significant with test statistics that range 
between 2.04 for the difference at the end of year 1 to 2.73 for the difference in the 
end of year 3. 
The underperformance of equity bids remains even when we look at the bids 
that used equity at least in some part to finance the bid. By the end of year 1, these 
bidders underperformed by 6.57% and by 12.45% by the end of year 2. The lowest 
point was once again reached by the end of year 3 when these type of bidders have a 
3 year buy and hold return of 
-17.64% with a test statistic of -3.49. As with the only 
equity bidders, by the 4t' and 5th years after the bid, their performance slightly 
improves to 
-13.13% and -10.63% respectively but still remains significant negative. 
When we compared the bids that used cash in whole or at least in some part 
of the financing package against the bids that used equity in whole or in part of the 
proposed-deal, the difference in the post-announcement buy-'and hold returns is 
smaller: By the end of year 1 the difference is 7.24% in favöur of the cash bids and it 
increases to 14.77% by the end of year 2. The difference reaches the maximum in 
year 3 with cash bids outperforming equity bids by 20.86%. By the end of year 4 and 
5 the difference is 19.64% and 16.32% respectively. Even th6ugh the differences are 
smaller, they remained 'significantly different from zero with test statistic ranging 
between 1.62 for the one year to 2.62 by the end of year 3. - 
215 
TABLE 7.8 
BUY AND HOLD POST- BID PERFORMANCE 
OF BIDDERS PARTITIONED BY THE METHOD OF PAYMENT 
PANEL B 
BUY AND HOLD MATCHED BY INDUSTRY AND MARKET TO BOOK VALUE 
MONTH FROM THE 12 24 36 48 60 
ANNOUNCEMENT 
ONLY CASH BIDS 6.10% 14.14% 26.60% 34.43% 29.44% 
test statistic of difference 1.12 1.30 1.73 2.01 1.95 
ONLY EQUITY 
-11.65% -19.30% -30.11% -25.83% -28.61% 
test statistic of difference 
-2.23 -2.88 -3.38 -2.23 -2.47 
SOME FORM OF CASH 0.67% 2.32% 3.22% 6.51% 5.69% 
test statistic of difference 0.23 0.43 0.51 0.95 0.84 
SOME FORM OF EQUITY 
-6.57% -12.45% -17.64% -13.13% -10.63% 
test statistic of difference 
-2.25 -3.07 -3.49 -2.1 -1.747 
test statistic of difference 2.04 2.28 2.73 2.61 2.46 
onl cash versus only equity 
test statistic of difference 1.62 2.10 2.62 2.22 1.94 
between some form of cash 
versus some form of equity 
AVERAGE BUY AND HOLD 
-2.78% 
-5.94% 
-7.60% -5.46% -3.39% MATCHED BY INDUSTRY 
AND MARKET TO BOOK 
VALUE OF ALL BIDDERS 
In panel C of table 7.8 we report the post-bid performance of bidders matched 
by industry and market value. ( the results are plotted in figure 7.7). As with the 
previous measures of performance we find significant differences between equity and 
cash bids. Those that used only cash outperform by 11.78% at the end of year 3 
while only equity financed bidders underperform by 20.12% at the same period. The 
difference in the performance between the two groups was 12.47% by the end of year 
1 and 27.8% by the end of year 2. The spread in the performances between only cash 
and only equity increased to 31.90% and 36.68% by the end of year 3 and 4 to reach 
53.99% by the end of year 5. The difference in the performance between the two 
groups of bidders was significant apart from the first year. The spread in the post-bid 
performance between cash and equity financed bids was smaller when we broadened 
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the two groups to include those bids that use cash or equity at least in part but was 
also significantly different from zero with a test statistic of 1.36 and 1.8 by the end 
of year 1 and 5 respectively. The spread was 5.27% and 13.26% by the end of year 1 
and 2 to increase to 21.23% in year 3. In the 40' year it dropped to 11.27% only to 
increase again to 16.28% by the end of year 5. The difference in the post-bid 
performance between equity and cash bids is significant with test statistics above 
1.36 
TABLE 7.8 
BUY AND HOLD POST- BID PERFORMANCE 
OF BIDDERS PARTITIONED BY THE METHOD OF PAYMENT 
PANEL C 
BUY AND HOLD MATCHED BY INDUSTRY AND MARKET VALUE 
MONTH FROM THE 12 24 36 48 59 
ANNOUNCEMENT 
ONLY CASH BIDS 3.00% 10.45% 11.78% 22.94% 27.20% 
test statistic of difference 0.58 1.15 1.31 2.15 1.91 
ONLY EQUITY 
-9.47% -17.35% -20.12% -13.74% -26.79% 
test statistic of difference 
-1.64 -2.00 -1.64 -0.91 -2.73 
SOME FORM OF CASH 1.59% 
-2.21% -5.56% 0.27% -1.46% 
test statistic of difference 0.66 
-0.56 -1.28 0.05 -0.25 
SOME FORM OF EQUITY 
-3.68 -11.05% -15.67% -11.00% -14.82% 
test statistic of difference 
-1.37 . -2.60 -2.85 -1.65 -2.62 
test statistic of difference 1.13 2.14 2.59 2.69 2.74 
only cash versus only equity 
test statistic of difference 1.36 1.55 1.51 1.43 1.80 
between some form of cash 
versus some form of equity 
AVERAGE BUY AND HOLD 
-1.81% -5.03% -7.02% -2.60% -3.92% 
MATCHED BY INDUSTRY' 
AND MARKET VALUE OF 
ALL BIDDERS 
Overall, our evidence show that bidders that use equity in the. financing 
package of the deal exhibit significant underperformance 
. 
and'. their post 
announcement performance is significantly worst than the bidders that use cash to 
finance the deal. Even when we broaden the samples to include the bidders that use 
1 217 
equity in part of the deal and not exclusively, the results remained similar. Even in 
this larger sample, equity bidders underperform and are doing significantly worst 
than those firms that use cash in whole or in part to finance the deal. 
Our results are similar with the results of Frank Harris and Titman (1991) 
who find that cash bids outperform and equity bids underperform, even though they 
find that for some methodologies the positive returns for all cash bids are not 
different from zero. 
The difference in the post-announcement performance of bidders between the 
cash and equity financed bids is puzzling. As we saw earlier, managers have the 
incentive to use overvalued shares to pay for the bid since overvalued shares will 
reduce the cost of the acquisition. Investors are not able to estimate the intrinsic value 
of the bidder with an accuracy such as managers can. Investors regard an equity 
financed bid as an attempt to exploit overvaluation and mark down the share price of 
the bidder on the announcement of an equity financed bid. The drop on the share 
price of the bidder however is around 1% and surely does not eliminate the whole 
overvaluation. Gradually as more information is revealed about the bidder investors 
may realise that the price of the bidder at the time of the bid was higher than its 
fundamental value and so they continuously mark down the share price of the bidder. 
The big underperformance of equity financed bids might indicate that at the 
time of the bid announcement the share price of the bidder must have been high and 
that the bidder was overvalued. However if managers use overvalued shares to pay 
for these takeover deals that does not automatically indicate that equity financed bids 
are driven solely by overvaluation exploitation and that managers deliberately exploit 
target firms' shareholders. The fact that bidders share prices are high at the time of 
the bid may not necessarily dictate the method of payment and may not be the driving 
factor behind the variation in the number of equity financed deals across time. 
If more managers deliberately time the takeover bids financed with equity 
around periods when the share price of the bidder is overvalued then we must find 
that those bidders should underperform as soon as the market realises that the true 
value of the stock is lower that its current value. In order to argue however that 
periods when the number of equity financed deals is higher are periods when shares 
are more overvalued than periods with small numbers of equity financed bids we 
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mw-. 
have to find significant differences between the bidders post-announcement 
performance of heavy and light takeover volume periods. 
The null and alternative hypothesis we test is the following. 
............................................................ ........................................................................................................................... Ho: The bidders that announce a takeover hid that is financed, in whole or in 
part, by equity in periods of heavy equity financed takeover volume periods 
have similar Post-announcement perfi)rmances with bidders that announce 
a takeover hid that is, financed with equity, in whole or in part, in periods of 
light equity. financed takeover volume periods 
He: The bidders that announce a takeover hid that is financed in whole or in 
port by equity in periods of heavy equity. /inanced takeover volume periods 
have significantly worst Post-announcement performances relative to 
bidders that announce a takeover hid that is financed with equity in ºw'holce or 
in part in periods of light equity financed takeover volume periods 
........................................................ .................................... ......... . ................................................................................  
To support the story that equity financed takeover bids are driven by 
overvaluation exploitation we seek to reject the null hypothesis in favour of the 
alternative. To do so we compare the Post-announcement performances of' bidders 
that announce a takeover hid, that is financed with equity in whole or in part, in 
periods of light volume with the Post-announcement performances of' bidders that 
announce a takeover hid, that is financed with equity in whole or in part, in periods 
of' heavy volume. 
To classify heavy and light volume periods, we rank the 132 month of our 
sample between January 1985 to December 1995 according to the percentage of 
equity financed bids over all takeover bids. The 33 months (25% of the sample) with 
the highest percentages of equity financed bids are classified as I leavy volume 
periods (HO'l') and the 33 months with lowest percentages of equity financed bids 
are classified as light volume periods (COLT)). The remaining 66 months arc 
classified as OTHER. The results of the Post hid performances of' bidders of' I IOT 
and COLD periods are in table 7.9. 
In panel A of table 7.9 we report the post-bid performance matched by 
industry and market to hook value of' bidders that used equity to finance the hid 
across I IO"I' and COLD periods. The comparison of' the post-announcement returns 
of HOT and COLD market bidders shows that HOT market bidders have 
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insignificant differences in their performances with COLD market bidders up until 
month 20. In figure 7.8 we have plotted these performances. The HOT market 
bidders' performance is represented by the red line and COLD market bidders' 
performance is represented by the blue line. We see that after the announcement and 
up until month 20 the two lines move together. Both group of bidders underperform. 
After month 20, COLD market bidders exhibit higher buy and hold performances 
than HOT market bidders. By the end of year 3, HOT market bidders have a buy hold 
return of 
-27.07% while COLD market bidders have a return of 1.61%, significantly 
higher than HOT market bidders with a test statistic of 1.63. This 28.68% difference 
in return between HOT and COLD market bidders decreases in the fourth year to 
reach an insignificant spread of 16.98% in favour of COLD market bidders by the 
end of year 4 and becomes 13.92% by the end of year 5 which is also insignificant. 
The number of COLD market bidders however is extremely small, only 30. 
Therefore we also compare the performance of HOT market bidders with the 
performance of bidders that made the announcement in all the remaining months 
which includes both the COLD and OTHER market bidders (green line in figure 7.8). 
Our findings suggest that HOT market bidders are worst performers relative to all 
other bidders. HOT market bidders underperform relative to all other bidders but the 
difference was not significant. Our findings on the post-announcement performance 
of HOT market bidders using the industry and market to book value adjusted buy and 
hold return indicate that HOT market bidders are not significantly worst performers 
than all other bidders. 
In panel B of table 7.9 we use of the second measure of performance which is 
adjusted for industry and market value. The use of this measure of post- 
announcement performance indicates no difference whatsoever between the HOT and 
COLD market bidders. In figure 7.9 we can see that HOT market bidders ( red line ) 
have better performances than COLD market bidders ( Blue line) in the period up to 
month 15. From that month and until the end of year 4, COLD market bidders 
perform better than HOT market bidders but the difference in the performance is not 
significantly different from zero. Comparing the HOT market bidders with all the 
remaining bidders( both COLD and OTHER green line in figure 7.9) produced 
insignificant differences in the performances of the two groups. 
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The use of Normal ( with no adjustments )buy and hold returns also produced 
a similar picture with the results with the industry/ Market value adjusted returns ( 
not reported). There is no significant differences between the HOT and COLD 
market bidders or all the remaining bidders. 
The small difference in the results between the industry/market to book and 
industry/ market value adjusted performances used to calculate the post-bid 
performances may be driven by the method used to calculate the performances. In 
order to do the industry/ market to book and industry /market value matching, data 
about the market to book and market value had to be found. However, for some 
companies we did not find data about their market value at the month of the 
announcement and for some others we had no data for the market to book value. 
Therefore, the differences in the two measures may be due to the fact that each HOT 
and COLD market bidders group consists of different firms in the industry/market to 
book value and industry and market value performances. 
Even if we use the industry and market to book adjusted returns that show 
some differences in the HOT and COLD market bidders performance, this difference 
starts from month 20. It is rather unconvincing to argue that for 20 month, investors 
did not realise that HOT market bidders are more overvalued than COLD market 
bidders and suddenly after 20 month investors found out. Beside that, the small 
number of firms in the COLD market sample, around 30, indicates that the average 
performance of this group may be driven by some outliers. Even though we did not 
identified extremely performing firms in the COLD market sample, even one firm 
can change the averages in this group. 
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TABLE 7.9: BUY AND HOLD POST- BID PERFORMANCE OF BIDDERS THAT USED EQUITY 
TO FINANCE THE BID ACROSS HOT AND COLD PERIODS' 
MONTH FROM THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF I 12 I 24 I 36 I 48 I $g 
THE BID 
PANEL A 
INDUSTRYAND MARKET TO BOOK VAL UE ADJUSTED 
BUY AND HOLD POST-BID 
-10.09% -19.17% -27.07% -20.87% -12.03% PERFORMANCE OF BIDDERS THAT (221) (220) (220) (212) (205) 
MADE THE ANNOUNCEMENT IN HOT 
PERIODS 
test statistic of difference from zero 
-2.09 2.94 
BUY AND HOLD POST-BID 
-01.08% -04.91% -09.19% -04.76% -11.03% PERFORMANCE OF BIDDERS THAT (179) (178) (177) (163) (151) 
MADE THE ANNOUNCEMENT IN 
OTHER PERIODS 
test statistic of difference from zero 
-1.22 
BUY AND HOLD POST-BID 
-13.35% -07.87% 01.61% -03.89% 01.89% 
PERFORMANCE OF BIDDERS THAT (30) (30) (30) (30) (28) 
MADE THE ANNOUNCEMENT IN COLD 
PERIODS 
test statistic of difference from zero 
-D. 63 : 0.10 -0.23 0.10 
TEST STATISTIC OF DIFFERENCE 0.32 
-0.80 -1.63 -0.89 0.69 
BETWEEN HOT AND COLD 
TEST STATISTIC OF DIFFERENCE 
-1.26 -1.15 -1.04 -0.87 0.25 
BETWEEN HOT AND ALL REMAINING 
MONTH (OTHER AND COLD) 
PANEL B 
INDUSTRYAND MARKET VALUE ADJUSTED 
BUY AND HOLD POST-BID 
-03.69% -11.65% -15.37% -07.74% -07.99% 
PERFORMANCE OF BIDDERS THAT (214) (214) (214) (207) (205) 
MADE THE ANNOUNCEMENT IN HOT 
PERIODS 
test statistic of difference from zero 
-0.82 -1 69 
.". -1.73 E` -0 74 -1.04 
BUY AND HOLD POST-BID 
-02.26% -10.96% -19.59% -16.15% -24.940/o PERFORMANCE OF BIDDERS THAT (167) (168) (168) (155) (145) 
MADE THE ANNOUNCEMENT IN 
OTHER PERIODS 
test statistic of difference from zero, 
-, 
-2.70 
BUY AND HOLD POST-BID 
-10.72% -07.58% 02.85% -07.12% -12.67% PERFORMANCE OF BIDDERS THAT (33) (33) (32) (32) (31) 
MADE THE ANNOUNCEMENT IN COLD 
PERIODS 
test statistic of difference from zero 
., " 
0.19'- 
-0.50 0.88 
TEST STATISTIC OF DIFFERENCE 0.79 
-0.29 -1.02 -0.03 0,29 
BETWEEN HOT AND COLD 
TEST STATISTIC OF DIFFERENCE 
-0.01 -0.15 0.06 0.52 
, 
33 
BETWEEN HOT AND ALL REMAINING 
MONTH (OTHER AND COLD) 
222 
1. HOT months are the 33 months (25% of the sample) with the highest percentages of equity financed bids per month and 
COLD month are the 33 months with lowest percentages of equityfinanced bids. The remaining 66 month are classified as 
OTHER. 
......................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 
Our results of similar post-bid performance of bidders that finance the bid 
with equity and made the announcement in HEAVY and LIGHT volume periods, do 
not support the argument that takeover activity financed with equity is driven by 
overvaluation exploitation. Periods of heavy activity in terms of equity financed 
takeover bids are not periods when bidders are more overvalued than periods of low 
activity. The significant variations on the equity financed takeover activity across 
time are not driven by variations in the magnitude of overvaluation. The variation in 
investors sentiment do not seem to have a significant impact on the timing of equity 
financed takeover bids. Other factors must account for the clustering of equity 
financed takeover bids in certain periods of time. 
The examination of the post-takeover performance of bidders that use equity 
to finance the bid and the fact that according to our results the equity financed 
takeover activity is not driven by overvaluation exploitation indicate that investors 
sentiment is not a major driving force of the variability of equity financed takeover 
activity. Therefore, we interpret this first negative sign and do not embark in a 
research effort about the impact of analysts' earnings overoptimism on the volume of 
equity financed takeover activity. Furthermore, the time length of the sample of 
equity financed takeover bids would be from 1988 to 1995 and the number of bids is 
only 482 compared with the 902 IPOs and the 1568 rights issues. Therefore, the size 
of the sample is greatly reduced and to make an investigation for an issue where the 
first signs and discouraging and the lack of data limits the significance of the research 
was seen to be unnecessary. 
7.7 CONCLUSIONS 
In this chapter we use equity financed takeover bids to gain insights about the 
timing of equity issues. This chapters first tests the' effect that economic conditions 
have both on the volume of takeover bids and on the adverse selection costs 
associated with the announcement of takeover bids "that are financed with equity. 
Takeover activity exhibits variations in its volume 
- 
across " time in the UK. The 
attractiveness of equity as a method of payment also varies over time and across the 
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business cycle. More firms use equity to finance a takeover bid during the upturn of 
the business cycle. 
The relation between adverse selection costs associated with the 
announcement of an equity financed takeover bid and the timing of equity financed 
takeover bids is also investigated. The announcement of a takeover bid is 
accompanied by significant negative returns for the bidder. There are significant 
variations however in the announcement period abnormal returns according to the 
method of payment. Proposals that use equity in whole or in part to finance a bid 
have significantly more negative announcement period returns than cash offers. We 
find evidence that the improvement in economic conditions has a significant effect 
on the announcement period returns foi equity financed bids. During the upturn of 
the business cycle 
, 
bidders that use equity to finance a deal have an average 1.1 % 
higher announcement period return relative to the downturn of the business cycle We 
find however no significant relation between the magnitude of announcement period 
returns and the timing of takeover bids that are financed with equity. Periods when 
adverse selection costs are low are not periods when the percentage of equity 
financed takeover bids over all takeover bids increases significantly. Bidders do not 
care about these indirect adverse selection costs when they decide to use equity to 
finance a takeover proposal. 
This chapter has also explored the post-announcement performance of 
bidders. We find that on average, bidders exhibit an underperformance of 7% in the 
third year after the announcement of the takeover. There are significant variations in 
the post-announcement performance according to the method of payment. Cash 
offers have significantly better performance than equity financed ones. Bidders that 
use cash outperform after the bid while bidders that use equity underperform. The 
difference in the post-announcement performance of equity and cash financed bids is 
large and significant. In theory we could argue that the underperformance of bidders 
that use equity as a method of payment is caused by the mark down of the share price 
of the bidder by investors who regard that an equity financed bid is driven by 
overvaluation exploitation. 
We find no relation however between the intensity of equity financed 
takeover activity and the post-bid performance. Bidders that announce the equity 
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financed takeover bid in heavy volume periods do not have worst performances 
relative to bidders that make the announcement in light volume periods showing us 
that the time series variations in the numbers of equity financed bids are not driven 
by overvaluation exploitation. Periods of heavy equity financed takeover activity are 
not periods when the bidders are more overvalued than periods of low equity 
financed bid activity. 
Overall, we find evidence that the timing of equity financed equity bids is not 
related to adverse selection costs or overvaluation exploitation. Takeover bids that 
are financed with equity seem to have their own dynamics and other factors may 
influence their timing. 
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CHAPTER 8: FINANCIAL ANALYSTS EARNINGS FORECASTS 
AND THE TIMING OF INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERINGS 
ö. 1. INTRODUCTION 
According to Ritter (1991) and Loughran and Ritter (1995) variations in IPO 
and SEO activity arise from changes in investors' sentiment. Issuers take advantage 
of transitory windows of opportunity and issue equity near the peak of industry 
specific fads. They argue that investors pay high multiples'of market to book or price 
earnings because they overestimate the net present value of future growth 
opportunities. 
In chapter 5 we found evidence in favour of the sentiment timing of UK IPOs. 
Firms that went public in heavy volume periods have significant worst post-IPO 
performances than firms that went public in periods of Light IPO volume. That result 
indicates that the former group of IPOs have more overvalued offer prices than the 
latter one. Even though the evidence suggests that there are periods when investors 
are willing to pay higher prices for the new issues, no one is sure what makes 
investors overpay. 
Rajan & Servaes (1998) find strong evidence that financial analysts' earnings 
forecasts have a significant effect on the US equity issuance volume. More firms go 
public when analysts forecast higher growth in the long term earnings of firms that 
recently went public. According to Rajan & Servaes (1998), IPO firms exploit 
earnings optimism. Such a proposition however has not been researched 
internationally. If swings in investors' sentiment is a major force behind the time 
series variation of equity issues as Loughran & Ritter (1995) argue then the use of 
earnings forecasts, as a proxy for investors sentiment, can help with the investigation 
of the driving forces of equity issuance volume. 
Financial analysts' earnings forecasts should be affected by market 
conditions. When the economy is growing, that growth` should cause an increase in 
the profitability of companies. That increase should be mirrored in analysts' earnings 
forecasts. If stock markets are characterised by a feeling of euphoria for the future 
profitability of firms, analysts'should forecast higher growth in'the earnings of firms 
and investors will be willing to pay high prices. On the `other hand if the market is 
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full of pessimism about the future growth of the economy, then analysts' earning 
forecasts should record that pessimism. Analysts' forecasts should reflect and to 
some degree even affect investors' sentiment. 
Previous research has shown that analysts' earnings forecasts are biased. 
Analysts significantly overestimate the earnings. The forecast errors analysts make 
are significant and exhibit a significant time series variation. There are periods when 
analysts are more overoptimistic than usual. If the market sentiment is mirrored into 
analysts' earnings forecasts and firms that make an equity issue time the issue in 
periods when the market is overoptimistic about the earnings' growth either for the 
whole market or for the recent equity issuers then we should find that more firms 
raise capital when analysts' overoptimism is high. 
The effect of analysts' earnings forecasts overoptimism has not been 
thoroughly researched. Rajan & Servaes (1998) have conducted the only study up to 
now that links the timing of IPOs with analysts' optimism. They find evidence of a 
significant relation between analysts' earnings forecasts and the number of firms 
going public. They report that analysts are overoptimistic for the future earnings of 
firms that recently went public. They find that when analysts forecast high growth in 
the long term earnings for the firms that in the previous year went public more firms 
decide to make an IPO in the current quarter. They find a significant relation not only 
between analysts' long term growth projections for recent IPOs and IPO volume but 
also between the magnitude of analysts' forecast error and the intensity of IPO 
activity suggesting that as analysts' overoptimism for the earnings potential for the 
recent IPOs increases more firms decide to go public. 
Recently a new area of research has been opened up in the UK by the 
availability of Financial Analysts Earnings Forecasts by I/B/E/S in the UK which 
provides an opportunity to test whether UK IPO volume is affected by analysts' 
optimism. IB/E/S provides consensus forecasts for a large number of UK firms 
starting from January 1987. I/B/E/S provides forecasted earnings per share for 
current year earnings, and forward year earnings for 2,3, and 4 years ahead as well as 
long term growth forecasts. The number of long term growth, forecasts however is the 
1987- 1998 period is very small 
, 
2301, and for the period of 1987. to 1990 I/B/E/S 
had only 204 long term earnings forecasts making the use of long term growth 
forecasts for academic research totally impossible. ý. a 
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The number of current year earnings forecast however is large. Since 1987 
and until 1998 more than 10,000 current year earnings forecasts are available and the 
numbers of forecasts are high even from 1987. These numbers allow us to test with 
some statistical power the effect of analysts' earnings forecasts on the IPO volume. If 
overoptimism for the earnings of recent issuers has a significant effect on UK IPO 
volume then we should find a significant relation between IPO volume and analysts' 
forecast errors. This chapter investigates the relationship between analysts' 
overoptimism and IPO volume. 
Evidence from US studies have shown that IPO firms time the issue at 
periods around the peak of their operating performance. Jain & Kini (1994) and 
Mikkelson and Shah (1994) find that the operating performance of recently newly 
listed firms deteriorate after the issue. Teoh, Welsh & Wong (1998) report that 
issuers increase the reported earnings in the periods before the IPO by manipulating 
the accruals but they find a deterioration of earnings in the post-issue years as a result 
of managers not being able to further manipulate their earnings and keep them at a 
level similar to the pre 
-IPO years. 
The use of financial analysts' earnings forecast can help in the understanding 
whether firms time the IPO around the peak of their profitability. Forecasted earnings 
reflect the current market view on the profitability of the issuers. If managers time the 
equity issue at the peak of the firm's profitability then analysts should revise 
downwards their earnings forecasts when the release of new information makes them 
realise that the current level of earnings can not be sustained. 
Forecast revisions have never been used in the IPO literature before. They 
have been used before in event studies to see what impact that 
. 
corporate 
announcement such as takeover bids and Seasoned equity issues have on the 
profitability of the firms. This is the first study that looks at the forecast revisions for 
firms conducting IPOs. 
In this chapter we try to answer two questions. Is IPO volume in the UK 
affected by analysts' overoptimism? Do UK IPO firms time the issue at the peak of 
their profitability? 
This chapter, enhances the IPO literature by uncovering the analysts' accuracy 
in forecasting the earnings of newly listed firms in, the UK and investigating for the 
first time the relation between UK analysts' earnings forecasts'overoptimism and UK 
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IPO activity. We also look at how analysts revise their earnings forecasts as the UK 
IPO firms become more seasoned to see whether IPO firms time the issue at the peak 
of their profitability. 
Our main findings can be summarised as follows: 
1. Analysts significantly overestimate the earnings of all firms in the UK and 
that the larger the horizon of the forecast the larger the forecast errors. The forecast 
errors are larger for smaller firms and there is a significant variation in the magnitude 
of the errors across industries and across time. 
2. UK analysts on average do not significantly overestimate the earnings of 
newly listed firms in the first year of their public life. Unadjusted forecast errors are 
not significantly different form zero and adjusted forecast errors are significantly 
positive indicating that the forecasts analysts make for IPOs, after being adjusted for 
the industry and size effect, are pessimistic relative to the forecasts made for the 
seasoned firms in the same industry and similar market value. 
3. There is a significant time series variation in the magnitude of analysts' 
earnings forecast errors made for the IPOs in the first year of their public lives. 
4. A significant relation between the magnitude of analysts' forecast errors and 
IPO activity is uncovered indicating that as analysts become more overoptimistic for 
recent IPOs or ( less pessimistic on an adjusted base) more capital is raised from 
IPOs in the current month. 
5. IPO firms do not time the equity issue around the peak of their profitability. 
Analysts revise upwards their earnings forecasts for 30 months after the month of the 
listing. IPO firms time the equity issue at the beginning or during a period of earnings 
growth. 
The rest of the chapter follows like this: First we present evidence on the 
accuracy of UK analysts in forecasting the earnings of all the firms covered by 
I/B/E/S and how the forecasts errors vary across time and according to the industry 
and market value of the firm for which the earnings financial analysts are trying to 
forecast. Following that, we report our results on analysts' forecast accuracy for the 
IPO firms for the 5 years since the firms went public and how the forecast errors 
affect the IPO volume. At the last part of this chapter we look at how analysts revise 
their earnings forecasts for, recently listed firms., 
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8.2. CHARACTERISTICS OF FINANCIAL ANALYSTS FORECAST ERRORS 
Previous research has shown that analysts are on average overoptimistic for 
the earnings of firms. The forecasted earnings are on average higher than the actual 
earnings, Berry & Dreman(1995), Chopra (1998) among others. Analysts' forecast 
accuracy however increases as the month of the announcement of earnings 
approaches. Our sample comprises of forecasts made for the current year earnings 
and were made up to 12 month prior to the announcement of the earnings provided 
by UB/E/S 
. 
Our sample covers the period January 1987 to December 1998. The 
number of forecasts depends on the horizon of the forecast. The larger number of 
forecasts were made 1 month prior to the earnings are announced, 10149 forecasts 
, 
and the smaller number of forecasts are made 12 months before the announcement of 
the earnings 
, 
5342 forecasts. As with other studies, we find that analysts' forecasts 
are significantly overoptimistic. The forecast error is calculated as (actual earnings 
- 
Forecasted earnings) / share price at the time the forecast is made. 16 The average 
forecast errors for all 12 forecast horizons are negative and significantly different 
from zero. Forecast accuracy decreases as the time horizon of the forecast increases. 
Results on average forecast errors made for all firms covered in I/B/E/S are in table 
8.1. When analysts forecast the earnings one month before the earnings 
announcement, they overestimate the earnings by 1.6% as a percentage of the share 
price. This overestimation increases to 2.8% when they forecast the earnings 6 
month before the announcement of earnings and goes to 3.9% when the forecast is 
made one year before the announcement. Median forecast errors are non-negative for 
the forecast horizons of 1 to 6 months. Only when the forecasts are made 7 to 12 
months before the 'earnings announcements are median forecast errors negative. 
47.2% of all forecasts made one month before the announcement of the 
earnings are underestimating the earnings and only 32% of forecasts overestimate the 
earnings with 20.8% of forecasts being accurate. As the forecast horizon increases, 
the percentage of positive errors decrease and those of negative errors increase. When 
analysts forecast the earnings 6 months prior to the, announcement of the earnings, 
47.6% of forecasts are underestimated and 49.4% of forecasts are overestimated. 12 
16 We deflate the forecast errors by the share price and not by the actual earnings per share. That is 
based on the assumption that the price is' a' more effective deflator than earnings. Christie (1987) 
discusses the merits of using price as a deflator of forecasts. However we also do it for the sake of 
comparability with the results of Rajan & Servaes (1998). 
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months before their announcement, 59% of their forecast are overoptimistic and only 
39.6% are pessimistic. Appendix 8.1 lists the average forecast errors analysts make 
for the whole sample of UB/E/S and other descriptive statistics. 
TABLE 8.1: AVERAGE FINANCIAL ANALYSTS EARNINGS FORECAST 
ERRORS FOR ALL THE FIRMS COVERED IN I/B/E/S IN THE UK 
The sample consists of all firms for which forecasts for the current year earnings were available from 
IB/E/S in the period 1987 to 1998 in the UK. The Horizon of the forecast refers to the period, in 
months, between the time the forecast is made and the announcement of the current year earnings. The 
errors are calculated as the difference between the Actual Earnings per share and the Forecasted 
earninQC ner share divided nver the share nrice at the time the fnrecact is mane 
HORIZON OF THE 
FORECAST 
AVERAGE 
FORECAST ERROR 
(FULL SAMPLE) 
AVERAGE 
FORECAST ERROR 
(EXCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 
BELOW AND ABOVE 3 
STANDARD DEVIATIONS FROM 
THE MEAN 
AVERAGE 
FORECAST ERROR 
(EXCLUDING 
OBSERVATIONS 1% AT 
THE TWO TAILS) 
1 month -0.016* -0.005* -0.004* 
2 months -0.018* -0.006* c -0.005* b 
3 months -0.026* -0.012* -0.006* b 
4 months -0.029* -0.015* c -O. 008* b 
5 months -0.025* -0.013* -0.009* b 
6 months -0.028* -0.015* c -0.011* b 
7 months -0.029* -0.015* -0.013* b 
8 months -0.03* -0.017* -0.014* b 
9 months -0.032* -0.018* -0.015* 
10 months -0.035* -0.021* c -0.016* 
11 months -0.035* -0.020* c -0.017* 
12 months -0.039* -0.024* b -0.02* b 
------------------ - -- - --------------------------------------------------------------   * Denotes significantly d ferent from zero at I% two tails 
a : Denotes that the average error of that forecast horizon is significantly more negative than the 
average forecast error of the immediate shorter horizon at 1% level two tails 
b : Denotes that the average error of that forecast horizon is significantly more negative than the 
average forecast error of the immediate shorter horizon at 5% level two tails 
c : Denotes that the average error of that forecast horizon is significantly more negative than the 
averageýbrecast error of the immediate shorter horizon at 10% level two tails 
.............................. .......................... The average forecast errors however are very sensitive to the presence of 
outliers. There is a small number of observations that distort the data. For example 
the most negative forecast error with a forecast horizon of 4 months is 
-91.1. If we 
exclude that observation the average forecast error for the 4 month forecast horizon 
drops from 
-2.9% to -1.9%. Therefore, we also report the average forecast errors 
excluding all observations that are over or below 3 standard deviations from the 
mean and alternatively by removing the 1% at each tail of the distribution (columns 3 
and 4 in table 8.1). , As a results of these exclusions of outliers, the average forecast 
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errors decrease ( become less negative) by up to two thirds of the average error for 
the whole sample. The average forecast error with 1 month horizon drops to 
-0.5% 
and 
-0.4% after the exclusions respectively from -1.6% for the whole sample. The 
average forecast error with a6 month forecast horizon decreases to 
-1.5% and -1.1% 
after the exclusions respectively from 
-2.8% for the whole sample. Even though 
errors are significantly reduced, they remain statistically significantly different from 
zero. Furthermore, even after the exclusions, the same pattern of improved accuracy 
as the announcement of the earnings approaches is observed. The differences 
between the average forecast errors from the average error of the immediate shorter 
forecast horizon is statistical significant for most of the pairs. More details (medians, 
maximum, minimum etc. ) about the forecast errors for the whole I/B/E/S sample and 
the sample after the exclusions are in the appendices 8.1,8.2 and 8.3. 
Apart from the horizon of the forecast, there are some other factors that affect 
the magnitude of the errors. Brown (1997) reports significant variations in forecast 
errors for different industries. The sector effect is also present in our sample. More 
specifically as we can see in table 8.2, analysts' forecast errors differ from one 
industry to another. In Figure 8.1 we can see that the average errors with a 12 month 
forecast horizon ( after the 1% exclusions) for firms in the Technology or Capital 17 
sector are much higher ( 
-2.49% and -2.47% respectively) than the errors made for 
the Utilities and Transport ( 
-0.31% and -1.6% respectively). The ' average forecast 
error of all forecast horizons for the Utility sector is 
-0.0017 while the average 
forecast error of all forecast horizons for the technology sector is 
-0.01624. 
17 We use the sector classification made by IBES 
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TABLE 8.2: AVERAGE FINANCIAL ANALYSTS' FORECAST ERRORS 
FOR DIFFERENT INDUSTRIES 
INDUSTRY UTILITY TRANSPORT HEALTH FINANCE ENERGY CAPITAL TECHNOLOGN' 
Forecast Horizon 
-0.0001 -0.0004 -0.0031 -0.0049 -0.0072 -0.0046 -0.0062 
1 month (137) (162) (377) (1387) (202) (2323) (542) 
Forecast ! lorizon 2 
-0.0001 -0.0029 -0.0046 -0.0068 -0.0075 -0.0055 -0.0075 
months (124) (143) (371) (1365) (199) (2265) (520) 
Forecast I lorizon 3 
-0.0009 -0.0038 -0.0052 -0.0068 -0.0077 -0.0074 -0.0086 
months (121) (137) (370) (1365) (199) (2217) (516) 
Forecast Horizon 4 
-0.0010 -0.0045 -0.0051 -0.0076 -0.0084 -0.0098 -0.0120 
months (118) (134) (367) (1353) (199) (2174) (507) 
Forecast Horizon 5 
-0.0004 -0.0047 -0.0057 -0.0099 -0.0097 -0.0108 -0.0145 
months (115) (129) (360) (1319) (196) (2129) (489) 
Forecast Horizon 6 
-0.0003 -0.0059 -0.0064 -0.0108 -0.01 12 -0.0135 -0.0169 
months (III) (121) (352) (1296) (194) (2073) (478) 
Forecast Horizon 7 
-0.0006 -0.0064 -0.0087 -0.0128 -0.0127 -0.0152 -o. 0184 
months (108) (121) (350) (1289) (193) (2028) (473) 
Forecast Horizon 8 
-0.0055 -0.0079 -0.0103 -0.0145 -0.0132 -0.0177 -0.0216 
months 
(106) (117) (344) (1277) (193) (1969) (468) 
Forecast horizon 9 -0.0018 
-0.01 14 -0.0105 -0.0141 -0.0122 -0.0197 -0.0236 
months (106) (117) (335) (1250) (183) (1905) (461) 
Forecast Horizon 10 -0.0020 -0.0094 -0.0097 0.0155 -0.0129 0.0217 -0.0237 
months 
(102) (114) (325) (1200) (182) (1808) (449) 
Forecast l lorizon 11 -0.0068 -0.0092 -0.0116 -0.0157 -0.0133 -0.0221 -0.0248 
months 
(92) (110) (295) (1094) (170) (1582) (422) 
Forecast I lorizon 12 
-0.0031 -0.0160 -0.0133 -0.0199 -0.0190 -0.0247 -0.0249 
months 
(71) (80) (224) (765) (118) (1128) (302) 
Average of all -0.00170 -0.00629 -0.00752 -0.01113 -0.01090 -0.01343 -0.0164 
forecast horizons 
................. ............................................................................................................................................................................................ The errors are the average forecast errors (? /'the industry after the exclusions of the outliers in 
the 1% at the two tails of the distribution In parentheses we have the number of frec"u. ct errors.... 
............. .................................................. ......... Apart from the industry classification, another factor that has been found to 
affect errors is the market size of the firms for which analysts earnings are trying to 
predict, Bamber (1987), Peters (1993), Brown (1997). To find the effect of the firms' 
size on (precast errors we ranked all firms that are covered in UB/E/S according to 
their market value at the time the of the fiscal year end. We then transformed their 
market values at December 1996 prices. Following that we split the total number of 
observations into 4 similar size quartiles and calculated the average forecast error in 
each quartile. Small firms are the firms in the smallest size quartile. Large firms are 
the firms in the largest size quartile. 
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In table 8.3 and figure 8.2 we see that the larger the size of the company the 
smaller the errors. For example the forecast error with I month forecast horizon is 
- 
1.16% for small firms and 
-0.06% for large firms. The error with a 12 month lorecast 
horizon is 
-5.12% for the small firms and -0.69% for larger firms. Small companies 
seem to offer more negative surprises to analysts. The average forecast error of' all 
forecast horizons for the small firms is 
-0.0512 while the average forecast error of all 
forecast horizons for the large firms is significantly lower, 
-0.0069. 
TABLE 8.3: AVERAGE FINANCIAL ANALYSTS' FORECAST ERRORS FOR 
FIRMS WITH DIFFERENT MARKET SIZE 
AVERAGE 
ERRORIN 
SMALL SIZE 
QUARTILE 
AVERAGE 
ERRORIN 
MEDIUM I SIZE 
QUARTILE 
AVERAGE 
ERROR IN 
MEDIUM2 
SIZE QUARTILE 
AVERAGE 
ERROR IN 
LARGER SIZE 
QUARTILE 
Forecast Horizon I month 
-0.01 16 -0.0027 -0.0014 -0.0006 
Forecast Horizon 2 months 
-0.0152 -0.0035 -0.0020 -0.001O 
Forecast Horizon 3 months 
-0.0176 -0.0049 -0.0027 -0.0015 
Forecast I lorizon 4 months 
-0.0195 -0.0060 -0.0040 -0.0026 
Forecast I lorizon 5 months 
-0.0237 -0.0070 -0.0047 -0.0034 
Forecast I lorizon 6 months 
-0.0279 -0.0081 -0.005") -0.0041 
Forecast Horizon 7 months 
-0.0316 -0.0103 -0.0065 -0.0047 
Forecast Ilorizon 8 months 
-0.0376 -0.0118 -0.0070 -0.0055 
Forecast Horizon 9 months 
-0.0393 -0.0128 -0.0076 -0.0059 
Forecast I Iorizon 10 months 
-0.0414 -0.0145 -0.0089 -0.0064 
Forecast Horizon 11 months 
-0.0422 -0.0159 -0.0088 -0.0072 
Forecast Horizon 12 months 
-0.0512 -0.0191 -0.0116 -0.0069 
Average of all forecast 
horizons 
-0.0279 -0.0090 -0.0055 -0.0039 
................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... Allfirms that are covered in 1, /ß, ýEAS are ranked according to their market value in December 96 prices at the 
time the earnings are reported.. Following that, we split the 9.798 firms for which data about their market values 
at the time oftheir earnings announcements have been found into 4 similar size quartiles. Sinallfirins are the 
firms in the smallest size quartile. Laºge. ßrms are the firms in the largest size quartile. In parentheses we have 
the number of observations 
......................................................................................................................................................................: 
Finally, we can see in table 8.4 that there is a wide variation in the magnitude 
of analysts errors across time. Figure 8.3 shows the average forecast error made for 4 
out of the 12 different forecast horizons from 1987 to 1997 for all firms covered in 
1/13/E/S 
. 
When analysts were forecasting the earnings in 1991 they were much more 
overoptimistic than 1994. The average forecast errors made in 1991 for a 12 month 
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forecast horizon is 
-4.2% but it is only -0.09% in 1994. The average forecast error of 
all forecast horizons made in 1990 is 
-0.0201 while the average forecast error of all 
forecast horizons made in 1996 is significantly reduced to 
-0.0071. 
So, in order to investigate whether analysts are overoptimistic for the earnings 
of' 1110 firms the proper adjustments have to be made. IPO firms are usually small 
firms which as we saw are characterised of higher forecast errors. The use of 
unadjusted forecast errors alone is not recommended. The three factors, ( industry 
size, and year) are three factors that we take into account into our analysis. 
TABLE 8.4: AVERAGE FINANCIAL ANALYSTS' FORECAST ERROR IN 
YEARS 1987 TO 1997 
YEAR 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Forecast Horizon 
-0-0011 -0.0008 -0.0026 -0.0045 -0.0075 -0.0090 -0.0065 -0.0029 -0.0034 -0.0034 0.0020 
I month (583) (906) (909) (802) (802) (853) (933) (909) (969) (999) (1026) 
Forecast Horizon 
-0.0002 -0.0007 -0.0041 -0.0064 -0.0088 -0.0114 -0.0091 -0.0050 -0.0052 -0.0034 -0.0031 
2 months (494) (905) (897) (791) (790) (844) (892) (896) (973) (999) (1018) 
Forecast horizon 
-0.0004 -0.0003 -0.0048 -0.0083 -0.0128 -0.0130 -0.0096 -0.0065 -0.0065 -0.0040 -0.0028 
3 months (547) (868) (887) (791) (772) (804) (983) (859) (978) (1090) (1012) 
Forecast I lorizon 
-0.0005 -0.0009 -0.0051 -0.0121 -0.0152 -0.0170 -0.0099 -0.0059 -0.0065 -0.0052 -0.0046 
4 months (505) (857) (972) (797) (742) (754) (1085) (846) (1002) (1058) (813) 
Forecast horizon 0.0017 
-0.0013 -0.0065 -0.0154 -0.0187 -0.0195 -0.0111 -0.0065 -0.0087 -0.0060 -0.0048 
5 months (541) (816) (1000) (735) (751) (836) (976) (893) (969) (974) (753) 
Forecast Horizon 0.0029 0.0015 
-0.0088 -0.0194 -0.0216 -0.0214 -0.0116 -0.0083 -0.0090 -0.0073 -0.005, 
6 months (575) (818) (898) (769) (791) (726) (996) (862) (1022) (950) (613) 
Forecast Horizon 
-0.0026 -0.0028 -0.0112 -0.0230 -0.0233 -0.0274 -0.0141 -0.0072 -0.0115 -0.0077 -0.007 
7 months (641) (853) (840) (747) (775) (749) (952) (912) (954) (951) (502) 
Forecast Horizon 
-0.0025 -0.0046 -0.0137 -0.0284 -0.0300 -0.0298 -0.0145 -0.0069 -0.0108 -0.0097 -0.008' 
8 months (738) (779) (803) (695) (786) (785) (869) (885) (935) (949) (465) 
Forecast Horizon 
-0.0032 -0.0046 -0.0150 -0.0308 -0.0324 -0.0281 -0.0165 -0.0078 -0.0116 -0.0089 -0.0074 
9 months (656) (780) (774) (696) (767) (788) (822) (894) (925) (935) (428) 
Forecast Horizon 
-0.0042 -0.0052 -0.0184 -0.0325 -0.0348 -0.0284 -0.0167 -0.0077 -0.0124 -0.0099 -0.0074 
10 months (584) (747) (700) (672) (736) (800) (765) (889) (898) (928) (371) 
Forecast Horizon 0.0043 
-0.0062 -0.0206 -0.0354 -0.0353 -0.0286 -0.0130 -0.0088 -0.0131 -0.0100 -0.0050 
II months (519) (689) (574) (636) (699) (752) (565) (864) (847) (901) (319) 
Forecast Horizon 
-0.0040 -0.0075 -0.0242 -0.0396 -0.0423) -0.032 I -0.0220 -0.0087 -0.0162 -0.0131 -0.003 
12 months 36, ) (496) (327) (509) (509) (572) (289) (729) (575) (665) (204) 
Average of all 
-0.0023 -0.0027 -0.0099 -0.0201 -0.0228 -0.0217 -0.0121 -0.0068 -0.0093 -0.0071 0.004E 
forecast horizons 
................................ ............................................................................................................................................................................ In parentheses we have the numher o1 observations 
......................................................................................................... 
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8.3. FINANCIAL ANALYSTS EARNINGS FORECASTS ERRORS FOR FIRMS MAKING AN 
IPO. 
Rajan & Servaes (1998) find that analyst significantly overestimate the 
earnings of firms that go public during the first two years of their public lives. No 
study has been conducted in the UK to see whether analysts are overoptimistic for the 
earnings of newly listed firms in the UK. To fill this gap we use UK data of Initial 
Public Offerings and financial analysts earnings forecasts made for these IPOs. The 
source of the IPO sample is the KPMG New Issue Statistics. Our sample covers the 
years from 1987 to 1996. Table 8.5 contains details about the number of firms 
making Initial Public Offers with the method of offer for sale, offer for subscription 
or placings and the amount of capital raised in December 1996 prices (excluding the 
privatisations) from 1987 to 1996. According to the KPMG New Issue statistics, 
during that 10-year period 902 firms went public with the method of offer for sale, 
offer for subscription or placing. There is a big variation in IPO activity across time. 
During 1994,179 firms went public while in 1991 the number of newly admitted 
firms was only 18. There is also a big variation in the amount of capital raised from 
IPOs with 1996 being the most active year with almost £10 billion raised. The 
IB/E/S however does not cover the whole sample of our IPOs. The number of IPO 
firms covered with earnings forecasts in the first year of the life of the IPOs varies 
over time and according to the horizon of the forecast. For example, we have 184 
forecasts made in the first year of the IPOs that are forecasting the current year 
""° earnings 3 months before the earnings are announced but only 83 forecasts made in 
the first year of the life of the IPO and were forecasting the 'current year earnings 12 
months before the earnings are announced. The level of coverage of the IPOs during 
their first public life varies from only 11% of the IPOs that went public in 1996 to 
40% of IPOs that came into the market in 1991. 
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TABLE 8.5: ANNUAL DISTRIBUTION OF INITIAL PUBLIC 
OFFERINGS AND IB/E/S COVERAGE OF IPOs 
The sample consists of offers of Common Stock made with the method of offer for sale 
and/or offer for subscription. The IPOs are collected from the KPMG NEW ISSUE 
STATISTICS. All Privatisations are excluded from the sample. First Day returns is the 
Price at the end of the first trading day minus the offer price over the offer price. 
YEAR NUMBER 
OF IPOs 
Number of IPOs 
covered by I/B/E/S in 
the first year of the 
life of the IPOs with a 
3 month forecast 
horizon 
Number of IPOs 
covered by I/B/E/S at 
least in one of the first 
five years of the life of 
the IPO 
IPO PROCEEDS £000 
(No privatisations) 
DEC 1996 prices 
1987 118 17(14%) 63(53%) 813,188 
1988 125 33 (26%) 70(56%) 1,806,070 
1989 82 23 (28%) 41(50%) 526,548 
1990 30 12 (26%) 15 (50%) 156,043 
1991 18 13(40%) 11(61%) 425,514 
1992 33 8(24%) 26 (78%) 1,232,279 
1993 137 18(13%) 66 (48%) 5,363,616 
1994 179 21(13%) 63 (35%) 8,788,834 
1995 75 24 (32%) 17 (22%) 2,514,200 
1996 105 12(11%) 12(11%) 9,973,404 
IBES coverage increases as the IPO firms become more seasoned. During the 
second year of the public life of the IPO, I/B/E/S provides 328 forecasts that were 
forecasting the current year earnings 3 months before the earnings are announced and 
174 forecasts that were forecasting the current year earnings 12 months before the 
earnings are announced. The total number of IPOs for which I/B/E/S provides 
forecasts for the current year earnings for at least one of the first five years from the 
listing is 384. 
We focus our attention to the earnings forecasts made from year one to year 
five and we want to see if the IPO activity in a given month is affected by the level of 
analysts overoptimism for the recent IPOs or the by the level of analysts 
overoptimism for the whole market. If managers exploit analysts earnings 
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ývý, 
overoptimism we should find that as the magnitude of analysts overoptimism 
increases more capital is raised from Initial 
Public Offers. So, the hypothesis we are testing is: 
................................................................................................................................................................................................................ Ho: There is no relation between analysts'. fvrecasi errors made fc)r the recent 
IPOs and/or the errors made fror all the firms in the nturket and IPO volume. 
He: There is a negative and significant relation between analvsts' jhreca. cl 
errors made for the recent IPOs and/or the errors made for all the firms in the 
market and IPO volume. 
....... 
................................................... ............................................................................................................................................ 
To provide support for the argument that analysts earnings overoptimism 
affects the IPO activity we should find a significant negative relation between the two 
and reject the null hypothesis of no significant negative relation. 
First we need to know whether analyst are overoptimistic for the earnings of 
IPOs during their early stages of their public lives. Table 8.6 reports the forecast 
errors that were made during the first five years of the IPO from the day of its listing. 
The same results are also presented in figure 8.4. Since analysts' accuracy improves 
as the forecast is made closer to the announcement of the earnings we report forecast 
errors for the 12 different forecast horizons. 
We find that in the first year of the IPO. Ilk) forecast errors are not 
significantly different from zero for the 10 out of the 12 forecast horizons. Forecast 
errors with forecast horizons of 2 to 5 months arc positive but insignificant from 
zero. Forecast errors with a forecast horizon of 6 to 12 months are negative but only 
the forecasts with II and 12 months are significantly negative at 5% level of 
significance using two- tail tests. The average forecast error of all forecast horizons 
made in the I" year of the life of the IPOs is 
-0.00091 which is not significantly 
different from zero even at 10% level. Our results indicate that when forecasts are 
made during the first year after the IPO, analysts do not significantly overestimate 
the earnings. These results are in contrast with the results of Rajan and Servaes 
(1998) who find that analysts overestimate the earnings of the IPOs in the first year 
oftheir life. They find that the average forecast error with a three month horizon is 
- 
0.0336 as a percentage of their share price and we find that the average error with the 
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same forecast horizon is 0.00094. The forecast error with a twelve month horizon in 
Rajan and Servaes (1998) was 
-0.0577 and we find that it is -0.0092. Potential 
reasons for these differences, apart from the obvious fact that we investigate the UK 
market and they look at forecasts made for US firms, is that the time period they 
study is 1975 to 1987 and we study the period of 1986 to 1996. Analyst' forecast 
accuracy may have improved over time creating smaller forecast errors. Furthermore, 
the number of forecasts in their sample is approximately 3 times larger than ours. In 
addition, Rajan and Servaes (1998) calculate their forecast horizons relative to the 
month of the fiscal year end and not relative to the month of the announcement of 
earnings as we do. We find that on average in the I/B/E/S sample, the announcement 
of earnings is made 5 months after the fiscal year end ( median 4 months). So, when 
Rajan and Servaes (1998) report an average error of 3 month forecast horizon, 
relative to the fiscal year end) of 
-0.0577 it is an error of 8 month forecast horizon 
relative to the announcement of earnings. The difference however between the errors 
we find in the UK and Rajan and Servaes (1998) in the US remains even after that is 
taken into account. 
Analysts start to significantly overestimate IPOs earnings in the UK in the 
second year after the IPO. Forecast errors made in the second year of the life of the 
IPO are significantly negative for 9 out of 12 forecast horizons but still are much 
lower than the forecast errors Rajan and Serves (1998) found. The average forecast 
errors made in the second year of the life of the IPO with a6 and 12 month forecast 
horizons are 
-0.0043 and -0.0118 and Rajan and Servaes (1998) report average 
errors of 
-0.0345 and -0.0534 respectively. Forecast errors made in the second year 
after the IPO are more negative than the errors made in the, first year for all forecast 
horizons and significantly at least at 10% 
, 
two tail tests, for 8 out of the 12 forecast 
horizons. The average forecast error of all forecast horizons made in the 2nd year of 
the life of the IPOs is 
-0.0056 which is significantly different from zero at 1% level 
and is significantly more negative than the average error of all forecast horizons 
made in year 1 at I% level of significance. 
Average forecast errors made during the 3`d year of the life of the IPOs are 
significantly negative for all forecast horizons. Average errors made during the 3rd 
year are more negative than the average errors made in year, 2 for all forecast 
horizons and significantly so at 10% level, two tail tests, for 8, out of 12 forecast 
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horizons. The average forecast error of all forecast horizons made in the 3'd year of 
the life of the IPO is 
-0.010 which is significantly different from zero at 1% level and 
is significantly more negative at 1% level than the average error of all forecast 
horizons made in the 2 "d year.. 
TABLE 8.6: AVERAGE FINANCIAL ANALYSTS' FORECAST ERRORS 
FOR IPOs DURING THE FIRST 5 YEAR OF THEIR PUBLIC LIFE. 
The sample consists of all IPOs for which forecasts for the current year earnings were available from 
I/B/E/S in the period 1987 to 1998. The Horizon of the forecast refers to the period, in months, 
between the time the forecast is made and the announcement of the current year earnings. The errors 
are calculated as the difference between the Actual Earnings per share and the Forecasted earnings per 
share divided over the share price at the time the forecast is made and are recorded according to the 
month the forecast is made. 
1St ear: : 2° ear, 
_ 
3rd year 11 4, year, 5t year 
Horizon of 
the 
forecast 
Average 
Forecast 
error made 
in 1 S` Year 
from the 
Listing 
Number 
of 
Forecast 
errors in 
the 1" 
year 
Average 
Forecast 
error made 
in 2nd Year, 
from the 
Listin 
Number 
of 
Forecast 
errors in 
the 2'd 
year 
Average 
Forecast 
error made 
in 3`d Year 
from the 
Listing 
Number 
of 
Forecast 
errors in 
the 3'd 
year 
Average 
Forecast 
error made 
in 4`h Year 
from the 
Listing 
Number 
of 
Forecast 
errors in 
the 4'h 
year 
Average 
Forecast 
error made 
in 5`h Year, 
from the 
Listing 
Number 
of 
Forecast 
errors in 
the 5th 
year 
1 month -0.0005 158 -0.0008 347 -0.0017** 357 -0.0061* a 323 -0.0077* 272 
2 months 0.00081 170 -0.0005 345 -0.0045* b 335 -0.0065* a 306 -0.0073* 272 
3 months 0.00094 184 -0.0012 328 -0.0054* b 343 -0.0078* a 292 -0.0092* 261 
4months, 0.00066 182 
-0.0021**c 335 -0.0081*a 332 -0.01* a 281 -0.0117* 259 
5 months 0.00105 176 -0.0036* a 336 -0.0089* b 327 -0.0129* a 275 -0.0134* 247 
6 months -0.0004 166 -0.0043* c 316 -0.0102* b 320 -0.014* a 270 -0.0189* 245 
7 months -0.0013 162 -0.0062* b 313 -0.0131* 311 -0.0152* a 264 -0.0188* 239 
8 months -0.0013 163 -0.0094* a 309, -0.0126* 303 -0.0188* a 259 -0.0184* 235 
9 months -0.0001 156 -0.0093* a 303, -0.0144* c 289 -0.0182* a 253 -0.0204* 227 
10 months -0.0018 143 -0.0119* a 282 -0.0138* 281 -0.0214* a 255 -0.0201 * 215 
11 months -0.0056** 130 -0.0123* c 263 -0. C155* 248 -0.02 31* a 227 -0.0183* 191 
12 months -0.0092** 83 -0.0118* 174 -0.0203* c 182 -0.0267* a 164 -0.0181* 129 
Average o 
all forecast 
horizons 
a 
-0.00091 1860 -0.0056* a 3651 -0.010 a 3628 -0.0141 *a 3169 -0.0147 * 2792 
* denotes Significance from zero at 1% two tail tests 
** denotes Significance from zero at 5% two tail tests 
*** denotes Significance from zero at 10% two tail tests 
a, b, c Denote significance from same forecast horizon of the previous year of the life 6f the IPO at B lo, 5% and 10% 
respectively at two-tail tests. 
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The average forecast errors continue to be significantly negative in the 4t' 
year after the listing for all forecast horizons. The average errors made in year 4 are 
significantly more negative than the errors made in the year 3 for all 12 forecast 
horizons. The average forecast error of all forecast horizons made in year 4 is 
- 
0.01418 which is significantly different from zero at 1% and is significantly more 
negative at 1% than the average forecast error made in the 3rd year. 
The average forecast errors made in year 5 remain significantly negative for 
all forecast horizons but they do not differ from the errors made in year 4. The 
average forecast error of all forecast horizons made in the Sth year is 
-0.0147, 
significantly different from zero at 1% but does not differ from the average error of 
all forecast horizons made in year 4. 
The analysis of unadjusted forecast errors reveals that analysts are not 
overoptimistic in the first year of their public lives for the current year earnings of 
firms that go public. 
We showed however earlier that analysts are on average overoptimistic for ":, 
all firms and that the forecast errors are affected by the industry and the size of the 
firms and the year the forecast is made. So, in order to get the error that is unique for 
the IPOs we have to adjust them for these three factors. 
Table 8.7 reports the adjusted average forecast error analysts make for the 
IPOs in the first five years from their listing. Adjusted forecast error for firm i is 
computed by subtracting from the unadjusted forecast error for firm i the average 
forecast error analyst made in forecasting the earnings for firms in the same industry 
with firm i and in the same Quartile of market size with firm i within that industry. 
and in the same year with a same forecast horizon with the unadjusted error. For 
more information on how the adjusted errors are computed see section 4.5. The 
adjusted forecast errors are plotted in figure, 8.5. 
In true terms (adjusted errors), IPOs positively and significantly surprise 
investors in the first and second years. Average adjusted forecast errors made in the 
first and second year of the IPO, for all forecast horizons, are significantly positive. 
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The average forecast error of all forecast horizons made in the 1st year is 0.00895 
which is significantly positive at 1% level. Average adjusted forecast errors made 
during the 2°d year after the IPOs are significantly positive for all 12 forecast 
horizons. Average adjusted forecast errors in the second year may be positive but are 
smaller than the average errors made in the first year and significantly so for 6 out of 
the 12 forecast horizons. The average forecast error of all forecast horizons made 
during the 2°d year is 0.00497, significantly different from zero at 1%, and also 
significantly lower than the average error made in year 1 at 1% level of significance. 
These findings are in contrast with the finding of Rajan and Servaes (1998) 
who found that adjusted forecast errors are negative and significantly different form 
zero. For example we find that the average adjusted forecast errors made in the first 
and second year of the life of the IPO with a twelve month forecast horizon are 
0.0110 and 0.0085, respectively and Rajan and Servaes (1998) find that the errors 
with the same horizon are 
-0.0321 and -0.0205 respectively. 
In the 3vd year after the IPO, the average adjusted forecast errors are 
significantly positive for 3 out of the 12 forecast horizons and the average adjusted 
error of all forecast horizons made in the 3`d year is 0.0022, significantly positive at 
10% and significantly lower than the average error made in year 2 at 1% level. 
In the 4th year after the IPO, average adjusted forecast errors are significantly 
positive for only 2 out of the 12 forecast horizons. The average adjusted error of all 
forecast horizons is positive, 0.00155, but not significantly different from zero but it 
is significantly lower than the average error made in year 3.. 
In the 5th year after the IPO, the average adjusted forecast, errors are not_ 
different from zero apart from the errors made with a forecast horizon of 11 and 12 
months which are significantly positive at 10% level of significance. The average 
forecast errors made in year 5 are not different from the average forecast errors made 
in year 4 for any forecast horizon. The average error made in year 5 of all forecast 
horizons is 0.00167 
, 
not significantly different from zero and in also not different 
from the average error of all forecast horizons made in year 4. 
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TABLE 8.7: AVERAGE FINANCIAL ANALYSTS' ADJUSTED FORECAST 
ERRORS FOR IPOs DURING THE FIRST 5 YEAR OF THEIR PUBLIC LIFE. 
The sample consists of all IPOs for which forecasts for the current year earnings were available from 
IB/E/S in the period 1987 to 1998. The Horizon of the forecast refers to the period, in months, 
between the time the forecast is made and the announcement of the current year earnings. The errors 
are calculated as the difference between the Actual Earnings per share and the Forecasted earnings per 
share divided over the share price at the time the forecast is made and are recorded according to the 
month the forecast is made. Errors are adjusted by subtracting the average errors analysts make for the 
firms in the same industry, and the same quartile in terms of the market value of the firm at the same 
Ist year 2- year, 4': , ý_ , 3`_ year , 2':, t°4 , year .. 57, year 
Horizon of 
the forecast 
Average 
Adjusted 
Forecast error 
made in 1 
Year from the 
Listing 
Number o 
Adjusted 
Forecast 
errors in 
the 1' year 
Average 
Adjusted 
Forecast error 
made in 2"d 
Year from the 
Listing 
Number o 
Adjusted 
Forecast 
errors in 
the 2nd 
year 
Average 
Adjusted 
Forecast error 
made in 3`d 
Year from the 
Listing 
Number o 
Adjusted 
Forecast 
errors in 
the 3`d 
year 
Average 
Adjusted 
Forecast error 
made in 4'h 
Year from the 
Listing 
Number 
of 
Adjusted 
Forecast 
errors in 
the 4`h 
year 
Average 
Adjusted 
Forecast 
error made in 
5`h Year from 
the Listing 
Number 
Adjust 
Form 
errors I 
the 5d 
year 
I month 0.0027*** 106 0.0033* 325 0.0025* 343 
-0.0009 298 -0.0008 263 
2 months 0.0055* 164 0.0045* 327 0.0017 324 0.0009 284 0.0019 264 
3 months 0.0067* 178 0.0045* 315 0.0022*** 329 0.0007 272 0.0017 253 
4 months 0.0070* 177 0.0054* 322 0.0007 319 0.0005 262 0.00 0 - 251 
5 months 0.0095* 171 0.0049* 324 0.0015 314 
-0.0005 254 0.0015 243 
6 months 0.0097* 160 0.0053* 307 0.0017 310 0.0005 248 
-0.0013 240 
7 months 0.0099* 155 0.0053* 304 0.0005 300 0.0040*** 245 
-0.0011 234 
8 months 0.0126* 157 0.0048* 300 0.0041*** 293 0.0031 240 0.0018 230 
9 months 0.0120* 150 0.0054* 294 0.0017 279 0.0051*** 234 0.0016 222 
10 months 0.0113* 138 0.0042** 274 0.0035 267 0.0024 236 0.0036 214 
11 months 0.0099* 125 0.0052* 257 0.0038 236 0.0012 210 0.0054*** 189 
12 months 0.0110* 80 0.0085* 170 0.0046 173 0.0030 155 0.0097*** 126 
Average of 
all forecast 
horizons 
0.00895* 1761 0.00497 *a 3519 0.0022*** a 
, 
3487 0.00155 a 2938 0.00167, 2729 
................ ------------ ........................................................ _ ............... ............. _ ... 
* denotes Significance at 1% two tail tests 
** denotes Significance at 5% two tail tests 
* denotes Significance at 10% two tail tests -- 
The number of adjusted forecast errors is d ferent from the number of unadjusted forecast errors 
because details about the market value could not be found for some companies 
---... _....... 
.. 
, ', 
_" 
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Unlike Rajan & Servaes (1997), we do not find that IPOs in the UK 
negatively surprise investors in the first year of the listing. We find that when 
analysts forecast the earnings of IPOs during the first year of their public life the 
average unadjusted errors are not significantly negative. In other words, it seems that 
analysts that forecast earnings in the first year after the IPO are accurate in their 
predictions. When the errors are adjusted for industry and size 
, 
we find that IPOs 
positively surprise investors in the first three years. After that, adjusted errors are not 
significantly different from zero. 
Our evidence suggest that analysts do not "inflate" their earnings forecasts 
when they forecast the profitability of the newly listed stocks during their first year of 
their public life. That indicates that UK analysts forecast "prudently" the earnings of 
newly listed firms and do not overestimate the forecasts they make. 
Even though analysts do not make overoptimistic forecasts for the earnings 
of IPOs during the first year of their lives there is a big variation in the sign and the 
magnitude of the errors across time. 
We showed in figure 8.4 that analysts overoptimism for the whole I/B/E/S 
sample varies across time. While analyst in general are overoptimistic there are 
periods when this overoptimism is very severe. Even though we find that 
(unadjusted) forecasts made for IPOs in the first year of their public life on average 
are not significantly overoptimistic, these errors exhibit variations across time. 
Figure 8.6 shows the average unadjusted forecast errors for 2 out of the 12 forecast 
horizons, made by analysts in the first year of the IPOs per year (solid lines). We 
can see that even though we found in table 8.6 that the average unadjusted forecast 
errors made in the first year of the IPO are not significantly different from zero, there 
are variations in the magnitude of these errors acrosstime. The average unadjusted 
forecast error with a7 month horizon was 0.0071 in -1990 but became 
-0.0069 two 
-rri'r6 years later in 1992. All other forecast windows exhibited similar variations (not 
reported). Even for the adjusted errors (Dotted lines), made in the first year of the 
IPOs which we found to be significant positive; we can see that there are some years 
when adjusted forecast errors are lower ( less positive). For example, the average 
adjusted forecast error with ä7 month forecast horizon was 0.024 in 1989 and 
dropped to 0.007 in 1991. So, even by using adjusted forecast errors for IPOs we can 
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see that there is a variation in the magnitude of analysts' overoptimism or rather 
pessimism since adjusted forecast errors are positive. It could be the case that these 
swings in analysts' "mood" affect the IPO activity. 
8.4. FINANCIAL ANALYSTS EARNINGS FORECAST ERRORS AND THE TIMING OF 
INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERS. 
Rajan & Servaes (1998) argue that "if analysts are overoptimistic about the 
growth potential of recent IPOs and there is substantial variation in analysts 
overoptimism across time more firms should come to the market when this 
overoptimism is severe". 
We investigate whether the IPO activity in the UK is affected by the 
magnitude of analyst's forecast errors for the recent IPOs or the whole market. 
Unlike Rajan and Servaes (1997) who use long term growth forecasts we use the 
forecast errors as explanatory variable. Analysts may be forecasting high growth in 
earnings in a certain period but this high prospects may represent the reality. 
Managers will not exploit overoptimism if they time the issue at a period when 
analysts forecasts are optimistic but reflect the true picture. However, when managers 
using the inside information they posses, realise that the forecasted earnings are 
above the true value will benefit if they make the issue at a period when earnings 
forecasts are irrationally high. We want to see if managers deliberately exploit 
favourable investors sentiment and the forecast errors are the best measure for that. 
Besides that, the number of long term growth forecast available in the UK data of 
I/B/E/S is very limited. Only 2300 long term growth forecasts are available 
compared while more than 10.000 forecast are available for current year earnings in 
the whole sample of I/B/E/S 
. 
In order to reject the null hypothesis that there is no 
significant relation between the magnitude of analysts forecast errors and the IPO 
volume in favour of the alternative hypothesis of a significant negative relation 
between the forecast errors and the volume of IPOs we regress the amount of capital 
raised from IPOs in real terms per month( prices Dec 1996 excluding privatisations ) 
against the average forecast errors ( both adjusted and unadjusted) analysts made 
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7, 
during their first public year of the IPOs in forecasting their current year earnings of 
firms that came into the market in the previous 12 months 18. 
The regression analysis that involves the use of forecast errors has some 
problems to solve. First, the forecast errors are higher when the forecasts are made 
further away from the month of the announcement of the earnings. Therefore a 
researcher has to options. First to use a different regression for the forecast errors 
with different forecast horizon and second to average the forecast errors of all 
forecast horizons and use one regression only. In the second case, the fact that the 
forecast errors with large forecast horizons have higher magnitude will more than 
"eliminate" the forecast errors with small forecast horizons, which are of a smaller 
magnitude. If however a researcher uses the average excess error for each forecast 
horizon, the problem with the inequality of the forecast errors according to the 
horizon of the forecasts will be eliminated. 
Therefore, to overcome the first problem instead of using the average 
forecast errors in each month we use the average excess error in each month. To find 
the average excess error in a particular month for a particular forecast horizon, we 
remove from the average forecast error made in that month the average error made 
for IPOs during the first year of their public life with the same forecast horizon. For 
example, from the average forecast errors of January 1987, made for IPOs with an 
horizon of 1 month we remove the average forecast error made for all IPOs during 
their first public year with one month forecast horizon. From the forecast errors 
made for IPOs for January 1987 with a 12 month forecast horizon we remove the 
average forecast error made for all IPOs during the first public year with a 12 month 
forecast horizon. Therefore, instead of having 12 series from January 1987 to 
December 1996 with the average forecast errors one for each forecast horizon, we 
have 12 series from January 1987 to December 1996 with the average excess forecast 
errors one for each forecast horizon. 
The second problem is that the number of forecasts available every month 
vary according to the number of forecast horizons. For example, due to the fact that 
18 we use the average of the previous 12 months to be sure that there are forecasts made for the IPOs in 
their f irst public year available. Using a shorter period results to some months having no value for the 
average error made for the IPOs during their first public life. 
19 The first year ( 1986) is dropped because the independent variables ( previous 12 month average) 
would not have contained all the 12 months. 
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most firms announce their earnings in the first quarter of the year, in December there 
is a large number of forecasts with 3,4 and 5 months forecast horizons and a few 
forecasts with forecast horizons of 10,11 and 12 months. To overcome this problem 
when we average the average error of all forecast horizons we give 'equal weight in 
each forecast horizon. So for example, suppose that in a given month we have 5 
forecasts with forecast horizons from 1 to 6 months and each one of them having am 
average forecast errors of 
-0.001 and 20 forecasts with forecast horizons from 7 to 12 
months and each one of them having an average forecast errors of 
-0.002. We 
calculate the average error in that given month as the average of the average of each 
forecast horizons' that is 
-0.0015 and not as the weighted average of all forecasts" 
which would have given an error of 
-0.00 18. Therefore instead of using 12 different 
regression one for each forecast horizon we use the average of all forecast horizons 
excess forecast error. 
In order to reject the null hypothesis that there is no significant relation 
between the magnitude of analysts forecast errors and the IPO volume in favour of 
the alternative hypothesis of a significant negative relation between the forecast 
errors and the volume of IPOs we regress the amount of capital raised from IPOs in 
real terms per month( prices Dec 1996 excluding privatisations) against the average 
of all forecast horizons excess forecast errors ( both adjusted and unadjusted) 
analysts made for IPOs during their first public year in forecasting their current year 
earnings that came into the market in the previous 12 months. It is a time series 
regression using monthly data starting from January 1988 to December 1996. We 
also use as an independent variable the average of all forecast horizons excess 
forecast error analyst made for the whole I/B/E/S sample in the previous 12 months 
( excluding the 1% outliers). Managers may time the IPO not only to take advantage 
of analysts' earnings optimism for recent issuers but may also be looking at the 
whole market earnings' optimism. The results are in table 8.8. We employ the Newey 
-West heteroscedasticity consistent covariance method. Since, the distribution of the 
IPO proceeds per month is ' not normally distributed we use the log transformed 
values which are normally distributed with a Jarque-Bera value 3.04, a value which 
i 
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rejects the hypothesis of not normality even at 20% level. Ordinary least squares and 
TOBIT regression were also run with no qualitative differences. 21 
Our results indicate that a significant relation between forecast errors and 
IPO volume exists. The coefficient of the adjusted excess forecast error made for the 
recent IPOs is negative and highly significant with a test statistic of 
-4.5. The 
J 
? tý 
coefficient of Unadjusted excess forecast errors is also negative and highly 
significant with a test statistic of 
-5.2. In contrast with the forecast errors made for 
recent IPOs, the magnitude of the forecast errors made for the whole IB/E/S sample 
does not affect the IPO volume. The coefficients of the whole market error is 
negative but not significant. In regression number 4 we use as independent variables 
both the unadjusted forecast error made for recent IPOs and the error made for the 
whole I/B/E/S sample and we see that only the coefficient for the errors made for the 
recent IPOs is significant. The whole market earnings overoptimism is not 
significant. The adjusted R2 in the regressions that have as independent variables the 
adjusted and unadjusted forecast errors made for the recent IPOs are around 20% 
which mean that the results are economically significant as well as statistically 
significant. 
TABLE 8.8: MONTHLY TIME SERIES REGRESSION OF IPO PROCEEDS 
AGAINST FORECAST ERRORS JANUARY 1988 TO DECEMBER 1996 
The regressions we run had the following format: 
Log(IPO PROCEEDS= ao + a1Log(1+IPO Error adjusted) + a2Log(1+Errors 
made for IPOs Unadjusted)+ a3Log(1+Errors made for the whole market) 
. 
ý,,., 
Constant Errors Made for Errors Made for Errors made for the R2 
Recent IPOs Recent IPOs Whole Market adjuste 
(Adjusted) Unadjusted 
, 
d 
1 4.633 
-105.600 17.5% 
21.470 
-4.555 
2 4.482 
-131.088 21.8% 
21.713 
-5.201 
3 4.604 =4.643 
-0.4% 
17.567' 
-0.675 
4 
. 
4.478 
-130.118 
T-7 
-2.416 21.1% 
21.509 
-5.200 -0.400 ' 
21 Rajan and Servaes (1998)used TOBIT regressions. TOBIT regressions correct the standard errors of 
the coefficients and in our regressions increased the significance of the test statistics. We opted 
however to report the results with the least significant coefficients. We also have run TOBIT 
regressions and regressions with the COCHRANE-ORCUTT method to correct for serial correlation 
of the errors without any qualitative'- difference of the results '', 
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............... ................ 
_ The above regressions are monthly time series regressions. 
- 
To calculate the independent variables first we calculated 
the adjusted and unadjusted forecast errors analysts made for IPOs during their first public year and the forecast errors 
analysts made for all firms covered by IB/E/S (excluding the 1% at the 2 tails) in each month from January 1987 to December 1996 according to the forecast horizons and created 3 groups ( one for the unadjusted errors, one for the 
adjusted errors and one for the whole market errors) of 12 monthly time series one for the forecast errors of each forecast horizon. 
Following that we calculated for each one of the 3 groups 12 monthly time series with the average excess forecast error one for each forecast horizon. To find the average excess error in a particular month for a particular 
forecast horizon, we remove from the average forecast error made in that particular month for that particular forecast 
horizon the average forecast error made for all IPOs from 1987 to 1996 during the first year of their public life and had 
that particular forecast horizon. 
Instead of having 12 monthly time series regressions, one for each forecast horizon we opted to use only one 
where the dependent variable is the monthly time series of the average of the average excess forecast errors of all the 
12 forecast horizons. We gave equal weight in each forecast horizon in the averaging process. 
We use three different independent variable The unadjusted excess forecast errors made for the IPOs during the 
first year of the life of the IPO that came into the market in the previous year. The adjusted excess forecast errors made 
for the IPOs during the first year of the life of the IPO that came into the market in the previous year. The excess 
forecast errors made for the whole market for all firms covered by IB/E/S (excluding the 1% outliers in the two tails) 
during the previous year. The adiusted forecast errors made for the IPOs are calculated by subtracting from the 
unadjusted errors, the average forecast errors analysts made for the firms in the same industry as the IPO firm and 
similar market value( same quartile) as the IPO firm and in the same year as the unadjusted error was made. T-Statistics 
are below the coefficients 
We find that the magnitude of financial analysts' optimism for the recent IPO 
has a significant effect on the timing of IPO activity. More capital is raised from 
Initial Public Offers in the current month when analysts were making larger ( more 
negative) unadjusted forecast errors or smaller ( less positive) adjusted forecast errors 
for the IPOs that came in the market in the previous year. Our results for the whole 
market errors indicate that general market overoptimism is not significant in affecting 
the IPO activity. 
We also run time series regressions where the dependent variable was the 
amount of capital raised from IPO per quarter instead of the amount raised per 
month. As independent variables we used the same as with the monthly regressions 
but instead of using the average errors of the previous year as we did in table 8.8 we 
use the average error of the previous quarter. The results were qualitative similar with 
the monthly regressions. Adjusted errors made for the IPOs that went public in the 
previous term were negatively and significantly related with the IPO activity in the 
current term. Unadjusted errors were also negatively and significantly related with 
the IPO activity while market errors had no effect at all. 
These findings suggest that IPO volume may be at least partially driven by 
analysts' optimism. There are periods where analysts become more optimistic about 
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the earnings potential of the firms that recently went into the market. Other firms 
seem to seizure that overoptimism and decide to go public when analysts are more 
optimistic about the earnings of other recent IPOs. We have to stress however that 
these errors are calculated ex post. These ex-post errors however are a measure of 
the market sentiment. To the degree that analysts forecasts reflect or even influence 
investors behaviour, we find that IPO firms seem to be able to go public when there 
is a feeling of overoptimism in the market about the earnings' potential of recent 
IPOs. 
8.5. FORECAST ERRORS MADE FOR RIGHTS ISSUERS AND THE BUSINESS CYCLE. 
Our results indicate that more capital is raised from IPOs as analysts make 
more overoptimistic forecasts for the recent IPOs or less pessimistic forecasts on an 
adjusted basis. As we have showed however in figure 8.4, analysts' overoptimism for 
the earnings of all firm covered by I/B/E/S varies across time and reached a peak at 
1991- 1992, a period when the UK economy experienced a recession. Chopra (1998) 
finds a negative relation between forecast errors and the growth in industrial 
production arguing that when economic growth is strong, earnings rise and they 
approach the analysts' overoptimistic forecasts thus resulting to a smaller forecast 
error. In periods when economic activity declines, earnings decline and analysts' do 
not reduce their estimates enough to take into account the effect of the deterioration 
in the economy on firms' earnings causing larger forecast errors. Berry & Dreman 
(1995) however report that the average earnings surprise does not differ between 
upturns and downturns of the business cycle. We find that forecast errors differ 
significantly from the expansion to the recession. (the classification of the expansion 
and recession was made according to the coincident indicator). Analysts make larger 
mistakes in forecasting earnings when the forecast is made during a recession. In 
table 8.9 we report the average forecast errors across upturns and downturns. For 
example, the average forecast error made in an expansion for all firms in the I/B/E/S 
database ( excluding 1% at the two tails) with a6 month forecast horizon is 
-0.09 
and it becomes 
-0.0 124 during the recessions, which is significantly more negative 
with a test statistic of 
-3.20. The 12 month forecast horizon average error made in the 
upturn is half the error made in the downturn, 
-0.0125 and -0.0263 respectively. The 
difference between the average errors in recessions and expansions, is statistically 
significant for 10 out of the 12 forecast horizons. The average forecast error of all 
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forecast horizons made during the upturn of the business cycle is 
-0.008891 while the 
average forecast error of all forecast horizons made during the downturn of the 
business cycle is 
-0.013137 which is. significantly more negative than the average 
error made during the upturn with a test statistic of -3.14. 
The comparison of forecast errors for the whole market across upturns and 
downturns however does not reveal the whole story. A more clear picture can be 
drown from looking at the forecast errors across the whole duration of the cycle. We 
have split each upturn and each downturn into three equal length periods. In figure 
8.7 we have plotted the average forecast errors made for the whole market for 3 
forecast horizons across these 6 sub-periods of the business cycle. We find that the 
average forecast errors are at the most negative values during the first part of the 
expansion (upturn 1) and the middle and last part of the recession (downturn 2 and 
3). The average forecast error with a6 month horizon was 
-0.0197 during the first 
part of the upturn and -0.0080 and -0.0042 during the middle and last part of the 
expansion. The average error with a6 month forecast horizon is 
-0.0080 in the first 
part of the recession and -0.0146 at the second and third part of the recession. The 
smaller ( less negative) forecast errors were made during the period before the peak 
of the cycle. The errors are recorded according to the month the forecast is made. It 
seems that analysts are more accurate in their predictions during the middle and late 
stages of the expansion but become inaccurate as the economy enters the recessions. 
Especially during the middle and last stages of the recessions they overestimate the 
earnings by higher degrees. Analysts seem that they can not estimate the earnings 
with great accuracy when the economic situation is deteriorating. It looks as if 
analysts can not foresee the "depth" of the recession. The forecasts they make 
during the last two stages of the recession are more overoptimistic. Probably they can 
not estimate the true effect of the recession on the firms' earnings or believe that the 
upward turning point and the subsequent improvement in firms earnings will start 
earlier in time. Even when the economy starts to pick up analysts seem to expect too 
much too soon from firms' earnings. Their forecast are overoptimistic in the first part 
of the recession but again firms do not live up to analysts expectations. 
iI 
252 
,. 
F, y 
TABLE 8.9: AVERAGE FINANCIAL ANALYSTS' EARNINGS FORECAST ERRORS 
ACROSS THE UPTURN AND DOWNTURN OF THE BUSINESS CYCLE 
ä. 
_.,.., 
Analysts average earnings forecast Errors made all the firms in the market 
covered by IB/E/S Excludin 1% at the two tails 
Average forecast error made 
during the UPTURN of the 
Business Cycle 
Average forecast error made 
during the DOWNTURN of 
the Business Cycle 
T- stats of difference 
between downturn and 
Upturn 
Forecast Horizon 1 month 
-0.0036 (3484)' -0.0045 (5181) -1.39 
Forecast Horizon 2 months 
-0.0055 (3359) -0.0056 (5122) -0.13 
Forecast Horizon 3 months 
-0.0062 (3287) -0.0071 (5292) -1.03 
Forecast Horizon 4 months 
-0.0065 (3239) -0.0087 (5739) -2.38 
Forecast Horizon 5 months 
-0.0082 (3236) -0.0104 (5255) -2.13 
Forecast Horizon 6 months 
-0.009 (3228) -0.0124 (5179) -3.20 
Forecast Horizon 7 months 
-0.0104 (3368) -0.0145 (5006) -3.75 
Forecast Horizon 8 months 
-0.0113 (3447) -0.0172 (4777) -5.08 
Forecast Horizon 9 months 
-0.0113 (3527) -0.0189 (4510) -6.41 
Forecast Horizon 10 months 
-0.0119 (3457) -0.0207 (4262) -7.03 
Forecast Horizon 11 months 
-0.0118 (3065) -0.0216 (3981) -7.64 
Forecast Horizon 12 months 
-0.0125 (2103) -0.0263 (2931) -7.63 
Average of all forecast 
horizons 
-0.008891 (38800) -0.013137 (56875) -3.14 
Analysts average unadjusted earnings forecast Errors made 
for IPO firms in the first yea of their public life 
Average forecast error 
made during the UPTURN 
of the Business Cycle 
Average forecast error 
made during the 
DOWNTURN of the 
Business Cycle 
T- stats of difference 
between downturn and 
upturn 
Forecast Horizon 1 months 
-0.0015 (63) 0.00059 (74) 0.83 
Forecast Horizon 2 months 0.00066 (79) 0.0009 (85) 0.12 
Forecast Horizon 3 months 0.00159 (86) 
-0.0003 (95) -0.81 
Forecast Horizon 4 months 0.00222 (86) 
-0.0007 (93) -1.24 
Forecast Horizon 5 months 0.00016 (94) 0.00228 (79) 1.10 
Forecast Horizon 6 months 
-0.0005 (88) -0.0002 (74) 0.11 
Forecast Horizon 7 months 
-0.0006 (95) -0.0022 (63) -0.59 
Forecast Horizon 8 months 
-0.002 (93) -0.0005 (67) 0.53 
Forecast Horizon 9 months 
-0.0004 (101) 0.0005 (52) 0.32 
Forecast Horizon 10 months 
-0.0025 (85) -0.0016(54) 0.24 
Forecast Horizon 11 months 
-0.0042 (69) -0.0077 (56) , -0.63 
Forecast Horizon 12 months 
, -0.0069 (44) -0.0127 (36) -0.57 
Average of all forecast 
horizons 
-0.000857 (983) -0.00112 (828) -0.33 
the number of observations differs from those in table 2 because our classification of the business 
cycle stops at 1996. Table 2 includes forecasts made in 1997 and 1998 as well. 
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Analysts' average adjusted earnings forecast Errors made 
for IPO firms in the first year of their public life 
Average forecast error 
made during the UPTURN 
of the Business Cycle 
Average forecast error 
made during the 
DOWNTURN of the 
Business Cycle 
T- stats of difference 
between downturn and 
Upturn 
Forecast Horizon 1 months 
-0.0004 (44) 0.0057 (54) 1.63 
Forecast Horizon 2 months 0.0039 (73) 0.0070 (85) 1.40 
Forecast Horizon 3 months 0.0061(81) 0.0071 (95) 0.38 
Forecast Horizon 4 months 0.0070 (81) 0.0073 (93) 0.13 
Forecast Horizon 5 months 0.0083 (89) 0.0113 (79) 1.12 
Forecast Horizon 6 months 0.0087 (85) 0.0111 (74) 0.81 
Forecast Horizon 7 months 0.0096 (91) 0.0106 (63) 0.34 
Forecast Horizon 8 months 0.0121 (90) 0.0133 (67) 0.34 
Forecast Horizon 9 months 0.0108 (98) 0.0143 (52) 1.07 
Forecast Horizon 10 months 0.0092 (84) 0.0146 (54) 1.64 
Forecast Horizon 11 months 0.0095 (69) 0.0103 (56) 0.14 
Forecast Horizon 12 months 0.0095 (44) 0.0129 (36) 0.33 
Average of all forecast 
horizons 
0.008255 
(929) 
0.010029 
(808) 
0.35 
11. In parentheses we have the number offorecast errors 
...... .................. .....................  ................ ........................................................................................................................................: 
However, the errors made for the recent IPOs, both adjusted and unadjusted, 
do not exhibit the same cyclical pattern as the errors for the errors for the whole 
market do. This is something that could be expected in the case of adjusted errors 
because these errors have the "cyclical element" removed from them. These errors 
are adjusted by removing the average error made by analysts in forecasting the 
earnings of firms in the same industry, same market value quartile and at the same 
time. Even the unadjusted IPO errors however do not differ between expansions and 
recessions. For example the 6 month forecast horizon adjusted error made in the first 
year of their life is 0.0087 during the upturn and 0.0 111 during the downturn of the 
cycle. The average adjusted forecast error of all forecast horizons made for IPOs 
during the upturn of the business cycle is 0.008255 while, the average adjusted 
forecast error of all forecast horizons made for IPOs during the downturn of the 
business cycle is 0.010029 which not different from the average error made during 
the upturn with a test statistic of 0.35. The unadjusted forecast error for the same 6 
month horizon is 
-0.0005 and -0.0002 respectively, for the upturnand downturn. The 
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average unadjusted forecast error of all forecast horizons made for IPOs during the 
upturn of the business cycle is 
-0.000857 while the average adjusted forecast error of 
all forecast horizons made for IPOs during the downturn of the business cycle is 
- 
0.00 112 which not different from the average error made during the upturn with a 
test statistic of 
-0.33. The number of IPO adjusted and unadjusted forecast errors 
however is much smaller than the number of forecasts available for the whole 
market. We have 44 to 101 forecasts at the most ( depending on the forecast 
horizon) made for IPO in their first year of their life during upturns and 36 to 93 
forecasts made during downturns. For the whole market errors however the size of 
the sample is very large relative to the size of the IPO sample with the number of 
observations ranging from 2103 up to 5739. Obviously when we compare the errors 
across upturns and downturns of the cycle, the power of the statistical tests is smaller 
in the case of the IPOs due to the smaller number of observations. 
Our findings that more capital is raised from IPOs in periods when 
overoptimism for the recent IPOs is high or pessimism is low, do not suggest that 
more capital is raised from IPOs during recessions, because unadjusted errors made 
for IPOs are not more negative during recessions and adjusted errors made for IPOs 
are not smaller during recessions as the table above indicates. 
Overall we find that the magnitude of financial analysts earnings forecast 
errors has a significant effect on the timing of Initial Public Offerings. Periods when 
analysts earnings optimism for the recent IPOs is high are periods when more capital 
is raised from Initial Public offers. We find a negative and statistically significant 
... 
relation between the magnitude of forecast errors and monthly IPO volume 
suggesting that as errors decrease (become more negative or less positive) the IPO 
volume increases. 
8.6. INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERS AND EARNINGS FORECAST REVISIONS 
The results in the previous section indicate that firms time their Initial Public 
Offers when analysts overoptimism for the earnings of firms that went public in the 
previous year is high or when pessimism is low. More capital is raised from IPOs 
when analysts are more overoptimistic for the earnings of recent IPOs. There may be 
however another factor that could have a significant effect on the timing of IPOs and 
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that is the analysts optimism for the earnings of the particular company that is about 
to be listed on the stock market. 
A firm may time its IPOs during a peak of their operating pertörmance. Firms 
may find that there is an opportunity to go public when they have reached the peak of 
their profitability. Previous studies produce evidence that issuers have an 
improvement in their operating performances before the IPO while in the post-IPO 
years their operating performances deteriorates. If issuers time the IPO at the peak of 
their profitability then analyst should revise downwards their earnings' forecasts as 
soon as they realise that their earnings' expectations can not be materialised. 
To see whether managers time their Initial Public offer at the peak of their 
earnings, we examine financial analysts forecast revisions for 384 Initial Public 
offers made with the method of offer for sale, offer for subscription or placing in the 
period 1987 to 1996. The forecast revision shows how analysts change their forecasts 
from one month to the other. If managers time the IPO at the peak of their earnings 
then at the time of the IPO, the forecasted earnings per share should be high. If the 
IPO was made at the peak of the profitability then after the IPO earnings would start 
to drop and we should find that analysts revise downwards their earnings forecasts as 
soon as the arrival of new information makes them realise that the high level of 
earnings at which the IPO has entered the market can not be sustained. 
To provide support to the argument that managers time the IPO at peaks of 
their earnings we will have to reject the null hypothesis of no significant negative 
forecast revision of IPO earnings after the listing in favour of the alternative 
hypothesis of a significant negative revision of analysts earnings forecasts after the 
IPO. 
do not revise theirßrecasted earnings for IPOfirms 
after the listing. 
Financial analysts revise downwards their. forecasted earnings for IPO, firms 
the listing. 
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To reject the null hypothesis we should find that analysts forecast revisions 
should be significantly negative after the listing of the firm. That would indicate that 
analysts downgrade their forecasts for the IPO after the listing and so managers could 
have timed the IPO prior to a deterioration of earnings. The monthly forecast revision 
(FR;, t) at month t for firms i is calculated as follows: 
F, r - Fi, i 
-i FR;, t =P 
Fi, t is the consensus analysts earnings forecasts for firm i at month t and F1, t. 1 
is the consensus analysts earnings forecasts for the same firm at month t-1. P* is the 
offer price of the IPO and is used to normalise the forecasts by the share price. More 
details on how the forecast revisions are calculated are in section 4.6 
Table 8.10 presents the average forecast revision of IPO earnings from month 
1 to month 60. The pattern we find is that analysts revise upwards their earnings 
forecasts for the IPOs from the second to the fourth month from their listing 
. 
TABLE 8.10: AVERAGE FINANCIAL ANALYSTS' NORMAL FORECAST 
REVISIONS FOR FIRMS CONDUCTING INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERS 
.; 
1 
Month Average N t statistic of percentage percentage percentage t stats for difference 
from the Forecast difference of positive of zero of negative between negative and 
Listing Revision from zero forecast forecast forecast positive percentages 
revisions revisions revisions ( positive t stats indicates 
more negative than 
positive 
1 
-0.00028 5 -6.88 0.00 0.80 0.20 #N/A 
2 0.00118 34 2.58 0.24 0.59 0.18 
-0.52 
3 0.00171 81 3.65 0.32 0.53 0.15 
-2.28 
4 0.00118- 108 2.72 0.29 0.59 0.12 
-2.44 
5 
-0.00144 141 -1.01 0.24 0.60' 0.16 -1.38 
6 
-0.00135 147 -1.73 0.26 0.57 0.17 -1.60 
7 0.00103 170 1.55 0.26 0.59 0.15 
-2.12 
8 
-0.00070 196 -1.89 0.19 0.58 0.22 0.70 
9 
-0.00026 215 -1.11 0.18 0.67 0.15 -0.51 
10 
-0.00065 229 -1.53 0.21 0.61 0.18 -0.81 
11 0.00000 234 0.01 0.24 0.57 0.19 
-1.30 
12 0.00062 237 1.35 0.23 0.62 
- 
0.16 
-1.63 
13 
-0.00036 229 -0.69 0.21 0.63 0.16 -0.99 
14 
-0.00089 249 -1.46 0.18 0.66 0.16 -0.48 
15 
-0.00007 
, ._ 
278 
-0.21, 0.19 
.., 
0.64.. 0.17 
-0.37 
16 
-0.00011 279 -0.23 0.20 0.59 0.21 0.29 
17 
-0.00160 270 -1.58 0.22 0.55 0.23 0.40 
Table 8.10 is continued next page 
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Table 8.10, continued from previous page 
Month Average N test statistic of percentage percentage percentage t stats for difference 
from the Forecast difference of positive of zero of negative between negative a& 
Listing Revision from zero forecast forecast forecast positive percentages 
revisions revisions revisions ( positive t stats indicates 
more negative than 
ositive 
18 
-0.00149 279 -1.94 0.19 0.57 0.24 1.19 
19 
-0.00145 274 -2.19 0.15 0.62 0.24 2.65 
20 
-0.00080 298 -1.19 0.15 0.64 0.21 1.54 
21 
-0.00157 302 -2.89 0.16 0.64 0.20 1.13 
22 
-0.00103 290 -1.14 0.14 0.63 0.22 2.33 
23 
-0.00095 289 -1.28 0.17 0.60 0.24 2.00 
24 0.00018 264 0.38 0.22 0.57 0.21 
-0.20 
25 
-0.00153 251 -1.31 0.19 0.57 0.24 1.15 
26 
-0.00211 275 -1.33 0.17 0.60 0.23 1.84 
27 
-0.00067 263 -1.98 0.14 0.66 0.21 1.89 
28 
-0.00099 264 -1.96 0.20 0.58 0.22 0.40 
29 
-0.00077 272 -0.77 0.20 0.54 0.26 1.64 
30 
-0.00124 260 -1.62 0.21 0.57 0.22 0.20 
31 
-0.00497 253 -1.49 0.21 0.53 0.26 1.16 
32 
-0.00094 250 -1.67 0.20 0.54 0.26 1.72 
33 
-0.00071 264 -1.53 0.16 0.57 0.27 2.94 
34 
-0.00279 264 -1.78 0.17 0.58 0.25 2.23 
35 
-0.00302 246 -2.07 0.17 0.55 0.28 2.82 
36 
-0.00333 220 -1.99 0.17 0.55 0.28 2.89 
37 
-0.00281 203 -2.44 0.20 0.50 0.30 2.34 
38 
-0.00200 221 -2.84 0.21 0.50 0.29 1.98 
39 
-0.00056 230 -1.30 0.13 0.64 0.23 2.57 
40 
-0.00211 242 -1.61 0.13 0.57 0.29 4.83 
41 
-0.00150 240 -2.07 0.20 0.53 0.27 1.77 
42 
-0.00466 235 -1.77 0.18 0.53 0.29 3.03 
43 
-0.00065 235 -0.54 0.18 0.53 0.29 3.16 
44 
-0.00156 220 -2.18 0.22 0.56 0.22 -0.11 
45 
-0.00183 239 -1.93 0.14 0.58 0.28 4.12 
46 
-0.00198 252 -2.16 0.20 0.52 0.28 2.18 
47 
-0.00264 240 -1.11 0.20 0.51 0.30 2.74 
48 
-0.00239 225 -2.66 0.18 0.48 0.34 4.65 
49 
-0.00207 203 -1.89 0.22 0.51 0.28 1.43 
50 
-0.00114 202 -1.37 0.20 0.52 0.28 1.82 
51 
-0.00243 206 -2.34 0.17 0.58 0.25 2.18 
52 
-0.00327 217 -3.87 0.13 0.58 0.29 4.75 
53 
-0.00160 224 -1.75 0.20 0.56 0.25 1.23 
54 
-0.00105 214 -0.86 0.13 0.66 0.21 2.28 
55 
-0.00222 211 -1.34 0.20 0.50 0.30 2.55 
56 
-0.00228 199 -2.10 0.18 0.54 0.28 2.50 
57 
-0.00224 219 -1.73 0.16 0.55 0.28 3.17 
58 
-0.00264 214 -1.29 0.15 0.56 0.29 3.51 
59 
-0.00182 212 -1.31 0.19 0.54 0.27 1.89 
60 
-0.00326 206 -1.03 0.16 0.60 0.24 1.92 
During the first 12 months, we have 4 months where the average analysts 
normal forecast revisions are significantly positive, for three months the forecast 
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revision is significantly negative and for 4 months the average forecast revision is not 
statistically different from zero. In the second year however we have 5 months with 
significant negative forecast revisions and 7 months when the forecast revisions are 
negative but not different from zero at 10 % level of statistical significance one tail 
tests. During the third and fourth year, 18 out of the 24 months are characterised by 
significant negative forecast revisions. The remaining 6 months are not different 
from zero even though revisions are still negative. In the fifth year, 6 of the monthly 
forecast revisions are negative and significantly different from zero and six are 
negative but insignificant. Overall, analysts revise upwards their earnings forecasts 
for IPOs in the first 
.4 months and from that point onwards they start to revise 
downwards their earnings forecasts. 
In Figure 8.8 we have plotted the financial analysts normal forecast revisions 
(equally and price weighted). The forecast revisions is represented by the change 
from one month to the other. The average forecast increases slightly in the first 4 
months but after that point there is a downward trend in forecast revisions. There is 
no significant difference between the equally weighted and the price weighted normal 
forecast revisions. The price weighted forecast revisions are slightly less negative but 
" overall the conclusions do not change. Analysts normal forecast revisions are 
negative after the first 4 months of the IPO. 
As we had argued however in chapter 4, the forecast revision is not the best 
measure of analysts view of IPO earnings as this does not take into account the fact 
that analysts revise downwards their forecasts for all firms as they approach the 
announcement of the earnings. Analysts' expected forecast revision is not zero. 
Analysts are overoptimistic when they make their forecasts and as time passes by, 
they revise downwards their forecasts. In other words, the forecast revisions have a 
negative drift which has to be taken into account. Analysts revise downwards their 
forecasts after the IPO but we do not know which part of this revision is due to the 
arrival of new pieces of information which show that analysts initial forecast for the 
IPOs were too high and which part of the revisions is caused by the negative drift, the 
usual correction of the earnings made for all firms as the announcement- of the 
earnings approaches. The negative forecast revision is likely to be caused by the fact 
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that analysts revise their forecast downwards as the announcement of the earnings 
approach and not due to new pieces of information with regards to the IPOs. A more 
appropriate measure of analysts behaviour is the abnormal forecast revisions because 
these revisions take into account the negative drift. For details on how the abnormal 
forecasts are calculated see section 4.6. 
In table 8.11, we present the Analysts Earnings Abnormal forecast revisions 
- 
for IPOs from month 1 to month 60. We find that analysts, in true terms, revise 
upwards their forecast for the IPOs for the first 2.5 years. In the first year, all 12 
months are characterised by positive abnormal forecast revisions and for 11 out of 
the 12 months the abnormal forecasts revisions are significantly different from zero. 
In the second year, 9 out of the 12 abnormal forecast revisions are significantly 
positive. The remaining 3 months are characterised by positive but not significantly. 
different form zero abnormal forecast revisions. Up until month 30, we 
predominantly see positive and significant abnormal forecast revisions. 24 months 
have significant positive abnormal forecast revisions. From that month onwards, 
most of the months are characterised by insignificant different from zero abnormal 
forecast revisions. From month 31 onwards and up to month 60,22 of the months 
have negative abnormal forecast revisions but only 4 are significant from zero. 
Results for price weighted abnormal forecast revisions were qualitative similar. (See 
figure 8.9) The only difference to the price weighted abnormal forecast revisions is 
that the upwards forecast revision is of a smaller magnitude but still the same 
conclusions are drawn. Analysts abnormal forecast revisions are significantly 
positive until the middle of the third year and from that point onwards abnormal 
forecasts are negative but insignificant form zero. 
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TABLE 8.11: AVERAGE FINANCIAL ANALYSTS' ABNORMAL EARNINGS 
FORECAST REVISIONS FOR IPOs 
Month Average N T statistic percentage percentage percentage t stats for 
from the Abnormal of difference of positive of zero of negative difference 
listing Forecast from zero abnormal abnormal abnormal between negative 
Revisions forecast forecast forecast and positive 
revisions revisions revisions percentages 
positive t stats 
indicates more 
negative than positive 
1 0.00142 5 1.29 0.60 0.00 0.40 
-0.91 
2 0.00216 34 1.74* 0.71 0.03 0.26 
-5.56 
3 0.00452 83 4.17*** 0.80 0.01 0.19 
-13.52 
4 0.00679 111 3.46*** 0.73 0.01 0.26 
-11.06 
5 0.00403 141 2.01** 0.72 0.01 0.26 
-12.15 
6 0.00332 146 1.47* 0.77 0.01 0.22 
-15.97 
7 0.0049 170 4.40*** 0.78 0.01 0.21 
-17.98 
8 0.0032 195 2.95*** 0.70 0.01 0.29 
-12.50 
9 0.00358 214 3.69*** 0.69 0.00 0.31 
-11.91 
10 0.00344 228 3.59*** 0.69 0.00 0.30 
-12.75 
11 0.00396 231 3.10*** 0.68 0.01 0.31 
-12.26 
12 0.00392 234 4.23*** 0.69 0.00 0.30 
-12.86 
13 0.00441 226 3.76*** 0.65 0.00 0.34 
-9.91 
14 0.00275 248 2.71 *** 0.65 0.01 0.33 
-10.48 
15 0.00356 277 4.61 *** 0.65 0.01 0.35 
-10.39 
16 0.00432 276 4.79*** 0.65 0.01 0.34 
-10.83 
17 0.00209 267 2.15*** 0.64 0.00 0.35 
-9.95 
18 0.00111 277 1.31 * 0.61 0.01 0.38 
-7.99 
19 0.00044 272 0.51 0.57 0.01 0.42 
-4.75 
20 0.00136 295 1.65* 0.58 0.01 0.41 
-5.97 
21 0.00123 299 1.37* 0.59 0.01 0.40 
-6.41 
22 0.0012 287 1.19 0.59 0.01 0.40 
-6.31 
23 0.00096 287 1.02 0.57 0.02 0.41 
-5.68 
24. 0.00246 260 2.94*** 0.58 0.00 0.42- 
-5.39 
25 0.00033 246 0.26 0.55 
-0.01 0.44 -3.32 
26 
-0.0003 273 -0.19 0.56 0.00 0.43 -4.39 
27 0.00245 263 2.31 *** 0.60 0.00 0.40 
-6.52 
28 0.0026 264 2.68*** 0.63 0.00 0.37 
-8.94 
29 0.00238 272 2.17*** 0.63 0.00 0.37 
-8.78 
30 0.00152 259 1.50* 0.61 0.00 0.39 
-7.26 
31 
-0.002 252 -0.63 0.61' 0.00 0.38 -7.35 
32 0.00119 249. 1.06 0.59 
. 
"" 
0.00 
" . 
0.41 
-6.07 
33 0.00061 262 0.62 0.58 0.00 0.42 
-5.51 
34 
-0.0015 262 -0.88 0.56 0.00 - '0.44 -3.98 
35 
-0.0021 246 -1.24 0.52 
. 
0.00 0.48 
-1.53 
36 
-0.002 221 -1.03 0.53 0.00 0.47 -1.88 
37 
-0.0022 204 
- 
-1.56* 
. 
0.51 0.00. 0.49 
-0.56 
38 
-0.0024 220 -2.00** 0.48 0.00 0.52 1.35 
39 0.00071 , 228 0.54 0.50 " 0.00 0.50 
-0.26 
40 0.00049 243 0.29, 
, ., 
0.53, 0.00 0.47 
- 
-1.67 
41 0.0007 241 0.75 0.54 0.00 0.46 
-2.46 
42 
-0.0027 234 --1.07 "Q 0.54 0.00 -0.46, -2.62 Table 8.11 continues next page 
ý; 
ýr 
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table 811 continue from previous page 
Month Average N T statistic percentage percentage percentage t stars for 
from the Abnormal of difference of positive of zero of negative difference 
listing Forecast from zero abnormal abnormal abnormal between negative Revisions forecast forecast forecast and positive 
revisions revisions revisions percentages 
positive t stts indicate 
more negative than 
sitive 
43 0.00148 234 1.11 0.56 0.00 0.44 
-3.69 
44 0.00089 219 0.84 0.54 0.00 0.46 
-2.58 
45 
-0.0004 237 -0.28 0.50 0.00 0.50 -0.13 
46 
-0.0008 251 -0.60 0.52 0.00 0.48 -1.39 
47 
-0.0001 239 -0.06 0.51 0.00 0.49 -0.39 
48 
-0.0013 225 -0.92 0.51 0.00 0.49 -0.67 
49 
-0.0004 204 -0.23 0.55 0.00 0.45 -3.10 
50 0.00041 201 0.31 0.54 0.00 0.46 
-2.41 
51 
-0.0004 206 -0.24 0.53 0.00 0.47 -1.68 
52 
-0.0013 216 -0.95 0.46 0.01 0.53 2.03 
53 
-0.0012 223 -0.86 0.56 0.01 0.43 -3.62 
54 
-0.0008 213 -0.59 0.52 0.01 0.46 -1.63 
55 
-0.0018 210 -1.27 0.52 0.00 0.48 -1.24 
56 
-0.0017 197 -1.24 0.49 0.02 0.50 0.28 
57 
-0.0015 217 -1.18 0.51 0.01 0.47 -1.08 
58 
-0.002 214 -1.26 0.47 0.01 0.52 1.64 
59 
-0.0025 213 -2.15** 0.45 0.01 0.54 2.46 
60 
-0.0034 206 -2.02** 0.46 0.02 0.52 1.80 
Figure 8.9 presents the equally weighted and price weighted abnormal 
forecast revisions. The abnormal forecast revisions is the change from one month to 
the other. The path shows an increase until around month 33. From that point 
onwards there is a downwards slope in the abnormal forecast revisions but not as 
steep as the increase observed from month 1 to 33. 
In general, we find that analysts revise upwards their earnings forecasts, in 
true terms, during the first 2.5 years of the life of the IPO but after that period, they 
start to revise downwards their earnings expectations but not significantly so. These 
results indicate that IPO managers do not time their equity issue around periods 
when analysts earnings forecasts are at levels that managers, using the inside 
information they have, consider to be the peak of their earnings performance. 
Analysts continue to revise upwards the IPO earnings even after the listing. There is 
however a significant difference in the magnitude of the revision. During the first 12 
- 
months, the cumulative abnormal forecast revision is 4.5%. For the following 12 
months the cumulative abnormal forecast revision is 2.6% and becomes only 0.3% in 
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the 3 year. That indicates that even though analysts revise upwards their earnings in 
the first 2.5 years the magnitude of the revision is much higher in the 15` year. 
Overall the results from the analysis of the forecast revisions reveal that IPOs 
do not time their offer in periods when analysts forecast a peak in their earnings. 
IPOs earnings continue to grow even after the listing at a considerable degree. The 
cumulative abnormal forecast revision for the IPO is 8% during the first 30 months 
and it is 
-2.8% in the months 31 to 60. That leads us to conclude that managers time 
their IPOs during or at the beginning of a period of growth and not at the peak of 
their earnings growth. The results however may be sample specific especially if the 
choice made by analysts as to what IPOs they are going to cover is affected by the 
forecasted growth. Analyst may choose to provide forecasts only for IPOs for which 
the growth potentials are high and avoid IPOs with limited growth potentials. 
8.7. ACTUAL GROWTH IN EARNINGS PER SHARE FOR IPOS 
Studies have found that the earnings of IPOs decrease in the years after the 
listing 
, 
Jain & Kini (1994), Mikkelson & Shah (1994). Such a result would be in 
contrast with our findings that analysts revise upwards their forecasts (in true terms) { 
for the UK IPOs. We look at the growth in reported earnings of the IPOs and their 
behaviour after the listing to see whether the deterioration of profitability found in 
the US IPOs is also present in UK IFOs as well 
. 
We computed the growth of 
reported earnings from the previous year for each of the first 5 years from the listing. 
Table 8.12 reports the results. We find that the IPOs that had a fiscal year end in year 
1 after the IPO had an average 13.2% increase (median 30.4 %) in their earnings 
relative to the previous year, the pre-IPO year. ( The month of the fiscal year end is 
used to find in which year to put the growth in earnings'and not the month of the 
announcement of the earnings. E. g. If an IPO has a fiscal year-end in month 11 after 
the IPO but the earnings are. announced in month 15 then ; the growth in 'EPS is 
regarded that has taken place in year 1). The size of the sample of the IPOs for which 
we were able to estimate the growth in their earnings in the first year is very small 
because little data for pre-IPO earnings are available. 
The growth in EPS was 14.9% in the second year (median 15.0%) or 11.4% 
if the outliers ( those with growth rates higher or below 2 standard deviations form 
the mean) are removed- The IPOs had a growth' in their earnings of 8.5%in the; third 
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year (10.5 % with no outliers). The growth of IPOs earnings continued to decrease in 
the fourth year where the growth was 7.6% (only 6.3% with no outliers). Finally, the 
Earnings per share of IPOs decreased by 1.1 % in the fifth year ( increase by 3.4% if 
we remove the outliers). 
TABLE 8.12: EARNINGS GROWTH OF IPOs 
PANEL A: 
FULL SAMPLE OF IPOS 
1st year 2" year 3rd year 4` year 57 year 
vera e Growth in 13.2% 14.9% 8.5% 7.6% 
Earnings per Share from 
previous year 
Median Growth in Earnings 30.4% 15.0% 14.7% 8.9% 9.3% 
er Share from previous 
year 
umber of observations 7 138 285 258 26g 
umber of firms with 5 (71%) 97 (70%) 197 (69%) 166 (64%) 68 (62.6% 
positive growth in EPS 
ero Number of firms with 0 3 (2%) 2(1%) 4(1%) 1 (0.4%) 
zero growth in EPS 
negative Number of firms 2 (29%) 38 (28%) 86 (30%) 88 (34%) 99(37%) 
with negative growth in EPS 
Panel B 
No Outliers Above and Below 2 standard Deviations from the Mean 
Average Growth in 13.2% 11.4% 10.5% 6.3% 3.4% 
Earnings per Share from 
previous year 
Median Growth in Earnings 30.4% 14.9% 14.9% 08.6% 9.4% 
er Share from previous 
year 
umber of observations 7 133 278 251 253 
Number of firms with 5 (71%) 94(71%) 194 (70%) 162 (64%) 1,61 
positive growth in EPS 63,6% 
Number of firms with zero 0 3 (2%) 2 (1%) 4 (1%) 1 (0.4 
rowth in EPS zero 
umber of firms with 2 (29%) 36 (27%) 82 (29%) 85 (34%) 91(36%) 
negative growth in EPS 
The Growth measures are calculated as the change in reported EPS in year t minus the Reported 
earnings in year t-1 over the EPS in year 1-1. Earnings per share are recorded according to the end of 
the fiscal year and not when the earnings are announced. In parentheses we have the percentage of fr, 
with positive, zero and negative growth in their EPS relative to the previous fiscal year. If we did not 
have the reported EPS in the Previous year. that IPO is dropped from the sample. 
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The results for the growth in IPOs reported earnings reinforce our findings 
from the analysis of abnormal forecast revisions. We find that IPOs' earnings 
continue to increase after the listing and grow more rapidly in the first two years The 
IPOs earnings growth rate starts to decrease from the third year. IPOs that had a fiscal 
year end in the first 30 months had an average growth of 15.59% relative to the 
previous year ( median 16.05%) and those IPOs that had a fiscal year end in the 
months 31 to 60 had an average growth of only 2.31% (median 9.63%) a difference 
which was statistically significant with a t-statistic of 2.16. The growth was 10.24% 
in the first 30 months without the outliers over and above 2 standard deviations from 
the mean and 3.9% in the following 30 months, a difference which was also 
significant (t stat 1.97). 
Our result from the analysis of financial analysts earnings forecast revisions 
and the growth in reported earnings for IPOs reveals that IPO firms do not time the 
IPO around the peaks of their profitability. IPO earnings continue to grow after the 
listing. Further more, analysts continuously revise upwards their earnings forecasts 
for almost 2.5 years after the listing. We can not support the argument that IPOs time 
their offer when managers believe that the firm has reached the peak of their 
profitability. IPO firms continue to increase their earnings at high rates for the first 
two years of their public life. It looks that managers time their IPO at the beginning 
or during a period of earnings growth and not at the peak of their profitability. 
8.8 CONCLUSIONS 
Variation in investors' sentiment in one explanation that has gained 
empirical support as a driving force behind the time series variation of equity 
issuance volume. If investors' sentiment affects the IPO activity then a relation 
between analysts earnings forecasts and IPO volume should exists. This chapter 
investigated the effect that UK financial analysts' earnings forecasts have on the 
timing of UK IPOs. We report that financial analysts' earnings forecasts are on 
average overoptimistic for all firms and that overoptimism varies across time, across 
industries and is higher for small firms. Analysts however are not overoptimistic for 
the earnings of IPOs during the first year of their public life. Unadjusted forecast 
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errors made during the first year of their public life are not significantly different 
from zero while errors adjusted for industry and market value are significantly 
positive. 
We find a significant time series variation in the sign and magnitude of 
analysts' forecast errors over time. Time series regressions of the amount of capital 
raised from IPOs revealed a significant relation between IPO activity and analysts' 
forecast errors. High forecast errors for the earnings of firms that recently went public 
cause an increase in the IPO activity. We find however that the magnitude of analysts 
- 
forecast errors made for all the firms in the market does not affect the IPO activity. 
Our results indicate that IPO volume is driven at least partially by analysts' 
overoptimism. As analyst become more overoptimistic about the earnings of the 
recent IPO, or less pessimistic on an adjusted basis, more capital is raised from IPOs 
in the current month results which are similar with the results of Rajan & Servaes 
(1998) for US IPOs. 
We also examined how analysts' forecasts behave after the firms have gone 
. 
-: , 
public. Previous studies have indicated that IPO firms time the IPO at the peak of 
their profitability. If firms time the IPO at the peak of their profitability then analysts 
should revise downwards their forecasts after the IPO. We find that analysts revise' 
upwards their forecast in the first two and a half years of the life of the IPO. The 
profitability of IPO firms grows by 15.59% relative to the previous year during the 
first 30 months after the IPO and only 2.31% in the next 30 months. IPO firms do not 
time the issue at the peak of their profitability at the beginning or during a period of a 
sustainable earnings growth. 
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CHAPTER 9: FINANCIAL ANALYSTS EARNINGS FORECASTS 
AND THE TIMING OF SEASONED EQUITY OFFERINGS 
9.1. INTRODUCTION 
In the previous chapter we investigated the effect of financial analysts' 
earnings forecasts on the timing of Initial Public Offerings in the UK. Our results 
indicate that financial analysts' earnings overoptimism has a significant role in the 
timing of equity issues. More capital is raised from IPOs when analysts are more 
overoptimistic for the earnings of recent IPOs. That result indicates that the market 
sentiment, as expressed by the magnitude of analysts forecast errors, is important in 
the timing the IPOs. 
As we found in chapter 5, the Seasoned equity offering activity in the UK 
exhibits a significant time series variation. Both the number of firms making a rights 
issue and the amount of capital raised varies over time. The question however that 
has not been researched previously is what is the effect of analysts' overoptimism in 
the timing of Seasoned equity offerings. 
Loughran & Ritter (1996) argue that the market sentiment should be 
important in the timing of Seasoned equity issues as well. Periods when the market is 
characterised by more favourable sentiment are periods when SEO activity should 
be higher. During periods of favourable market sentiment share prices are very likely 
to be higher and analysts should forecast higher level of earnings relative to periods 
when the market felling is gloomy. In Seasoned Equity offerings where the new 
shares are offered to the general public, managers who act on behalf of existing 
shareholders have the incentive to make the issue when the share price is overvalued. 
In such a case, more capital will be raised with the existing shareholders losing a 
smaller portion of the firm's ownership to the new shareholders. Under such a 
scenario, periods when the earnings forecast are overoptimistic are more likely to be 
periods when prices are above the fundamentals thus creating an environment when 
seasoned equity capital can be raised in'more favourable terms. 
As we said in 5`h chapter however, the rights issue is a unique method for 
raising seasoned equity capital because it eliminates managers' incentives to exploit 
new shareholders in favour of existing ones by'selling to them overvalued shares. 
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Under a rights issue, the new shares is offered first to existing shareholders. They 
have the right to buy the new shares at the prefixed price and terms or to sell their 
rights at the market. In either ways existing shareholders or managers do not gain or 
lose anything if the issue price is high. ( see endnote 1 for a numerical illustration of 
this argument). The exploitation of market sentiment and analysts' overoptimism in 
order to sell to the new shareholders overvalued shares is an explanation that is not 
plausible as an explanation for the timing of a seasoned equity issue made with the 
method of the Rights Issue. If managers seek to maximise the existing shareholders' 
utility, they have no incentive to price the new shares at dearer prices. Existing 
shareholders will not gain or lose anything if the issue is timed when the share prices 
are high or low. Therefore, managers that seek to maximise their shareholders' utility 
have no incentive to time the issue when analysts' overoptimism is high. That is 
unless, managers place their own satisfaction higher than that of their shareholders. 
In such a case, managers do have the incentive to issue at higher prices. By issuing at 
a higher price, they can raise more capital by offering the same number of shares. If 
managers increase their personal utility by managing a company with largest value of 
asset or their remuneration packages are linked to the value of the company they 
manage or its assets' growth we could expect managers to issue equity when the 
market conditions favour the issuance of capital. If their personal satisfaction is 
ranked higher than that of their shareholders we could expect that managers time the 
equity issue when the market sentiment favours the issuance of more capital. 
Firms that make a rights issue are under pressure from the underwriters to 
- 
price the new shares at low prices. If the new issue is priced at a high price then the 
probability increases that existing investors will not commit their funds to buy the 
new shares and therefore would prefer to sell their rights to the market. The 
underwriter's obligation is to buy these rights if no other investor want to buy them 
and provide the money to buy the shares that correspond to these un-exercised rights. 
That represents a cost to the underwriter who, in such a outcome has to commit funds 
to acquire and effort to sell the shares to the market. Therefore there is pressure from 
the underwriters to the issuers first to, price the issue. at low prices and second to 
make the issue at periods when investors are more willing to exercise their right. If 
there are periods during which existing shareholders are more willing to buy the new, 
issue, then these pressures from the underwriters may ease thus making the issue of 
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capital easier. Certainly periods when analysts' earnings forecasts are high and the 
market. sentiment is favourable should be periods when investors will be more 
willing to participate in the issue and therefore underwriters' concerns should be 
minimised compared with periods with gloomy earnings' forecasts. 
Even in the cases when the rights issue is not underwritten or there is no 
,ý 
guarantee that the un-exercised rights will be bought by the underwriter, firms will be 
better off to time the issue at a period when earnings' forecast are high. Investors will 
be more eager to participate in the issue when they see that the earnings of the firms 
are high, reassuring firms that the they will raise all the amount that they have 
planned to fund their projects. On the other hand, the participation of investors on 
rights issues should be lower when the earnings forecasts are lower or the business 
environment is gloomy making the issuance of the full amount of capital planned by 
the firms more unlikely. 
No study however has looked at the effect of analysts' earnings forecasts 
overoptimism on the timing of Seasoned equity issues in the UK. This chapter 
intends to fill the gap left in the literature by uncovering the relation, if any, between 
analysts' earnings forecasts overoptimism and the times series variation in the SEO 
volume in the UK. 
Evidence from US studies indicate that firms that make a SEO suffer from a 
deterioration in their operating performance in the period after the issue. Loughran & 
Ritter (1997) argue that "the operating performance, as measured by numerous 
accounting measures peaks at the time of the offering deteriorates in the post- 
announcement years". If issuers, time the issue at the peak of their earnings' 
- 
performance then that should be mirrored into analysts' earnings forecasts. An 
increase in the forecasted earnings of the issuers should be observed in the pre- 
announcement years which should peak at the time of the announcement and should 
deteriorate in the years after the issue. Analysts should revise upwards their forecast 
in the pre-announcement years followed by a downwards revision in the post- 
announcement years. By using financial analysts' earnings forecasts we. can see how 
the market. thinks the equity issue. will affect the issuers' profitability. Brous (1992) 
finds that the announcement of a SEO induces analysts to downgrade their current 
year earnings forecasts for the issuer indicating that the announcement of the issue 
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creates concerns for investors about the future level of earnings. At chapter 6 we 
found that issuers with high earnings growth in the pre-announcement period have 
more negative price reactions on the announcement of the rights issue. If the market 
was expecting that high earnings' growth to continue after the issue then such a 
negative price reaction should not have occurred. However the significant negative 
reaction for firms with high growth in earnings indicates that the market regards that 
this growth in the pre-announcement period can not be sustained after the issue. The 
examination of analysts' earnings forecast revision should help us uncover the impact 
that the rights issue has on the profitability of the issuer. If the issue is a signal of bad 
times to come in terms of future earnings then analysts should downgrade their 
forecasts on the announcement of the SEO. 
In this chapter we try to answer two questions. Is Seasoned equity volume in 
the UK affected by analysts' overoptimism and how do analysts view that the equity 
issue will affect the profitability of the issuer? 
This chapter extends the SEO literature by investigating the relation between 
the financial analysts' earnings forecasts and the time series variation in the volume 
of rights issues in the UK. We investigate whether analysts are overoptimistic for the 
earnings of firms that make a rights issue and if so what is the effect of that 
overoptimism in the timing of equity issues. We also investigate how analysts revise 
their forecasts around the rights issue announcement to see whether issuers time the 
issue at the peak of their profitability. 
Our main findings can be summarised as follows: 
1. Financial analysts significantly overestimate the earnings of firms that make 
a rights issue in the year prior to the announcement of the issue. Forecast errors 
adjusted for industry and market value made in the year prior to the announcement 
are significantly negative. 
2. There is a significant time series variation in analysts' overoptimism for the 
earnings of rights issuers; 
3. Financial analysts' eamings'forecast errors are negatively and significantly 
related with the amount of capital raised from rights issues. Periods when analysts are 
more overoptimistic about the earnings of recent SEO issuers, are periods when more 
capital is raised from SEOs in the current month. - 
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4. Firms that make a rights issue exhibit a large increase in their forecasted 
earnings in the pre-announcement period which comes to an end with the 
announcement of the rights issue. After the announcement of the rights issue, 
analysts revise slightly downwards their forecasts but not at a magnitude equal to the 
pre-announcement increase. 
The rest of the chapter follows like this: First we report our results on 
financial analysts' earnings forecast errors for firms conducting a rights issue for the 
period of 3 years prior to 3 years after the announcement of the issue followed by an 
investigation of the relation between the magnitude of forecast errors and the timing 
of rights issue volume. Last we look at the financial analysts' normal and abnormal 
forecast revisions around the rights issue announcement. 
9.2. FINANCIAL ANALYSTS EARNINGS FORECASTS ERRORS AROUND THE RIGHTS 
ISSUE ANNOUNCEMENT. 
The issue of financial analysts earnings overoptimism around the SEOs has 
recently attracted the academia's interest. The studies that have been conducted 
however offer contradictory results. 
Ali (1995) examines SEOs frone 1972 to 1992 and finds that the forecasts 
errors made for the earnings of the year of the offering, after being adjusted for the 
I/B/E/S mean forecast error, are not significantly negative. The forecasts however 
that were made in forecasting the earnings of the 5 years after the issue 
announcement are significantly overoptimistic. 
, 
Hansen & Sarin (1998) find that the unadjusted forecast errors for the 
current year earnings analysts make in the period 6 terms prior to the announcement 
of the issue and up to 1 month after the announcement, are significantly negative. 
Unadjusted forecast errors are also significantly negative in the quarters +2 to +8, 
but of higher magnitude compared with the errors made in pre-announcement period. 
Hansen & Sarin (1998) report however that analysts', errors are higher when they 
forecast the earnings of firms with high growth. They find that firms that make a 
SEO are firms with high growth and therefore the forecast error have to be adjusted 
for this "growth bias". 
, 
After, adjusting the errors for the "growth" bias, Hansen & 
Sarin (1998) find that analysts are not overoptimistic in 
, 
the period prior to the 
announcement of the issue. Forecast errors made in the pre-announcement period, 
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adjusted for the growth bias, are positive and significantly different from zero. With 
regards to the post-announcement period, their analysis reveals that errors are 
insignificantly different from zero. Similar results were obtained when they adjusted 
the errors for the number of analysts following the issuer or when they looked at the 
long term growth in the earnings instead of current year earnings. 
Dechow, Hutton & Sloan (1998) however in contrast with Hansen & Sarin 
(1998) find evidence that analysts overestimate the long term earnings of firms 
making a SEO by 10.6% when the forecasts are made in the period 9 months prior up 
to 3 months after the issue. The difference in the two papers is puzzling since both 
look at approximately the same time periods. The discrepancy however must be 
driven by the method used to calculate long term growth in earnings. Hansen & Sarin 
(1998) calculate the long term forecast error as the difference between the error made 
for the company and the error made for non-SEO companies with similar forecasted 
growth in their earnings. Dechow, Hutton & Sloan (1998) on the other hand, do not 
adjust their errors for any benchmark. 
The low number of firms with long term growth forecasts available in the 
UK, limits our attempt to try and clear the situation in analysts' overoptimism. We 
have to use current year earnings. That means that we can compare our results only 
with with Hansen & Sann (1998) and not with Dechow, Hutton & Sloan (1998) who 
use long term growth forecasts. 
Details about the number of firms making a rights issue of common shares 
and the amount of capital raised in the period 1987 to 1996 are presented in table 
9.1. Through the 10 year period, we have 1568 rights issues. There is a variation in 
the equity issue volume over time. 1987 was the year with the largest number of 
firms making a rights issue and 1993 was the year when the largest amount of capital 
was raised through rights issues with £7.8 billion. 1992 and 1995 were the least 
active years both in terms of number of rights issues per year with only 95 and 83 
issues respectively and in terms of amount of capital raised with £2.2 and £2.8 billion 
raised respectively The I/B/E/S however does not cover the whole population of 
rights issuers. The coverage of I/B/E/S ranges from year to year. In 1987 for only 
3.8% of issuers did I/B/E/S had earnings forecasts made in year 
-1 relative to the 
issue while in 1992 the coverage increased to 30%. , 'In total, IB/E/S provide 
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earnings forecast with 1 month forecast horizon for 201 firms made in the year prior 
to the announcement of the Rights issues. 
TABLE 9.1: ANNUAL DISTRIBUTION OF RIGHTS ISSUES 
ANNOUNCEMENTS AND IB/E/S COVERAGE OF RIGHTS ISSUERS 
The sample consists of Rights Issues of common equity made by listed firms. 
The data for Rights Issues were collected from DATASTREAMTM 
Year Total Number of Total Number of Firms that Total Amount of 
Rights Issues made a Rights Issue and are capital raised from 
Announcements covered with forecasts in the rights issues in real 
year prior to the terms 
Announcement (horizon of in £ millions) 
the forecast 1 month) 
1987 260 10(3.8%) 6325 
1988 174 16(9.2%) 4612 
1989 177 15(8.4%) 2974 
1990 149 22(7.7%) 3108 
1991 186 24 (12.9%) 6655 
1992 95 29 (30.5%) 2228 
1993 188 35 (18.6%) 7809 
1994 151 16 (10.61/o) 5115 
1995 83 22 (26.5%) 2867 
1996 105 12 (11.4%) 3253 
We investigate the behaviour of financial analysts earnings forecasts for firms 
announcing a rights issue in the period 3 years before and 3 years after the 
announcement. 
Table 9.2 reports the forecast errors that were made by analysts from year 
-3 
to year +3 relative to the year of the announcement of the rights, in forecasting the 
current year earnings, without any adjustments. The same results are also presented 
in figure 9.1. Since analysts' accuracy improves as the forecast is made closer to the 
announcement of the earnings we report forecast errors for the 12 different forecast 
horizons. We also have in the ` last row of table 9.2 the average forecast errors 
irrespective of the forecast horizons. 
In order to interpret the results we have to split the 6 year period into two, the 
pre-announcement period and the ' post-announcement period. With regard to the 
post-announcement period; * we ' find'that there are no big differences in analysts' 
forecast errors in years +1 to +3. ` All forecast errors for all forecast horizons made in 
the years +1 to +3 relative to the issue announcement are significantly negative. The 
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average forecast error of all forecast horizons made in year +1 is 
-0.01448, 
significantly negative at 1% and the average error of all forecast horizons made in 
year +2 is 
-0.01559 which is also significantly negative at 1 %. The average error of 
all forecast horizons made in year +3 is 
-0.01557 significantly negative at 1% and not 
different from the average error made in year +2. In figure 9.1 the post-announcement 
years are presented with the dotted lines. Forecast errors are similar for all 3 post- 
announcement years especially when the horizon of the forecasts is more than 6 
months. 
In the pre-announcement years, we find that financial analysts' forecast errors 
are slightly higher (more negative) in the year before the announcement, (solid blue 
line in figure 9.1) relative to the first post-announcement year (year '+1). The 
difference is significant for the five out of the twelve forecast horizons (2 months up 
to 6 months). The average forecast error of all forecast horizons made in year 
-1 is - 
0.01933 and is significantly more negative than the errors made in years +1, +2 +3 
with test statistics, 3.1 
, 
2.5 and 2.4 respectively. 
The least negative forecast errors were made during the year 
-2 relative to the 
announcement of the rights issue even though these errors were still significantly 
different from zero. The average error made in year 
-2 is -0.01063 significantly 
smaller than the error made in year 
-1. Forecast errors made in year -2 are 
significantly smaller than the errors in year 
-3 for 7 out of the 12 forecast horizons (. 
months 2 to 7 and 9). Forecast errors made in the year 
-3 are similar in magnitude 
with the errors made in year 
-1 and for no forecast horizon are the errors in year 
-1 
more negative than the errors in year 
-3. 
The results on the unadjusted forecast errors made for firms that announced a 
rights issue reveals that analysts are overoptimistic when they forecast the earnings of 
rights issuers both before and after the announcement of the issue. There is however 
a difference in the magnitude of the overoptimism between the, pre and post 
announcement years. Analysts are more overoptimistic when their forecasts are made 
in the year prior to the announcement of the rights issue and in the year 
-3 relative to 
the issue relative to the 3 post announcement years.. These results are partly in line 
with the results 
. 
of Hansen &Sarin (1998) who also report that analysts are 
s-ý.. 
,.. 
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overoptimistic (if no adjustments are made) for the current year earnings of firms 
making a SEO in the US both in the period before and after the issue announcement. 
TABLE 9.2: AVERAGE FINANCIAL ANALYSTS' UNADJUSTED FORECAST ERRORS FOR 
RIGHTS ISSUERS IR YEARS 
-3 TO +3 RELATIVE TO THE ISSUE ANNOUNCEMENT. 
The sample consists of all firms that made an announcement of a rights issue and for which for which forecasts for the current 
year earnings were available from I/B/E/S in the period 1987 to 1998. The Horizon of the forecast refers to the period in 
months between the time the forecast is made and the announcement of the current year earnings. The errors are calculated as 
the difference between the Actual Earnings per share and the Forecasted earnings per share divided over the share price at the 
end of the month that the forecast is made. 
». cc 
--1»' cc year -f-2» ý. ýý year i3 ear-3 
,. 
year 
-2 ear-l, ear 
Forecast 
Horizon 
Average 
Forecast 
error made 
in the year 
-3 from the 
issue 
Number 
of 
forecast 
errors 
made in 
ear-3 
Average 
Forecast 
error made 
in the year 
-2 from the 
issue 
Number 
of 
forecast 
errors 
made in 
year 
-2 
Average 
Forecast 
error made 
in the year 
-1 from the 
issue 
Number 
of 
forecast 
errors 
made in 
year 
-1 
Average 
Forecast 
error made 
in the year 
+1 from the 
issue 
Number 
of 
forecast 
errors 
made in 
ear+1 
Average 
Forecast 
error made 
in the year 
+2 from the 
issue 
Number 
of 
forecast 
errors 
made in 
year +2 
Average 
Forecast 
error made 
in the year 
+3 from the 
issue 
Number 
of 
forecast 
errors 
made in 
year +3 
1 month 
-0.0031 142 -0.0048*** 183 -0.0055** 201 -0.0076* 270 -0.0034** 277 -0.0055** 278 
2 months 
-0.0124** 147 -0.0038*** 176 -0.0120* 209 -0.0039** 252 -0.0075** 274 -0.008* 271 
3 months 
-0.0182* 141 -0.0044** 183 -0.0154* 204 -0.0069** 259 -0.0079* 270 -0.0101* 266 
4 months 
-0.0168* 143 -0.0059** 176 -0.0156* 207 -0.0075* 258 -0.0117* 253 -0.0115* 263 
5 months 
-0.0127** 140 -0.0078* 167 -0.0213* 216 -0.0073* 245 -0.0166* 257 -0.0123* 253 
6 months 
-0.0182* 146 -0.0082* 168 -0.0243* 204 -0.0145* 237 -0.0171* 249 -0.0151* 253 
7 months 7-0.0208* 143 -0.0097* 175 -0.0234* 197 -0.0179* 232 -0.0168* 253 -0.0174* 253 
8 months 
-0.0243* 135 -0.0148* 174 -0.0213* 194 -0.0214* 236 -0.0228* 251 -0.0208* 238 
9 months 0.0276* 133 -0.013* 164 -0.0246* 201 -0.0223* 226 -0.0212* 252 -0.0214* 244 
10 months 70.0235* 130 -0.0182* 161 -0.0221 * 184 -0.0235* 213 -0.0217* 241 -0.0234* 235 
II months 
-0.0215* 116 -0.0201* 143 -0.0262* 173 -0.0229* 192 -0.0221* 219 -0.0224* 211 
12months 
-0.0205* 83 -0.026* 105. -0.0353* . 121 -0.0321*, 131.. -0.0257* 159 -0.0296* 138 
Average 
of all 
forecast 
horizons 
-0.01804* 1599 -0.0106 *a 1975 -0.01933*a 2311 -0.0144 *a 2751 -0.0156* 2955 -0.01557* 2903 
.* denotes Significance from zero a.. 1 % two tail tests .................... _......................... ...... ............................................................................................... 
** denotes Significance from zero at 5% two tail tests 
*** denotes Significance from zero at 10% two tail tests, 
a, b, c Denote significance from same forecast horizon of the previous year of the life of the IPO at P lo, 5% and 10% 
respectively at two. tail tests. 
.........................................::.................................. 
`....................................................................................................................... ' 
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We showed however in chapter 8 that analysts are on average overoptimistic 
for all firms and that the forecast errors are affected by the industry and the size of 
the firms. So, in order to get the error that is unique for the Rights issuers we have to 
adjust them for these factors. Hansen & Sarin (1998) report that firms with high 
forecasted growth have higher forecast errors and they adjust their forecasts errors for 
the "growth bias". Our data does not enable us to make such an adjustment. Instead, 
we adjust for the size effect which may approximate for the forecasted growth since 
small firms are more likely to experience higher growth rates than large firms. 
Table 9.3 reports the average forecast error analysts make for the Rights 
issuers in the years 
-3 to +3 after we adjusted them for the industry and the market 
value of the issuer. For detail on the calculation of the forecast errors and the 
adjustment procedure see section 4.5. 
The results on the adjusted errors are also plotted in figure 9.2. Adjusted 
forecast errors made in the year 
-1 are significantly negative, at least at 10% level 
two tail tests, for 9 out of the 12 forecast horizons. Only the forecast horizons of 1,2 
and 10 months are not significant from zero at the above level of significance even 
though they were significant using one tail tests. The average adjusted forecast error,: 
of all the forecast horizons made in year 
-1 is -0.0086 which is significantly negative 
at 1%. For the year 
-2, rights issuers adjusted errors are significantly positive (solid 
green line in figure 9.2) for 7 out of 12 forecast horizons. For the remaining, 5, 
forecast horizons, 4 are positive but insignificant from zero and one is negative but 
insignificant. The average adjusted forecast error of all forecast horizons made in 
year 
-2 is 0.0046 which is significantly negative at 1%. Adjusted errors for year -3 
are not significantly different from zero apart from the 12 month forecast horizon 
which is significantly positive. The average adjusted forecast error of all forecast 
horizons made in year 
-3 is -0.00067 which is not significantly different from zero. 
The adjusted forecast errors made in year 
-1 are significantly higher (more: 
negative) than the adjusted errors made in year 
-2 for 11 of the 12 forecast horizons 
only difference of 1 month forecast horizon was not significant). Errors made in year 
-1 are significantly more negative than errors made in year -3 for the 5,6,7,10,11 
and 12 month forecast horizons. In addition, the average adjusted forecast error of all 
forecast made in year 
-1 is significantly higher (more negative) than the average 
adjusted forecast error of all forecast horizon made in year -2. 
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TABLE 9.3: AVERAGE FINANCIAL ANALYSTS' ADJUSTED FORECAST ERRORS FOR 
RIGHTS ISSUERS IR YEARS 
-3 TO +3 RELATIVE TO THE ISSUE ANNOUNCEMENT 
The sample consists of all firms that made an announcement of a rights issue and for which for which forecasts for the current year 
earnings were available from I/B/E/S in the period 1987 to 1998. The Horizon of the forecast refers to the period in months 
between the time the forecast is made and the announcement of the current year earnings. The errors are calculated as the 
difference between the Actual Earnings per share and the Forecasted earnings per share divided over the share price at the time the 
forecast is made. The errors are adjusted by subtracting the average errors analysts make for the firms in the same industry and the 
same size quartile. 
ýWear =3": "Year: c`=2" 1 
. 
"bYear=-1", "''`Year. +l". ` "Year +2" Year +3" 
Forecast 
Horizon 
' average 
Adjusted 
Error made 
in the year 
-3 relative 
to the Rights 
issue 
Number 
of 
forecast 
errors 
made in 
year-3 
average 
Adjusted 
Error made 
in the year 
-2 relative 
to the Rights 
issue 
Number 
of 
forecast 
errors 
made in 
year 
-2 
average 
Adjusted 
Error made 
in the year 
-1 relative 
to the Rights 
issue 
Number 
of 
forecast 
errors 
made in 
year 
-1 
average 
Adjusted 
Error made 
in the year 
+1 relative 
to the Rights 
issue 
Number 
of 
forecast 
errors 
made in 
year +1 
average 
Adjusted 
Error made 
in the year 
+2 relative 
to the Rights 
issue 
Number 
of 
forecast 
errors 
made in 
year +2 
average 
Adjusted 
Error made 
in the year 
+3 relative 
to the Rights 
issue 
Number 
of 
forecast 
errors 
made in 
year +3 
I month 0.0022 141 0.0017 181 -0.0008 197 -0.0033 261 -0.0003 266 -0.0021 271 
2months 
-0.0039 146 0.0052** 174 -0.0053 204 0.0011 247 -0.0030 265 -0.0030 262 
3months 
-0.0076 140 0.0057* 180 -0.0077*** 200 -0.0009 253 -0.0021 261 -0.0036 256 
months 
- -0.0053 142 0.0049** 173 -0.0071*** 202 0.0002 252 -0.0042 245 -0.0034 252 
5 months 0.0017 139 0.0059** 165 -0.0112** 212 0.0024 240 -0.0065*** 249 -0.0032 244 
6 months 
-0.0008 "145 0.0065** 166 -0.0123** 201 -0.0037 234 -0.0059 241 -0.0037 244 
7months 
-0.0014 142 0.0058** 173 -0.0099*** 192 -0.0045 229 -0.0028 246 -0.0054 244 
8months 
-0.0015 133 0.0064** 173 -0.0073*** 189 -0.0059 231, -0.0075*** 245 -0.0081*** 228 
9 months 
-0.0035 131 0.0058 164 -0.0104** 196 -0.0056 220, -0.0058. 246 -0.0045 234 
10 months 0.0023 128 0.0022 161 -0.0070 179 -0.0076 206 -0.0052 236 -0.0055 224 
Il months 0.0039 114 0.0034 143 -0.0103*** 169 -0.0073*** 186 -0.0060 215 -0.0038 197 
12 months 0.0125** 82 -0.0010 105 -0.0167*** ' 117. -0.0116*** 126 -0.0077 155 -0.0084 126 
Average 
of all 
forecast 
horizons 
-0.00067 1583 0.0046* a 1958 -0.0086* a 2258 -0.0034* a 2685 -0.0046*, 2870 -0.0043* 2782 
denotes Significance from zero at 1% two tail tests 
... 
** denotes Significance from zero at 5% two tail tests 
*** denotes Significance from zero at 10% two tail tests 
a, h, c Denote significance from same forecast horizon of the previous year of the life of the IPO at 1916,5% and 10% 
respectively at two-tail tests. : ` ' 
--- -------------------------------------------  - ------- --------------- 
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For all the 3 post-issue announcement years, adjusted errors of different 
forecast horizons are predominantly not significantly different from zero. Only 
occasionally are errors significantly negative. The average forecast errors however 
irrespective of the horizon of the forecasts reveals that these forecasts are 
significantly negative. Comparing the average adjusted errors made in year 
-1 with- 
the errors made in the first year after the announcement shows that the errors in year 
-1 are more negative than the errors in year +1 for 9 out of the 12 forecast horizons 
but significantly so only for 5 of them. The average adjusted forecast error of all, 
forecast horizons made in year 
-1 is significantly higher (more negative) than the 
average adjusted errors of all forecast horizons made in years +1, +2 and +3 with test :- 
--- 
statistics 3.1,2.3 and 2.55 respectively. 
Summarising our findings on the adjusted forecast errors made around the 
rights issue announcements, we find that issuers have more than the average 
overoptimistic earnings forecasts in the year before the announcement. Analysts that, ' 
make earnings forecasts in the year prior to the announcement of the issue 
overestimate the issuers' earnings by greater percentages relative to all other years 
and especially relative to the first post-announcement year. 
Out results on the adjusted forecast errors are different from the results of 
Hansen & Sarin (1998). They report that adjusted errors made both in the pre- 
announcement and post-announcement period are positive and significant different 
from zero and that forecast errors made in the pre-announcement period are more. 
positive than those made in the post-announcement period. 
I 
Our results suggest that rights issuers experience more overoptimistic 
forecasts in the year prior to the issue announcement than the firms within the same 
industry and similar size. This is the first evidence that rights issuers could be 
exploiting analysts' overoptimism in the timing of the rights issue. That however 
. ,' 
does not indicate that the time series variation in rights issue volume is driven by 
overoptimism in analysts' forecasts. To argue that the rights issue activity is (driven 
by analysts overoptimism we have to need to find first a time series variation in' 
analysts overoptimism and second a direct and significant relation between analysts 
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forecast errors and rights issue volume. More conclusive evidence is presented in the 
next part when we investigate whether more capital is raised when analysts errors are 
higher. 
9.3. FINANCIAL ANALYSTS EARNINGS FORECAST ERRORS AND THE TIMING OF 
RIGHTS ISSUES. 
Rajan & Servaes (1998) argue that "if analysts are overoptimistic about the 
growth potential of IPO and there is substantial variation in analysts overoptimism 
across time more firms should come to the market when this overoptimism is 
severe". We found in chapter 8 that analysts' overoptimism for firms that recently 
went public varies across time. In the previous chapter we also found evidence that 
the UK IPO activity is affected by analysts' optimism with more capital being raised 
from IPOs during periods when analysts' earnings forecasts for the recent IPOs are 
more overoptimistic on an unadjusted basis or less pessimistic on a adjusted basis. 
Our findings show that analysts' overoptimism for the firms that make a 
rights issue in the UK also varies across. In figure 9.3 we present the average forecast 
errors per year, made for rights issuers in the year 
-1 relative to the announcement of 
the issue (both adjusted and unadjusted), for 2 different forecast horizons. We can 
see a swing in analysts' overoptimism. As we found earlier, analyst on average are 
overoptimistic about the earnings of right issuers in the year before the issue 
announcement on an unadjusted basis. There are periods however when they are 
;... more overoptimistic than average. In 1987, 
. 
1988 and 1989 average unadjusted 
forecast errors (dotted lines in figure 9.3) made in the year prior to the rights issue 
with a forecast horizon of 4 months were not significantly different from zero while 
errors made in 1990 were significantly negative. Adjusted errors ( solid lines in 
figure 9.3 ) also exhibit significant variations across time. If Rights issue activity is 
affected by analysts' overoptimism we should find that more capital should be raised 
from rights issues when analysts overoptimism is high. 
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'Ehe null and alternative hypothesis are as follows: 
...................................................................................................................................................................................... Ho: There is no relation between the magnitude of analysts ' forecast errors 
made for the Rights issuers in the year prior to the announcement of the issue or 
the analysts' errors made for the whole market and Rights issuance volume. 
He There is a negative and significant relation between the magnitude of 
analysis 'forecast errors made 
. 
for the Rights issuers in the year prior to the 
announcement of'the issue or the analysts' errors made for the whole market 
and Rights issuance volume. 
. 
............................................................................................................................................................................................................. 
To support the argument that analysts' overoptimism is related to the Rights 
issuance activity we seek to reject the null hypothesis in favour of the alternative. 
In the next section we run monthly time series regressions adjusted for 
Newey West test for heteroscedasticity consistent covariance" similar to that of the 
previous part but this time the dependent variable is the amount of capital raised 
from rights issues. We regress the amount of capital raised from rights issues, in real 
terms (prices December 1996) per month, against the average of all forecast horizons 
excess forecast errors analysts made, it year 
-1 relative to the rights issue, for the 
current year earnings of firms that recently ( previous 12 months) announced a rights 
issue both adjusted for industry and size and unadjusted. We also use as an 
independent variable the average of all forecast horizons excess forecast error 
analysts made in the previous 12 months for the earnings of all firms in the market 
(excluding 1% outliers). The results are in table 9.4. Since, the distribution of the 
S1': 0 proceeds per month is not normally distributed we use the log transformed 
values which are normally distributed with a Jarque-Bera value 3.77, a value which 
rejects the hypothesis of non-normality at 15% level. 
As with the IPOs we find that the magnitude of analysts' forecast errors has 
an effect on the rights issuance activity. In regression I of table 9.4 we use as 
independent variable the adjusted errors made for rights issuers in the year prior to 
22 We also run Tobit regressions since the depeident variable is truncated at zero. Tobit regressions 
correct the standard errors and in our regressions that lead to higher test statistics relative to the 
ordinary least squares. 
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the announcement. The negative coefficient indicate that as analysts become more 
overoptimistic (more negative adjusted forecast errors) about the earnings of firms 
that made a rights issue in the previous 12 months, more capital is raised from rights 
issues in that month. The coefficient was significant at 10% two tail tests with a test 
statistic of 
-1.6. 
In regression 2 we use the average unadjusted error made for the rights 
issuers in the year prior to the announcement of the issue. The coefficients for the 
unadjusted errors also has a negative sign and is significant at 10% two tail tests 
with a test statistic of 
-1.7. 
In regression 3 we introduce as independent variable in the regressions the 
average error made for all the firms that are covered in I/B/E/S in the previous 12 
months. The coefficients for the errors made for the whole market in the previous 12 
months are negative but insignificant at conventional levels. 
In the regression 4 we use both the unadjusted error made for rights issuers as 
well as the error made for the whole market. The whole market error coefficient is 
not significantly negative 
. 
The coefficient for the unadjusted forecast errors made for 
the rights issuers is negative and significant again at 10% level. 
We also used quarterly time series regressions instead of monthly where the 
dependent variable was the amount of capital raised per quarter and as independent 
variables we had the same variables as previously but not averaged over the previous 
12 months but over the previous quarter. The results were qualitative similar. The 
adjusted forecast errors made for rights issues were negatively related with the Rights 
issuance activity and the coefficients for the unadjusted forecast errors made for 
rights issuers were negative and significant. The coefficients for, the whole market 
errors however were not significant when they were the only independent variable 
and were also not significant when they were used in the regressions together with 
the unadjusted Errors made for the rights issuers that had indeed negative and 
significant coefficients. 
23 We also run Tobit regressions since the dependent variable is truncated at zero. Tobit regressions 
correct the standard errors and in our regressions that lead to higher test statistics relative to the 
ordinary least squares. - 
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TABLE 9.4: REGRESSION OF RIGHTS ISSUES PROCEEDS AGAINST 
FORECAST ERRORS JANUARY 1998 TO DECEMBER 1996 
The regressions we run had the following format: 
Log(Rights PROCEEDS) t= ao + ajLog((1+Rights Error adjusted)1 + a2 
Log((1+Errors made for Rights Unadjusted), + a.? Log((1+Errors made for the 
whole market), 
Constant Errors Made for Errors Made for Recent Errors made for the --R--2- 
Recent RIGHTS RIGHTS Whole Market adjusted 
Adjusted (Unadjusted) 
1 5.194 
-90.102 131% 
26.774 
-1.694 
2 5.193 
-60.449 14.2% 
27.726 
-1.707 
3 5.188 
-60.001 2.1% 
28.949 
-1.263 
4 5.194 T 
-81.884 -93.198 11.8% 
29.588 
-1.741 -1.347 
................ -- .................... ---------------------- ----------------- .......... -............................................. ........................ 
......,, The above regressions are monthly time series regressions. To calculate the independent variables first we calculated 
the adjusted and unadjusted forecast errors analysts made for rights issuers during the year before the issue 
announcement and the forecast errors analysts made for all firms covered by I/B/E/S (excluding the 1% at the 2 tails) 
in each month from January 1987 to December 1996 according to the forecast horizons and created 3 groups ( one for 
the unadjusted errors, one for the adjusted errors and one for the whole market errors) of 12 monthly time series one for the forecast errors of each forecast horizon. 
Following that we calculated for each one of the 3 groups 12 monthly time series with the average excess 
forecast error one for each forecast horizon. To find the average excess error in a particular month for a particular 
forecast horizon, we remove from the average forecast error made in that particular month for that particular forecast 
horizon the average forecast error made for all rights issuers from 1987 to 1996 during the year prior to the issue: 
announcement and had that particular forecast horizon. 
Instead of having 12 monthly time series regressions, one for each forecast horizon we opted to use only one ": ` 
where the dependent variable is the monthly time series of the average of the average excess forecast errors of all the 
12 forecast horizons. We gave equal weight in each forecast horizon in the averaging process. 
We use three different independent variable The unadjusted excess forecast errors made for the rights issuers 
during the year prior the issue announcement that announced a rights issue in the previous year. The adiusted excess 
forecast errors made for the rights issuers during the year prior the issue announcement that announced a rights issue in 
"` 
the previous year. The excess forecast errors made for the whole market for all firms covered by IB/E/S (excluding the l 
1% outliers in the two tails) during the previous year. The adjusted forecast errors made for the rights issuers are 
calculated by subtracting from the unadjusted errors, the average forecast errors analysts made for the firms in the same 
industry as the rights issuers firm and similar market value( same quartile) as the rights issuers and in the same year as: 
the unadjusted error was made: T-Statistics are below the coefficients 
conciuaing our results, we can say that tinanciai analysts' forecast 
overoptimism for the earnings of firms that announced a rights issue in the previous 
year has a significant effect on the rights issue activity in the current month. More 
capital is raised when the overoptimism for the earnings potential of resent issuers is 
high. Both adjusted and unadjusted errors made for recent issuers were negatively 
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and significantly related with the Rights issuance volume. Using quarterly time series 
regressions instead of monthly, where the dependent variable was the amount of 
capital raised per quarter and the independent variables were averaged over the 
previous term and not year, also produced significantly negative coefficients for the 
adjusted and unadjusted errors. We also find that the magnitude of financial analysts 
overoptimism for the whole market does not have a significant effect on the timing of 
Rights issue activity in the monthly regressions or in the quarterly regressions. 
These findings suggest that rights issue volume may be at least partially 
driven by analysts' overoptimism. There are periods where analysts become more 
overoptimistic about the earnings potential of the firms that recently raised capital. 
Other firms seem to seizure that overoptimism and decide to make an issue as well. 
As we saw in chapter 8, the average errors made for the whole market are 
significantly more negative during the downturn of the cycle. That could have 
indicated that we have more capital raised from rights issue when analysts are more 
overoptimistic which may be periods of the downturn of the cycle. As we found for 
the IPOs however in the chapter 8, the average errors analyst make for recent IPOs 
during the recession are not higher (more negative) than the errors made during the 
upturn of the cycle. As the following table however indicates, the average errors 
adjusted and unadjusted) made for the rights issuers in the year 
-1, do not differ 
significantly from expansion to recession as well. 
TABLE 9.5: AVERAGE FINANCIAL ANALYSTS' FORECAST ERRORS 
MADE FOR RIGHTS ISSUERS IN YEAR 
-1 ACROSS THE UPTURN AND 
DOWNTURN OF THE BUSINESS CYCLE 
Analysts' average unadjusted earnings forecast Errors made for rights Issuers in the year 
- 
1 relative to the announcement of the issue ° 
Average forecast error 
made during the UPTURN 
of the Business Cycle 
Average forecast error 
made during the 
DOWNTURN of the 
Business Cycle 
, 
T-, stats of difference 
between downturn and 
Upturn 
Forecast Horizon 1 months 
-0.0056 (90) -0.0055 (111) -0.02 
Forecast Horizon 2 months 
-0.0136 (89) . 0.0108(120)' ,. -0.37 
Forecast Horizon 3 months 
-0.0173 (85) -0.0139 (119) -0.38 
Forecast Horizon 4 months 
-0.0184 (89) -0.0134 (118) -0.57 
Forecast Horizon 5 months 
-0.0264 (94), -0.0174 (122) y' " -0.87 
Forecast Horizon 6 months 
-0.0299 (90) -0.0198 (114) -0.92 
Forecast Horizon 7 months 
-0.0223 (93) -0.0244 (104) 0.19 
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Forecast Horizon 8 months 
-0.0192 (93) -0.0233 (101) 0.44 
Forecast Horizon 9 months 
-0.024 (102) -0.0251 (99) 0.10 
Forecast Horizon 10 months 
-0.0148 (97) -0.0302 (87) 1.51 
Forecast Horizon 11 months 
-0.0208 (89) -0.0318 (84) 0.96 
Forecast Horizon 12 months 
-0.0191 (53) -0.0478 (68) 1.57 
Average of all forecast 
Horizons -0.01936 
(1064) 
-0.02043 (1250) -0.55 
Analysts' average adiusted earnings forecast Errors made for rights Issuers in the year 
-1 
relative to the announcement of the issue 
Average forecast error 
made during the UPTURN 
of the Business Cycle 
Average forecast error 
made during the 
DOWNTURN of the 
Business Cycle 
T- stats of difference 
between downturn and 
Upturn 
Forecast Horizon 1 months 
-0.0017 (86) -0.0002 (111) -0.33 
Forecast Horizon 2 months 
-0.0071(85) -0.0041 (119) -0.39 
Forecast Horizon 3 months 
-0.0117 (82) -0.0049 (118) -0.80 
Forecast Horizon 4 months 
-0.0121 (85) -0.0034 (117) -0.99 
Forecast Horizon 5 months 
-0.0177 (91) -0.0062 (121) -1.16 
Forecast Horizon 6 months 
-0.0192 (89) -0.0068 (112) -1.24 
Forecast Horizon 7 months 
-0.0097 (90) -0.0100 (102) 0.03 
Forecast Horizon 8 months 
-0.0059 (90) -0.0086 (99) 0.31 
Forecast Horizon 9 months 
-0.0121 (99) -0.0085 (97) 0.37 
Forecast Horizon 10 months 
-0.0018 (94) -0.0128 (85) 1.10 
Forecast Horizon 11 months 
-0.0079 (87) -0.0128 (82) 0.44 
Forecast Horizon 12 months 
-0.0050 (50) -0.0259 (66) 1.19 
Average of all forecast 
Horizons 
-0.00948(1031) -0.000776 (1229) 0.79 
Unadjusted forecast errors made for rights issuers in year 
-1 relative to the 
issue announcement do not differ significantly across the upturn and downturn of the 
business cycle for 10 out of the 12 forecast horizons. Only errors made 10 and 12 
months before the announcement of earnings were significantly more negative during 
the downturn of the cycle but the coefficients for these forecast horizons were not 
significant in the regressions of table 9.4. The average unadjusted forecast error of all 
forecast horizons made during the upturn of the business cycle is 
-0.01936 while the 
average unadjusted forecast error of all forecast horizons made during the downturn 
of the business cycle is 
-0.02043 not significantly different from the average 
unadjusted error made during the upturn with a test statistic of -0.55. The adjusted 
errors made for rights issuers in year -1, do not differ significantly across the upturn 
and downturn of the cycle for no forecast horizon. The average adiusted forecast 
error of all forecast horizons made during the upturn of the business cycle is -0.00948 
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while the average adjusted forecast error of all forecast horizons made during the 
downturn of the business cycle is 
-0.000776 not significantly different from the 
average adjusted error made during the upturn with a test statistic of 0.79. Therefore 
our findings that more capital is raised from rights issuers when analysts are more 
overoptimistic for the earnings of recent issuers do not imply that more capital is 
raised during recessions because adjusted and unadjusted errors made for recent 
issuers are not higher (more negative) during the downturn of the cycle. 
9.4. RIGHTS ISSUES AND ABNORMAL FORECAST REVISIONS 
The previous results indicate that firms time the announcement of the rights 
issue when analysts' optimism for the earnings of all firms in the market or for the 
firms that made a similar announcement in the previous year is high 
. 
There may be 
however another significant factor that could have a significant effect on the timing 
of Rights issues and that is the analysts optimism for the earnings of the particular 
company that is about to announce this equity issue. 
Firms may time the equity issue when analysts forecast high growth in their 
earnings. Firms may find that there is an opportunity to make an issue when their 
earnings forecasts are too high. Managers can use the inside information they posses 
to estimate with accuracy whether the current forecasts that analysts make are 
overoptimistic or not. If the earnings forecasts for the. particular company are 
overoptimistic that will make the rights issue easier. More investors will be willing to 
participate in the issue and larger amounts of capital will be easier to be raised. 
If firms time the rights issue when analysts are overoptimistic for their 
earnings, then analyst should revise downwards their forecasts as soon as they 
realise that their earnings expectations can not be materialised. 
Brous (1992) examines financial analysts earnings forecasts revisions for 321 
firms that made a SEO in the US. He finds that the SEO is considered as a negative 
signal for the profitability of the issue. Analyst revise upwards their earnings forecast 
in the months prior. to the announcement of the issue. On: the : month of the 
announcement of the SEO, analysts revise downward their current year earnings 
forecast. The downwards revision, continues up to month 3, 
. 
after the issue 
announcement. Brous (1992) suggests that the "announcement conveys negative 
information about the level of future earnings". '"t 
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In chapter 6 we found that the announcement of a rights issue in the UK is 
accompanied by significant negative returns. We reported that firms with high 
earnings growth in the pre-announcement periods and high debt to equity ratios have 
more adverse price reaction than firms with low earnings growth and low debt to 
equity ratio. Those results indicate that the market expresses more doubts about the 
future profitability of firms with high growth in earnings in the pre-announcement 
period as if investors may assume that the upwards trend will not continue after the 
issue. In addition, highly leveraged firms whose profitability is high should not have 
problems servicing the debt and therefore if investors think that the earnings of 
highly geared firms are high enough to sustain such high level of debt, no adverse 
price reaction should be expected. If the level of earnings for highly geared firms 
., 
however is not adequate to enable the firms to service the debt, then the equity issue 
may send signals to the market that the extra funds are needed to help the firm 
services the debt. The negative price reaction for highly leveraged firms indicate that 
investors may think that the future profitability of these firms will decrease to an" 
extent that without any issue it may threaten the viability of the firm. Therefore the 
rights issue may send signals to the market that the future profitability of the issuer is 
in danger. The use of financial analysts earnings forecasts can help us to see in a 
direct way how the market views the rights issue will affect the profitability of the 
issuer. If investors regard a rights issue as a bad signal for the future profitability of 
the issuer than we should find a downward revision in the forecasted earnings at the 
month of the announcement of the rights issue and thereafter. 
We examine financial analysts normal and abnormal forecast revisions for 
firms that announce a rights issue in the period 1987 to 1996. Only firms with 
earnings forecast for at least 5 months prior to the announcement of the issue are 
included in the sample. I/B/E/S analysts provided forecasts for 157 24 rights issuers 
at the time the rights issue announcements were made. I 
Table 9.6 presents the average normal forecast revision from month 
-12 to 
month +12 relative to the announcement of the issue. What we see is that on the 
announcement of the rights issue, analysts revise downwards their earnings 
forecasts. 
24 For 11 firms there was not enough data to estimate the abnormal forecast revisions so the size of the 
sample for abnormal forecast revisions is 146 
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Normal forecast revisions are significantly negative for every month around 
the equity issue announcement. The median forecast revision however is 0 for all 
months. That happens because not all analysts revise their forecast every month. We 
can see in the 5`h column of table 9.6 that around 50 to 60% of forecast revisions are 
zero showing that analysts do not revise their forecasts every month. The percentage 
of negative forecast revisions however is usually greater than the percentage of 
positive forecast revisions. 
TABLE 9.6: AVERAGE FINANCIAL ANALYSTS' FORECAST REVISIONS 
FOR FIRMS ANNOUNCING A RIGHTS ISSUE 
Month relative 
to the issue 
announcement 
Average Forecast 
Revision for firms 
making a rights 
issue 
t statistic of 
difference of 
forecast 
revision from 
zero 
Percentage of 
Positive 
forecast 
revisions 
Percentage 
of zero 
forecast 
revisions 
Percentage 
of negative 
forecast 
revisions 
-12 -0.0018* -2.59 0.16 0.54 0.30 
-11 -0.0054 -1.15 0.24 0.52 0.24 
-10 -0.0039** -1.86 0.24 0.44 0.32 
-9 -0.0018** -2.03 0.19 0.50 0.31 
-8 -0.0014* -2.92 0.21 0.50 0.30 
-7 -0.0012*** -1.55 0.17 0.59 0.24 
-6 -0.0017** -1.93 0.19 0.57 0.24 
-5 -0.0058** -2.26 0.19 0.48 0.33 
-4. -0.0021 * -2.53 0.17 0.57 0.27 
-3 -0.0035* -2.45 0.15 0.57 0.28 
-2 -0.0014** -1.82 0.21 0.58 0.21 
-1 -0.0014** -2.27- - 0.19 0.56 0.25 
0 
-0.0021 * -2.45 0.19 0.55 0.26 
1 
-0.0011 -0.94 0.22 0.51 0.26 
2 
-0.0033** -1.78 0.23 0.51 . 0.26 
3 
-0.0011 * -2.88 0.13 0.56 0.31 
4 
-0.0043** -2.03 0.18 0.55 0.27 
5 
-0.0051 * -2.34 '0.15 0.52 0.33 
6 
-0.0025** 1. -1.65 -. 0.19 - 0.55 0.26 
7 
-0.004* -3.01 0.18 0.45 0.38 
8 
- 
0.0035** 
-1.94 0.21 0.48 - 0.31 
9 
-0.0031 0.16 0.52 0.32 
10 
-0.0013** -1.65 0.15 0.56 0.29 
11 
-0.0014** -1.83 0.22 . 0.52 0.26 
12 
-0.0018*, -3.05., 0.14 0.57 0.29 
............................................................................................... _..................................................................................................................; 
* ** *** denotes Significance. at 1%z5% 10% respectively one tail tests " z.... s 
.... ................... ... ......... ................................................... 
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As we had argued however in chapter 4, the normal forecast revision is not a 
correct measure of how analysts see the effect of the rights issue on the rights issuer 
profitability, as this does not take into account the negative drift in analysts' forecast 
revisions. The normal forecast revision reflects two different sets of information. 
The one set refers to the information that makes analysts to adjust their forecasts to 
lower levels simply because, as the announcement of the earnings approaches, the 
release of new information makes them realise they have overestimated the earnings. 
The second set refers to the new information that is revealed to the market with the 
announcement of the issue. The normal forecast revisions do not distinguish between 
the two different sets of information. Therefore, these negative normal forecast 
revisions do not distinguish which part of these revisions is due to the improved 
accuracy of analysts as they approach the announcement of earnings and which is due 
to the new information that is generated by the rights issue announcement. A more 
appropriate measure is the abnormal forecast revisions because that takes 
. 
into 
account the negative drift of the analysts' forecast revisions. The abnormal forecast 
revisions manage to "sterilise" the revisions and reveal the forecast revision that is 
caused by the announcement of the rights issue only. 
In table 9.7, we present the abnormal forecast revisions for firms that 
announced a rights issue from month 
-12 to month +12. ( The abnormal forecast 
revisions are also potted in figure 9.5). We find that the rights issuers has positive 
abnormal forecast revisions in the pre-announcement period. In the 3 pre- 
announcement years, 30 months have positive abnormal forecast revisions ( 15 
significant at 10% level one tail or higher) and only 6 have negative abnormal 
forecast revisions ( all insignificant). In the year prior to the announcement of the 
issue, all monthly abnormal forecast revisions apart from one, are positive and 6 of 
them are significantly different from zero. 
On the month of the announcement of the issue, the abnormal forecast 
revision is marginally negative but not significant. Abnormal forecast revisions after 
the issue announcement are predominantly negative. In the 36 months after the issue, 
26 months are characterised by negative abnormal forecast revisions but only_ 8 of 
them are significant at least at 10% level one-tail ' tests. In the year after the 
announcement of the issue, 9 months have negative abnormal forecast revisions and 
3 of them are significant. Overall, we see a big difference in the analysts' abnormal 
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forecast revisions in the pre-announcement and the post-announcement period. In the 
36 months prior to the issue announcement the cumulative monthly forecast revision 
is +0.0947 while in the 36 post-announcement months the cumulative abnormal 
forecast revision is 
-0.047. 
TABLE 9.7: AVERAGE FINANCIAL ANALYSTS' ABNORMAL FORECAST 
REVISION FOR FIRMS ANNOUNCING A RIGHTS ISSUE 
Month relative 
to the issue 
announcement 
Average 
Abnormal 
Forecast 
Revision 
t statistic of 
difference of 
abnormal 
forecast revision 
from zero 
Percentage of 
Positive 
Abnormal 
forecast 
revisions 
Percentage of 
zero Abnormal 
forecast 
revisions 
Percentage 
of negative 
Abnormal 
forecast 
revisions 
-12 0.0038*** 1.51 0.65 0.02 0.33 
-11 0.0045 ** 1.85 0.66 0.03 0.31 
-10 0.0023 0.75 0.67 0.03 0.30 
-9 0.0039*** 1.51 0.70 0.00 0.30 
-8 0.0016 1.21 0.62 0.03 0.35 
-7 0.0035** 1.89 0.66 0.03 0.31 
-6 0.0030** 1.88 0.65 0.05 0.30 
-5 0.0006 0.20 0.70 0.02 0.29 
-4 0.0019*** 1.41 0.69 0.02 0.29 
-3 -0.0004 -0.30 0.69 0.00 0.31 
-2 0.0008 0.64 0.66 0.02 0.32 
-1 0.0007 0.74 0.64 0.02 0.34 
0 
-0.0004 -0.48 0.60 0.00 0.40 
1 0.0005 0.57 0.62 0.00 0.38 
2 
-0.0016 -0.80 0.64 0.00 0.36 
3 0.0005 0.61 0.64 0.00 0.36 
4 
-0.0024 -1.21 0.67 0.00 0.33 
5 
-0.0043** -1.78 0.62 0.02 0.36 
6 
-0.0015 -0.96 0.66 0.01 0.34 
7 
-0.0022* * -1.65 0.63 0.00 0.37 
8 
-0.0028*** -1.37 0.68 0.00 0.32 
9 
-0.0015 -1.26 0.66 0.01 0.33 
10 
-0.0002 -0.20 0.65 
. 
0.00 0.35 
11 0.0000 0.01 0.68 '0.00 0.32 
12 0.0001 0.12 0.62' 0.01 0.37 
.................................................................................................................................................................... ............ 
-. 
` *, **, *** denotes Signifcance at 1%, 5%. 10% respectively, one tail tests 
.................. _................. . . ................ _............... _................................ 
i 
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Figure 9.5 presents the abnormal forecast revisions at a monthly continuously 
compounded form based at month 
-3625. We can see that there is an upwards forecast 
revision in the pre-announcement months. After the announcement of the issue, 
forecast revisions are predominantly negative creating a downward slope. 
In general, we find that a rights issue is regarded by analysts as a negative 
event in terms of its effect on the forecasted earnings. We find that a rights issue 
induce analysts to slightly decrease their earnings forecasts for the firms that 
announced a rights issue. The downwards revision of earnings however is not an 
immediate and highly drastic action as Brous (1992) finds for US SEOs but it is 
rather a smooth process that lasts for about 2.5 years. Analyst revise downwards their 
forecasts after the announcement of the issue but not at a magnitude and significance 
found in US SEOs. 
Our findings partly support the findings of Brous (1992) who found that a 
Seasoned equity offer in the US is regarded as a negative signal about the future 
earnings of the issuer. Brous (1992) finds that analysts revise upwards their 
forecasted earnings before the announcement and revise downwards their earnings 
forecasts of the current year earnings after the issue. Firms in the US seem to time the 
equity issue decision in periods when analysts increase their earnings forecasts. 
Our results also indicate that managers time the rights issue announcement 
after an increase in their forecasted earnings. Forecasted earnings increase before the 
issue and decrease after the issue. However the results are far from overwhelming. 
The significance of the downwards forecast revisions is very limited. The size of our 
sample is approximately half of that of Brous (1992). It will be possible that in future 
research when the number of earnings forecasts available will increase to test the 
above propositions with greater confidence. 
What our results however indicate is that Rights issuers time their issue after 
an increase in their earnings and that the forecasted earnings decrease after the issue. 
In contrast with our findings for the IPOs sample where we find that the IPO firms do 
23 Cumulating the abnormal forecast revisions instead of continuously compounding them produced 
insignificant differences 
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not time the issue around the peak of their profitability, the evidence on the SEOs 
indicate that issuers time the issue at the peak of their profitability. 
9.5 CONCLUSIONS 
Evidence from US studies suggest that Seasoned equity issuance activity is 
driven by variations in investors' sentiment. Financial analysts' earnings forecasts 
should be affected by the market sentiment and therefore can be used as a proxy for 
the market sentiment. This chapter investigated the relation between the financial 
analysts' earnings forecasts overoptimism and the timing of Rights issues in the UK. 
We find that firms that make a rights issue have more than the average 
overoptimistic forecasts in the year prior to the announcement of the issue. 
Unadjusted forecast errors are significantly negative in the year prior to the 
announcement of the issue and are significantly more negative than the first post 
announcement year. Adjusted errors are significantly negative in the year prior to the 
announcement of the rights issue. 
The magnitude of the forecast errors analysts make for the recent rights 
issuers has a significant effect on the amount of capital raised from rights issues. 
More capital is raised from rights issues when the, average of the previous 12 
months, forecasts analysts make, in forecasting the earnings of seasoned issuers in 
the year 
-1 relative to the issue announcement, are more overoptimistic. The 
overoptimism for the earnings of the firms in the whole market did not had a 
significant effect on the SEO volume. Periods when analysts make more 
overoptimistic forecasts for the whole market are not periods when more capital is 
raised from rights issues. 
This chapter also used financial analysts earnings forecasts to see what impact 
the SEO announcement has on the profitability of the issuer. The examination of 
financial analysts' earnings forecast revisions showed that firms that make a rights 
issue experience significantly positive abnormal forecast revisions in the pre- 
announcement period. After the announcement of the issue, analysts revise 
downwards their forecasts, but the downwards revision is not a drastic one. With the 
announcement of the rights issue a process of downwards forecast revisions 
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commences which lasts for about 2.5 years. The downwards forecast revision 
however is not a highly significant one. 
Overall our results indicate that Rights issue volume is driven at least 
partially by analysts overoptimism for recent issuers. As analyst become more 
overoptimistic about the earnings of the recent Issues 
, 
more capital is raised from 
seasoned equity issues. 
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CHAPTER 10: CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis has tried to answer what are the driving forces behind the time 
series variation in the number of firms that make Initial public offerings, Seasoned 
equity offerings and takeover bids that are financed with equity in the UK and in the 
amount of capital that firms raise from IPOs and SEOs. The innovating thing in the 
thesis is that we treat the three corporate actions in a unified framework and try to 
find whether the factors that drive one activity drive the other two as well. 
The thesis starts with a review of the literature findings regarding the three 
stylised facts that characterise the firms that make an IPO, SEO and a takeover bid 
that is financed with equity. First, they are all characterised by significant adverse 
share price movements in the period around the event which create additional 
indirect costs for the firms. IPO firms have very large positive returns in the first 
trading day and firms that make a SEOs or a takeover bid financed with equity 
experience a significant drop on their share price on the announcement of their plans. 
Second, the overwhelming empirical evidence suggest that firms that make an 
IPO, SEO or a takeover bid that is financed with equity perform badly in the long run 
after the event. Third, the number of firms that engage in those activities vary 
significantly across time. An evaluation of the theories developed for the three 
abnormal phenomena reveals that information asymmetries about the intrinsic value 
of issuers and bidders and managers' incentives to make equity issues and takeover 
bids that are financed with equity when the share prices are overvalued provide the 
most widely accepted explanation for the drop on the share price of the SEO and the 
bidder. Cognitive bias and overvaluation timing are 
- 
the best explanations the 
literature can provide for the long run underperformance of the IPOs, 
, 
SEOs and 
equity bidders. As far as the time series variation of the number of firms engaging in 
these activities 
-is concerned, changes in. business 'conditions and : investment 
opportunities, exploitation of investors' sentiment and market imperfections such as 
information asymmetries create "windows of opportunity" when equity, issues and 
'-- 
-' 
= takeover bids can' be made in more favourable terms. The literature provides ample 
evidence that the three corporate activities have certain similarities., There is no study 
however that investigates and presents what is the degree of unification of the three 
corporate activities. 
, 
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Chapter 3 reviews the previous studies made on the effect that analysts' 
earnings forecast optimism and forecast revisions have on the timing of equity 
issues. The literature has concentrated on two things: First on the investigation of 
whether analysts are more overoptimistic for the earnings potential of issuers in the 
periods around the issues and relative to non-issuers and what effect that 
overoptimism has on the timing of issuance activity. Second, how analysts perceive 
that an equity issue will affect the profitability of the issuer. Evidence suggests that 
analysts are overoptimistic for the earnings of issuers in the years after the IPO and 
before the SEO and that analysts' overoptimism has a significant effect on IPO 
volume. More firms go public when analysts are more overoptimistic for recent 
issuers. Negative earnings forecast revisions on the announcement of the SEO 
suggest that a SEO is regarded as a negative signal for the future profitability of the 
issuer and that the issuers time the SEO at the peak of the profitability. 
Chapter 4 details the data collection methods used in the thesis, the samples 
used and the methodology followed to calculate abnormal announcement period 
returns, long run performances, financial analysts adjusted and unadjusted earnings 
forecast errors as well as normal and abnormal earnings forecast revisions. 
Chapter 5 is the first empirical chapter investigating what drives the Initial 
public offerings activity in the UK. We find that the magnitude of first day returns 
has no significant effect on the timing of IPOs. Periods of high IPO activity are not 
periods when average first day returns are low. As expected, we report a very strong 
business cycle effect. IPO activity in the UK is significantly higher during the upturn 
of the business cycle., Chapter 5 also reveals significant evidence in favour of the 
"sentiment timing" theory. As with other studies we find that IPO firms perform 
badly after the listing. The underperformance however is concentrated only to IPOs 
that go public in periods of heavy IPO volume while IPOs that go public in light 
volume periods do not underperform.: The difference in the performance of IPOs that 
go public in Heavy and Lights volume periods is significant indicating that Heavy 
volume period IPOs are more overvalued than Light volume period IPOs. Managers 
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"time" the IPOs in periods when investors are paying for the new issues prices which 
are above the fundamentals. 
To further strengthen our support to the "sentiment" timing theory we use, in 
chapter 8, financial analysts' earnings forecasts as a proxy for the market sentiment. 
We find that the magnitude of analysts' optimism has a significant effect on the 
timing of UK IPOs. More capital is raised from IPOs when analysts are more 
overoptimistic about the earnings of recent IPOs. 
The analysis of the UK rights issuance activity in chapter 6 shows that 
different forces from those found for IPOs are responsible for the variation in the 
SEO volume. Unlike IPOs, our analysis of rights issues shows that adverse selection 
costs play an important part in the timing of SEOs in the UK. More firms make a 
rights issue and more capital is raised from rights issues during months when the 
adverse selection costs of the previous quarter are low. In contrast with the IPOs, we 
do not find that the rights issuance activity differs significantly between upturns and 
downturns of the cycle. That is due to the extremely high activity observed in the last 
stage of the recession. We also do not find that the driving force behind the time 
series variation in rights issues is overvaluation exploitation. The post-announcement 
performance of issuers that make the announcement in heavy volume periods is 
similar with the post-announcement performance of rights issuers that make the 
announcement in light volume periods. Periods of heavy rights issue activity are not 
periods when the issuers are more overvalued than periods with low activity. 
Chapter 9 uncovers that analysts' earnings forecasts overoptimism has a significant 
role in the timing of SEOs as well. More capital is raised during periods when 
analysts are more overoptimistic for the earnings of recent seasoned equity issuers. 
Chapter-7 investigated the timing of takeover bids that. are, financed with 
equity. Our results show that neither, 
. 
adverse - selections,, nor 
- 
overvaluation 
exploitation is a major driving force behind the time series variation in the volume of 
equity financed bids. The magnitude of adverse selection costs, associated with bids 
that are financed with equity, ', has no effect on how many bidders will choose equity 
to finance the bid. A strong business cycle effect is also present in the equity financed 
takeover bids. The percentage of equity financed takeover bids over all bids increases 
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when stock markets are rising and when the economy is in the phase of an expansion. 
10% more bidders use equity to finance a takeover bid during the upturn relative to 
the downturn of the cycle. Our evidence on the post-bid performance indicate that 
firms that finance the bid with cash outperform firms in the same industry and similar 
market to book or similar market values. Takeover bids that are financed with equity 
however, significantly destroy the value of the bidders' shareholders since, after the 
equity financed takeover bid, bidders underperform significantly relative to firms in 
the same industry and similar market to book or similar market values. That could 
indicate that the reason behind the use of equity as a method of payment is that 
bidders' shares are overvalued when they propose the use of equity to finance a 
takeover bid. We find however no difference in the post-bid performance of bidders 
who use equity to finance the bid and made the announcement in heavy volume 
periods with those bidders that made the announcement in light volume periods. 
Bidders that use equity to finance the bid are not more overvalued in periods of heavy 
activity. That result put doubts as to whether the poor long run performance of equity 
financed bids is driven by deliberately timing the bid at periods when shares are 
overvalued. The time series variation in the equity financed takeover activity is not 
driven by variations in the magnitude of overvaluation. 
Evidence from financial analysts earnings forecasts presented in chapter 8 
revealed that UK IPO firms do not time the equity issue at the peak of their 
profitability. Financial analysts revise upwards their earnings forecasts for the IPOs 
during the first 30 months after the issue. In the months 31 to 60 after the IPO, 
analysts' forecasts revisions are slightly negative. Furthermore, the earnings that 
IPOs report show a steady growth rate in the first 3 years after the listing. Only in 4th 
and 5th year does the growth rate of earnings decreases. That makes us conclude that 
firms time the IPOs at the start or during periods of sustainable earnings growth and 
not at the peak of their operating performance. 
The large positive returns at the first trading day of the ' IPO and the 
significant price drops at the announcement of the SEO and the takeover bids that are 
financed with equity are anomalies that have attracted our attention as well. As with 
previous studies we report in chapter 5 that UK IPOs have large first day returns. 
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IPOs that were placed directly to investors and firms with high Price earnings ratios 
have higher first day returns. The improvement in economic conditions has a 
significant effect on the average first day returns. The average underpricing is higher 
during the upturn of the business cycle. 
Chapter 6 also investigated the effect the announcement of a rights issue has 
on the share price of the issuer. We find that the announcement of a rights issue in 
the UK is accompanied by a drop on the share price of the issuer of 1.79%. This drop 
is not caused by the increase in the supply of shares nor from the redistribution of 
wealth from shareholders to bondholders. We find that the negative price reaction is 
most likely to be driven by investors who regard the issue as a negative signal for the 
future profitability of the issuer and that is supported by two significant findings. 
First, firms with high growth in their earnings in the period prior to the 
announcement have more negative price reactions on the announcement of the issue. 
The market reacts more adversely on the announcement of rights issues made by 
firms that have experienced high growth in their earnings which is consistent with the 
market taking the view that this upwards trend will not continue in the future. 
Second, analysts revise upwards their earnings forecasts in the period prior to the 
announcement and revise their forecasts downwards after the announcement of the 
issue. The difference in the monthly forecast revisions between the pre- 
announcement and post-announcement periods is highly significant. Another 
interesting result of chapter 6 is that the adverse selection costs associated with the 
announcement of a rights issue are significantly lower during the upturn of the 
business cycle which is also consistent with the possibility that the earnings of firms 
are less likely to be hit during the upturn of the cycle than the downturn. Firms that 
announce a SEO in the upturn of the business cycle have around 1.0% higher returns 
than the SEOs that announce the issue during the downturn of the cycle. 
A significant negative price reaction is found in chapter 7 for the firms that 
announce a takeover bid. The price of the bidder drops : by, 1.07% on average. The 
magnitude of the drop varies according to the method of payment with bids that 
include equity in the financing package, having significantly, more negative returns 
relative to bids that include cash in the financing package. ? As with the rights issues 
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we find that the announcement of a takeover bid that is financed with equity is 
accompanied by less negative returns when the announcement takes place during the 
upturn of the business cycle. The difference in the announcement period returns 
across upturns and downturns is around 1.1% and remains even when we take into 
account the various bidders and targets characteristics that affect the market reaction 
to the equity financed bids. The negative price reaction on the announcement of the 
equity financed bid is not caused by the "price pressure" nor from the redistribution 
of wealth from shareholders to bond holders. The acquisition of large targets in 
relation to the size of the bidder is accompanied by less negative returns in contrast 
with the theoretical predictions of the two models above. The market reacts less 
adversely in equity financed bids when the bid is successful, when the growth 
opportunities of the target are high and when the bidder is less overvalued and 
measures of growth and profitability show that the bidder on its own has little 
potential for expansion. 
This thesis has tried to answer two main questions. The first one was whether 
the three equity issuance activities, the IPO, the SEO and the takeover bid that are 
financed with equity move together. Our motivation was to see whether the timing 
aspect of the equity issue decision is driven by the same factors whether this issue is 
an IPO a SEO or it is made in order to finance a takeover bid. Our answer to that 
question is that the three equity issuance activities differ as to what are the main 
motivations behind the timing decision. The three corporate activities do not respond 
to the same factors in the same way. 
The second question we tried to answer is what is the effect of certain factors 
on the timing of equity issues. We tested what impact four main factors, the business 
conditions, the adverse selection costs, overvaluation exploitation and sentiment 
timing, have on the timing of IPOs, SEOs and takeover bids that are financed with 
equity. 
Business conditions have a significant impact on the timing of IPOs and 
takeover bids that are financed, with equity. More firms make an IPO and more 
capital is raised from IPOs and more bidders use equity to finance the bid during the 
upturn of the business cycle. Rights issue activity. however does not exhibit the same 
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cyclical pattern. Rights issuance volume is not significantly higher during the upturn 
of the business cycle mainly because of the very high SEO activity in the last phase 
of the downturn of the business cycle. 
The magnitude of adverse selection costs associated with the equity issues 
affects only the timing of rights issues. More firms make a SEO in the UK when 
these costs are low. In addition more capital is raised from rights issues when adverse 
selection costs are low. The timing of IPOs and equity financed takeover bids 
however is not related with the magnitude of adverse selection costs. 
Exploitation of overvaluation is a major driving force of IPO activity with 
more capital raised from IPOs during periods when share prices are more overvalued. 
The timing of rights issues and equity financed takeover bids however is not driven 
by deliberate exploiting overvaluation. Periods when SEO and equity financed 
takeover activity is high are not periods when these issuers are more overvalued than 
periods when equity issuance activity is low. 
Favourable investors sentiment is a major driving force behind the timing of 
equity issues. More capital is raised from IPOs and SEOs when analysts are more 
overoptimistic for recent issuers. Issuers seem to. be able to time their issues when 
market sentiment for equity issuers is particularly favourable. Variations in this 
sentiment create variations in equity issuance activity. 
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TABLE 10.1: SUMMARY RESULTS OF THE IMPACT OF BUSINESS 
CONDITIONS, ADVERSE SELECTION COSTS, OVERVALUATION 
EXPLOITATION AND FAVOURABLE INVESTORS SENTIMENT ON THE 
TIMING OF IPOs, SEOs AND TAKEOVER BIDS THAT ARE FINANCED 
WITH EQUITY. 
Factor that may Initial Public Seasoned Equity Takeover bids that 
timing affect the of 
ssues e uit 
Offerings Offerings financed with equit, %, 
q y 
Business Significant I'ositiN V No significant Significant Positi"., 
Conditions Impact. More firms impact Impact. More bidder; 
make an IPO and use equity to finance i 
more capital is raised takeover bid during the 
during the upturn of upturn of the busirres, 
the business cycle cycle. 
Adverse selection No significant impact Negative Impact. No significant impact 
costs When adverse 
selection costs are 
high, SEO activity 
is significantly 
lower 
Overvaluation Significant impact. No significant No significant impact 
exploitation timing More capital is raised impact 
when IPOs are more 
overvalued 
Favourable Significant impact. Significant impact. Not investigated 
investors' sentiment More capital is raised More capital is 
and analysts' when analysts' raised when 
earnings optimism earnings analysts' earnings 
overoptimism for overoptimism for 
recent IPOs is high or recent issuers is 
earnings pessimism high 
for recent IPOs is low 
Overall, the timing of Initial Public Offerings seems to be more opportunistic. 
Issuers seem to be able to time the IPO when share price and investors' sentiment is 
high. For a firm that is already listed, an equity issue does not seem to be driven by 
the same degree of opportunism. Rights issuers in the UK are able to time the issue 
during periods when investors sentiment is favourable and after a good performance. 
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On the other hand, the use of equity to finance a takeover bid seems to be driven by 
factors other from those that our research has investigated. 
10.2. CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE THESIS. 
This thesis has investigated many areas that have not been previously 
researched. The thesis has extended the literature by documenting the relation 
between adverse selection costs and the volume of rights issues and equity financed 
takeover bids in the UK. We also uncovered the magnitude of analysts overoptimism 
around equity issues and its effect on the timing of equity issues, areas where only 
international but no UK studies exist. 
Using theories developed in US and applying them in a different dataset, we 
investigated the effect of the state of the business cycle on the magnitude of adverse 
selection costs for IPOs, SEOs and takeover bids that are financed with equity. 
The use of industry/market to book value and industry/ market value adjusted 
long run performances that we use in the thesis represent the latest and most widely 
approved way of calculating the long run performance and although we use it a tool 
to for specific tests represent in itself a major contribution of the thesis. The relation 
between equity issue activity and the long run performance and the stylised approach 
on the classification of periods as Heavy and Light is a further contribution. 
The use of financial analysts forecast revisions for UK rights issues and IPOs 
is also a part of this research with originality. No study has documented how analysts 
react on the announcement of a rights issue and how they, revise their earnings 
forecasts. 
_. 
I. 
The most important contribution of the thesis is that it investigates the general 
issue of whether the timing of three corporate activities is dictated by the same 
factors. We wanted to uncover the degree of unification and commonality between 
the three corporate activities. 
10.3. DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH. 
," 
:'. 
The part that we believe can provide the motivation for future researchers is 
the use of financial analysts earnings forecasts to try to explain why firm that make 
an equity issue underperform. We find evidence that more capital is raised form IPOs 
and SEOs when analysts are more overoptimistic about the earnings of recent issuers. 
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We feel that future research will establish a coherent relation between analysts 
forecast earnings surprises, forecast revisions and long run underperformance. 
Our analysis indicates that as analysts become more overoptimistic for the 
earnings of recent issuers, more capital is raised from IPOs and SEOs. The number of 
earnings forecasts however is limited and that may cause problems if the analysts do 
not choose the firms for which they will provide forecasts at random. Analyst may 
seek to forecast the earnings of firms that they believe they have good growth 
potentials and leave out firms with limited growth potentials. Furthermore, these 
overoptimistic forecasts may be made by affiliated analysts who are pressured by 
their employers to "help" the issues by forecasting good prospects. Herding theories 
argue that analysts look at other analysts forecasts in order to estimate their own 
forecasts. Therefore unaffiliated analysts may look at the forecasts of affiliated 
analysts and adjust their own forecasts accordingly. In other words the analyst 
overoptimism for recent issuers may not be a wide spread phenomenon for all 
analysts but may be driven by agency costs. Future research may be able to 
disentangle the effect of analysts overoptimism for recent issuers from agency 
problems by looking at forecasts made only by unaffiliated analysts. 
Apart from a look at earnings, future researchers should in our opinion, take a 
closer look at other accounting information and especially to look how IPOs perform 
relative to the expectations. Profitability is an important aspect that can affect the 
valuation of firms but other measures such as sales, assets and other accounting 
information can be used to judge whether IPO firms or SEO firms perform according 
to expectations or not. 
Especially in the case of equity financed takeover bids and the big difference 
in their post announcement performan:, e relative to cash offers more accounting 
information have to be used to try and identified other factors that could be 
responsible for such a huge difference. Most important, future research must 
concentrate on the quality of the bids and the synergistic gains that arise from equity 
or cash financed bids. 
The area of rights issue announcements also offers opportunities for future 
research especially in order to understand the negative price reaction that occurs on 
the announcement day. In UK some rights issues, are announced together with 
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earnings and therefore the market may reacts for both events. If future research can 
identify which rights issues are not announced together with earnings or disentangles 
the effect that earnings announcements have on the share price from the effect of the 
rights issue announcement, then more clear conclusions can be drown as to what 
forces are behind the significant negative price reaction. 
Finally we believe that we made a great effort to gather as many firm specific 
variables that can explain the announcement period abnormal returns of rights issues 
and takeover bid announcements and first day returns. It is outside our limits 
however to account for all factors and therefore future researchers with greater data 
availability should be able to test our hypothesis with greater statistical power. 
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APPENDIX 
1) Suppose that we have a firm with 5000 shares valued at £1 each and with only 
two shareholders. The first shareholder has 2000 shares or 40% of the value of the firm and 
the second shareholder has 3000 shares or 60% of the firm. If the firm makes an issue of 2 
new shares for every 5 old for £0.50 each the first shareholder will take 800 shares by 
paying £ 400 and the second one will take 1200 shares by paying £ 600. After the issue the 
total value of the firm will be £ 6000 (£5000 +£1000 from the issue) and so with 7000 
shares the share price will be £0.8571. With such a price the first shareholder will have 
2800 shares or £ 2400 and the second shareholder will have 4200 shares or £ 3600. The first 
shareholder will still have 40 % of the firm and the second shareholder will still have 60% 
of the firm. They both did not gain or lose anything. If the first shareholder did not exercise 
his/her rights he/she could sell the rights in the market at an equilibrium price of 14.28 
pence per share. In that case a new shareholder would pay this price for the 2000 rights of 
the first shareholder or £285.71 and take 800 shares by paying £400. The new shareholder's 
value of shares would be 285.71+ 400 = 685.71. The first shareholder would now continue 
to have 2000 shares now valued at £0.8571 or total value of shares 1714.28 but will also 
receive £ 285.71 from the new shareholder or £ 2000 in total. He did not gain or lose 
anything. 
Even if the price of the new share was £0.80 instead of £ 0.50 things would not 
change. The only difference would that the total value of the company after the issue would be 
£ 6600 instead of £6000 and the first shareholder would hold £ 2640 worth of shares and the 
second would hold £ 3960 worth of shares. Their percentage holdings would still be 40% and 
60% respectively. 
2) 
forecast revision over the offer price at month 2= (11-10)/100* = 0.01 
forecast revision over the offer price at month 60 = (11-10)/100*= 0.01 
* offer price is 100 p 
forecast revisions over the current share price at month 2= (11-10)/101.6**= 0.0098 
forecast revisions over the current share price at month 60 = (11-10)/160**= 0.0062 
**for simplicity we assume that the share price increases by 10% per annum and 'so 
increases to 101.6 after two months and 160 after 5 years. 
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3) EQUAL WEIGHTED AVERAGE FORECAST REVISION 
forecast revision of firm A with an offer price of 50p at month 2= (11-10)/50= 
0.02 
forecast revision of firm B with an offer price of 500p at month 2 =(11-10)/500= 
0.002 
EQUAL AVERAGE FORECAST REVISION 
PRICE WEIGHTED FORECAST REVISIONS 
= 0.011 
forecast revision of firm A with an offer price of 50p at month 2= (11-10)/50= 0.02 
forecast revision of firm B with an offer price of 500p at month 2=(11-10)/500= 
0.002 
weight for firm A= 50/(50+500) = 0.09 
weight for firm 5= 500/(50+500) = 0.91 
PRICE WEIGHTED FORECAST REVISIONS = (0.02 *0.09 + (0.002 *0.91 = 0.00362 
306 
4) 
The dependent variable is the amount of capital raised from IPOs per month in Dec 
. 
00 
is'. 
....... 
IS 
verage, eng 
alysts ma( 
wring the peric 
an 1987 to D+ 
1987 
. 
ý, ; 
196 prices. 
The independent variables are the average forecast errors ( both adjusted and 
unadjusted) analysts made for the IPOs in forecasting their earnings during their first 
public year that came into the market in the previous 12 months. It is a time series 
regression using monthly data starting from January 1988 to December 1996. 
IPO proceeds 
(in £m) 
Error made for 
Recent IPOs 
(adjusted) 
Error made for 
Recent IPOs 
(unadjusted) 
Error made for the 
Whole market 
Jan-87 6.328 
Feb-87 5.073 
Mar-87 141.576 
Apr-87 133.121 
May-87 50.667 
Jun-87 110.196 
Jul-87 201.407 
Aug-87 5.730 
Sep-87 12.902 
Oct-87 123.843 
Nov-87 10.919 
Dec-87 11.426 
Jan-88 19.487 0.00070 
-0.00014 -0.00108 
Feb-88 0.00079 0.00204 
-0.00066 
Ma 
- 
117.685 0.0009 0.00214 
-0.00121 
Apr-88 118.465 0.00149 0.00252 
-0.00090 
May-88 82.909 0.00131 0.00207 
-0.00060 
Jun-88 283.898 0.00133 0.00262 
-0.00057 
Jul-88 155.342 0.00114 0270 
-0.00074 
' Aug-88 22.073 0.00114 0.0 7 
-0.00065 
Sep-88 29.348 0.00122 0.0023 
-0.00066 
Oct-88 516.411 0.00110 0.00234 
-0.00076 
Nov-88 55.688 0.00128 0.00223 0.00074 
Dec-88 157.284 0.00121 0.00200 
-0.00069 
There are some months when one or even no forecasts are made and othe hen 10 
forecast have been made. To avoid giving the same weight to a month with 1 cast 
and to the month with 10 forecasts we calculated the average forecast error o Ne 
previous 12 months as the average of all forecast made during the previous 12 month 
(eg for the Jan 95, the average of all 18 forecast that were made during the Jan 94 to 
Dec 94) and not the average of the previous 12 monthly averaaec`_ - -- - -i ------ ----- -- - ----v- -- ---- r-- ------ -- ----__.... J ... __.. oý.,. 
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This 
= ý° is :' the 
average error 
analysts, made 
during the period 
Feb, 1987, to Jan 
1988 for IPOs ` ý' 
f 
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